



ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOKS



The Routledge Handbook to the History and Society of the Americas

Edited by Olaf Kaltmeier, Josef Raab, Michael Stewart
Foley, Alice Nash, Stefan Rinke and Mario Rufer

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK TO THE HISTORY AND SOCIETY OF THE AMERICAS

The colonial heritage and its renewed aftermaths – expressed in the inter-American experiences of slavery, indigeneity, dependence, and freedom movements, to mention only a few aspects – form a common ground of experience in the Western Hemisphere. The flow of peoples, goods, knowledge, and finances have promoted interdependence and integration that cut across borders and link the countries of North and South America together. The nature of this transversally related and multiply interconnected region can only be captured through a transnational, multidisciplinary, and comprehensive approach.

The Routledge Handbook to the History and Society of the Americas explores the history and society of the Americas, placing particular emphasis on collective and intertwined experiences. Forty-four entries cover a range of concepts and dynamics in the Americas from the colonial period until the present century:

- The shared histories and dynamics of inter-American relationships are considered through pre-Hispanic empires, colonization, European hegemony, migration, multiculturalism, and political and economic interdependences.
- Key concepts are selected and explored from different geopolitical, disciplinary, and epistemological perspectives.
- Highlighting the contested character of key concepts that are usually defined in strict disciplinary terms, the Handbook provides the basis for a better and deeper understanding of inter-American entanglements.

This multidisciplinary approach will be of interest to a broad array of academic scholars and students in history, sociology, political science, cultural, postcolonial, gender, literary, and globalization studies.

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CONTENTS

<i>List of contributors</i>	<i>ix</i>
<i>Academic advisory board</i>	<i>xv</i>
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	<i>xvii</i>

General introduction to the Routledge Handbook to the history and society of the Americas	1
<i>Olaf Kaltmeier</i>	

PART I

History and society in the Americas from the 16th to the 19th century 13

1 Introduction: history and society in the Americas from the 16th to the 19th century. The bigger picture	15
<i>Josef Raab and Stefan Rinke</i>	
2 America	34
<i>Stefan Rinke</i>	
3 Atlantic	40
<i>Ernesto Mercado Montero</i>	
4 Colonial economies	48
<i>Juan Marchena Fernández</i>	
5 Colonial rule	57
<i>Eduardo Cavieres</i>	

Contents

6	Columbian exchange <i>Charles C. Mann</i>	67
7	Conquest and colonization <i>Christoph Strobel</i>	75
8	Enlightenment <i>Thomas O. Beebee</i>	84
9	Gender <i>María Amelia Viteri and Cristina Yépez Arroyo</i>	90
10	Independence movements <i>Roberto Breña</i>	101
11	Indigenous peoples <i>Alice Nash</i>	112
12	Interethnic relations <i>Izaskun Álvarez Cuartero</i>	125
13	Language <i>Lilia Rebeca Rodríguez Torres and María del Carmen de la Peza</i>	135
14	Memorial culture <i>Scott Manning Stevens</i>	145
15	Migration <i>Silke Hensel</i>	153
16	Nation and state building <i>Stefan Rinke and Mirko Petersen</i>	165
17	Religion and missionizing <i>Claude Gélinas</i>	175
18	Slavery <i>Christine Hatzky</i>	184
19	Unfree labor <i>Christine Hatzky</i>	197

PART II

History and society in the Americas in the 20th and 21st centuries 205

20	Introduction: history and society in the Americas in the 20th and 21st centuries. Inter-American thresholds and critical key concepts <i>Olaf Kaltmeier, Michael Stewart Foley, and Mario Rufer</i>	207
21	Alter-globalization <i>Guiomar Rovira</i>	222
22	Biopolitics <i>Rodrigo Parrini and Nattie Golubov</i>	228
23	Consumerism <i>Gustavo Blázquez</i>	236
24	Education <i>Stefan Peters and Adriana Serrudo</i>	246
25	Ethnicity <i>Christian Büschges</i>	259
26	Family <i>Cornelia Giebler</i>	270
27	Freedom <i>Donovan Hernández</i>	279
28	Gender identities <i>Karina Bidaseca and Julia Roth</i>	291
29	Health <i>Núria Homedes and Antonio Ugalde</i>	298
30	Hybridity, mestizaje, créolité <i>Afef Benessaïeh</i>	307
31	Indigeneity <i>Olaf Kaltmeier</i>	319
32	Intersectionality <i>Julia Roth</i>	330

Contents

33	Latinidad <i>Luz Angélica Kirschner</i>	339
34	Memory politics <i>Ludmila da Silva Catela and Michael Stewart Foley</i>	347
35	Modernization <i>Frederik Schulze</i>	355
36	Multiculturalism <i>Eduardo Restrepo</i>	365
37	Popular <i>Pablo Alabarces</i>	370
38	Postcolonialism and decoloniality <i>Mario Rufer</i>	379
39	Race <i>Peter Wade</i>	393
40	Religious beliefs <i>Heinrich Wilhelm Schäfer</i>	403
41	Social movements <i>León Enrique Ávila Romero</i>	415
42	Socialism <i>Marc Becker</i>	429
43	Subcultures <i>María del Carmen de la Peza and Michael Stewart Foley</i>	436
44	Transnational migration <i>Gilberto Rescher</i>	447
45	Urbanization <i>Lawrence A. Herzog</i>	457
46	Whiteness <i>María Teresa Garzón Martínez</i>	469
	<i>Index</i>	481

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK TO THE HISTORY AND SOCIETY OF THE AMERICAS

Olaf Kaltmeier

The *Routledge Handbook to the History and Society of the Americas* charts the field of inter-American studies, focusing on the transnational or hemispheric dimensions of social, cultural, and political dynamics in history that shaped the different societies and communities in the Americas. In doing so, the *Handbook* is inspired by recent debates in cultural and postcolonial studies in the humanities and social sciences that have challenged traditional conceptualizations that have had the tendency to essentialize and universalize Western/European concepts that are grounded on particular local experiences. Furthermore, these approaches have illuminated the important contributions of other epistemic communities, especially indigenous and Afro-American, as well as nonacademic actors, especially from social movements and the field of cultural production, for the emergence and constant redefining of key concepts in the Americas.

In this sense, it is not the aim of this Handbook to provide a unilateral and homogenous narration of history and society in the Americas from a single perspective. In contrast, this *Routledge Handbook* deals with selected key concepts that are widely used in academic and cultural–political discussions in the Americas. These concepts are explored from different geopolitical, disciplinary, and epistemological perspectives. In highlighting the contested character of key concepts that are usually defined in strict disciplinary terms or in regard to specific – often unconsidered – geopolitical standpoints, the Handbook provides the basis for a better and deeper understanding of inter-American entanglements.

Inter-American studies can be conceived as a trendsetter for the recent paradigm shift in area studies embracing a transregional epistemology and a focus on dynamics of entanglements. This Handbook defines areas as transversally, multiply connected, embedded in multiple, historically constructed power relations, and in permanent processes of change. Areas are thus comprehensible only within the larger frameworks of a North–South dialogue, mobility, and entanglements, as well as competing geopolitical imaginaries. In doing so, this Handbook does not just list historical events or narrate macro-regional dynamics; instead, it makes the effort and provides the tools for a terminological and methodological rethinking of (trans)area studies in the current era of globalization.

Beyond its particular focus on “Histories and Societies of the Americas,” this Handbook is an integral part of a broader project on “Inter-American Perspectives” consisting of two further Handbooks. The *Routledge Handbook to Political Economy and Governance in*

the Americas, divided into “Political Economy” and “Geopolitics and Governance,” and the *Routledge Handbook to Culture and Media in the Americas* with one part on “Literature and Music” and a second part on “Media and Visual Culture.” The volumes generate and systematize knowledge about the Americas by a collection of key terms discussed critically through an interdisciplinary and meta-reflexive lens. The three Handbooks are cross-indexed and each part provides a conceptual introduction to the interdisciplinary and inter-American perspective of its fields of studies. Due to their transdisciplinary approach, the Handbooks are of interest for a broad array of academic disciplines, especially Cultural Studies, History, Sociology, Social Anthropology, Political Sciences, Political Economy, Literature, Linguistics, Media Studies, and Cultural Geography, as well as different areas studies such as U.S.-American and Latin American Studies.

Inter-American studies

It is a basic assumption of this Handbook that the production of knowledge can only be understood comprehensively if its specific historical–political plurilocal context is taken into account. This is especially true in the case of the Americas which historically have been invented in the process of European colonial expansion. This colonial heritage and its renewed conflictive aftermaths – expressed in the inter-American experiences of slavery, indigeneity, and dependency, but also in freedom and liberation movements, to mention only a few aspects – form a common ground of experience in the Western Hemisphere (Gilroy 1993; Mignolo 2008).

This violent colonial foundation is even expressed in the geopolitical imagination of the double-continent “America.” From the etymological point of view, America was derived by early modern cartographer Martin Waldseemüller from the name of the colonial explorer Amerigo Vespucci. From an indigenous perspective, in that time, no framework existed within which to conceive of the Western Hemisphere as a whole. However in the West, the imagination of America as an alter ego of Europe and a “New World” began to arise and shape the geopolitical imagination of a globalized world. In late-Enlightenment, this image of the “New World” became bifurcated. Due to different ways of colonization and religious belief systems, Hegel and other European thinkers introduced a dialectical vision of Protestant North America and Catholic South America (Mejías-López 2009, 190), which still has its repercussion in stereotypes and even in some Neo-Weberian academic approaches.

After independence, early geopolitical imaginaries of hemispheric integration from the Americas – from Simón Bolívar to the Monroe-Doctrine – were applied first in a Creole, anti-colonial sense and directed against European colonial power, although even between the 1830s and the 1850s, certain imperialist patterns in U.S. policies toward the Latin American South were notable. With the frontier and westward expansions (in the realm of the westward expansion and the annihilation of indigenous peoples) and after the end of civil war in the 1860s, the U.S. increasingly saw Latin America and the Caribbean as a new frontier in the South, initiating a new imperialism. The turn from 19th–20th century thus marked a turning point in the Western Hemisphere from a trans-Atlantic relationship with Western Europe toward a growing inter-American entanglement. In the Spanish–U.S.-American–Cuban–Filipino War in 1898, the last Spanish colonial domain ended the era of traditional European colonialism in the Americas (Pérez 1998; Schoonover 2003; Salvatore 2006).

The shift from transatlantic to inter-American entanglements resulted into a new imperialist pan-American integration policy under U.S. hegemony. Since the 1890s, the growing

U.S.-export economy conquered new markets in Latin America, reducing the influence of British economic agents. This shift toward inter-American relations found its expression not only in economic and political entanglements but also in the area of specific knowledge production. In contrast to Europe – where geographical societies have been related to colonial projects (Smith 2010, 24) – area studies in the U.S. began to emerge later – since the late 19th century – and they mainly had a pan-American orientation, as it is the case of the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History founded in 1928 in Havana and established in Mexico City or the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano established in 1940 (Giraudó 2006).

The hemispheric geopolitical imagination under U.S. hegemony was not uncontested in the South. Historian Michel Gobat (2013) argued that the recognition of the government of U.S. filibuster William Walker in 1858 by the U.S. President Franklin Pierce fostered the idea of Latin America as a geopolitical and identitarian category against U.S. imperialism. This geopolitical imaginary was also expressed by anti-imperial writers such as Cuban José Martí or Uruguayan José Enrique Rodó. In this sense, Latin Americans have used the concept of *América* (with an accent) to foster the idea of an Ibero-American union in the process of liberation from colonial rule, and since the end of 19th century to speak of “*nuestra América*,” the Latin American one, against the growing U.S. imperialism. In the same period, in the midst of the 19th century emerged also the concept of Latin America, which was first used by French traveler and economist Michel Chevalier in 1836 and after that disseminated by Latin American politicians and intellectuals to mark a religious, cultural, and language-based difference to North America. Yet, the Spanish heritage in Latin America was also increasingly criticized. In regard to Area Studies, emerged in this context in 1875 in Nancy, France at the International Congress of Americanistas (ICA), one initial aim was to highlight the cultural dynamics in the Americas before the conquest. Since then, 56 ICA congresses have been held in the Americas and in Europe, covering diverse cultural and historical topics of inter-American entanglements beyond the initial focus on pre-Columbian cultures. But also within pan-Americanism, there was a space for anti-hegemonic dynamics. David Luis-Brown (2008) has argued that pan-American indigenist and Afro-American movements initiated hemispheric waves of decolonization and disseminated ideas of hemispheric citizenship.

A specific conjuncture of inter-American integration took place in the realm of the Good Neighbor Policy vis-à-vis World War II. In this geopolitical context, the U.S. was very concerned with establishing good relations with its Latin American neighbors in order to impede the expansion of the fascist axis-powers in the Western Hemisphere (Cramer and Prutsch 2012), which found its expression also in intense artistic, cultural, and academic co-operation. The Rockefeller Foundation and the Office of Inter-American Affairs (founded in 1940) funded Latin American Studies in the U.S., although the plans for the creation of a national, state-run Latin America Institute were not realized (Loschke 2018).

However, global reconfiguration after World War II, which made the U.S. a world power and also produced the bipolar geopolitical system of the Cold War, put an end to inter-American integration and lead to a new conjuncture of knowledge production in area studies (see Hall 1947; Cumings 1999; Szanton 2004). Since 1946, The Social Science Research Council has promoted the new branch of Area Studies, based on the social sciences (against the predominance of the humanities in European regional studies models), which was highly welcomed by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation. This model of regional research shaped the contemporary understanding of Area Studies in global academia, and became a role model for this approach in the U.S. Latin American Studies.

Inter-American relations were shaped most by global geopolitical considerations to impede the advancement of communism in the Western Hemisphere. In the face of growing revolutionary forces and guerrilla movements in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s which were initiated by the Cuban Revolution in 1959, many of the new area studies centers had the political aim to collaborate with the military intelligence arms in order to contain these revolutionary movements (Berger 1995). The Project Camelot, planned in 1963 by the Special Operations Research Office at the University of Washington D.C., was funded by the U.S. Department of Defense and had the task to investigate the reasons for revolutionary uprisings in the Global South in order to produce new counterinsurgency strategies. Due to protest, the six-million-dollar program was cancelled as a whole, but several parts were realized in the form of other projects. The Project Camelot reveals the dangerous alliance of military interest and academic research in the Cold War period (Loschke 2018, 344–348). However, other projects of Latin American Area Studies were more related to the “Alliance for Progress” and the idea to foster development, the core concept of postwar social policy proclaimed by the U.S. president Harry S. Truman in his inaugural address in 1949 (Esteve 1992). This Cold War dynamic had its repercussions in Western Europe. In Great Britain and Germany, the establishment of new Latin American Research Centers began with a state-sponsored program, following the U.S.–American model of area studies (Puhle 2018).

Critical academic networks, such as the Latin American Studies Association, LASA (founded in 1966), also emerged to position themselves in opposition to U.S. interventionism in Latin America and in Vietnam in the Cold War power field (Berger 1995, 173; Sadowski-Smith and Fox 2004, 12; Wesely-Smith and Goss 2010, 16). For these critical academics, dependency theory, which had its origins in Latin American intellectual production, became a main paradigm to explain historical and contemporary power relations. In this sense, Latin Americanists especially welcomed political and cultural integration processes within Latin America that also had its repercussions in the academic field. (Mignolo 2003) In the Andes, the system of Andean Universities was established by the Andean parliament in 1985, while UNESCO founded the network of the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) in 1957. These experiences of Latin American (and often anti-imperialist, or better: anti-U.S.–American) integration were renewed in the 2000s by the left-wing governments – especially in Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador, Cuba, and Bolivia – with several processes of economic, political, and cultural integration.

In the 20th century, increasing processes of inter-American exchange, transfer, interdependence, and entanglement can be observed that have shaped contemporary social, cultural, political, and economic dynamics in the Americas. The growing latinoization of the U.S. has changed not only demographics and cultural politics in the U.S. but also the academia. The establishment of Chicano/a and Latino/a American Studies departments highlights that Latin American Studies is not a remote object but an urgent perspective in the midst of the U.S. The U.S.–Mexican border is the most crossed border of the world, cross-cultural media flows shape consumer cultures in the North and the South of the continent, and capital interest influences geopolitical imaginaries of hemispheric integration, while drug and arms trade as well as its containments are other examples for the multiple forms inter-American relations can take. In much the same way, South–South dynamics between Latin American countries in terms of political, cultural, and economic integration have become more intensive in the 1990s and 2000s. The indicators of hemispheric dynamics are pervasive; at the same time, these dynamics are impossible to chart from any isolated location or discipline. They show the need for an interdisciplinary and interregional dialogue, based on a new, more mobile, and cross-related epistemology.

These phenomena are one of the principle reasons why Inter-American Studies have become such a widespread and fast developing academic venture drawing on the contributions of a growing number of scholars and disciplines doing research and publishing within the paradigm of (trans)regional or postnational studies of the Americas. In the last two decades, new inter-American studies have become a trend in international academia, with research centers opening in various universities across the United States, Canada, Europe, and Latin America, while inter-American topics are increasingly being addressed in the traditional surrounding disciplines from literary studies over history to sociology and political sciences.

In contrast to integrationist visions in the 1940s, the aim of these new inter-American area studies is not to forge a unified pan-American union. Instead, inter-American studies perceive the Americas as multiply entangled, interconnected, and shaped by historical power relations. In U.S.-American Studies, the inter-American turn began at the end of the 1980s with the reception of postcolonial theories (Pratt 1992; Pease 1994; Rowe 2000; Kaplan 2008) that were later incorporated into postnational history approaches (Bender 2002; Tyrell 2007, 2009; Rinke 2012). Likewise, Latin American cultural studies took new directions and engaged with cross-border entanglements of cultural industries and economic integration (Martín Barbero 1987; Mato 1999; Martín Barbero and Garretón 2003; Yúdice 2003), also in regard to the world-system approach (Quijano and Wallerstein 1992) as well as with discourses of cultural hybridization (García Canclini 1995; Herzog 1999). There has also been a major contribution to related topics from U.S. Latino Studies which have focused on border and ethnic issues from a broad range of disciplinary approaches (Anzaldúa 1999; Herzog 1999; Saldívar 2007, among many others). In the face of powerful indigenous movements since the end of the 20th century, national identity has been profoundly redefined, finding its supreme expression in the constitutional recognition of the pluricultural or even plurinational character of American nation, especially in Latin America. In this context, inter-American academic debates concentrated on the critical analysis of the relation of modernity and coloniality (Mignolo 2000) as well as on the geopolitics of knowledge and efforts to promote an “ecology of knowledge” against the “epistemocide” against indigenous, Afro-American, and other subaltern forms of knowledge (Santos 2013). In this sense, some scholars have argued for an urgent need of revision of academic institutions in order to replace the “uni-versity” dominated by a patriarchal, Eurocentric, logocentric, and capitalist *pensée unique* by an open and diverse “pluri-versity,” where different forms of knowledge can be exchanged (Grosfoguel 2013, 89).

Specific inter-American approaches (Kadir 2003; McClennen 2005; Raab 2008; Thies and Raab 2008; Kaltmeier 2011; Raussert 2017) find an open space for discussion in the e-journal *Forum for Inter-American Research* (fiar) and the International Association of inter-American Studies (IAS) with its biannual conferences, founded in 2009 by the research group “E pluribus unum? Ethnic Identities in Processes of Transnational Integration in the Americas” at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research at Bielefeld University. The main institutional networks engaged in the publication of the *Routledge Handbooks* on “Inter-American Perspectives,” namely the Center for InterAmerican Studies (CIAS) at Bielefeld University and the International Association of Inter-American Studies, are deeply inspired by these debates, fostering the idea to rethink the Americas as a space of entanglements.

The structure of the *Handbook on History and Society in the Americas*

The *Handbook on History and Society in the Americas* is divided into two main parts. The first part deals with concepts and dynamics in the colonial and early postcolonial periods of the Americas. It basically covers dynamics until 1898, when the U.S. after the

Spanish-U.S.-American-Cuban-Filipino War, that put an end to formal Spanish colonialism in the Western Hemisphere, took a more proactive, or even imperialistic, role toward its Southern neighbors, initiating an ongoing process of intense inter-American relations and entanglements. The second part is concerned with inter-American concepts and dynamics of the 20th and 21st centuries that shape the social relations within and between the societies and communities of the Western Hemisphere. Each of the two parts of the volume consists of 20–30 entries on key concepts of the Americas that provide in-depth knowledge on crucial inter-American topics.

Each of the two parts of this Handbook consists furthermore of an introduction that provides a general historical contextualization. This introduction is especially helpful to connect the different thematic entries and to put them into a broader framework. Obviously, there are several options to write such a historic introduction. An easy way would be to deliver a timetable of historic events. Nevertheless, this traditional history of events, suggesting the possibility of a transparent historical timeline, is not very convincing for a history concerned with concepts. The identification of certain historic conjunctures would definitely be a better choice, as it provides sufficient contextualization to grasp the changing and floating meanings of certain concepts. However, this approach also has its pitfalls, as it possibly insinuates a complete and coherent understanding of inter-American historic dynamics.

For the *Handbook on History and Society of the Americas*, a third path was opted for that is related to the approach of the history of ideas suggested by Reinhart Koselleck and his colleagues in the German eight-volume dictionary on historical key concepts. Koselleck (1992; 2011, 8) argued that the period between 1750 and 1850 can be understood as a *Sattelzeit*, or threshold period. This means that concepts that had a long semantic history back to antiquity changed their meaning dramatically, with the social, political, and cultural revolutions of modernity concepts like state, citizenship, or family being completely resemanticized. In turn, new concepts – often neologisms such as class, imperialism, and socialism – arose to help conceptualize the contemporary society (2011, 9). The transformation of meaning is – following Koselleck – related to the emergence of a new temporal dimension and experience in the late-Enlightenment period after the French Revolution which also led to a new concept of history (2011, 11–13). The entries of the basic historical concepts (*Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*) seek to identify in a seismographic way precisely those moments that “reveal the decisive turning points or conjunctures or events” (2011, 31).

Following these ideas, in the *Handbook on History and Society in the Americas*, each of the two parts of the volume provides an introduction that highlights the most important historical turning points where new concepts emerge and older concepts change their meaning. Obviously, the approach of the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* is limited to the German-speaking space and its underlying assumptions on history cannot be applied in an uncontested way in the Americas. An important project that applies the diachronical Koselleckian approach to the Iberian world is *Iberconceptos* (<http://www.iberconceptos.net>). This project focuses its history of concepts especially on the threshold of the 18th century into the 19th century that marks the transition toward modernity and that coincides in the Americas with the period of independence in a global Age of Revolution.

For the Americas – without any doubt – the conquest and colonization beginning after 1492 marked a fundamental turning point, where different indigenous worldviews and concepts were annihilated or fundamentally transformed. This moment marked the beginning of a cultural encounter between Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere, as well as the emergence of a capitalist world-system. From this point onward, historical turning points and conjunctures in the Americas have been related to global dynamics, although

with particular expressions. Another important turning point, which is of particular importance for inter-American relations, is the year 1898. With the Spanish-U.S.-American-Cuban-Filipino War, the U.S. established themselves as an imperial power, initiating a new conjuncture of globalization (Schoonover 2013), while the independent Latin American countries also developed ambitions of more cultural, political, and economic autonomies. This threshold also serves as a point of reference to separate the first part of the Handbook from the second part.

Nevertheless, this turning point is not the only one of influence in the Americas. While the *Sattelzeit* is a macro-historical threshold between pre-modernity and modernity, the inter-American turning points detected in this Handbook and represented in the Introductions to the two parts of this volume operate on the meso-level of historical conjunctures. For example, the short threshold between 1989 and 1990 is characterized not only by the end of the Soviet System and the geopolitical block confrontation as well as the end of many authoritarian regimes and dictatorships in Latin America, but also by the invention of the Internet and the emergence of the network society. New concepts such as globalization or neoliberalism emerge, while older concepts such as socialism have changed their meaning. In this sense, the introductions are written in a constant dialogue with the specific entries of the volumes.

Inter-American key topics – entangled entries

Inter-American Studies seek a different take on transnational phenomena, cherishing the goal of developing a critical dialogical methodology by decolonizing key concepts, paradigms, and theories. In order to un- and rethink common concepts in terms of dynamics of inter-American entanglements, the *Routledge Handbook* proposes a twofold interdisciplinary dialogue, which refers first to crossing the boundaries between the established area studies and, second, to that of the academic discipline.

In regard to the first aspect, the goal is to provide a critical vocabulary within a dialogical and horizontal framework between North and South as well as South and South in the context of processes of globalization. The most basic yet essential requirement of a critical handbook of inter-American Studies is the acknowledgment of the multiplicity and simultaneity of knowledge production in different areas and various disciplines. The differences need to be recorded, contraries and similarities juxtaposed, and the existing sources of knowledge mobilized, including extra-academic ones. In a first stance, it is important to understand the different meanings and connotations the same concept may have in different contexts and from the perspective of different loci of enunciation in unequal power relations. In order to do so, the methodological apparatus of historical semantics can be used. Koselleck was interested to track the meaning of a concept in diachronical and also in synchronical terms. Today, it seems difficult to reconcile both perspectives. While Bielefeld historical semantics (Steinmetz 2008) is especially interested in the diachronical dimension, the Cambridge School (Pocock 1996) gives preference to the analysis of concepts in its specific spatiotemporal context. In this Handbook, the pretense to do historical semantics in strict methodological terms is not intended, rather an inclination toward Cultural and Postcolonial Studies and its focus on the context, arguing that in the Americas, there are a whole variety of different contexts to be dealt with. First, there are different linguistic spaces and geopolitical units, but also within these spaces, variety is given, basically in regard to coloniality and the multiple social and cultural fragmentations derived from it. This means that concepts are also contested – by different meanings and even counter-concepts. This perspective has been

exemplified in regard to the field of development by the *Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power* edited by Wolfgang Sachs (1992), which became a benchmark in post-development approaches.

To approach the study of the Americas, an interdisciplinary perspective is necessary. After all, different disciplines provide optional insights and open windows for dialogue and exchange. Thereby, the *Routledge Handbook* draws particularly on those interdisciplinary approaches shaped by Cultural Studies, Estudios Culturales, Postcolonial Studies, Gender Studies, and Globalization Studies. Beyond the “parochialism” (Sayer 2000) of disciplines, we propose a topic-based approach that does not create a unified definition of an issue, but that puts into light the cultural construction process of a concept and the different notions a single concept is framed by. In order to grasp the notion of entanglements, we put the concept of dialogue in the center of our methodological reflections. What we want to capture is the multiplicity, simultaneity, mobility, dialogical, and often conflictive (ex)change of knowledge. This is also revealed in the definition of the structure and topics of this volume.

In order to identify the relevant topics in each volume of the *Routledge Handbooks*, we worked in interdisciplinary and interregional editorial committees including scholars from North and South America as well as from Europe. Finally, the work of these committees was discussed in several conferences of the editorial board consisting of the editorial teams of all three *Routledge Handbook* volumes.

As the Handbooks are not concerned with the universal definition of concepts, independent of place and time, we choose topics and concepts of inter-American importance that are under debate and on the move. In this sense, we want to reveal how the same term or topic can be conceptualized in different ways depending on the locus of enunciation and the particular moment in time.

This special way to unthink concepts in an inter-American perspective is revealed in the topic's general structure. Each entry first begins with a short general description of the topic. This introductory part could include a short history of the concept or etymological considerations, especially in regard to the Americas. Second, the main part consists of discussion of the topic in its inter-American dimensions. Here, we propose to take into account three heuristic approaches. (a) Comparison: This refers to the description and analysis of the same topic in different, separated contexts. (b) Transfer: This refers to the flow of meaning and knowledge from one context into another. Here, we are interested in the itineraries of the flows as well as in the adaption of a new meaning in a new context. (c) Entanglement: This refers to the mestizaje and hybridization of different meanings through interchanges. Thereby, new meaning can be produced. The entry concludes with a final discussion of the topic, where the authors can reveal their own opinions.

A methodological outlook: dialogue and decolonization

The *Routledge Handbooks* on “Inter-American Perspectives” seek to provide the frame and the tools needed to explore the hemispheric space of entanglements in the Americas as a new perspective in area studies. Conceptually, it stresses the dimension of “inter” as a discursive zone to capture the dynamics, negotiations, and power relations of knowledge production from diverse loci of enunciation. The *Routledge Handbook* is thus based on an approach of entangled spaces and histories that has far-reaching methodological implications. Beyond the critique on “methodological nationalism” and container thinking, the development of horizontal methods based on reciprocity and dialogue is required in order to construct

a common basis of understanding (Corona Berkin and Kaltmeier 2012; Kaltmeier 2017). Thus, the horizontal, dialogical, and reciprocal interchange becomes the starting point for the production of knowledge. This perspective implies a profound rethinking and decolonization of area studies, which cannot only mean changing “the content but also the terms of the conversation” (Roth 2014, 137). This implies that the voices of those who produce knowledge have to be multiplied. (Santos 2013)

In order to make other voices in sources heard, Edward Said (1994) proposes a “contrapunctual lecture,” where the juxtaposition of imperialism and resistance leads in a dialectical manner toward a new stage of representation. In a similar way, Walter Mignolo suggests the idea of a “pluri-topic hermeneutics.” The core idea of this approach is to read a given text from the perspective of its main cultural influences. Echoing Said’s idea of the contrapunctual lectures, Mignolo underlines that a “double critique” means “to think from both traditions and, at the same time, from neither of them” (2000, 67). Thus, both approaches are reduced to a bipolar – “double” or “contrapunctual” – mode of reading which implies a clash of two cultural traditions often conceived of in terms of a political antagonism. However, in empirical research, we have to deal often with multiple positionings, forms of transculturation and mimicry, as well as tactical self-positionings that cannot be reduced to one antagonism – be it cultural or political (Rufer 2012). In inter-American contexts, this would probably lead to a reproduction of the Anglo versus Latino binary.

Therefore, actors that are involved in multisited constellations must be taken into account, from governmental, nongovernmental actors, to cultural producers, as well as different cultural and geopolitical loci of enunciation. Thereby, it must be acknowledged that the academic field is still a privileged site of knowledge production with highly symbolic capital, but it is not the only site where knowledge is produced. Decentralizing the existing knowledge hierarchy and the search for dialogue with other sites of knowledge production is thus another challenge for dialogical area studies.

For a single author, it is quite a challenge to write such an exigent entry. Therefore, the editorial board has encouraged coauthorships. Sarah Corona Berkin has elaborated the proposal of “writing with two hands” (2007), which means that authors from different cultural backgrounds sit together and produce texts. This must not lead necessarily to a consensual text; instead, difference can, or even should, be visible. This approach implies focusing on the multiple loci of enunciation and the dynamics of entanglement in the Americas and puts emphasis on the mutual construction of meaning and concepts. The entries are often written in coauthorship from the “North” and the “South,” so that in the course of the writing, dialogue takes place. The idea is to put Corona Berkin’s concept of “writing with two hands” into academic practice.

Beyond this exercise in cowriting, all entries underwent a strict double-blind peer-review process, where authors from the North were especially reviewed by experts from the South and vice versa. Furthermore, all entries have been discussed intensely in the editorial conferences by the editors of the three volumes. This dialogical approach contains a further epistemological challenge for academic knowledge production. Dialogical approaches – like the one developed in this *Routledge Handbook* – cannot aim to arrive at a consensus. A final definition of a concept would mean the end of dialogue. Instead, we hint at the process of knowledge production and underline that the understanding of difference might be more important than the production of “universal truth.” This does not open the path for “alternative facts” or relativist partial truths. Instead, it helps to understand different positions on a broader contextual and epistemological level, and invites engagement in political-academic debates.

Beyond this dialogue distilled in each entry, and beyond the lively discussions on the structure of each volume, there is also a dialogue between the volumes. We would like to invite the readers to an entangled reading. This means that we do not prefer a linear reading of one page after the other, but a flâneur-like cruising from one entry to the other. Cross-references between the entries of all volumes support this way of reading within each volume and within the three handbooks. In this sense, each volume is also an invitation to you, as a reader, to get into dialogue with the text you read. We hope that you enjoy this dialogical knowledge production as much as we, as authors and editors, have done.

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PART I

History and society in the Americas
from the 16th to the 19th century



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1

INTRODUCTION

History and society in the Americas from the 16th to the 19th century. The bigger picture

Josef Raab and Stefan Rinke

The histories of the Americas begin long before 1492. The space that was later to be called the “Western Hemisphere” was inhabited by innumerable people when Christopher Columbus arrived in Guanahani on October 12 of that year, and lands in the far West had been in the European imagination for centuries (→ America, I/2). But 1492 illustrates that the history of the Americas is a history of encounters – of individuals, societies, ideologies, worldviews, languages, and cultural practices. The first contacts between European explorers and Native Americans in the Bahamas had repercussions for the Aztec, Mayan, and Inca empires and eventually for indigenous communities anywhere, as the encounter at one site was followed by encounters throughout the Americas (→ Indigenous Peoples, I/11). The year 1492 also highlights the tendency to tell history from the vantage point of the victors, relegating the role of indigenous peoples and other oppressed sections of the population to a subordinate position (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7). The first part of the *Routledge Handbook to the History and Society of the Americas*, by contrast, wants to look at the bigger picture, considering 1492 a rupture rather than the beginning of the history of a “New World,” examining the hemispheric consequences of the initial contacts between Europeans and the indigenous population, and complementing the history of the victorious powers with a focus on those who were acted upon.

The tremendous changes (→ Columbian Exchange, I/6) that were triggered by the events of 1492 and subsequent years have led to a prevailing approach to the histories of the New World subdivided along the lines of the colonial empires involved. Tulio Halperín Donghi reminded his readers at the time of the quincentennial in 1992 “that Spanish (as well as Portuguese and Anglo-) America was first conceived as an overseas replica of its mother country” (1992, 220). We are accustomed to speaking of “the Spanish conquest,” “Portuguese America,” and “the English and French colonies in North America.” For the time since the struggles for independence, we have come to think in terms of national(ist) histories and cultures, which promote concepts like “[U.S.] American exceptionalism” and “Brazilian exceptionalism.” But this concentration on the dominions of European colonial powers, on regions defined by geography or language (→ I/13), or on the specific development of particular nations may produce reductionist perspectives (Raab 2016). Halperín Donghi points out that national histories, while seemingly neat, tend to overlook international affairs and also run the risk of obscuring the heterogeneity within a nation (1993, xiii). While a focus on regional, national, or transnational entities (like “New Spain” or “the Caribbean”) is very

appropriate for exploring many topics, it may run the risk of reducing some complexities and omitting some of the inter-American transfers and interconnections involved. As Herbert Eugene Bolton, the pioneer of inter-American historiography, pointed out in his presidential address delivered to the American Historical Association in Toronto in 1932:

There is need of a broader treatment of American history, to supplement the purely nationalistic presentation to which we are accustomed. European history cannot be learned from books dealing alone with England, or France, or Germany, or Italy, or Russia; nor can American history be adequately presented if confined to Brazil, or Chile, or Mexico, or Canada, or the United States. In my own country the study of thirteen English colonies and the United States in isolation has obscured many of the larger factors in their development, and helped to raise up a nation of chauvinists. Similar distortion has resulted from the teaching and writing of national history in other American countries. It is time for a change.

(1993, 448)

More than eighty-five years later, Bolton's complaints against national(ist) historiography and isolationist approaches have not lost any of their validity. While there are studies of "Latin American history," Pan-Americanism (→ II/40), or U.S. interventions (→ Interventionism, II/36) in the Western Hemisphere, many approaches remain nation-centered. Usually, if the historiography on the Americas looks at a bigger picture, it is with regard to a specific topic, like slavery (→ I/18). David Eltis's *The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas*, David Brion Davis's *Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World*, and John Thornton's *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1800* are among the successful examples of inter-American historiography (see also Joseph 1998). Prevailing approaches, however, are more likely to focus on a nation or they concentrate on a geographical/cultural entity like *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, edited by Leslie Bethell. The "General Preface" to that publication states that here:

Latin America is taken to comprise the predominantly Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking areas of continental America south of the United States—Mexico, Central America and South America—together with the Spanish-speaking Caribbean—Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic—and, by convention, Haiti. (The vast territories in North America lost to the United States by treaty and by war, first by Spain, then by Mexico, during the first half of the nineteenth century are for the most part excluded. Neither the British, French and Dutch Caribbean islands nor the Guineas are included even though Jamaica and Trinidad, for example, have early Hispanic antecedents and are now members of the Organisation [sic!] of American States).

(2008, xiv)

In this formulation, the project already points to its own shortcomings: Spanish Florida, the Mexican territories that would become the Southwest of the United States in 1848, and regions in the Caribbean that have seen "Latin" or "Spanish" or "Hispanic" involvement are omitted. In view of the prevailing reductionist approaches to the histories and societies of the Americas, the *Routledge Handbook to the History and Society of the Americas* aims to look at the bigger picture, the hemispheric contexts of topics, issues, and developments which all have their local, regional, and national ramifications, but which also display an inter-American dimension that tends to be overlooked in traditional historiography.

The focus of this first section of the handbook is on the histories and societies of the Americas up until 1898. The year 1898 was chosen as the end point of this period because it marks the onset of new inter-American dynamics with the United States going to war against Spain for control of the remnants of that country's colonial empire in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. That conflict initiated what Henry R. Luce in the 1940s would call "the [U.S.] American Century," when the United States assumed the status of a world power and when inter-American relations – whether characterized as "Big Stick Policy," "Good Neighbor Policy," "Benign Neglect," or overshadowed by plans for a border wall – started being dominated by the United States. For the period up until 1898, three turning points will be discussed:

- 1 1492: the beginning of European interventions in the Americas,
- 2 1760–1830: the end of colonial rule and the establishment of American nation-states, and
- 3 the 1860s: a period marked by commercial expansion and improved means of transportation, social and economic reforms, the abolition of slavery in the United States, mass immigration, urbanization and industrialization, the genocide of indigenous peoples, a growing chasm between the United States and Latin America.

These turning points all have their local and regional relevance, but they also affect the Western Hemisphere in general.

1492

There is hardly any event in world history that equals the discovery of America in terms of the status it held in Europe for centuries as an undisputed historical turning point (Fernández-Armesto 2009, 14; Rinke 2013, 7). "America" (→ I/2) was a concept that did not yet exist in 1492. It assumes a spatial unit that Columbus did not recognize in his lifetime and which his contemporaries only started to understand through the publication of Amerigo Vespucci's *Mundus Novus* [*The New World*] in 1502/03. What counts as a historical caesura or as the beginning of a new era lies in the eyes of the beholder. People define certain events as shifts or turning points in order to establish a periodization of their lives or of the history of their community. These temporal divisions make sense and create an image of the world based on the necessities and values of those who construct it. Since the beginning of professional historiography in the 19th century, such constructions have mostly been undertaken by historians steeped in European conventions and thinking in terms of nation-states. The periodizations they established stem from specific causes. Their motives must not simply be accepted as given but must be questioned again and again, for what is a turning point for one individual need not be one for others, even though Europeans have tended – especially since 1492 – to connect their will to dominate the world with the drive to dominate the images of the world.

Columbus did not leave the slightest doubt that he thought of his discoveries as extraordinary. Already in a letter which he wrote on his return voyage in 1493 to his patron, the royal treasurer Luis de Santángel, he presented his accomplishment as a divine blessing that meant a victory for all of Christendom and that would also furnish riches and wealth. But he was still eager to situate the foreign that he had seen with his own eyes in his horizon of expectations shaped by the biblical history of salvation.

Several years later, once the dimension of Columbus' discoveries became apparent, contemporaries like the well-known Dominican Bartolomé de las Casas spoke of "a time so new

and incomparable to any other.” This notion of living in a new era that had started with the discovery of a New World solidified over the following centuries (→ Memorial Culture, I/14). In European historical thought of the late 17th century, it initiated the division into periods that are common today: Antiquity, Middle Ages, and Modernity. In the European version of history, 1492 could thus be interpreted as a turning point par excellence, a caesura that separated the – supposedly – “dark” Middle Ages from the new spirit which marked the beginning of the Renaissance.

However, we also know that Columbus was not the first European who came to America. That feat had probably been accomplished by Leif Eriksson around 500 years earlier. But Eriksson’s discovery had not produced any knowledge that survived the course of time. Eriksson’s knowledge was lost, while Columbus used the communication revolution unfolding in his times in order to market his accomplishments (→ Language, I/13). He consciously put his success in the context of the conclusion of the Reconquista and of the expulsion of the Jews from Spain. That way, the discovery did not stand alone, but was linked to other important developments of the year 1492. If one thinks beyond the limits of Spain, one has to include numerous events taking place around 1500 and originating in Europe: the creation of the Behaim globe in Nuremberg, the spread of book printing, other voyages of discovery and especially the Indian voyage of Vasco da Gama via the eastern sea route. The densification of change and the experience of the new created the impression of a temporal caesura.

This understanding of a shift in the temporal dimension corresponded to the caesura in the spatial imagination which the Day of Guanahani triggered for Europeans (→ Geopolitics, II/34). As mentioned earlier, Columbus had no idea of this spatial dimension since he assumed that he had discovered the islands off the coast of Cathay, i.e. China. Those who followed him in the subsequent decade realized fast that Columbus had erred. At the latest when Vespucci’s *Novo Mundus* was published in 1502/03, the continental character of the discovered areas was established, even if it was still to take a long time until this knowledge became influential on a larger scale. These developments marked a decisive change in the European worldview.

The discovery opened up completely new spaces (→ Atlantic, I/3). Soon, it was even proved that one could sail around the earth, which provided the basis for a new consciousness of the world. In 1492, the newly discovered territories, as a new continent, started an exchange with what had suddenly become the “Old World,” which, in turn, established increasingly more networks. There were transatlantic processes of exchange that assumed global dimensions. Europe rose from being an appendix of the Eurasian land mass that had been insignificant in terms of world history to becoming “the West,” which could subsequently set standards (Abellán 2009, 13).

European empires became the colonial masters of alien and far remote peoples (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7), whom they oppressed and exploited in a bloody manner (→ Colonial Rule, I/5, Unfree Labor, I/19). Economic ties (→ Colonial Economies, I/4) made possible trade with alien goods, some of which fundamentally changed ways of living. The migration (→ I/15) of people from different continents – some voluntary, much of it forced – gave rise to a new kind of population (→ Hybridity, I/30). Women were generally kept in subservient roles (→ Gender, I/9). With the people came animals, plants, and germs (→ Columbian Exchange, I/6). As Europe was seizing America, Christianity spread as a world religion and made some advances in the competition with Islam (→ Religion and Missionizing, I/17). The interactions changed not only those directly involved in them. It is beyond doubt that from a European perspective, the Day of Guanahani was a turning point in history.

But was this also true for the “discovered,” who, in contrast to Columbus, did not leave any written records of the events? It is not only because of the issue of missing written sources that the indigenous peoples were regarded for centuries merely as passive objects of European action and did not have their own voice. In a way, they were taken to be part of the wilderness which was to be pushed back. It was a crucial component of their new view of the world promoted by the discovery that Europeans now saw themselves as the center and masters of the world (→ Memorial Culture, I/14).

Thanks to archeological and ethnohistorical research, we have a more differentiated sense of the perspective of the indigenous today (→ Indigenous Peoples, I/11). For a long time, it had been assumed that the indigenous considered the arrival of Europeans to be the return of the gods, therefore integrating them into their messianic prophecies. This view was based on the assumption that indigenous communities were “traditional” and therefore unable to give a rational explanation for the foreign. There was usually no awareness that this kind of reasoning relied on a certain European understanding of rational action, nor was there a realization that Columbus himself did not adhere to that standard.

The reinterpretation of sources revealed that things were probably quite different for many “discovered” peoples. The various indigenous ethnic groups reacted rather pragmatically to the new and they were certainly able to put the arrival of Europeans in a larger context since they had historical knowledge, even if they passed on this historical knowledge in a different manner – usually orally – from one generation to the next (→ Language, I/13). The arrival of Europeans was surely a surprising experience for most of them but the unexpected encounter with strangers who were culturally different and superior in terms of armament was nothing new, especially in the Caribbean region. The Lucayan people of Guanahani probably saw the strangers as messengers from the realm of the dead, but they were not helpless vis-à-vis the newcomers.

The indigenous communities and empires on the mainland were to react differently again and in very diverse ways to the European invaders (→ Interethnic Relations, I/12). The reason for this range of reactions is that this was a process that was started in 1492 but that extended over many decades, even centuries. From an indigenous perspective, there was a big difference between encountering the first discoverers at the end of the 15th century and seeing the conquest of the Inca Empire forty years later, since knowledge about the newly arrived from Europe had changed considerably. Even by 1570, when the Iberian empires had consolidated, the vast expanses of America had by no means been conquered in their totality. Depending on the historical context and on the cultural background of the very diverse communities whom Columbus had subsumed under the term “indio,” the experiences made in the encounter of Europeans varied immensely (→ Indigeneity, I/31).

Nonetheless, we can also speak of October 12, 1492 as a turning point for the indigenous population, without succumbing to Eurocentrism. After all, this date doubtlessly marked the beginning of one of the biggest demographic catastrophes in human history. To be sure, invasions, the reign of foreigners, and the superimposition of cultures and empires by new arrivals had already characterized pre-Columbian history. The ancestors of the Lucayan and Taíno people whom Columbus encountered in the Caribbean had once themselves pushed out communities living there (Robiou Lamarche 2003, 166). But the European conquerors and soon also the African slaves (→ Slavery, I/18) meant completely new challenges for people in America. Their lives were to change more fundamentally than ever. This is why the Day of Guanahani also constitutes an irreversible turning point for the American indigenous peoples.

1760–1830

The discovery and conquest of what was for the Europeans a New World was followed by the establishment of a new colonial rule (→ I/5) practiced not only by Spain but soon also by other European powers like England and France. The next period that was significant for world history and for inter-American relations was marked toward the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century by the revolutions of independence in the Americas (→ Independence Movements, I/10). Between 1760 and 1830, revolutionary processes unfolded in the Americas which led to the dissolution of the old colonial empires (→ Atlantic, I/3; Nation and State Building, I/16). While those processes were highly heterogeneous, they shared certain characteristics with regard to the motifs, the course of action, and the consequences (Rinke 2010, 22–23).

Closely tied to the Enlightenment (→ I/8) and to the French Revolution, the ideas of freedom (→ I/27) and equality spread. America was the continent that saw the first successful anticolonial liberation movements. Among those were not only the “American Revolution” of the future United States in the North, but also the slave revolution in the French Caribbean colony of Saint-Domingue (→ Revolution, II/44), which led to the abolition of slavery (→ I/18) in 1793 and to the independence of the state of Haiti in 1804, the independence revolutions in the Spanish colonial Empire starting in 1808, which triggered the creation of numerous republics by 1830, as well as the comparably unbloody transformation of Brazil into an independent empire starting in 1822. These developments were very different from each other but still constitute a unity. They lay the foundation for the first continental sphere worldwide which largely – although not completely – left behind the principle of monarchy and which recognized the people, i.e. *demos*, as the new source of legitimacy of political domination (→ Democracy, II/32). At the end of this process, there was a new ensemble of states which by and large is still in place today.

By the middle of the 18th century, the official status of colonies in North and South America had not changed, but those regions had progressed socially and politically to an extent that led to them being thought of as *de facto* autonomous. In the English as well as in the Iberian sphere of influence, the second half of the 18th century was marked by reform politics of the respective mother countries in the context of enlightened absolutism, which aimed at the renewal of a more extensive control and exploitation of the colonies by the European centers of power. But those elites who had already been born and socialized in the Americas were not ready to accept these reform politics without any resistance. These “*creoles*,” as they were called in Hispano-America, developed new identities tied to the spaces of their respective home regions in America. As a consequence, there was an increasing alienation from the mother country, which ultimately culminated in independence movements.

The period from the beginning of reform politics until the conclusion of independence wars in Hispanic America when the last Spanish troops left the South American mainland in 1826 was a time of enormous change, in which the foundations for the relations between the U.S.A. and Latin America were laid (→ Pan-Americanism, II/40; Interventionism, II/36). While the independence movements that occurred during this period in North and South were parallel, they were not concurrent processes of dissolving the bonds with the European mother countries, and despite all the common elements, numerous differences exist in terms of causes, progression, and consequences. Those differences were also to characterize the zones of contacts between the Americas, which were now multiplying in a short time.

The Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) was doubtlessly an important point of departure for those upheavals. Already the wars of the first half of the century had demonstrated that Spain

and its colonial empire were increasingly at stake in the battles between the English and the French for domination of the sea. Two years after, hostilities started in the North American colonies as the French and Indian Wars (1754–1763) just as conflict erupted in Europe, but the Spanish crown managed to stay out of it for years. Only in 1762 did Spain join France in the war against England. The reason for this step was the increase of English power in America, for the English had by then already scored major victories against the French in North America and in the West Indies. But the plan of the Spaniards did not work out. On the contrary, England now also used its supreme power at sea against the Spanish overseas possessions. The war ended in a disaster for the Spanish. The peace accords of Fontainebleau (1762) between England and Spain and of Paris (1763) between England and France involved a new territorial order in America. Spain ceded Florida to England and recognized England's sovereignty over all the areas east of the Mississippi River. At the same time, Spain also had to officially recognize British dominion in Central America – in British Honduras. As a recompense, it received Louisiana, including New Orleans, which had hitherto been French, and did not suffer any losses in the southern Caribbean.

The outcome of the war made the Spaniards intensify their reform politics in the colonies. On the whole, the situation for the Spanish colonial empire had changed by 1763 such that Spain was now left more or less alone to face the English demands and smuggling activities. After all, England had pushed the French out of North America.

After their independence, the U.S.A. was still facing two important colonial powers in North America: England and Spain. Both were striving, partly jointly, partly in opposition to one another, to hold back the U.S. American settlers. These endeavors also included agreements with Native American tribes in the Mississippi region. The Spanish troops wanted to establish a protectorate in this border region. However, those efforts were halted when Spain was defeated by revolutionary France in Europe. In 1795, right when the Spanish and the French concluded the rather unflattering Peace of Bâle, there was an agreement with the United States about the disputed borderline. This turn of events was conducive for the western expansion of the U.S.A. Its first culmination was the Louisiana Purchase, in which the United States acquired the vast territories between the Mississippi River and the Rocky Mountains from France – Spain had previously had to cede its claims to those areas to Napoleon. Through the expedition of Meriwether Lewis and William Clark (1804–1806), the government in Washington underlined its claims to an expansion all the way to the Pacific. The increase of U.S. power also became apparent in terms of the economic situation. It was in Spain's own interest to cooperate with its neighbors. Already in 1793, the island of Cuba was allowed to do trade with the U.S.A. in hopes of thus enabling the owners of sugar plantations to take over the defense of Cuba and of the Spanish Caribbean. The United States had transformed within a short period of time from a small coastal state that was hardly to be taken seriously to an important factor of power in North America.

Concurrently, the position of Spain deteriorated further through the European revolutionary wars around the turn of the 18th century. This phase of almost constant war with England (1796–1808) was also the backdrop for the English blockade of Cádiz starting in 1797. This development led to a complete cessation of Spain's American trade (→ Colonial Economies, I/4). In summary, it can be said that by the beginning of the 19th century, the international constellation had changed decisively. Spain had lost its status as a supreme power and was effectively no longer able to protect and supply its colonies. England, on the other hand, had, despite its loss of a few North American colonies, decisively solidified its role as the ruler of the seas. The U.S.A. had already embarked on a development which, in the long run, was to be more dangerous for the Spanish Empire than the Old World rivals.

This danger emanated less from the potential of the United States in terms of power politics, which did not yet play a role in this early phase, than from economic relations as well as especially from the influences in the area of political ideas. Through the spread of Enlightenment (→ I/8) texts by John Locke, Adam Smith, Abbé Raynal, Rousseau, Voltaire, Montesquieu, and many others, which were read by the creole elites in Anglo- and Latin America alike, contacts between intellectual elites from the North and from the South of the Americas intensified. They were reading the same authors, and some enlightened Latin Americans took an interest in eminent Anglo-American individuals like Benjamin Franklin as early as the 1760s.

Leading intellectuals from North and South America were united above all in their defense against theories of America's inferiority that had been voiced by various European authors. Their origin lay in the monumental *Histoire naturelle* by Georges-Louis Leclerc Buffon, which was published in 44 volumes starting in 1749. In this well-known work, Buffon opined that America was a young continent in terms of earth's history and that it had an unhealthy climate in which only few animals evolved, which were smaller than those in the Old World (→ Nature, II/39). European species transferred to America would degenerate there, thought Buffon. Also the autochthonous population was at a lower mental and physical level, according to Buffon. All in all, America was considered immature, in a state of childhood which it could not overcome.

In Anglo-America, the Founding Fathers of the United States took a critical approach to the theory of decadence. Thomas Jefferson refuted Buffon's theses, which had infuriated him, in his *Notes on the State of Virginia* of 1781. Alexander Hamilton went in the same direction in the *Federalist Papers* of 1787 and clearly recognized the claim to domination that was linked to the degeneration thesis.

Concerning Ibero-America, critical responses to the degeneration theses initially came especially from the Jesuits. The order had been expelled from Spain and its colonies in 1767 (→ Religion and Missionizing, I/17). One reason for this action had been the anti-Jesuit sentiment of the Enlightenment. In their writings, the Ecuadorian Juan de Velasco, the Chilean Juan Ignacio Molina, Francisco Javier Clavijero from New Spain, and many others wanted to set the record straight in terms of the wrong ideas about America and thus also to defend America's honor in a newly conceived patriotism. The development of an American identity could tie in with these writings by authors exiled in Europe and read in America.

During the preparatory phase of independence from 1763 to 1776, the elites in Latin America stayed on top of the revolutionary rhetoric of the North Americans as well as they could, given the restrictions of censorship. The documents related to the Inquisition in Mexico in the 1770s reveal the steep rise of engagements with North American ideas. The early publications of the North American Continental Congresses of Philadelphia in 1774/75 were already eagerly received. Soon thereafter, the Declaration of Independence with its political ideals of the people's sovereignty and of human rights (→) as well as with its arguments for seceding from the European mother country met with particular interest in Latin America. Latin American creoles were also eager to find out about hostilities in the English colonies and viewed the early development of the United States sympathetically. But it was symptomatic that the traffic of news usually took a detour via Europe. The inability to speak each other's language made a direct exchange of ideas difficult. The Declaration of Independence and other central writings of the North American revolutionaries were circulated as Spanish translations from the French translation.

In general, one could, in view of Spain's weakness, interpret the independence of the U.S.A. as a warning for the further development of the Iberian empires. The ideas of the

Anglo-American revolutionaries and the example of their nation building (→ Nation and State Building, I/16) were of great political significance for the visionaries of Latin American independence movements. With the late colonial resistance movements of the 1780s, the Spanish Empire in America ultimately entered the period of Atlantic revolutions (Chavez 2002, 74).

Toward the end of the 18th century, direct relations between the U.S.A. and Latin America increased especially in the context of Free Masons and because of the intensification of trade relations. The admiration for the successes of the young United States for their institutions and especially for George Washington was great and widespread. The Venezuelan Francisco de Miranda and the Chilean José Miguel Carrera were not the only ones to now seek and find – even if only to a limited degree – direct contacts and support in the United States. For men like Miranda, the United States were precursors in the fight against colonial power in America, in the “New World,” which was increasingly also seen as a political space of its own. This development went hand in hand with the distancing from the European mother countries and with the assertion of a fundamental conflict of interests between Spain and America that could not be healed.

Not all the Latin Americans who had the chance to get to know the U.S.A. firsthand were thrilled by what they observed. Indeed, in view of the increasing contacts, the realization grew that despite all commonalities in terms of historical experiences, Anglo-America and Ibero-America were two fundamentally different structures. The U.S.A. was playing a new role in the turbulent transition phase between 1780 and 1810 not only as an important trade partner but also as the source of revolutionary ideas. Doubtlessly, it was only small groups among the creole elites who recognized the congruence of interests between North and South in the Americas and who recognized that the problems experienced with Spanish colonial power were similar to what the North American colonies were facing at the beginning of their independence war. But Latin America was not to take the step toward revolution in direct imitation of the republican brother state in the North but on the basis of a historical context that was shaped by events in Europe.

Indeed, the revolutionary events that had started in France in 1789 triggered the independence movements in the South of the Americas. The beginning was made by the French Caribbean colony of St. Domingue, where, starting in 1791, the only successful slave rebellion in world history took place (→ Slavery, I/8), which led in 1804 to the founding of independent Haiti (Thornton 1998, 72). The collapse of Spain and Portugal in view of the Napoleonic expansion caused the Hispano-American independence revolutions a few years later and as a late effect also the secession of Brazil from the Portuguese imperial union. These processes differed significantly not only between but also within the three major regions. But there was one factor that played an important role in all three developments toward independence. This is the linkage to the Atlantic (→ I/3) context. This referred primarily to the relations to the European mother countries although over time, the U.S.A. also gained in relevance.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the United States was hardly yet able to exert a self-confident and autonomous policy toward the independence movements in the South. But one decisive element soon became apparent: the disinclination of the U.S. toward social revolutionary movements. This was especially the case if those movements had an ethnic element (→ Ethnicity, I/25) and thus conjured up liberation movements that could also affect the African American population in the United States, as became apparent in the context of the Haitian Revolution. While President John Adams was still conducting trade with the Haitian revolutionaries, his successor Jefferson, a slaveholder himself, rejected those

categorically fearing a negative impact on the United States. He did not consider Haiti worthy of becoming an independent state and the eruption of violence there and the result of an independent black republic triggered concerns about future developments in Latin America, which the creole elites there shared.

Yet, Jefferson also believed in a separate spatial sphere of the New World. The idea of such a Western Hemisphere had already transpired in Washington's farewell address when he underlined that the United States had better stay out of European conflicts. Jefferson was to further shape this thought and to proclaim an American space of freedom (→ 1/27), which was not marked by the "passions and wars" of Europe (Johnson 1990, 53).

But when in 1809/10 the initially successful creation of governing juntas signaled the beginning of Latin American independence movements, Washington had to take a position sooner or later. However, neither the creation of juntas nor the declarations of independence, which were initially mostly formulated cautiously, triggered a clear positioning of U.S. American foreign policy. From the perspective of the United States, the international situation was too problematic for a decisive stance, as there had been tensions with England for a while because of the blockades against France. Moreover, Washington did not want to risk losing the sympathy of the Spanish – and thus of the French, who were then already occupying the Iberian Peninsula – since there were hopes that the Spanish would yield in the negotiations on who would possess Florida.

This is why the United States was at first only offering moral support to the South. U.S. Congress founded the Committee on the Spanish American Colonies in 1811 and President James Madison permitted arms trade and sent private trade representatives to Latin America. But at the center of U.S. foreign policy was the intention to use the international tribulations to one's own advantage. In this way, the Napoleonic occupation of Spain furthered the U.S. American seizing of West Florida, where a very heterogeneous population of bandits, deserters, runaway slaves, and immigrants had evolved under the nominal rule of Spain. This population rebelled in 1810 and declared its independence. A few weeks later, the United States annexed the territory. This course of events furnished the model that North American desperados could imitate further west only a few decades later (Langley 1997, 201).

Concerning the developments in Latin America, however, the United States remained guarded. The war against England from 1812 to 1814 did not leave the United States much leeway. Despite some military defeats, this war led to a nationalist enthusiasm and deepened the idea of a special mission of the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, it was already in this context that expansionist demands were raised in the U.S.A. which were directed above all toward Florida and Texas. The fact that those areas still belonged to the Spanish colonial empire was disregarded in all the enthusiasm.

Meanwhile, the independence movements in Latin America also succeeded without U.S. support. Under the leadership of Simón Bolívar (1783–1830) in the northern Andes region, and of José de San Martín (1778–1850) in the area of La Plata, the armies of the resisters pushed out the Spaniards in bloody battles lasting several long years until 1826, while New Spain seceded from the mother country in a more conservative, unbloody revolution. Developments were similar in Brazil, which had constituted an independent empire since 1822.

Even before the end of their independence war activities, the already liberated regions in South America strove for diplomatic recognition. But the United States, which seemed predestined to become an ally, was very reticent in this regard. Washington only showed itself ready to enter negotiations, also in view of the military successes of the Latin Americans, once it had reached its primary goal through Spain ratifying the Adams–Onís Treaty in 1821. This reticence was due less to noble republican values but more to the desire for a

good position in the competition with Great Britain about future influence in the region. In 1822, the U.S.A. then actually broke the ice by recognizing Gran Colombia. That same year followed the recognition of Mexico, Chile, the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, and Brazil. This is, moreover, when the first official envoys were sent to Latin America.

In the end, it was not the U.S.A. but England that was the decisive ally of the Latin Americans in their fight for independence, for England supplied weapons, mercenaries, and diplomatic support. But that factor did not prevent U.S. American politicians from considering the United States early on to be the quasi-natural leader of the Americas. U.S. American elites were very reticent in assessing the abilities of the new Latin American sister republics. Especially President Monroe's foreign secretary, the later President John Quincy Adams, made it clear more than once that there could be no common interests between North and South America. This view was linked to an overt disdain for the creole leading classes of the South who had not enjoyed the freedoms of an Englishman and who were additionally hampered by the Catholicism in their thinking. The long-standing prejudices against the Spanish heritage were transferred without any hesitation to Latin America. Often concepts like "uncivilized," "subservient," and "addled by Catholicism" were used. There was a basic conviction that Latin Americans were different (→ *Latinidad*, I/33), despite the common experience of a war against the mother country and despite republican processes of state building. Latin America was interpreted as the foreign from which one should better keep one's distance in order not to be infected with the vices and weaknesses that were assumed to exist there.

Not only U.S. Americans but also leading Latin Americans saw fundamental differences. The fact that these views also influenced the creation of political institutions could be seen above all with Simón Bolívar. In his opening speech to the Congress of Angostura in February 1819, when the war of independence was still in full swing, Bolívar presented in more detail his ideas of a constitution, clearly separating them from what he considered the "formidable" Anglo-American model, which he deemed of little practical use for Latin America. Considering the North to be absolutely different, he constructed a constitution model that was to be a counter-model by relinquishing federalism and strengthening the executive branch (Rama 1981, 95).

The 1860s

For the United States of America, the 19th century marks the age of expansion. The phrase "Go west young man, and grow up with the country," commonly attributed to *New-York Tribune* editor Horace Greeley, encapsulates the country's desire for growth in terms of territory and power. That growth came mainly at the expense of the indigenous population and of Mexico. Although a civil war (1861–1865) brought tremendous losses of lives, property, and infrastructure to the United States and divided the nation for decades to come, the 1860s also mark an intensification of industrialization and urbanization as well as the growth of a transportation network for the U.S., and features on the country's path toward claiming leadership in the Western Hemisphere – a claim that alienated Latin American countries, which grew increasingly weary of U.S. dominance and interference.

In 1820, there were still about 125,000 Native Americans living in the areas east of the Mississippi River (→ *Indigenous Peoples*, I/11). But in view of the hunger of white settlers for land (→ II/15), the prospect of establishing cotton plantations in the South, and the opportunities that land speculators and politicians were eager to seize, the Indian Removal Act was signed into law by President Andrew Jackson in 1830. On its basis, first nations were

forcibly relocated from the southeast of the United States to lands west of the Mississippi River, especially in present-day Oklahoma. Many died from disease, starvation, or exposure to the winter cold, which is why the forced marches to reservations came to be known as the “Trail of Tears.” By 1844, the removal of Native Americans from territories east of the Mississippi had been largely completed.

At the same time, the North of the United States saw urban growth (→ Urbanization, I/45), industrial expansion, and the influx of European immigrants soar to new heights in the 1840s (→ Migration, I/15), while the South flourished because of slave-produced cotton and sugar and while railroad networks expanded to link Midwestern farms and ranches with eastern markets. The completion of the Transcontinental Railroad in 1869 provided a link between San Francisco Bay and the urban centers on the Atlantic coast and thus helped consolidate the United States and pave the way for increasing its territory and number of states – at the expense of Native Americans, whose lands were appropriated for the railway construction and whose livelihood was destroyed when masses of buffalo were killed to facilitate the passage of trains.

The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 had paved the way for that expansion. In view of the weakness of the Spanish Empire, the United States had wanted to make sure that Britain and France would not assume control of Spanish dominions (like Cuba, Florida, and Texas). President James Monroe warned European empires against trying to take control of any new areas in the Americas, which, however, did not prevent the United States from attempting to increase their own influence and territory in the Western Hemisphere (→ Interventionism, II/36). The U.S. actively promoted the settlement of Anglos in Texas, then a state of the United Mexican States, which the U.S. hoped to integrate into its own territory as a slave-holding future state. Anglo settlers declared the independence of Texas from Mexico in 1836. A group of rebels supporting them were defeated at the Alamo in San Antonio by Mexican president and General Santa Anna’s troops, who were subsequently crushed by Anglo-Texan forces and U.S. volunteers under the leadership of General Sam Houston. When attempts to buy Texas and what is today the Southwest of the United States from Mexico failed, U.S. President James Knox Polk provoked Santa Anna into attacking U.S. troops stationed just north of the Rio Grande in Texas, which was officially Mexican territory. The Mexican–American War (1846–1848) erupted, as a result of which Mexico lost close to half its territory to the United States. The outcome of the war, the fate of about 75,000 Mexicans who lived in the territories acquired by the United States, and the subsequent dispossession of and racism against Mexicans in the conquered areas left a legacy of bitterness and hate against the United States in Mexico and among Mexican Americans.

President Polk’s subsequent plans of annexing the Yucatán Peninsula and of purchasing Cuba from Spain (for \$100 million) to prevent the island from falling into British hands and to increase U.S. slavery territory failed, but they further demonstrate the expansionist tendencies of Democratic politicians in the mid-19th-century United States. The idea of an exceptionally favored position of the U.S.A. in terms of political system as well as social and economic organizations was coupled with the notion of a divine mission of extending the U.S. system all across North America into the concept of “Manifest Destiny,” which is generally thought to have been coined by newspaper editor John O’Sullivan in 1845. A good decade later, in 1856, American filibuster William Walker from Tennessee, who had earlier led an invasion of Mexican Baja California and established an unsuccessful republic there, became involved in a revolution in Nicaragua and managed to become president of that country, reestablishing slavery there but eventually driven out by the armies of neighboring Central American nations. All the while, U.S. attempts to annex Cuba continued.

The nation's westward expansion did not stop with the removal of the indigenous peoples from areas to the east of the Mississippi River. Wagon trains of white settlers crossed the Mississippi in the 1860s. The westward expansion was fostered by the Homestead Act of 1862, which, after five years of continuous residence on the land, granted every citizen 160 acres of federal land that had previously been seized from the indigenous population. At the same time, transportation networks were expanded in the North and South, as water travel and ship construction also intensified.

In the spirit of political reform, the first women's rights convention in the Americas was held in Seneca Falls, New York in 1848 (→ Gender, I/9). It brought some attention to gender inequalities, although women suffrage was still a long way off. (It was not introduced on the federal level until 1920.) Nonetheless, the convention illustrated the spirit of reform that characterized much of the Americas in the mid-19th century. In the United States, the philosophical movement of Transcendentalism as well as various utopian communities were questioning conventions and were looking for new ways of living together.

In most Latin American states, progress-oriented elites focused on trade and education came to power in the middle of the 19th century. They had recognized the mistakes made during the first decades of independence and saw that in economic and social terms, their nations were stagnating. It was their goal to overcome backwardness by gradually adopting European models (→ Development, II/6; Modernization, I/35). To do so, they favored integrating their countries into the world economic system mainly by exploiting its available resources (→ Global Commodity Chains, II/12).

The guiding principles were those of liberalism: effort and responsibility of the individual in the realm of political ethics – free trade and laissez-faire in the realm of economics as well as an international division of labor on the basis of exporting raw materials and importing finished products. In terms of economic policy, the state was seen in the role of guaranteeing a functioning export economy.

The optimistic assumption had been that the growth of exports would result in increased productivity and in structural change toward a modern market economy. Nineteenth-century Latin American elites adhered to an ideal of progress that could be seen, for example, in the new means of communication and transportation – like the railroad – which were financed with European bonds. Latin American economies benefited from European industrialization and population growth in the second half of the century, which meant a growing demand for food, raw materials, and tropical products like tobacco, cocoa, coffee, rubber, and sugar. As the United States was expanding westward, Chile and Argentina also settled their back country (→ Borderlands, II/26). The increase of transatlantic steamer connections as well as the development of a transport system in the hinterlands of Latin America provided the basis for a successful export orientation. Since the commercial sector was not sufficiently developed, the demand for finished goods could not be met. Imports were thus necessary, and in order to reach a trade balance, the increase of exports seemed indispensable. However, economic developments were not without crises (→ II/4). Often, far-reaching privileges had to be granted to foreigners in order to acquire capital. The liberal paradigm of progress was already being questioned toward the end of the 19th century.

The liberal enthusiasts of progress wanted to leave the colonial past behind. They combatted the secular influence of the church (→ Religious Beliefs, I/40) with reforms and new constitutions. Modernizing education (→ I/24) and expanding the infrastructure were among the central goals of the reformers. Especially in conflicts involving the church, this period saw numerous civil wars between conservatives and liberals which repeatedly

made visible the major lines of conflict between country and city, tradition and modernity, export-orientation and large estates.

The reformers in Latin America wanted most of all to transplant European “civilization” to their “barbaric” surroundings. Intensifying economic relations with Europe was not enough to achieve this goal. While goods and money remained fundamental for Europeanizing the immediate surroundings, the ideal went much further. Like many of his contemporaries, the Argentine Juan Bautista Alberdi propagated the “whitening” of the population through the mass settlement of European immigrants (→ Immigration, I/15; Biopolitics, I/2). This measure was meant to make the undeveloped areas of the hinterland usable. Already in the first half of the 19th century, immigration-friendly laws had been passed in the independent states. In the second half of the century, especially the governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile were actively promoting immigration. This policy was further supported by the rise of European Positivism and social Darwinism. Indeed, as in the United States, there was mass immigration in the second half of the century, especially from Europe and to a lesser degree from Asia. However, only about one-fifth of the fifty million Europeans who settled in Latin America between 1830 and 1930 remained in the south of the bi-continent. But their impact was considerable, since they were concentrated in few counties: Argentina, Brazil, and, to a lesser degree, Chile and Uruguay.

Meanwhile, in the U.S.A. (where the mass immigration by Europeans and the privileging of whiteness (→ I/46) were even more acute than in Latin America), the northern and southern states had become increasingly alienated from one another by 1860. An agrarian, slave-based economy as well as a special “code of honor” characterized the South, whereas in the North, urban centers and industrial production grew (→ Urbanization, I/45). European aristocracy was the social model of plantation-owning Southerners, who could only support their lifestyle because of slave labor, while Northerners led the abolitionist campaign and endeavored to uphold democratic principles.

When Abraham Lincoln won the presidential elections of 1860 despite the general lack of support for him in the twelve slave states, his reassurance that slavery (→ I/18) could continue in any state where it was already in place did not convince Southerners. So, seven Southern states seceded from the Union, drew up a charter that recognized “the right of property in negro slaves,” and set up the rival government of the Confederate States of America under the presidency of Jefferson Davis in 1861. A civil war broke out in April 1861, when Confederate forces attacked about seventy Union soldiers and nine officers stationed at Fort Sumter in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina. As the war dragged on, President Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation, which went into effect on January 1, 1863 and which declared that “all persons held as slaves” in the territory of the Confederacy were “then, thenceforward, and forever free.” Black regiments were integrated into the Union army, and by the end of the Civil War, 178,895 black soldiers were enlisted in the army of the North (→ Interethnic Relations, I/12). Despite numerous military victories of the South, the North won the war in 1865 because of its better transportation system, its economic advantages, and ample supplies, as well as its significantly bigger population. The recruitment of African Americans and of newly arrived immigrants tipped the balance even further toward the Union.

Especially in the Southern states, reconstruction took decades. The end of slavery had removed the basis of the profitable plantation economy in the South and led to starvation especially among the black population as well as to violent racism (→ Race, I/39). The outcome of the war meant that any future territories accepted as new states into the United States would be non-slavery states and it put an end to the dream of some Southerners to expand their slave economy into the Caribbean and Central America.

The 1860s were less of a turning point in the Northern states of the U.S.A. and in the centers of political power. The war had left the North with far less destruction than the South, and it had made some individuals very rich. Immigration from Europe continued to soar, as white settlements moved ever further west, culminating before the end of the 19th century in the “closing of the frontier.” Between the end of the civil war and the turn of the century, the economic might of the United States rose sharply. This development is reflected in Mark Twain’s term of “the Gilded Age,” which refers roughly to the period between the 1870s and 1900 and which implies that while the wages of industrial workers rose considerably, the profits of factory owners rose immensely. Automation and the invention of the conveyer belt increased industrial production and profits even more (→ Capitalism, II/2). But because of the oversupply of potential laborers through immigration, urban slums and poverty also spread, as the chasm between rich and poor widened (→ Social Inequality, II/20).

Between 1865 and 1900, the U.S. population more than doubled from thirty-seven million to seventy-six million people. During this same period, the U.S. gross national product more than tripled and industrial production quintupled. Great Britain recognized the preponderance of the United States and stood by as the U.S. was increasing its influence in the Caribbean and in Central America. Along with its economic power rose the nationalist fervor in the United States, as the figure of “Uncle Sam” was used in popular culture to signify strength, democratic principles, and a nation that protects its own interests. Some in the country now went back to the concept of “Manifest Destiny” to suggest that the United States had a mission to make other parts of the world more like itself and to “educate” or “police” other nations, as Theodore Roosevelt would proclaim in his “Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine” in 1904 (→ Interventionism, II/36). The path of the United States to becoming a world power was admired by some and feared by many in Latin America, as it seemed likely that the Western Hemisphere nations would be the first to feel the U.S. hunger for leadership and the U.S. claim to setting the terms of inter-American relations (→ Geopolitics, II/34).

For Latin America, the integration of the continent into the world market was not smooth because mass immigration created new social problems. It also created new frictions in external relations. Often, the debts incurred out of confidence in the future could not be paid back on time. The civil wars frequently affected foreigners, who demanded recompense. This development led to quarrels with powerful Europeans, who repeatedly demonstrated where the limits of partnership lay. Unlike the United States, Latin America was not in a position of strength in international relations.

An additional complication was created by the beginning imperialist competition in dividing up the world. While Great Britain had achieved an informal hegemony especially in economic terms, that situation did not in the least mean an end to classic colonialism. Starting in the 1860s, Spain and France, self-appointed guardians of the “Latin race,” developed imperialist tendencies which went beyond the interventionism of the first half of the century. In their efforts, the European invaders benefitted from the temporary focus of the United States on the U.S. Civil War. The endeavors culminated in the Mexican Empire by the grace of France under the Hapsburg Maximilian (1864–1867). Only the demise of the Empire through the resistance of the Mexicans was to disavow for good the idea of restoring a European monarchy in Latin America.

Already in colonial times, members of the upper social classes had started to divide into those who wanted to preserve close ties to the mother country and those who focused on their American surroundings. During the wars of independence, this division went hand in hand with an intellectual detachment from the metropolises. This attitude affected especially

Spain, which had come to be viewed as the epitome of backwardness and tyranny. By contrast, at the same time, the European centers of Enlightenment (→ I/8), especially France and England, were seen as setting new standards. In terms of culture, the 19th century was characterized by the search for distinctive national and Latin American identities and by the attempt to discard the burdens of the colonial heritage. In their attempts to establish their own identities, Latin Americans as well as U.S. Americans retained Europe in many respects as an important point of reference. In the United States, the so-called “grand tour” of European centers of culture was a convention for those social classes who could afford it, and university students and professors looked to and studied in London, Paris, and Heidelberg. The leading Latin American thinker of the day, the Venezuelan Andrés Bello, spent eighteen years in London before starting to publish his pioneering scientific and literary writings. This orientation likewise impacted ideas on progress, which also had a cultural dimension (→ Modernism, III/14). European remedies were taken into consideration for coping with Latin American problems of development (→ II/4) like the missing national integration and the marginalization of broad sectors of society. Those who seemed unable to be integrated thus had to be exterminated. The national conceptions of Latin America and North America (→ Nation and State Building, I/16) did not provide a place for indigenous peoples (→ I/11), for example. In the United States, Native Americans born there were not granted U.S. citizenship (→ II/27) until 1924.

However, Latin America’s orientation toward Europe also had its limits. In many places, traditionalist and patriarchal ideas were preserved. The blind fervor for modernization (→ I/35) and the aping of European styles were publicly criticized. Moreover, even among the enlightened elites, the opinion was voiced early that the indigenous and other non-privileged sectors of the population were an integral part of Latin America. The existence of these groups made it impossible to Europeanize Latin America completely. Many Latin Americans were annoyed by the dominance of Europeans in their own country. In view of romantic historicism and anti-Spanish attitudes, the indigenous heritage now came to be idealized in many places (→ Memory Politics, I/34). These practices continued Enlightenment discourses of the “noble savage” (→ Indigeneity, I/31).

In reality, however, the masses of indigenous people, African Americans, and mestizos in the population remained excluded from the projects of those who wanted to Europeanize Latin America as well as from those of their critics. But this does not mean that these lower classes in the country as well as in the growing cities had nothing to oppose to the Europeanizing tendencies. Their traditionalism, their value systems oriented more toward the community and less toward the individual gave them a basis for resisting the pressure of change exerted by the Europeanized upper classes of the urban centers. In this manner, the discourse among the elites also further diversified. The discovery of one’s own America and of the diversity of its ethnic groups was recognized as a potential source of strength and self-confidence (→ Ethnicity, I/25; Hybridity, I/30). The search for the roots of one’s own culture in the autochthonous civilizations and in the masses of the marginalized as well as the demand for a united front against U.S. American interventionism (→ II/36) became important innovative elements of Latin American intellectual history.

Since the end of the U.S. American Civil War, the international situation had been changing radically. The U.S.A. was again ready for action, and the Europeans were retreating. These two developments promoted each other. But they explain only in part the failure of European colonialism, for the decisive resistance against the Europeans emanated from Latin America itself. It had quickly become apparent that a reliance on the Monroe Doctrine would not lead to anything. That conviction applied not only to Mexico and the Caribbean

but even to the deep south of the Americas, where the English had been able to acquire the Falkland Islands in the 1830s without any retribution. Instead of putting one's trust in the United States when it came to defending one's national sovereignty, one had to rely on one's own strength. This strategy was successful in Mexico as well as along the Pacific in the 1860s.

Apart from the attempts of protecting oneself from the transgressions of the major powers, there were also serious endeavors in Latin America during this phase to newly define certain fundamental provisions of international law in order to avert interventions in general. The right to intervention, which the United States, and even more so the European powers, claimed so often in the 19th century, was based on the assumption of a right to protect one's citizens and their property anywhere in the world. The Argentine diplomat and jurist Carlos Calvo was the first to question this claim. In 1868, he countered it with two fundamental principles of international coexistence: on the one hand, the absolute right to a freedom from interventions and, on the other, the absolute equality of foreigners and one's own citizens. Since this far-reaching demand could not be established as a generally binding legal principle, Latin American states endeavored to embed it in interstate agreements as the so-called Calvo Clause.

In view of the superior power of European nations, the Calvo Clause remained a utopia for a long time to come. This is why it seemed all the more important to Latin American observers to keep the idea of a Pan-American union alive (→ Pan-Americanism, II/40), although the respective conferences had hardly yielded any tangible results. Latin Americans were generally suspicious and hostile in response to the growth of U.S. power in the 1860s. Already in 1856, a third Pan-American congress, whose main goal was to curb further U.S. expansionism, had been convened in Santiago. At that time, an increasing division of the Western Hemisphere into the United States versus Latin America occurred.

A countermovement came in the 1870s, when the Bolivarian dream of inter-American solidarity and union was revived – most notably by Argentine writer, educator, diplomat, and President Domingo Faustino Sarmiento and U.S. Secretary of State James G. Blaine. Sarmiento, an aficionado of the United States, endorsed the Monroe Doctrine as long as it was interpreted as a foundation of mutual respect among the American nations rather than a claim to U.S. leadership. Blaine, for his part, convinced U.S. business leaders of the economic prospects that Latin America held for the United States.

He invited representatives of all American nations (except for Canada, which was part of the British Empire) to the First International Conference of American States in Washington, D.C. in 1889. All except for the Dominican Republic and the Kingdom of Hawaii accepted the invitation. The meeting went on into the following year and it was used by the hosts as an opportunity to showcase for the Latin American delegates, who were invited to tour industrial sites in the U.S., progressive methods of industrial production. The eighteen nations represented at the conference founded the International Union of American Republics and established the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics. Among those who mistrusted the display of U.S. accomplishments and leadership was the Cuban exile journalist, freedom fighter, and poet José Martí, who reported on the meeting for various Latin American newspapers. He feared that “Pan-Americanism,” the way it unfolded at the conference, was straying from Bolívar's goals and was now instead being interpreted as U.S. dominance over Latin America in economic, political, and military respects. His fears were confirmed when Theodore Roosevelt took office as the U.S. President in 1901 and introduced his so-called “Big Stick” policy.

Because of the growing alienation of Latin America from the United States, the movement of Pan-Latinism emerged around the middle of the 19th century (→ Latinidad, I/33).

The concept of “Latin America” had not yet entered common parlance. “America” (→ I/2) had long been used to refer to the south of the Americas, which had been explored first. This convention only changed in the 19th century with the rise of the United States, when “America” came to be used in many European languages as a synonym for the U.S.A.

So what was left for southern America? At first, concepts like “Hispano” or “Ibero” were out of the question because of the desire to clearly separate from the old colonial power. As a consequence, the naming was done in France and was adopted only later by the inhabitants of southern America. The idea of a Latin family of nations emerged in early 19th-century Romanticism, which was trying to establish linguistic and cultural traditions and which divided Europe into three major cultures, of which the Roman-Latin was one. The existence of these families of nations or “races” was considered to be an important impetus for historical change. The “Latin race,” which was propagated especially by France, stood, among other elements, for common Roman linguistic roots and for the shared history of the Roman Empire.

However, the “race latine” was commonly thought at the time to be endangered by the rise of the “Anglo-Saxon race.” This applied not only to Europe but also to the Americas. Starting in the middle of the 19th century, France, under Louis Bonaparte, presented itself as the protector of *latinidad*, which met with approval in Latin America, since there were few defenses against the threat of U.S. American expansionism. Belonging to the “race latine,” on the other hand, promised cultural superiority, an idea which was well received among intellectuals. It is likely that around 1856, the notion of “*América latina*,” Latin America, was first used in this context. By the end of the 19th century, it had been firmly established for it reinterpreted the difference to Anglo-Saxon America in a positive cultural holistic concept that was politically relevant because it could be used to appeal to the solidarity of all Americans of the South, regardless of whether they spoke Spanish or Portuguese.

Interrelated spaces and histories

In his famous 1891 essay “Our America,” José Martí urged his readers to abandon the vestiges of colonialism and to learn about other areas and nations of the Americas, treating them with respect. He wrote: “The disdain of the formidable neighbor who does not know her is our America’s greatest danger” (2002, 295). In a way, exceptionalist historiography and isolationist approaches to the histories and societies of the Americas are a version of the narrow perspective of which Martí had warned. Therefore, the goal of Inter-American Studies and inter-American historiography is to move beyond isolationist thinking and container models by uncovering connections between events, issues, or dynamics that shape a particular site or community but that also affect other sites or communities in the Americas. This does not imply an assumed homogeneity throughout the Western Hemisphere but rather an interconnectedness that will often reveal that the ways in which particular issues play out in one area are related to that issue’s dynamics elsewhere in the Americas. As Josef Raab wrote: “Sites, encounters, constellations, and issues will not emerge as uniform throughout the Americas, but neither will they emerge as entirely separate from one another” (2016, 217). That is why comparisons, transfers, and interconnections are central to this project and to its endeavor to open up some of the bigger, inter-American picture of the encounters and practices that have marked the Western Hemisphere. In this sense, this part of the Handbook is meant to serve as an invitation to rethink the Americas from the 16th to the end of the 19th century as an interrelated space with interrelated cultures, histories, and societies. In this way, every single entry hopes to uncover, as Herbert Eugene Bolton had already proclaimed in his 1932

presidential address, “that each local story will have clearer meaning when studied in the light of the others; and that much of what has been written of each national history is but a thread out of a larger strand” (1933, 449).

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2

AMERICA

Stefan Rinke

In historiography, the invention of America refers to the act of naming and conceptualizing the “newly discovered” areas in the West by the Europeans of the early modern period. The name givers Waldseemüller and Ringmann already used the Latin term “*invenire*.” The Mexican historian Edmundo O’Gorman (2003) then translated it in the 20th century into scholarly jargon, where it has prevailed ever since as an established term. This – from the European perspective – “New World” was not given the name of a Greek goddess or compass direction, as were the continents of the Old World. It also did not receive the name of the first “discoverer” Columbus. Still, as with the “old” continents Europe, Asia, and Africa, it, too, concerns a feminized name (→ Gender, I/9). Naming is an act of surveying the world that is correctly interpreted as signifying a dramatic change and a new beginning. It coincides with the start of the modern era. Along with it, the idea of the “West” – the Occident – emerged, whose encamped outskirts were the newly discovered lands beyond the ocean. Mental and real maps changed accordingly. The freshly designated region “America” and its inhabitants did not choose their name. The naming was done by Europe, which, with this baptismal act, claimed for itself the right to interpret the world. Language proficiency (→ Language, I/13), cartographical surveying, and global domination went hand in hand with the European expansion in the New World (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7). The story of the invention of America is always also the history of the ideas and concepts connected to it.

Naming and its backgrounds

What later generations would come to equate with America’s baptism was a publication – a *cosmographia* – which put the new name in print for the first time and also depicted it visually (Abellán 1972, 10–55). It stood in the tradition of medieval cosmographies which mixed geographical and historical knowledge with biblical and ancient ideas of the cosmos. At the same time, however, it went beyond traditional cosmographies with its appearance and what it showed. The work was a big seller: in 1507 alone, it went through four editions, which were later followed by many more. Its authors were the young humanists Martin Waldseemüller (1470/75–1518/21) and Matthias Ringmann (1482–1521) (Wolff 1992, 115–116). The revolutionary nature of this work was not that it seized on the then already

widely accepted sphericity of the earth, but rather that it portrayed, in words and pictures, the newly discovered territories as an independent part of the world. What is more, it even suggested a name for it: “America” after Amerigo Vespucci (Rinke 2013, 140–143).

But why call the region America and not Columbia? Columbus – the at first celebrated and then disputed “true discoverer” – died in Valladolid, Spain in 1506, before the nature of his discovery was fully understood. Amerigo Vespucci, on the other hand, had clearly recognized its scope, which he described vividly and in detail in his *Mundus Novus* (Wallisch 2002, 13–31). The *Mundus Novus* flew off the shelves, even more than the *Cosmographiae Introductio* a few years later. It quickly appeared in numerous editions and was translated into various languages. Vespucci’s findings were thus marketed to the public in a way that was virtually unheard of in the early modern period (König 1992, 66–72).

From the 19th century, critics denied Vespucci’s credibility due to discrepancies in his accounts. The naming of America, therefore, was thought to have been a substantial error for some time. In contrast to the explorer Christopher Columbus, Vespucci’s achievement lies in his discernment and proper conceptualization of the new. At the same time, however, in spreading the awareness of the continental implications of the discoveries, his contribution was to global knowledge.

As regards its substance and its reception, the *Cosmographiae Introductio* gathered considerable momentum. Still, in centuries that followed, the name America hardly won out completely. Neither in the 16th century nor in later centuries was the name the only common designation for the new continent, whose mapping, as many examples show, rapidly progressed during this period. There was rather a juxtaposition of a number of different terms. For instance, the designation “India,” “reinos de las Indias,” became established in the Spanish language throughout the colonial empire, including the Caribbean. Even when the recognition prevailed in the course of the 16th century that this was erroneous, the name continued to exist.

With the gradual opening up and settlement of the Americas, the name “terra incognita” was soon excluded. Until about 1540, the American east coast was more or less known and this also was generally reflected in the cartography by 1570. Regional names that would soon become standard, such as Peru or Brazil, acquired greater precision. It is therefore unsurprising that there was not an unambiguous acceptance of America as a generic term. In any event, the name did not fall into oblivion. Indeed, it even came into use on the Iberian Peninsula (Brading 1991, 197–224).

At first, the term America mainly referred to South America. Following the Europeans’ discoveries, it usually concerned the east coast of present-day Brazil. The Caribbean and Central America were also occasionally included. Nevertheless, early cartographic depictions also clearly show the divided character of the continent, whereby the notion that the north belonged to Asia persisted for some time. An early exception was the Paris “green globe” – the “globe vert” – from around 1513 to 1515, which also assigned the name America to the north for the first time. This designation gained favor especially in the work of Mercator, who already referred to north and south as America in his world map from 1538. Then, he explicitly distinguished between “North” and “South America” in his atlas from 1569, calling them “Americae pars septentrionalis” and “meridionalis.” It took some time, however, for these designations to prevail. In the meantime, the north was alternately referred to in atlases as “Terra florida,” “Terra del Labrador,” or “Parias.” With the gradual colonization of the north by the British and other Europeans, the references were extended in the course of the colonial period to the entire double continent (Lehmkuhl and Rinke 2008).

Toward the end of the colonial era, the southern part of the double continent then lost its share of the semantic content of a name that had originally belonged to it alone. The South's marginalization began at this stage, for the exclusive use of the name America to refer to the former English colonies has been verified for this era. Around 1850, only the United States was America in the now dominant European languages. In fact, it was even necessary to invent a new name for southern America. Why did this happen?

The name America came into use more and more as a designation during the Enlightenment (→ I/8). The term "Americans," moreover, no longer denoted the indigenous peoples (→ I/11), as in the early colonial period, but increasingly the descendants of the European conquerors and settlers, the Creoles. Nonetheless, the European sense of superiority toward America and its inhabitants remained. What was new was the pseudoscientific degeneration theory, which educated Europeans now expanded on. In America, the theory did not go unchallenged, however. In Anglo-America, the Founding Fathers of the United States looked critically at the degeneration theory. Thomas Jefferson refuted it in his *Notes on the State of Virginia* from 1781. In 1787, Alexander Hamilton followed suit in the Federalist Papers. In Latin America, it was mainly the Jesuits who repudiated the degeneration theorists. In both cases, the criticism stimulated the process of self-discovery in the Americas. However, reciprocal influence was limited (Elliott 2006, 369–403).

From the mid-18th century, the colonial masters in Europe tried to carry out reforms in the spirit of enlightened absolutism in both regions. The Americans protested against this attempt to effectively transform the American possessions into colonies and to bolster access to them. The dissent was directed against economic exploitation and political discrimination, and it only grew as the hegemony of the mother countries became shaken by the armed conflicts. Paradoxically, the reforms designed to help strengthen Iberian colonial rule (→ I/5) actually contained the seeds for overcoming it (→ Independence Movements, I/10) (Rinke 2010, 44–45).

In both cases, the impetus for the discontent and revolt came from abroad – from the European homelands, which, from the perspective of the American Creoles, produced much hardship. The animus emerged at a time when enlightened notions of popular sovereignty, natural human, and civil rights spread among the educated circles (→ Human Rights, II/35), along with an awareness of the advantages of the republican system of government. In both the north and the south, American-born colonists detected a basic and insoluble conflict of interests between Europe and America and recognized the colonial powers as tyrants. The path toward independence had thus been paved in both regions. The name America came to epitomize an initial act of anti-colonial rebellion (→ Revolution, II/44).

This incipient struggle for freedom (→ I/27), however, did not occur in the colonial empires of the Iberian powers, but instead in the Anglo-American colonies. The revolution of the Thirteen Colonies would also significantly change the meaning of the name America, for it now became synonymous in many European languages with the fledgling United States. Englishmen had already described the colonies in North America for some time as simply America and the settlers living there as Americans.

From the perspective of the settlers in the English colonies, there had never been any need for a generic proper name. After all, the colonies were independent entities connected only by their allegiance to the Crown (Stewart 1945, 170). It was not until the events came to a head in the 1770s that the battle line between the Crown and the colonists could not be ignored. Arriving at a name that set the colonists apart from the colonial masters therefore became all-the-more critical. In the "Articles of Association" from October 1774, the group of the colonies is called "America" and its inhabitants are referred to as "American subjects"

of the crown. Mention is even made in this document to “British America.” The first proper name to appear after the outbreak of open hostilities was the “United Colonies,” but also “United Colonies of America” and “North America.” It was used, for example, in the early conscription orders issued for the Continental Army. The fact that this name could not last is obvious, for the term “colony” explicitly referred to the British rule that was now being rejected.

What names actually came into question for the emergent state? In the title of his “Common Sense” from January 1776, Thomas Paine already addresses the “inhabitants of America.” On the very first page of his famous text, Paine writes: “The cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind” (Paine 1986, 64). While his America was undoubtedly Anglo-America, the claim that Paine uttered with revolutionary zeal was universal. America’s struggle was the struggle of humanity; his America was a model for people all over the world (→ Foundational Discourses, III/8).

The Declaration of Independence, authored by Thomas Jefferson, spoke of the “unanimous declaration of the thirteen United States of America.” Here, he replaced the term “colony” with “states” and, accordingly, “United Colonies” with “United States” (→ Nation and State Building, I/16). It was a name that encompassed many interests, while also expressing a clear demand for legitimacy. By the same token, the name was not entirely new or unfamiliar and, what was crucial given the various rivalries, it implied the equality of the former colonies. As the typeface of the document shows, however, the issue of the name was by no means as settled as one may want to believe in hindsight. All the same, “States of America” appears in capital letters. A delimitation or more precise naming (including geographical or cultural aspects) was also not undertaken. Indeed, this may have only contradicted the universal claim that defined the act of declaring independence.

The precursor of the U.S. Constitution, the “Articles of Confederation” from November 1777, also refers to “The United States of America” in its very first paragraph. Reference was moreover made to “America,” although here it only pertained to the new nation. This synonymy would in fact remain influential. The use of the name America for the former British colonies continued to be quite ambiguous, however. For instance, in the “Federalist Papers,” Alexander Hamilton used America to refer to the new state, but also to the colonial possessions of the English and Spanish, with whom the United States shared the continent. One even spoke in the first international treaty of the newly independent (albeit still not officially recognized) state with France – the Treaty of Alliance of 1778 – of the “United States of North America.” The treaty text itself, however, alternated terms without further ado. The Constitution of 1787 finally officially established the term “United States of America” and called its citizens “Americans.”

The events in the United States attracted worldwide attention. Documents like the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were disseminated rapidly in Europe and other parts of the world. This, consequently, gave rise to a profound semantic shift that the protagonists of the United States could not have anticipated. The terms “America” and “Americans” were now used exclusively, and with increasing frequency, for the new state, which had emerged from the English colonies in North America, and for its inhabitants.

Thanks to its democracy (→ II/32) and declaration of human rights (→ II/35), this America quickly became a model for Europe. It was the destination of a mass European migration (→ I/15) and, during this tumultuous period when many Europeans’ hopes for freedom went unfulfilled, it was viewed as a sign of the future. Similar to the Age of Discovery, emphasis was again placed on the novelty of America, but only the America of the north. The connotation of the name was not simply positive; it conveyed an almost utopian

promise (→ Utopias, III/23). It also contrasted greatly from the negative undertone in the colonial period when America was perceived to be wild, cannibalistic, and even degenerate. By the end of the 18th century, the use of the name became routine.

This particular America saw itself called upon to spread its own social system. The idea that the United States had a “manifest destiny” to expand territorially was already present early on (→ Land, II/15). The U.S. supposedly had a quasi-divine mission to disseminate its model of society, but also to extend its geographical reach. In the process, the belief in having been specially chosen took on a racist component in the 19th century (→ Race, I/39). Its adherents now viewed the “Anglo-Saxon race” of the United States as being naturally superior to all other races. The discourse of otherness became the basis of a new expansionist policy to the south of America, which some contemporaries portrayed as largely inevitable given the laws of nature (→ Interventionism, II/36).

But, how did these developments affect southern America? The American Revolution was closely followed in the realms of the Spanish Empire. As a result of the new policy of free trade, there were commercial opportunities and new contacts. In the wake of the spread of enlightened ideas, contacts between the intellectual elites intensified. They shared the ideas of popular sovereignty, human rights, and the development of the identity of the Creoles, whose commonality lay in their distinction from Europeans. There was a feeling of solidarity with the inhabitants of the “New World” in their struggle against colonialism and oppression. In addition, the exotic United States came to be respected as a political and economic model.

On the other hand, the increasing contact led to the growing realization that, despite all the similarities in their historical experience, Anglo and Hispanic America represented two fundamentally different structures. In the context of the North’s perceived absolute otherness, Simón Bolívar constructed a constitutional model which in its departure from federalism and strengthening of the executive was meant to represent an alternative project.

In the period that followed, the fractious southern America was increasingly marginalized, not only in terms of the external perception, but regarding how it perceived itself. As a consequence, on the American continent, educated Creoles viewed the United States as a utopia of prosperity and a glaring antithesis of their own imperfection – despite the threat it represented to their individual sovereignty. For U.S. Americans, however, the America of the south was a contrasting foil that served to confirm their own exceptional nature. The European perception appears to have only reinforced this black and white image. The success story – the United States – stood in clear opposition to the negative example of southern America. This America would have to discover its own name, which, again, would come from the outside. Given the attitude of the Latin American elites who were pushing to modernize (→ Modernization, I/35), it is hardly surprising that European influences were able to shape the region’s self-understanding, including its very nomenclature. This was initiated in particular by France in connection with the Pan-Latinism, which propagated the unity of the “Latin race” and the family of cultures (→ Pan-Americanism, II/40). The French ideology, which originally concerned Europe and contained a thoroughly imperialist element, could be transferred to America because the contrast between the Anglo-Saxon north and the Latin south seemed self-evident.

Conclusion

Around 1850, a process had come to an end in which the name America had experienced a significant shift in meaning. By the mid-19th century, in most languages, America denoted the formerly small and insignificant British colonies, which, after their independence, had

unwaveringly pursued the path to American hegemony. In this name, there was no room any longer for the “first America” of the south. On the one hand, this differentiation was ultimately due to the different historical contexts in which the colonies had to assert their independence from the mother countries (→ Independence Movements, I/10; Revolution, II/44; Nation and State Building, I/16). On the other hand, the head start and the relative success of the United States caused standards to be set that the Americans of the south could hardly achieve for a variety of reasons. The exclusive use of the name, America and its – albeit not completely – positive reinterpretation with respect to the United States effectively marginalized the South. A new name had to be discovered – and, significantly, it was found in Europe. The judgments that were connected to this schism would remain crucial for the regions’ further development: America was the land of the future, of progress, of democracy; Latin America was a region of unfulfilled hopes, stagnation, and anarchy. A baptism was thus carried out once again. Unlike in 1507, however, it cannot be ascribed to a document, but was rather manifested over an extended period. Here, too, the naming was a forceful act that divided the world anew. Once again, it entailed the formation of hierarchies, this time between the northern and the southern “hemispheres.” That said, regions that were originally thought of – such as Canada, the Caribbean, and even Brazil – have been increasingly pushed into the background, as the dichotomy between the U.S. and Hispanic America has predominated discursively. Besides this, the name “Latin America” was decided upon by the Creole elites and did not include the majority of the population, especially the indigenous peoples. On this front, it would take 150 years before anything would change.

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3

ATLANTIC

Ernesto Mercado Montero

The Atlantic is a field of study and methodology that has gained popularity among historians, sociologists, and economists over the last two decades. The label is derived from the Atlantic Ocean and encapsulates the idea of an arena where the main political, economic, and cultural transformations that forged the early modern world occurred. The geographic spectrum of the Atlantic is exceptionally flexible. Unlike nation-based historiographical fields, the Atlantic provides scholars with a framework for examining interconnections, movements, encounters, and exchanges between different peoples and cultures in Europe, Africa, and the Americas. Historians of the Atlantic world explore distant regions such as South America, the Caribbean, the Gulf of Guinea, the North Sea, and New England. They focus on the interrelations between local and global social, political, environmental, and scientific spheres. David Armitage (2002) distinguishes three different but not mutually exclusive forms of Atlantic historical inquiry. Circum-Atlantic history provides trans-imperial analyses around the Atlantic basin. This approach is mobile and connective, tracing the circulation of peoples, ideas, and commodities across the Atlantic world. Trans-Atlantic history is also trans-imperial in nature, but emphasizes links between distant regions. Cis-Atlantic history examines how transatlantic and interimperial economic, political, and social networks shaped a particular nation, city, state, or region. The chronological scope of the Atlantic field is also versatile. It may extend from Columbus' arrival to the New World in 1492 through the decline of the Atlantic slave trade (→ Slavery, I/18) and the consolidation of modern nation-states in the Americas during the mid-19th century (→ Nation and State Building, I/16).

Bernard Bailyn (1996) situates the origins of this concept back during World War I, when a transoceanic geopolitical consciousness emerged in the United States (→ Geopolitics, II/34). Nevertheless, scholarship employing Atlantic perspectives first appeared in greater numbers in the aftermath of World War II. Jacques Godechot's *Historie de l'Atlantique* (1947), Michael Kraus's *The Atlantic Civilization* (1949), and R. R. Palmer's *The Age of Democratic Revolution* (1959–1964), among many others, are representative of the first wave of Atlantic historical literature. One of the common characteristics of these early works is that they focus on the Atlantic Ocean as the cradle of Western civilization. This Eurocentric approach gradually shifted toward sophisticated examinations of the social, political, and cultural complexities of the early modern era. For instance, Eric Williams' *Capitalism and Slavery* (1944)

analyzes how triangular trade circuits linking Europe, Africa, and the Americas established the foundations of the Industrial Revolution (→ Colonial Economies, I/4; Capitalism, II/2). England, France, Spain, and the colonial Americas supplied exports and ships; Africa provided slave labor; and the New World's plantation societies furnished Europe with sugar, tobacco, and raw materials. Williams' Atlantic perspective illuminates how the imperial regulation of trade allowed merchants to accumulate capital, encouraged the development of the 18th-century banking system, and ultimately facilitated the emergence of industrial capitalism and abolitionist ideas.

The black and red and trans-imperial Atlantic

The consolidation of the Atlantic as a field of study suited for examining the development of the early modern world occurred over the course of the 1990s. Paul Gilroy's *The Black Atlantic* (1993) reinterprets the dominant conception of Atlantic history by examining the movement of individuals and ideas from a diasporic angle. He proposes the Black Atlantic model in contrast to narratives of global homogenization, uniform nation-states (→ II/38), and political discourses that align race (→ I/39) with national belonging. His narrative builds upon W.E.B. Du Bois' notion of a "double consciousness" among African diasporic subjects. Blacks in the New World navigate discourses of national belonging while acknowledging their African ancestry (→ African-descendant Literatures, III/2). The Black Atlantic confronts portrayals of the slave trade and plantation societies as premodern relics. Gilroy also discloses the relationship between the Age of Reason (→ Enlightenment, I/8), modern capitalism, and slavery. He suggests that a fruitful discussion of modernity should address issues such as how slaves selectively engaged with the political ideologies of the Enlightened Revolutions, the foundations of scientific racism, and the transmission of cultural and racial hierarchies across the Atlantic world.

Paul Gilroy's *Black Atlantic* not only enriches the history of modernity, but also represents a point of inflexion in Atlantic historiography. In spite of the emphasis on the North Atlantic World, Gilroy's intellectual contributions to African diaspora studies continue to inspire young scholars two decades after *The Black Atlantic*'s publication. The remarkable influence of Gilroy's thoughts transformed the Atlantic field into a dialectic exercise centered on the intervention of Europeans, Africans, and their descendants as agents of modernity. Jenny Pulsipher (2005) and Jace Weaver (2014) challenge this panorama by underlining the Amerindian communities' centrality to the Atlantic experience (→ Indigenous Peoples, I/11). Recently, Weaver has developed the idea of the Red Atlantic. He examines Natives' intervention in the extended process of globalization from the early modern era through the 20th century. Central to his argument is the notion that "native resources, ideas, and peoples themselves traveled the Atlantic with regularity and became among the most basic defining components of the Atlantic cultural exchange" (Weaver 2014, 28). He calculates that some 6,000 Amerindians crossed the Atlantic Ocean as slaves, sailors, and diplomats, both by force and voluntarily. They participated in the fur trade and integrated into the emerging legal culture as petitioners and brokers.

The Atlantic approaches reveal the inconsistencies of discourses that divide the world into rigid categories, such as Anglo and Latin America, and the North and South Atlantic. Under such divisions, "Northwestern Europe and their colonies became distinctively 'modern,' while the other regions of the Atlantic littoral (Latin America, Africa, and Iberia) remained 'backward'" (Cañizares-Esguerra 2013, 597–598). One of the principles of the Atlantic field is to undermine this teleological narrative by illustrating the fluid nature of imperial boundaries and the entangled trajectory of European empires in the New World.

As Stephanie Smallwood (2007) demonstrates, an inter-American and trans-imperial perspective is a prerequisite to illuminating the social and economic dynamics of the early modern world. The British, Portuguese, and Dutch competed and allied to control the circulation of gold and slaves in the African Gold Coast and the plantation colonies in the 18th-century circum-Caribbean (→ Slavery, I/18). The Jamaican and Barbadian slave traders not only supplied the British West Indies and the American mainland with slave force, but also Spanish traders from Portobello and Cartagena of the Indies. The Atlantic framework has also provided historians with mechanisms for reconsidering the operation of the Atlantic slave trade beyond imperial, cultural, and religious boundaries. Intercolonial slave trade entangled profits from different nations. London did not control the circulation of slaves from Africa to the British colonies in the Americas. Caribbean merchants, speculators, and wholesalers dispatched 15–25 percent of the slaves arriving to the main British ports to other locations in the British, French, and Spanish colonies for resale (O'Malley 2014).

The Atlantic field illuminates the shortcomings of examining early modern geography under national paradigms. Lauren Benton (2010) undermines the assumption that maritime empires comprised vertical power structures subordinated to European metropolises. Contrarily, the American colonies functioned as semiautonomous spaces with legal and political particularities. New World's rivers, highlands, and islands were *sui generis* legal zones. Convict islands, for instance, posed risks to imperial order. The threat of mutiny and slave revolt encouraged the institutionalization of violence and transformed forts or *presidios* into legal limbos under military command.

Similarly, David Hancock (2009) reexamines the notion of oceanic corridors as commercial circuits ruled exclusively by metropolitan agents. His investigation into Madeira's wine complex demonstrates the versatility of Atlantic commercial routes when decentered from England, Portugal, and Madeira. Markets and capitalist agents emerged out of marketplaces and trade, not from imperial regulations. Huguenots, African descendants, and colonial traders developed truly trans-imperial commercial networks. While wine distributors imported manufacturing ingredients into Madeira from the Baltic, England, France, Spain, and Portugal, Madeira's exporters built sophisticated intercontinental and inter-American systems of trade with partners in Europe, North America, and the Spanish, Dutch, and British Caribbean (→ Global Commodity Chains, II/12).

The Atlantic in the age of reason

Besides illuminating how porous imperial borderlands (→ II/26) transformed the New World into a stage for overlapping commercial projects, the Atlantic paradigm has also suited academics' need to explore correlations between sovereignty, modernity, and the Enlightenment. Laurent Dubois draws our attention to the pertinence of "writing a history of the Enlightenment whose actors include not only the familiar literate intellectuals that historians and theorists have long studied, but others who did not for the most part articulate their political philosophy in writing – the slaves" (2006, 2). The enslaved Enlightenment is eminently Atlantic. It discloses the connections between literate elites on both sides of the ocean, analyzes diverse spheres of intellectual debate, and studies the intercolonial circulation of ideas. Following Gilroy's path, Dubois dismisses the assumption that Europeans were the exclusive architects of political theory and modern ideas of the nation-state. Instead, he proposes European, African, and American epistemologies integrated to form the Enlightenment project. This perspective allows Dubois to disclose the complex process that gave form to modern ideas of belonging, governance, and citizenship (→ II/27).

Dubois' approach to the Enlightenment represents just one instance where Atlantic approaches facilitate reexaminations of the production and transmission of knowledge between Europe, Africa, and the Americas. Neil Safier's *Measuring the New World* (2008) adapts the Atlantic methodology, primarily centered on the movement of people and exchange of commodities and ideas between Atlantic port cities, to explore colonial Quito's intellectual production. He suggests that the Enlightenment was not a metropolitan movement. Instead, he argues that it spawned from the transoceanic circulation of ideas, rectifications, and overlapping intellectual influences. Safier demonstrates that influential works of the Age of Reason such as La Condamine's *Carta a la Provincia de Quito* and Diderot's *Encyclopedia* employed indigenous knowledge and sources (→ Indigenous Literatures, III/10).

Likewise, the emergence of Creole naturalists such as Francisco José de Caldas, Juan Viscardo y Guzmán, and José Hipólito Unane reveals that scientific knowledge emerged from the interaction of multiple actors in the Americas and Europe. Mark Thurner (2011) argues that Peru's intellectuals forged a Creole patriotic epistemology that privileged the first-hand observation of material and cultural artifacts. Thurner questions the idea of American peripheries existing as passive receptors of Enlightened knowledge. For him, the Enlightenment emerged out of a Creole scientific critique and meticulous reconsiderations. This method, he maintains, adapted the Baroque and Renaissance traditions of exegesis and revisionism to the New World's local conditions.

These Atlantic histories invite us to reconsider the idea of Europe as the tribunal of universal historicism. Historians have transformed the Atlantic into a field that connects different social and intellectual spheres in Europe, Africa, and the Americas. Recently, scholars have illustrated the mutability of scientific practices in the Age of Reason. James Delbourgo (2006) illuminates how the revisionist spirit that characterized Spanish Creole intellectuals extended throughout the American continent. He offers an examination of Enlightened North America beyond prevailing narratives of Jacobinism, political representation, and projects of nation-state formation. The elements of Empiricism, informal economic connections, and entrepreneurialism in experiments with electricity were also crucial in forging the American modernity. Benjamin Franklin's empirical work with electricity represented a major break with European epistemological hierarchies. It empowered North America to become the epicenter of scientific experimentation in the British Atlantic world. American insurgents transformed the rhetoric of electricity into a symbol of Republican resistance. They portrayed Benjamin Franklin as a physical heroic genius who incarnated a new relationship between knowledge and power and a nationalistic myth of mastery (→ Foundational Discourses, III/8).

The inter-American and trans-imperial nature of the Atlantic was not limited to transforming the early modern world into a stage for cultural and epistemological hybridities (→ Hybridity, I/30), but also favored social and economic exchanges between Africa, Europe, and the South America. For instance, Xabier Lamikiz (2010) explores the rise of merchant communities linking Cadiz, Bilbao, and colonial Peru in the 18th century. These traders shaped maritime routes that linked South America and Spain via Cape Horn and established new trade networks between Europe, South America, the Atlantic, and the Pacific. The African Gold Coast, Ivory Coast, and the Bight of Benin were also critical for the consolidation of the Atlantic empires. 18th-century African commercial agents were as significant to the Atlantic economy as merchants from Liverpool, Nantes, or Cartagena of the Indies. Individuals, such as the Fante leader John Corrantee, were skillful autonomous businessmen and diplomats. They shifted their commercial alliances with rival European empires, received elitist education in Europe, and played off the ongoing interimperial rivalries for their own benefit (Sparks 2014).

These connections are important for understanding the emergence of black identities and ideas on ethnic difference (→ Ethnicity, I/25). Elizabeth Kiddy (2005) analyzes how African descendants recreated diverse African and Catholic rituals and symbols in colonial Brazil. As many other regions in North America and the Caribbean, South Atlantic cities such as Montevideo and Buenos Aires also witnessed the emergence of new diasporic identities. Alex Borucki (2015) examines how the entanglement between slave trade routes, black colonial militias, and Catholic confraternities forged networks among African descendants, new black identities, and black “nations” in the 18th-century Río de la Plata. Inter-marriage between Indians, African descendants, and Europeans shaped new ethnic labels such as mulatto, mestizo, and quarter-tone in the Iberian imaginary. Some of these categories transferred to the British and French Atlantic, becoming fundamentals of colonial racially based ideologies.

The fluid nature of the Atlantic world also allowed subaltern subjects to subvert colonial social hierarchies (→ Colonial Rule, I/5). James Sweet’s study on the African healer Domingos Álvares (2011) illustrates that knowledge empowered individuals like him to navigate slave societies, forge interethnic networks of kinship, and ultimately obtain manumission. Domingo’s journeys between West Africa, Brazil, and Portugal epitomize transcontinental routes for circulating knowledge, while the incorporation of Catholic symbols in his pharmacopeia epitomizes the formation of hybrid epistemologies in the Atlantic world. African epistemologies also represented mainstream models of knowledge in the 17th-century Spanish Caribbean. Pablo Gómez (2013) examines how the San Sebastian Hospital in Cartagena of the Indies functioned as a center for the hybridization of conceptions of the human body and healing techniques of Bran, Arará, Carabalí, and Congo cultures during the early modern era. Mutual learning and intellectual permeability among Europeans, Spanish Creoles, and Africans forged the quintessence of Atlantic therapeutics.

The Atlantic in the age of revolution

Similar to scientific empiricism and cultural hybridities, the transmission and reinterpretation of metropolitan political ideologies also reveal the entangled nature of the Atlantic world. The Age of Revolutions has captivated significant scholarly attention in the last two decades. Early studies about interimperial political affairs have evolved toward analyses centered on American and Caribbean interrelations across political, social, and cultural boundaries. Historians of the Revolutionary Atlantic draw our attention toward the New World as an axis of modern political principles (→ Revolution, II/44). For example, slaves turned citizens expanded the initial scope of the French Republican meaning of equality. It was in the late 18th-century Caribbean, not in Paris, where ideas that favored the abolition of colonial slavery, and universal and natural rights merged (→ Human Rights, II/35) (Dubois 2004). The Atlantic Revolutions facilitated the inter-American geographical mobility of Europeans, white Creoles, and African descendants. Ashli White (2010) examines how refugees of the French colony of Saint-Domingue landed on the North American east coast after the destruction of Le Cap Français in June of 1793. Likewise, Maya Jasanoff (2011) explores the trajectories of hundreds of black loyalists who crossed the Ocean from North America to London and Sierra Leone after the American Revolutionary War.

One of the major advantages the Atlantic framework offers is the opportunity to explore the social and political dynamics inherent in 18th-century interimperial turmoil. This era brought exceptional opportunities for subalterns’ political involvement and geographic mobility. Polyglot and multicultural African descendants navigated geopolitical instability by filling the European powers’ necessity for troops during wartimes (→ Military, II/37).

These Atlantic Creoles shifted their allegiances from one empire to another, in keeping with local and global political exigencies. Aware of the animosity between Britain and Spain, for example, numerous fugitive slaves arrived in Spanish Florida after escaping from British plantations in North America. After swearing fidelity to the Spanish king, the former slaves embraced Roman Catholicism and the Spanish legal culture (Landers 2010). In sum, Atlantic methodologies provide a comprehensive examination of the lives of individuals who crossed geographic, cultural, and linguistic boundaries in the New World.

Far from marginal to the transformations of the early modern world, subaltern subjects took advantage of global contingencies and established allegiances with antagonist political factions. Marcela Echeverri (2011) establishes that Amerindians and African descendants embraced loyalism during the wars of independence in New Granada (present-day Colombia) as a strategy for navigating a turbulent era (→ Independence Movements, I/10). Slaves understood their political role as loyalist not as a rebellion against their masters, but as protectors of the Spanish king's authority. The slaves composed memorials to the Spanish Crown, requesting freedom in exchange for militancy. Indians also joined the loyalist troops as a tactic to gain land titles and exceptions from paying tribute. Histories following traditional nation-based methodologies fail to illuminate the complexity of a revolutionary Atlantic that was not constrained by national, imperial, linguistic, or ethnic boundaries.

It is equally misleading to examine Cuba's 19th-century slave society as an anomaly resulting from an isolated and "retrograde" Spanish Empire. As Alejandro de la Fuente (2008) postulates, Havana City integrated an entangled system of communication and trade that included Cartagena of the Indies, Seville, the Canary Islands, Cape Verde, and the Netherlands. Cuban planters took advantage of Havana's long history of connections with the Atlantic world, including nearby French colonies, after the outbreak of the Haitian Revolution in 1791. Revolutionary Saint-Domingue "profoundly shaped the experience of enslavement and conceptions of freedom in Cuba and the Atlantic World in the nineteenth century" (Ferrer 2014, 12). News, people, and documents from Saint-Domingue arrived in the main port cities of the Americas. While Haiti became a destination for fugitive slaves from the Spanish, French, and British Caribbean, small-scale clandestine slave trafficking arose between revolutionary Saint-Domingue and Cuba. Cuban colonial elites invoked the image of Haiti after local insurrections in 1808 and 1812, gained concessions from a weak metropole, reinforced the hand of slavery on the island, and justified postponing abolition. Ultimately, an Atlantic approach to the Cuban slave system at the turn of the 19th century allows us to reflect on a series of veiled but significant interconnections between the French and Spanish Caribbean.

An inter-American perspective

Recently, historians have examined the relationship between local and global forces from a truly inter-American vantage point. Fabrício Prado (2015) illustrates how trans-imperial interactions and political networks between Spain and Portugal in Río de la Plata transformed the imperial rule between the 1760s and the 1820s. Local elites in Montevideo and its adjacent hinterland, the Banda Oriental, expanded their commercial and political influence over borderland territories with Brazil. These individuals built transnational relations upon familial, religious, and political networks that eventually forged new regional identities and original geopolitical arrangements.

Currently, the Atlantic continues to be a relevant and promising field. Anthropologists, scholars of religious studies, and interdisciplinary approaches have embraced this framework

to transcend the limitations of national paradigms. Historians of the Atlantic world have created kaleidoscopic narratives of entangled empires, enslaved and free individuals, merchants, and Amerindians that connected the Americas, Africa, and Europe. As Cañizares-Esguerra suggests, future research should consider “each space as shot through with a multiplicity of entangled actors and agendas (individual, local, regional, national, imperial)” (2013, 602).

The Atlantic field also provides us with new methodological tools and perspectives for examining how inter-American dynamics shaped the early modern world. Comprehensive examinations of the trans-imperial links between the British, Lusophone, Dutch, and Spanish dominions in the north and south Atlantic during the early modern era might illuminate new interimperial political, commercial, and cultural dialogues. For example, North American traders and sailors from Rhode Island and Massachusetts forged effective trade relationships with local agents in Cuba, Paramaribo, Rio de Janeiro, and Buenos Aires in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. These networks also extended to Asian and Pacific ports. The Atlantic paradigm might be an instrument for illuminating not only more inter-American connections, but also new relationships between the Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and Pacific worlds.

The fragmented circum-Caribbean geography also represents a suitable space for future examinations centered on the role of military and commercial agents, as well as cultural brokers, from a truly trans-imperial and inter-American perspective. The lives of ordinary people, such as Honduran mahogany cutters, free and enslaved black seamen in North and South America, and rum and indigo traders who traveled across the Atlantic, are a window for examining new dialogues and intersections between social, political, and commercial spheres beyond national frameworks. Miskito Indians and Caribs also established long-lasting relationships, including political alliance and slave trafficking across imperial borderlands, with competing European powers. Should one examine these networks in tandem with traditional circuits of slaves’ distribution throughout the Atlantic world? Or maybe these systems operated under different geographic and commercial paradigms? Perhaps a holistic perspective would allow scholars to escape from narratives that implicitly subordinate subalterns to the dynamics of imperial markets. Undoubtedly, we witness a promising panorama for the Atlantic world as an inspiration for future groundbreaking scholarship.

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4

COLONIAL ECONOMIES

Juan Marchena Fernández

In historical writing on the Americas, the *colonial period* (approximately 1492–1825) has referred to the time period in which certain European states forcibly imposed economic relations on large swathes of the American continent, exerting control over their resources; the workforce necessary to extract or produce those resources; and their interior markets. In the American territories, colonizers set up extensive power structures – administrative, political, and military – while also establishing social, ideological, religious, and cultural control. These vectors of domination constitute what has come to be called colonial regimes (→ Colonial Rule, I/5).

Colonial economies have been thought of as extraction economies (→ Extractivism, II/9), which is to say, devoted entirely to the removal or production of goods (primarily metals, but also other raw materials, textile fibers, and foodstuffs) to be *exported* to the colonizing country. In exchange for these goods, colonies received industrial and semi-industrial products, which were indispensable and were not manufactured – not permitted to be manufactured, in fact – in the colonies. As part of the exchange, they also received slave labor from Africa (→ Slavery, I/18), which they used in areas where the Indigenous population was not large enough to meet their labor needs (→ Indigenous Peoples, I/11).

Products imported from European and African ports were given a high price in American markets to make up for the disparity between the tremendous value of goods exported to Europe and the originally low value of imported goods. By artificially correcting the trade balance between colonizing country and colony, and imposing a strict monopoly on cross-Atlantic trade (→ Atlantic, I/3), Europe made sure that the colonies remained commercially dependent.

In recent years, historical writing on the colonial Americas has expanded its attention to the sector of the colonial economy that was *not* directed outward, but rather inward, toward the American interior. Scholarship has become more nuanced, with the aim of assessing, explaining, and revaluing this interior sector, which included the significant, vibrant native economy of the American world and Indigenous societies' systems of exchange, as well as the establishment of very regionalized, but still interconnected, colonial economies. To elaborate on this study, it is necessary to revisit what some writers have referred to as the generative, inwardly oriented economy, as distinct from the extraction economies. In these brief pages, an attempt will be made to analyze both sides of the equation.

A sea of trade

First, it should be pointed out that during the 16th- and 17th-century Atlantic Age, not all colonial powers found themselves in a position to develop and oversee colonial economies across the Atlantic. Following a long tradition of oceanic navigation – including the much earlier discovery of the Atlantic islands (The Azores, Canary Islands, Madeira), the north and west coasts of Africa, and, after 1492 and 1500, the coasts of the West Indies and American continents – subjects of the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies began to organize on their own (though with royal permits, or in some combination) a number of important risk and trade companies. With these companies, they founded a string of commercial installations along the American coast, dedicated to the trade (forced exchanges) of high-value goods for very low-value trifles or trinkets.

The resulting profits spurred the organization of all manners of expeditions, individuals in search of new sources of metal, and indigenous labor to mine it. By the same token, other companies and venture businesses were being organized from non-Iberian European ports – both Atlantic (France, England, Holland) and Mediterranean (Genoa, Florence, Naples, Sicily) – only somewhat legal and somewhat official, but encouraged by their respective monarchies, regardless. Sometimes, these companies consisted of more prominent sailors, who put themselves at the disposal of the different monarchs, and who were hired for their nautical or cartographic expertise. The sailors were Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, French, and English – a sort of internationalism of the sea. Other times, sailors organized on their own, into something akin to companies of *seafarers*, *gens de mer*.

The insular and continental Caribbean and the northeast coast of Brazil were the first sites of this commercial activity, which used a model similar to earlier Mediterranean merchants' associations or African trading posts. Soon after, came the more direct hunt for resources: mining sandbanks for pearls and placer deposits for gold, where Indigenous peoples had traditionally mined, and plundering the natives' burial sites, temples, palaces, and reservoirs of metal. To accomplish this, the company men not only carried out devastating conquests and cavalry raids, but they also organized conquest enterprises. In the end, they had gained control of vast amounts of territory (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7) and a great mass of the Indigenous population, whom they forced through sheer coercion, as well as a process of acculturation and evangelization (→ Religion and Missionizing, I/17), to work for this mining economy. Assaulting the merchant ships that carried these goods also proved to be a lucrative business, and this became the work of the new venture companies. Along with the merchants' associations and shielding themselves from official navies, they established the first stations on the American coasts for refueling and replenishing the water supply for their naval boarding operations.

Once the resources obtained by simple plunder had been exhausted, or when these became more difficult to find, then began the direct extraction from the mines (principally silver) and from the gold deposits, which had just been discovered. The search for metal was so extensive that in 1575, just fifty years after the initial conquest of the American interior, the primary sources of metal had already been located, and the majority of them mined by a swarm of novice entrepreneur miners. These miners were transforming from basic traders into *industrialists*, taking on the role of owners of mines and machinery (the system of technical equipment needed to extract silver). They exploited Indigenous labor with permissions they negotiated with their respective monarchs and, in this way, were able to operate the mines at the lowest possible cost, while earning substantial profits (→ Unfree Labor, I/19).

In reality, the traders acted like metal prospectors, taking advantage of the market's imbalance of supply and demand. As a result, the shipment of manufactured goods from

European ports to colonial enclaves continued to increase. The number of colonists settling in these American ports and in the interior also kept growing (→ Migration, I/15), as did their eagerness to use the metal they had amassed to purchase products that denoted high social status. These products included textiles, clothing, formal apparel, and horseback riding gear; high-end accessories to flaunt like luxurious furniture, linens, silverware, glasses, decorative weapons, European food and drink that they refused to give up; and popular goods, too, such as hardware, tools, and gunpowder.

This merchandise was sent to, and meant to be bought and used in, the ports. However, it was also spread throughout the immense continental territories, especially cities and mining towns in the interior, in an effort to promote the most favorable conditions for exchanging these products for metal, which, in turn, transformed the products, just like the metal itself, into monetary-assets.

The Spanish and Portuguese monarchies quickly came up with control mechanisms for the trade and negotiation, intent as they were on manipulating the course of trade through fixed, unique ports (Seville and Lisbon in Europe; Veracruz, Havana, Cartagena, Panama, Lima, Salvador de Bahía, Recife, or Rio de Janeiro in the Americas). To the same end, they created fiscal institutions like the *Casa de la Contratación* (Spanish Supreme Trade Commission) and *Casa da Índia* (Portuguese Overseas Trade Authority), where they charged exclusive customs duties and went after any unauthorized or irregular trade.

Trade quickly became a regulated, recorded, and tabulated *carrera* (the *Carrera de Indias*, *Carrera da Índia*, or “Route to the Indies”). Throughout the process, and in successive stages, they were able to *monetize* the metals by ascribing market value to them by exchanging them for merchandise, and the more unequal these operations were, the more successful they became. Therefore, the best “business opportunity” consisted of trading the least possible amount of merchandise (originally acquired at the least possible cost) for the greatest possible amount of metal in the Indies. Almost all operations were carried out on credit, through loans and installments – so-called *cambio* (financing) – which yielded greater profit, even in the mere trading of merchandise for metal. More and more, colonial commerce was based on *cambio* and *oportunidad* (opportunities) instead of simple barter: trading capital, instead of goods. Thus, a complex web of operations formed, a *Manual of Deals and Contracts* (*Suma de ratos y contraltos*), as defined by the Spanish Dominican friar Tomás de Mercado (1571). The Atlantic was a sea of trade, and mercantilism the ship that sailed it.

In the second half of the 16th century, by means of the Manila Galleon (also known as The China Ship), American silver reached the Oriental world. The tides of trade across the Pacific, with Mexico as well as Lima, grew over time; Asian products began to arrive in America, and from there to Europe.

These rivers of traded metal converged at the European ports of the Iberian monopoly, and next found their way to the rest of Europe’s commercial centers, where most commercialized goods originated. This activity set off an explosion in the value of metals and the price of products, but at the same time prompted production that focused specifically on the American market. France, England, and Holland created and built up companies that specialized in these dealings. As a result – whether through the navigation routes (Spanish and Portuguese) or through the Companies – European merchandise acquired a high value, even higher thanks to it being sold in the colonies’ central markets, where it could be exchanged directly for metal. America had become a part of what Fernand Braudel termed the world-economy (Braudel 1979) and Immanuel Wallerstein termed the world-system (Wallerstein 1974) (→ Capitalism, II/3).

In places where there did not exist a sufficient Indigenous population to be used as a workforce, or where this population had been killed by the wars of conquest or diseases brought over by European colonizers, traders (primarily Portuguese but, soon after, French, English, and Dutch businessmen) introduced an enormous enslaved population from Africa, which very quickly climbed to the tens of thousands. These men and women were kidnapped, imprisoned, and enchained by slavers in Africa. At first, this occurred on the coast (in what was called Guinea of Cape Verde, the Guinea Mine, and the Slave Coast), and later in the interior (the kingdom of Kongo and the land of Angola). The slaves were then forcibly transferred to American ports where they were sold and distributed across the continent, forming a diaspora, forced and cruel – another inhumane facet of globalization, as Paul Gilroy (1995) has described. The growing demand for labor boosted the price of slaves at slave markets, and these markets became the nuclei of colonial America, engendering a new black Atlantic culture.

Consequently, African slavery turned into the third pillar of the colonial economy, in particular the extraction economy, which now comprised: raw materials mined in America and transported to Europe; European products sent to America and acquired in exchange for the raw materials; low-value European goods brought to Africa in order to buy slaves; and slave labor forcibly taken from Africa to America, in exchange for which, more American metal was funneled to Europe. And trading soon came to incorporate more than just metals, pearls, and gemstones. It expanded to include other types of goods, for example: natural materials native to America – and in high demand – like dyes; Asian goods; and other commodities held in increasingly high esteem in Europe, such as sugar, tobacco, cacao, wool, fruits, and various types of cattle feed (→ Columbian Exchange, I/6).

Non-Iberian colonies

Some Atlantic countries – primarily France, England, and Holland – arrived at the American market after the Spanish and Portuguese, and quickly found that it was closed off to them because of the Iberian monopoly's laws. Thus, these countries chose to adopt and develop a variety of strategies at once:

One: Try to obtain control of products being exported to America from European ports, Lisbon and Seville in particular, as their marketplaces could not meet the continuously increasing demand, and so they had to purchase their merchandise in a large space, both commercial and productive. Textiles and other exported raw materials and necessities were controlled, in large part, by these non-Iberian producers and merchants. Throughout Europe, they formed dense and extensive networks, which converged in the same ports as the peninsular monopoly. They made the most substantial profits of colonial exchange: profits that were promptly used to grant loans (at a high interest rate) and credit, both of which Atlantic trade necessitated, as the majority of operations were run “on credit” and “at risk.” These European networks – many familial, controlled by “New Christians,” or formerly Jewish *Conversos* – established between ports in the Hispano-Portuguese monopoly, as well as in the north of Europe, quickly grew in number and density, until they almost monopolized the very monopoly of commercial trade and the accompanying financial mechanisms.

Two: Bring manufactured products directly to American ports at a price much lower than the official price, without going through the Iberian monopoly institutions. They carried out these massive contraband operations with their own ships, using bases already established on the American continent. In return, they obtained great quantities of metal without having to go through Spanish and Portuguese authorities, nor pay them taxes or fees. These maneuvers

enabled them to offer better prices than what was offered by official trade, giving them a competitive advantage.

Three: Carry out direct attacks on official merchant vessels in transit between America and Europe, especially those traveling from colony to colonizing country, as it was in this direction that ships were transporting metals. They conducted these attacks through privateer operations, with letters of marque happily granted to them by European monarchs, who wanted to take advantage of the many wars declared during this period. Privateering at times facilitated commercial operations of great importance, and was directly tied to smuggling. Other versions of such plundering operations were conducted by filibusters, similar to privateers but without letters of marque, as well as pirates, whose attacks on merchant ships were indiscriminate, and with no regard for which flag the ship bore nor which port it sailed from.

Four: Establish themselves directly in the American territories, whether by conquering the Spanish or Portuguese; by settling in “empty” land (many Caribbean islands were still in such condition, semi-deserted from the few decades of Spanish invasion); by establishing bases of operations for commercial trade (legal, privateering, or smuggling of ships carrying merchandise or slaves); or by farming, especially monocultures such as sugar, cacao, coffee, and tobacco. This is how the majority of non-Iberian colonies were started, establishing themselves in both the Caribbean and in other continental areas, like the Guianas and Central America.

The non-Iberian colonies in the Caribbean reached notable development in the 17th century, and even more so in the 18th. The colonies had become active commercial and production centers, and distinguished themselves clearly from the Iberian colonial model: on the one hand, they were commercial bases focusing on smuggled goods, for which they received mostly metal, and on the other hand, they were settlements with plantation economies, dedicated to intensive monoculture farming and exporting their crops to Europe. The plantations relied on slave labor from Africa, which – because of the high mortality rate among slaves – plantation owners had to replace at a high rate.

The biggest of the non-Iberian colonies in the Caribbean was the island of Jamaica, conquered by the Spanish in 1655 and transformed into an enormous hacienda. Jamaica became one of the top sugar exporters in the world, and its port, Kingston, one of the most active of the Caribbean, thanks to the quantity of goods and merchandise distributed from there throughout America. Plantation owners, merchants, slave vendors, and chartered company officers formed a skilled and efficient mercantile elite. Their dynamism was in marked contrast to the antiquated ways trade was understood in Spanish ports, where the monopoly, managed from Seville and Cádiz, had served as the foundation of mercantile operations for many decades.

The other major European colony in the Caribbean was Saint Domingue, the western region of the island of Hispaniola, which was also turned into a French colony in 1697. Saint Domingue was another prosperous settlement based on its plantation economy, at first producing sugar, and later adding coffee and, to a lesser extent, cotton and indigo, until the region became the most prosperous of France’s colonies in the second half of the 18th century: approximately, 40 percent of the sugar and 60 percent of the coffee consumed in Europe came from this colony, to which was added the production from other French islands like Guadeloupe and Martinique.

Holland also had colonial settlements in the West Indies, which they developed mostly through their chartered companies, in particular, the Dutch West India Company (*Geotroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie*, WIC). Their activity extended to the islands of Curacao, Aruba, and Bonaire (located opposite the Venezuelan coast), which they took from the Spanish in 1634 and 1636. They also took Recife and the region of Pernambuco (on the

coast of Brazil) from the Portuguese, and controlled these areas between 1630 and 1654, connecting Holland to the African colonies, which they also took from the Portuguese: Luanda (in Angola, between 1641 and 1648), and the Gold Coast (now Ghana) and Slave Coast (now Benin) in 1642. Other Dutch establishments were positioned in the north of the continent, like the colony of New Amsterdam (now New York) in 1625, as well as what is now Connecticut, Delaware, and New Jersey.

Thanks to these acquisitions and settlements, the WIC oversaw a vast circuit in which products as varied as sugar, pelts, tobacco, cotton, metal, woven fabrics, and, of course, slaves were transported from one place to another, earning the WIC the greatest profits in this tri-continental game of trade.

These chartered companies in France and Holland, as well as England, developed under the norms of privileged societies, given the monopolies their respective monarchies had achieved in their colonies. The companies also performed administrative functions in these areas, even including a military role, as they exerted pressure on their rivals – both other companies and other crowns of Europe. The companies' chief traders and shareholders, in the ports of origin, conducted their affairs according to profitability and business opportunities. The combination of private initiative and privileged officials made them exceptionally competitive, compared to the more rigid, state-run Iberian models, which were difficult to adapt to different circumstances.

In the north of the American continent, England had continued to form colonial settlements, since its establishment of New England: Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and the aforementioned formerly Dutch colonies, conquered in 1664, adding to those established in Pennsylvania, Maryland, the Carolinas, and Georgia. The settlements were under the direct rule of the British crown, whether they were controlled by the settlers themselves or the proprietors. These colonies were founded on agricultural production, at first limited to subsistence agriculture, but later reaching a greater scope. The fundamental difference between them and the Spanish colonies or the Caribbean plantation colonies was *who* they were: a predominantly white population of English, Welsh, Irish, and Scottish origin, who mixed very little with the indigenous population (→ Whiteness, I/46). The slave population also kept growing, primarily in the south, where the plantation economy (first cotton and tobacco, then rice and indigo) reached a significant level of development. The absence of a landed elite facilitated a certain degree of equality among the proprietors, who became the leading political and economic agents of the new colonial society.

By the mid-17th century, the colonial economy no longer belonged to the two Iberian imperial powers. Rather, America had become a part of the multilateral, international web of exchange that stretched between the shores of the Atlantic.

A look into the American interior

Yet how did the American colonial economy evolve in this context? This requires looking at the other side of the equation: the generative, inwardly oriented economy, with its robust domestic markets, a feature of the Iberian (and particularly the Spanish) colonial economies that distinguished them from the settlement and plantation economies.

The discovery of resources in this part of the American world gave rise to regional specialization. For that reason, zones devoted to mining and metal production can be seen (plants for mining and refining); zones with the high population needed to perform this work (mining towns); production zones to meet the needs of those populations; and zones in which the products, raw materials, and metals were bought and sold. At the same time, it was necessary

to establish fixed ports to gather the metals and merchandise, and to hold annual trade fairs. Distinct commercial zones were set up for this purpose (Havana, Cartagena, Veracruz, Lima), with warehouses equipped to store the merchandise, customs to regulate it, residences for traders to stay in, and headquarters and compounds to keep guard over the merchandise and also to determine the best routes through which to distribute these colonial products to the places where they would be used. Cities were founded (Potosí, Minas Gerais), connecting the routes on which metals, merchandise, and slaves were transported from the ports to the mining towns.

Mining, and the subsequent movement of metals, significantly increased regionalization: of laborers, who went to the places with the greatest demand (this travel was often forced through *mitas*, a pre-Hispanic system of obligatory labor in the Andean region); of the products needed to meet the needs of workers and their families; and even of the supplies necessary for mining. All of these shifts resulted in a scope of circulation and a network of communication that extended for thousands of kilometers, complete with dozens of hubs where the routes came together. These hubs served simultaneously as markets, warehouses, and control posts to maintain Europe's fiscal system. And it was not just the internationally traded goods circulating on these routes, but also regional products, a large fraction of which were provisions for the various colonial hubs (Assadourian 1982): production hubs (for example, Potosí, which had reached a population of 120,000 by 1620 and was located at an altitude of 4,000 meters, where nothing was produced except metal; as well as Zacatecas, Querétaro, and Guanajuato in Mexico; and Minas Gerais in Brazil, which also had a large population); commercial hubs (the ports with swelling populations and significant purchasing power, where everyday consumer products attained a high value); and political and administrative hubs (headquarters of viceroyalty, courts, governorships, and archbishoprics).

Soon, other types of natural currencies were established, which, along with metal, functioned as "bargaining chips." These came from different areas, but were of high consumption in the populated hubs. They included: the coca leaf from the Andean region; wine, *pulque* (an alcoholic drink made from the agave plant), and liquor, produced in the temperate valleys; woven fabrics for the indigenous population, handcrafted in artisans' homes or made from wool, cotton, and linen in textile plants (with primitive looms for mass production), which were an important resource for the indigenous population from the beginning of the 17th century, but which also obligated this population to participate in the production of fabric; mules, used principally for transport, and which had to be deliberately "produced" in areas suited to their needs, fed and fattened up in other areas, and sold in special fairs called *tabladas*, held in the trade network's major hubs; and Andean sheep (llamas, alpacas, country sheep). The Indigenous society's traditional production and trade continued to hold great importance, while adapting to the times, and to the increasingly Europeanized markets.

The colonial economy utilized these goods and their channels of distribution and exchange in order to insert itself into – and dominate – the existing system. Regional products created a large sphere of circulation, with metal as the primary unit of trade, assigning value to other goods and allowing for these goods and accompanying services, including labor and transport, to be exchanged across short, medium, and long distances. Abundant wealth was generated in this sphere, where the Royal Roads came together or merged with the traditional roads of the indigenous population and later the *mestizo* population of mixed European and Indigenous descent (→ Hybridity, I/30). It was evident that the two economic systems – export–import and interior trade – wound up connecting in a myriad of ways and for a myriad of reasons, at times even blending together.

During the 18th century, all of the processes pointed out thus far accelerated. Metal production reached record levels and, with the boost in assets coming into the economic

system, the momentum of commercial activity continued to increase. Agricultural production and exports increased, in accordance with the growing external demand from mostly Europe, but also included the transport of these products to the interior market. Cacao and tobacco use, for example, was also rising in America and thus the plantation economy extended throughout the Iberian colonies, in Cuba, on the Venezuelan coast, in northern Peru, some coastal areas of Mexico, and later in northeastern Brazil (→ Global Commodity Chains, II/12).

The implementation of the Bourbon Reforms in the Spanish colonial world in the 18th century, and the Pombaline reforms in the Portuguese colonial world, aimed to control these expansive processes in order to maximize their yields. The reforms initiated new, strict customs enforcement on the trade routes; raised taxes on commerce (*alcabalas*, or sales tax) and revalued the individual fees that were levied on domestic and rural markets.

The Spanish colonial administration found itself forced to exponentially increase its spending in the Americas: the warlike activity taking place between European powers on the American continent (thanks to the shift of the theater of war to the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, Central America, Río de la Plata, even to the Pacific), required that the colonizing countries step up their military and defensive spending, with new garrisons, new naval fleets, new fortifications – colonial spending did nothing but grow.

However, being that expenses, as well as revenue, were not evenly spread out across the continent, the money allocated to cover the expenses had to be redistributed in order to sustain the trade routes of the interior. Consequently, the *Royal Treasuries* (offices where taxes collected from different American regions were deposited) had to meet not only their own expenses, but also other expenses assigned to them, including some outside their jurisdictions. For example, the Mexican royal treasuries paid the Crown's expenses (administration, defense, navy, fortresses, etc.) in major Mexican commercial zones, but also in the West Indies (Cuba, Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo), which could not afford taxes on their own ever-increasing expenses. Taking a new approach, Mexico sent vast amounts of metal to other regions and commercial zones annually. These metal shipments were called *situados* (transfers), due to the fact that the metal was initially "situated" in the Treasury of origin.

The Royal Treasuries of Santa Fe, Bogotá, and Quito were similarly in charge of financing the expenses of southern Caribbean ports; same for Guatemalan treasuries, responsible for all of Central America; and Lima's treasuries, which paid for the whole Pacific coastal area, from Panama to Chiloé; and those of Upper Peru, Potosí, and the rest of the mining regions, which covered expenses for the areas of the Río de la Plata, Buenos Aires, and Montevideo. In short, there was this continuous shuffle of resources, further distinguishing the different economic regions of the Americas.

Together with economic regionalization came a political equivalent, brought about by the Bourbon and Pombaline reforms, in order to rationalize the administration and more effectively control the taxation regime (setting up new viceroalties, new management systems, new captaincies). Political regionalization provided greater authority to these distinct economic regions, while at the same time keeping them integrated into the colonial area as a whole.

A familiar ending

When these territories gained their independence (→ Independence Movements, I/10), the centrifugal force generated by regionalization only became stronger, in the end fragmenting colonial America: even when regions opted for the same economic models, they executed these models in different – if not conflicting – manners.

In the context of trade liberalization, each of these regions tried to still maintain a monopoly on the free trade. The extractive economic model, developed simultaneously in every one of these regions, and in clear competition with one another, was the model that prevailed. Propelled by the new European and North American colonizing countries, and devastating to the domestic economic model, the economy for the majority of the continent would henceforth be a collection of fragments. This pattern persisted over time, affecting a greater and greater number of products, and demanding intensive mass production and more resources of all types, material and human. Meanwhile, the profits of importation were concentrated in the hands of a few. America's role in the international economy, as a supplier of raw materials and importer of industrially manufactured products, did not change after independence, nor were there significant changes to the continent's production model. As numerous analysts have written about – Tulio Halperín Donghi (2002) and Theotonio Dos Santos (1994), among many others – the colonial economy continued on its long course in Latin American History (→ Development, II/6).

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5

COLONIAL RULE

Eduardo Cavieres

Traditionally, it has been believed, and some continue to maintain, that the different ways the Spanish and the English colonized the “New World” produced a profound difference in relations between colonizer and colony in the North as opposed to the South (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7). Moreover, this idea received plenty of support throughout the course of decades due to a recurring debate from within Dependency Theory (→ Development, II/6). Namely, whether or not the strongly feudal Latin America of the colonial period would have necessarily passed through a period of republicanism prior to the development of pre-capitalism or capitalism (→ II/2) itself.

There has also been plenty of discussion with regard to the development of the Protestant ethic as opposed to a traditional Catholic one as well as other aspects of culture (→ Religious Beliefs, I/41). With respect to the appeals to Max Weber, Macfarlane (1993) describes the difference between the Anglo-Saxon colonization and the Iberian one. On the one hand, he underlines the important role Protestantism played in laying the groundwork for capitalism by offering the necessary protection for deep-seated tendencies to arise and strengthen. On the other hand, it was not a fundamental cause for the development of capitalism. What Weber did indeed believe was that the idea of the Puritan way was an important part of the development of modern man.

In a broad context, even when certain behaviors and objectives were the same, each individual instance of colonization was subject to the particular circumstances and opportunities that its period in history provided. Spanish conquistadors in what would become Hispanic America were confronted by indigenous peoples socially organized in huge empires with densely populated nuclei (→ Indigenous Peoples, I/11). Especially the Incas and Aztecs had extended their cultural power and influence across great distances, which was not true of the situation in North America, a fact which defined the character of the processes of discovery, colonization, and domination of these new territories and societies by the English. In general, the end result was clearly different, but was the difference due only to the weight of economic domination (→ Colonial Economies, I/4)? Throughout all the colonial spaces in the Americas, the social realities were marked by discrimination, inequality, and exploitation (→ Social Inequality, II/20; Interethnic Relations, I/12). For a historical analysis of these phenomena, it is important to understand the relationship between society and power that simultaneously implies and explains the differences in the timeline of social developments.

It is for this reason that in this approach, the analysis of colonial rule is not focused schematically on hierarchies and personnel of political power, but on their rationale and their effects on the dominated societies.

The origin of the relationship between the metropolis and its colonies garners more attention from a historiographic perspective as an element of understanding than as an innovation. Metropolitan societies and their colonies grew and changed together, naturally linked by each other's traditions and circumstances. In the case of the English, for example, the Protestant Reformation had an undeniable impact on the politics and the process of colonization. A century earlier, prior to the appearance of Protestantism, everything was very different (Elliot 2006, 16–17).

Thus, looking backward, while theoretically it is true that processes of independence appear unexpectedly from the circumstances (or what would traditionally be called cause and effect), their form and character incubate in the societies from which they arise, grow, and adapt (→ Independence Movements, I/10). More important than analyzing whether or not the independence of the United States was an example for Latin American independence movements are the differences in the gestation of a citizenry which, in the same stages of their republics, are vastly different. In this context, the focus of this text will be on comparing the cases of the United States and Hispanic America, without forgetting that it is equally important to consider the cases of Portugal and France.

Colonial rule: an inter-American vision

Regarding the inequalities between European societies at the end of the 15th century, the question that is continually asked is why those countries who had the greatest possibility for a successful westward expansion did not actually do it, meanwhile those who experienced complications in their efforts of consolidation – whether due to internal wars, nation building (→ I/16), or expulsion of Arabs and Jews – were successful. Over the long term, in England, the colonization process catalyzed internal force within society, whereas for Spain, the westward expansion meant a “lost” history.

This question was discussed by Braudel (1974) within the concept of the “betrayal of the bourgeoisie” and in Cipolla's (2003) extremely detailed analysis. Nonetheless and despite the fact that historiography has become divided, with politics, culture, society, or economics being different points of focus, analyzing these diverse aspects of life together has become necessary in order to visualize the past in a fully integrated way. One example comes from the discussions related to the economic crisis and social change in Europe during the late Middle Ages. In England, the decline of the population was accompanied by a rise in real wages, and along with that came the end of servitude in its traditional form. This was the case as well for so many other parts of the Western World. Some believed that the bonds which deprived people of their freedom were forgotten and that the profits from the feudal system decreased or disappeared. At the beginning of the 16th century, when the situation reversed, the peasants were surely the victims of the very same market forces which, a century prior, had favored them (Karl Schnith 1993).

In any case, the great political transformations which the beginning of the 16th century brought prevented a total regression. In Spain, on the other hand, social transformations took place at the highest reaches of the social scale. It was the influx of rich businessmen (particularly during times of economic crisis) who solidified their position through the purchase of titles of nobility that brought constant changes in the composition of the aristocracy (Amelang 1986). In one particularly in-depth study of the house of Medina Sidonia,

Luis Sala Almela came to the conclusion “that political power in the Hispanic Monarchy could not be considered as radiated from a center which is characterized by being the exclusive site of political power, but as an uncertain result of a myriad of treaties and trade-offs” [translation by the author] (Salas 2008, 21–22). In other words, a type of tension existed between services and benefits.

In the case of Anglo-Saxon colonies, particularly that of the English, there was a continuity of purpose in the political body with a confluence of various social elements that integrated in search of identical objectives. Among these were the shared sense of the usefulness of the colonial project, taking advantage of individual efforts, and the transformation of private interests into national ones. According to Sánchez Barba, who explained this in detail decades ago, this complicated interaction of efforts and motivation conveniently coincided with Henry VIII’s break with Rome which, along with provoking a new national sentiment, also brought on the promotion of universal expansion. If mercantilism or proto-capitalism began with Henry VIII to become a substantive part of the English expansion across the Atlantic, according to Sánchez Barba, it was the Reverend Richard Hakluyt from whom colonial expansion first developed religious overtones. Hakluyt preached that Britain’s imperial project was part of the Divine Plan. The idea that the colonization of British America was “a plan drawn by the hand of God to fulfill his ends” was forged in sermons and pamphlets during the time that the colonies were being settled. During the 18th century, this influential ideological tradition could be found throughout the colonies. It boosted the confidence of those who believed that America held a special place in the Divine Plan, even if its importance remained unclear (Bailyn 1967). In practical terms, these ideas were made into political realities long before independence itself (Rogers 1992).

Beginnings and developments: divergent thoughts and actions

Just as important as the topics mentioned earlier was the revolution in the English countryside. It was no less profound than a physical transformation of the landscape as intensive agriculture gave way to extensive sheep farming. What had begun in the 16th century culminated with the appearance of the gentry into the social stratum as a result of the confiscation of church lands (→ Commons, II/31; Land, II/15). The result was a massive number of out-of-work peasants who emigrated in search of new land (→ Migration, I/15), resulting in the first English colonies being formed in North America with agricultural being a strong feature. Speculation for land in the colonies was driven by laws prohibiting the second sons of aristocrats from inheriting land and wealth, which increased prices. Thus, an early capitalist tendency was produced where the doctrine of mercantilism, focused on the necessary and intense search for new markets, heavily favored British colonial expansion.

Institutional political changes in the metropolitan areas of England were the main support of this process. These changes increased the space in society for freedom (→ I/27) and emancipation from oppressive state control, altered constitutional law, and abolished certain privileges enjoyed by the monarchs. The Bill of Rights adopted on February 13, 1689 established the sovereign dominion of Parliament. Furthermore, the rights of commercial and manufacturing interests to hire and fire at will and determine wages at their convenience were strengthened. These political and economic processes came together in such a profound way that by the time the moment of independence came in the colonies, the ideas and representations of freedom were already there. The independence process did not, therefore, abolish nor alter the existing social order. However, it preserved political freedom which constitutional corruption threatened, and established in principle conditions which were

already in place (Bailyn 1967). Moreover, as opposed to the case of colonization in Hispanic America, the concept of sovereignty was not based on the extremes of King and people. Since 1640, a new factor had been in effect that legitimized the concept of the sovereignty of Parliament. The idea was that since Parliament is not a man or even a small group of men, there was no risk nor restrictions needed since it seemed unlikely to become a dangerous type of absolute power.

The case in Spain, or rather in Castile, was vastly different. The political process which arose in the medieval era was far less broad and for that matter much more restrictive of society. In fact, it should be remembered that by Papal Bull, Ferdinand and Isabela themselves were the lords of all new lands, even unknown or unexplored ones. The Consejo de Castilla, or Council of Castile, of 1493 structured the administrative process of the incorporation of new lands. This culminated in 1524 with the creation of the Council of the Indies, whose main concern was to keep in the hands of the crown the lands that were still in the process of being conquered and colonized.

Especially during the reigns of Carlos V and Philip II, the complex situation between Castile and Aragon as well as with the rest of the Spanish kingdoms on the peninsula was full of political, legal, and theological subtleties. Spain saw itself as a political grouping of many kingdoms which were all bound together under the law of the Crown and not as a political state. Madariaga exemplifies this with the fact that “These Kingdoms” is how Spain describes itself in official manuscripts, thus seeing the conquered territories in the Americas not as colonies but as another kingdom like Castile, Cordoba, Valencia, and the others (1955, 39–40).

Yet in practice, this did not change the foundation of social domination in the new colonies. This view encouraged the pursuit of profits for the Crown, its bureaucrats, investors, and the thousands of unscrupulous Spaniards who sought fortunes without regard for their countrymen nor for the natives in the new lands. Without necessarily contradicting the existing literature about the formation of a tradition of resistance in America against Spanish colonial domination (Solé 2008, 272–279), the institutions of the monarchy and the power structure (from the King down to the smallest local jurisdiction) were able to grow and sustain themselves unchanged until the reforms initiated around 1760. The reforms were characteristic of the Enlightenment (→ I/8) but ultimately concentrated and centralized power (Llombart 1992; Bellver 2009).

Nonetheless, the spirit and the letter of the law did not transfer from Spain to the American colonies in a consistent way. Different but coordinated organs of power, from the King to his family, were the administrators of the Spanish colonies in the Americas. From a social point of view, a large discussion exists with respect to the true role played by the *cabildos*. Scholars are divided on whether they originally represented “the people” or the “vecinos” (households of considerable economic and social standing) and whether they succeeded at the goals for which they were conceived. One would imagine that the way of governing its colonies would be the same as the way of governing at home in Spain, where there exists a wide array of government officials of different types. However, on the peninsula as well as overseas, it was common for the most powerful municipalities to be controlled by members of the nobility. An institution created as a counterweight or to check the power of the nobility, called *jurados*, did not solve the problem in any definitive way. In the colonies, the heads of the richest households were members of the *cabildos*, positions which generally derived from purchasing titles of nobility. This situation was present throughout the empire. It was convenient for the Crown, for whom the sale of such positions offered the possibility of more income and it also offered new aristocrats the possibility of social advancement. Logically,

the results varied with the level of economic power of the residents in question and the resources available. The democracy of the *cabildos* in one or the other territories was much more authentic in theory than it was in practice. On the other hand, the duties related to daily life in the cities and villages, and especially the possibility of exercising social control, not only allowed for a forum to challenge local power but also to achieve real prestige and economic power. Neither in spirit nor in practice did it approach the representative authority of the assemblies of the English colonies.

More important in terms of exercising power on an intermediate level effectively at the local or regional level was the institution known as the *corregidores*. These men were representatives of the royal jurisdiction and performed judicial functions, held the office of *commandante*, or military governor, and acted as the head of the city council. In 17th-century Castile, the holder of this position was the chief in charge of administration of royal profits. Certain limits were put on their power, one of which was time limits on their term in power. Another was what was called *juicio de residencia*. This was a judicial procedure whereby upon completion of their term in power, they would be the subject of a review of their actions during the term they had just completed. Despite these limitations however, the power of the *corregidores* persisted without restrictions until the Bourbon reforms and the intendancy system. The system of the *corregidores* allowed for the king to maintain some sort of order in all the regions, including the colonial territories in the Americas, although no direct officials were placed there. However, the king did not leave the municipalities to completely govern themselves especially in terms of administering income and wealth (Dominguez Ortíz 1974, 202).

The experience of the French colonies was quite different first, in terms of the role played by the metropolis and the monarchy, and second, because French society notoriously lacked interest in the colonial project. Prior to 1663, emigres were recruited in order to become proprietors of colonies, private entrepreneurs, and even as a religious presence. Following the creation of the colonial Sovereignty Council, mercantile colonies were established and, for a time, the crown subsidized transportation to New France, an area which is in today's Canada. This did not clarify the confusing fiscal policy which was shortsighted and sometimes contradictory. As time passed, the colonies of the so-called West Indies – Guayanas, Guadalupe, Martinique, and Haiti – transpired into a much more successful enterprise. While it is true that religious problems in the metropolis resulted in the expulsion of Jews and Protestants, it also meant the arrival and departure of large numbers of Huguenots both to and from the colonies. This together with the effect of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 which gave colonial territory to the British meant that the French population in the colonies never rose above 3,000 between 1670 and 1730. A large number of them arrived as indentured servants (→ Unfree Labor, I/19), unskilled workers who worked without pay for three to seven years in exchange for transportation, clothing, room, and board (Pritchard 2004, 16–28).

The Portuguese colonization of Brazil experienced some similarities to the French circumstances, although that case bears more resemblance to the Hispanic colonization. At the beginning of the process of the discovery and colonization of the American colonies, Portugal was also transitioning from a medieval society to a more modern one. Unfortunately, some of the mechanisms used were weak, such as the process which established recipients for colonial land grants. After the first decades of leases to the consortium of merchants of Lisbon, twelve chief proprietors were established under the supervision of the Crown and subject to a variety of taxes (→ Taxation, II/22). Economic success from gold (albeit of a cyclic nature), or the more permanent income from sugar, generalized slavery (→ I/18) and took away the social significance of the indigenous population. Thus, the development of a historiography of the 16th through the 18th century is more focused on the difficulties of

settlement and permanent geopolitical defense of access to the Atlantic Ocean rather than with the nascent social structures. These social structures had as their base the undesirable elements of Portuguese society as well slaves, people of mixed-race origins (→ Hybridity, I/30), and indigenous people. Beginning with the reign of Dom José I (from 1750 to 1777), continuing with the intervention of the Marquis of Pombal and later the government of Dom Joao, from 1792 to 1816, changes were largely made for the consolidation of the monarchy's power due to the reorganization of the imperial and administrative systems in order to reestablish state authority (Bethell 1987).

Refocusing on the central question: central power and local institutions

Although both Spain and England were simultaneously pushing forward with colonization, they each approached the venture with different strategies. Excluding the decisions of Queen Isabel, the Spanish crown established a policy of conquest and colonization of the Indies without risking its own capital but still extending its power into new territories. The English crown, on the other hand, took advantage of what was perhaps just the right moment in history and promoted a much more pragmatic approach with very different criteria. Licenses and concessions for territory were given to companies or individuals under the condition that they guarantee a common political scheme for the new colonists. It was not at all about a society of equality, but it afforded some rights of representation to “freemen” through their vote or participation in the assemblies (→ Participation, II/41). Of course, this was of utmost importance to the political development of the new colonies. Although technically England ruled over the colonies and for the most part those who moved there had every intention of remaining under the crown, the daily reality revealed the weaknesses of protecting and ruling a population across the Atlantic. Popular participation in government was a standard practice in the society which laid the foundation for the possibility of what would become the beginnings of sovereignty (Morgan 2006, 127–128).

Right from the beginning, these weaknesses proved inadequate for the Crown's purposes and in the long run, it provoked a major political change. Morgan (2006) gives many examples for this in the very origins of colonization. The pilgrims, for example, landed in Plymouth in 1620 but had landed first in Virginia because of their contract with the Virginia Company of London. They simply left the company's jurisdiction behind, thereby gaining more freedom for their political decisions. Similarly, in 1636, colonists of the Massachusetts Bay Company that should have established themselves in Boston moved to Hartford. There are plenty of similar cases. The localized experiences show that they all sought to agree on the formation of a local government of their own design through the implementation of a true social contract. This was precisely the fundamental characteristic of the colonies. There was diversity in their manner of organization but they stressed the political development of the metropolis and therefore put into place important self-government practices. This also accounts for the early appearance of the aforementioned representative assemblies (Solé 2008, 17–21). These are examples of movements which have transformed history; they search for a way to maintain a certain political balance without weakening the power of the monarchy, in times of profound change in England itself, and were able to make space in society for expressions of the popular will which was far from the true will of the monarchy, the nobility, and the powerful businessmen.

The rise of the popular representative assemblies, independent of any belief about real popular sovereignty, led to its own dynamics. One such dynamic was the different attitudes

it provoked from various agents of the Crown's authority in the colonies. For example, little bits of autonomy were given to the colonists as a way of co-opting them and making their own jobs easier. In the case of the Virginia Company of London, after decades of colonial governance, it finally recognized that orders coming from officials in England, who do not understand life in the colonies, could cause all manners of confusion and disaster. In 1618, the Company instructed governors to organize an assembly that could sanction laws, subject to their veto, but accepting as well the veto of the assembly to some of their regulations. In 1624, the company went bankrupt and the colony returned to the ownership of the King. He proceeded to immediately dissolve the assemblies but his new representatives quickly realized that they would not be able to exercise any power without the consent of the people. Independent of the instructions coming from London, the majority of royal authorities continued having meetings with representatives elected from the communities. Confronted with such facts and the reality on the ground, the monarchy officially recognized the necessity of having an assembly in Virginia in 1639 (Morgan 2006, 128–129).

The political dynamic of the British colonies in America was one of constant changes, with forward motion followed by retreat. Of course, that was not the case farther north in what is currently Canada. Aside from being very widely distributed, the three most important settlements of these colonies – Quebec, Trois-Rivières, and Montreal – only allowed French Catholics and they copied the structure of land ownership from the mother country. A small number of large landowners subdivided their property into smaller parcels for leases. Judges and officials were appointed directly by the Crown and there was no place for either popular assemblies or local government. Pains were taken to completely reproduce the character of the French monarchy.

In comparison, Spain and the Indies included a power structure which, when compared to the colonies further north, was more unwieldy, more centralized and inherently more wary of threats against it. The ever-elusive unity of the different kingdoms brought together under the rule of the sole King did not affect the centralized power structure which Castile designed for its colonies in the Indies,

The Catholic Kings, their ministers and successors governed without being impeded by doctrine or by powerful men whose actions would weaken their belief in the absolute nature of royal power and in the Christian duty of monarchs to exercise it. The political, ecclesiastical, legal and administrative organization of the Iberian possessions in the New World was designed and constructed under this very theory.

[translation by the author] (Véliz 2011, 44)

However, the dawning of the 18th century announced changes in both traditions and in both places. The nature of these changes was not so much a break with history, but a form of progress. While England had previously unwittingly exported the political changes taking place in the metropolis itself, Spain had relative success with its effective combination of church administration (→ Religion and Missionizing, I/17), economic management (→ Colonial Economies, I/4), and language development (→ Language, I/13). The Church had a humanizing effect on relations with the indigenous peoples (→ I/11). Although the Casa de Contratación or Hiring House held an economic monopoly, it did not alter the American economic model which, from the beginning, was dominated by Spaniards from the peninsula who very quickly established their own oligopoly, becoming *criollos*, or members of the ruling class who are distinctly of the New World in Hispanic America (García Fuentes 1993).

Intellectuals in England as well as in Spain made important contributions to modern thought. Collectively, these contributions were meant to transform the politics and the government and sought, albeit more slowly in the case of the Hispanic realm, to confront a new type of popular representation.

However, the colonial activity of the Portuguese in present-day Brazil should be stressed, particularly the partitions originated in a Papal Bull issued by Alexander VI; however, other legal actions at the time were consequential also. For many decades, Portugal was also part of a larger entity with Spain due to the union of the Crowns; however, they continued competing overseas. Ultimately though, the colonization of Brazil was fairly unique because it was essentially a project of businesses and entrepreneurs. Therefore, in comparison to the Spanish or British colonies, it lacked practically any spirit of popular or social participation (→ II/41). It was noted previously that in 1533, John III of Portugal divided his new territory into twelve captaincies which were given to nobles. These general captaincies were given for life and became hereditary. In 1549, this was corrected by appointing a governor or chief captain who was the direct representative of the King and who had authority over all the colonies. The powerful new land owners lost part of the political privileges but their economic interests were untouched and included the exploitation of manual laborers who were unable to stand up for their own basic rights. Initially, the indigenous population was conceived of as the labor source. However, whether due to the violence suffered at the hands of the conquerors or because they moved to the interior of the continent, the colonial powers ceased using the indigenous peoples and turned to the use of African slaves (→ Slavery, I/18). The enslavement of the indigenous peoples was a significantly violent exploitation that ended in 1570 when the Crown declared their freedom. As it was, the Portuguese already had experience with the plantation system and had used African slaves to produce sugar on islands off the coast of Africa (→ Extractivism, II/9).

The story of how all this came about in 1420 is very instructive for an understanding of what happened later in the New World, as far as the process of the colossal ecological changes wrought by the conversion of tropical jungle into sugar plantations, slavery and the extermination of indigenous people (the Guanches) and the importation of African slaves to produce the sugar on the plantations ... during the decade of 1580, slavery and plantations were dominant features of the Brazilian economy.

(Marks 2007, 125)

Under these circumstances, the social nature of political representation was almost nonexistent or at best poorly developed (→ Nature, II/39; Columbian Exchange, I/6).

Final considerations

It is clear that the colonial rule is not one of today's political ideals. Moreover, it does not form part of the narrations of national history of the states which emerged in the very crisis of colonial rule and rejected the claim to power of their European metropolis. This in no way ignores the discussion if the context of colonial rule gave rise to formative values which allowed the emergence of political consciousness in parts of the colonized population. For North and South America, this discussion is of great interest due either to the events which took place or the ideas which surrounded them.

It is clear that the externalization of power in the American colonies, with the differences noted in this work, was a response to the transformations which Europe was

experiencing at the time as the Modern State began to rise to prominence (→ Nation and State Building, I/16). As strong as the concentration of royal authority appears, whether in Spain, England, France, or Portugal, the changes that were taking place in Europe induced the dynamics and pace of building colonial power. The political institutions of colonial rule, the viceroys and governors-general, hardly withstood inertia and, as Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie wrote, history never stands completely still. With the central metaphor of the Body of the King, the Spanish political theory of the 16th and 17th centuries, headed by Juan de Mariana, Martín González de Cellorigo, Pedro Fernández de Navarrete, Cristóbal Pérez de Herrera, Suárez de Figueroa, and Juan de Santamaría, did not differ thematically from Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, even though they came to opposing conclusions.

Unlike England, where Henry VIII left the Catholic Church and became the head of his own church, both Spain and France obtained the privilege of electing Bishops and Abbots and thus constantly counted high-ranking church officials in government roles. Looking at the other side of the Atlantic, the permanent expansion of the colonial activity required an increasingly complex administration by the bureaucracies of the central states (Bennassar 2006, 23–61). Appointment, transfer, and revocation of the Crown's agents throughout every level of administration were, in the end, important to the movement of ideas, projects, and individual as well as group interests. Even though the state's power lacked formal division, its specialized legislative and judicial practice helped in the creation of a growing political consciousness throughout the 18th century.

The existence of a determined power structure in the colonies did not mean that the execution of power had been realized in the way traditionally thought. This holds as well for the verticality of the central legislation. What comes from the centers of power can be thought of also as a response to demands or realities arising from the peripheries themselves. Along a spectrum of power from the King to the subjects, it appears that for the exercise of power in the colonies, as well as its limitations, the assemblies of the colonies of the North and the *cabildos* in the case of the colonies of the South were of fundamental importance. The proof of this would come in 1776 and 1808, respectively.

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6

COLUMBIAN EXCHANGE

Charles C. Mann

The Columbian Exchange, a term coined in 1972 by the historian and geographer Alfred W. Crosby, Jr. (2003), refers to the worldwide, ongoing transfer of species between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres that began with Columbus's first voyage in 1492. Some writers, following J.R. McNeill (1998), suggest that the ecological movement across the Pacific should be named the "Magellan Exchange," with "Columbian Exchange" being restricted to shifts across the Atlantic. Because the novel ecosystems resulting from waves of biological invasion have grown evermore similar in composition, it has been argued that the Columbian Exchange marks a new era in the history of life, the Homogenocene (Samways 1999; Mann 2011). The name refers to homogenizing: mixing unlike substances to create a uniform blend. Other researchers have proposed that the Columbian Exchange marks the beginning of the Anthropocene, the geological age in which climate and environment have been dominated by human activity (Lewis and Maslin 2015).

Conditions for the Columbian Exchange were set up more than 200 million years ago, when the Earth consisted of a single, vast landmass known today as Pangaea. Geological forces broke up this huge expanse, splitting the world into the continents familiar today. Because the great majority of the Earth's living creatures could not travel across the oceans separating the pieces of Pangaea, they came to house different suites of plants, animals, and microorganisms. (A few creatures were able to jump the gaps – insects and birds, as might be expected, but also a few domesticated plants, like bottle gourds, sweet potatoes, and coconuts, the subject today of scholarly puzzlement. However for the most part, the continents spent tens of millions of years evolving in isolation.) Journeying over the Atlantic (→ I/3) and then the Pacific, Columbus and those who followed him effectively reintegrated the long-isolated ecosystems of the Americas, Eurasia, and Africa (→ Nature, II/39). In Crosby's phrase, their voyages served "to bind up the seams of Pangaea" (2015, 112).

The Columbian Exchange played a prominent, if indirect, role in subsequent human history. But because the evidence of its course is often scanty and difficult to interpret, researchers disagree on its precise contours; in addition, the exchange continues to the present, with new introductions occurring constantly, making its ultimate import difficult to judge. In his initial formulation, Crosby (2015) proposed that the "portmanteau biota" of the Columbian Exchange transformed much of the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand into

“neo-Europes,” ecological mirrors of their homelands, giving European forces a key edge in the struggle over colonization (→ *Conquest and Colonization*, I/7). In this analysis, the Columbian Exchange was a primary factor in the rise of the West.

Bacteria and viruses

The first – and arguably most consequential – manifestation of the Columbian Exchange was the spread of microorganisms, especially those associated with disease. Because the Americas had a relative lack of easily domesticated animal species, its original inhabitants domesticated only the dog; the llama, the alpaca, the guinea pig (all only in the Andes); the turkey, the Muscovy duck, and, possibly, several species of bee (all only in Mesoamerica). In consequence, the great majority of Americans – unlike their counterparts in Europe, Asia, and Africa – did not live among farm animals. When humans and domesticated animals share quarters, they are constantly exposed to each other’s microbes. Over time, mutations permit animal pathogens to “jump the species barrier” and afflict people: avian influenza becomes human influenza, bovine rinderpest becomes human measles, and horsepox or camelpox becomes human smallpox. Because the Western Hemisphere had few domesticated animals, it had almost none of these “zoönotic” diseases. By contrast, Eurasia and Africa had scores; in addition to the maladies described earlier, the tally includes anthrax, influenza, salmonella, diphtheria, brucellosis, bubonic plague, and some forms of tuberculosis. After 1492, the epidemiological imbalance was righted, to devastating effect. Estimates of the death toll for Native Americans in the centuries after Columbus reach, controversially, to 95 percent (→ *Indigenous Peoples*, I/11) – the worst demographic catastrophe in human history (Diamond 1997, 77–78, 92, 195–214; Crosby 2015, 172–194). So great was the population decline that many areas previously cleared by native peoples reforested, with wildlife populations rebounding (Denevan 2016). (A representative argument for a lower, though still high, death toll, is Brooks 2001, 136–160.)

The precise date of first onset is unknown, although it has been suggested that Columbus’s second voyage in 1493 brought influenza, smallpox, and/or malaria to Hispaniola (Guerra 1988; Cook 2002). Whatever the identity of the disease agents, they had an impact; the repentant conquistador Bartolomé de las Casas, who came to Hispaniola in 1502, wrote that “so much illness, death and misery, from which infinite numbers of fathers and mothers and children sadly died” had occurred on the island in 1494–1496 that “according to what was believed there” two-thirds of its indigenous population had died in those years (Las Casas 1951, I, 419–420). Spaniards, exposed to these diseases as children, were almost all immune.

The first well-documented epidemic, also in Hispaniola, occurred in 1518 (Cook 1998, 60–63). A letter to the Spanish crown in January 1519 from the Hieronymite fathers then ruling the island reported that the previous month, a “pestilence of smallpox that does not cease” had killed “almost a third of the said Indians” (Pacheco and Torres de Mendoza 1864–1884, I, 367). In all likelihood, that epidemic was the source of the smallpox brought to Mexico by the Narváez expedition of 1519. Racing through the densely populated central plains, the smallpox virus played a critical role in the Spanish conquest of the Triple Alliance. (The “Aztec empire,” as it is more commonly known, was an alliance of three groups dominated by the Mexica; “Aztec” is a 19th-century invention.) As Spaniards under Hernán Cortés and their indigenous allies besieged the Mexica capital, Tenochtitlan, the epidemic raged through the city (McCaa 1995). The corpses were covered with the unmistakable pustules of smallpox. “The Mexica capital fell not by the force of Spanish arms, but to disease and plague,” Matthew Restall has written (2003, 140–142).

As first noted by Dobyns (1966), the epidemic traveled through southern Mexico into Central America. It arrived in the Andean heights of the Inka empire in 1524–1525. Among its victims were the Inka emperor Wayna Qhapaq, his wife, his son and heir, his brother, his two most important deputies, and most of the officer corps of the Inka military. So many court figures died that the imperial succession devolved into a years-long civil war. Parachuting into this situation in 1532, the Spanish invaders were able to play off the weakened sides against each other (Pachacuti Yamqui Salcamayhua 1879, 309–324; Cabello Balboa 1920, 113–121, 128–172; Cieza de León 1959, 78–87; 1998, 187–193; Rostworowski 1999, 110–125). Some historians have argued that the epidemic was due not to smallpox, but to bartonellosis, an indigenous bacterial disease carried by sandflies (Kiracofe and Marr 2008). If so, the first epidemiological effect of the Columbian Exchange in the Andes would have been the measles pandemic of the 1530s, which helped snuff out Inka rebellion (Cook 1981).

Possibly, the most enduring effects of the Columbian Exchange were from two mosquito-borne diseases: malaria and yellow fever. Malaria is primarily caused by two related, single-celled parasites: *Plasmodium vivax*, brought from Europe, and *Plasmodium falciparum*, brought from Africa, likely on slave ships; the latter is more deadly but also more sensitive to cold. Yellow fever, a virus, is carried only by *Aedes aegypti*, an African mosquito probably transported with falciparum. By the late 17th century, falciparum malaria and yellow fever were constant menaces in a warm belt extending roughly from Washington, D.C. to Brazil's southern border (McNeill 2010, 32–57). In this region, almost all European migrants fell victim to one or both; survivors might be sick for months, a process called “seasoning” (Rutman and Rutman 1976). By contrast, most West Africans had built-in defenses, genetic or acquired through childhood exposure, against the diseases (Mann 2011, 85–106).

Indentured servants comprised between one-third and one-half of the Europeans who arrived in North America in the 1st century of colonization (→ Unfree Labor, I/19) (Galenson 1984, 1). But as malaria and yellow fever became more common in warm areas, European workers became an increasingly risky investment (→ Migration, I/15). The spread of introduced, highly profitable, labor-intensive sugar into Brazil, Suriname, Mexico, and the Caribbean in the 17th and 18th centuries added to the demand for labor. In purely economic terms, Philip Curtin has calculated, Columbian-Exchange diseases made the enslaved worker “preferable at anything up to three times the price of the European” (1989, 207). Without malaria and yellow fever, it seems likely that the slave trade would never have reached its height (→ Slavery, I/18) (Eltis, Lewis, and Richardson 2005; McGuire and Coelho 2011, 57–174; Esposito 2015).

In 1802–1803, rebelling African slaves in Haiti were able to take advantage of their immunity (→ Revolution, II/44). When France shipped in an army of 60–65,000 men to quell the revolt, insurgents led by the ex-slave Toussaint Louverture hid in the forests and waited for yellow fever to intervene. Within a few months, disease killed about three-quarters of the French troops and debilitated the rest (McNeill 2010, 252–262). The Haitian revolutionaries purposefully employed a strategy that had been followed accidentally in the American Revolution. Britain's “southern strategy” of 1780–1781, intended to take advantage of supposed royalist sympathies in the southern colonies, foundered when the British army encountered malaria. Under the command of Maj. Gen. Charles Cornwallis, the British lost so many men to disease that the force fled north to Yorktown, on Chesapeake Bay, hoping to be extracted. Instead, they were blockaded by the French. With “revolutionary mosquitoes” making more than half of his soldiers too sick to fight, Cornwallis was forced to surrender, giving victory to the Americans (McNeill 2010, 198–232).

Plants

Plants played a different role in the Columbian Exchange, most significantly as agricultural commodities. The first important example was tobacco (*Nicotiana tabacum*), originally an Amazonian species but brought to the Caribbean by its first inhabitants, who used it in rituals. (North American peoples smoked another, now-uncommon species, *Nicotiana rustica*.) By 1607, when England founded its first colony in Virginia, London already had about 7,000 tobacco “houses” – café-like smoking sanctuaries for the city’s mass of nicotine junkies (Rich 1614, 24–25). Colonial Virginia survived economically by supplying them. In a remarkable development, similar fads for tobacco sprang up almost simultaneously in the Ottoman Empire, Mughal India, Ming-dynasty China, Tokugawa-era Japan, and sub-Saharan Africa. Intoxicating and addictive, tobacco was the subject of the first truly global commodity boom (→ Colonial Economies, I/4; Global Commodity Chains, II/12) (Gately 2001, 56–87).

In Europe, the most important American agricultural import was the potato, native to the Andes. Having never before grown tubers, many Europeans initially regarded the potato with suspicion. Not until the second half of the 18th century did European governments discover its primary virtue: it could produce three to four times as much dry food matter per acre as traditional European cereal crops like wheat and barley (Salman 1985; Earle 2018). Its adoption – together with that of another American import, maize, in southern Europe – dramatically increased the supply of food in Europe and with it, the supply of Europeans. Bigger harvests helped create the political stability at home required for empire building abroad (McNeill 1999).

A similar boom occurred in China, which adopted American crops faster than Europe. “While men who stormed Tenochtitlan with Cortés still lived,” Crosby wrote, “peanuts were swelling in the sandy loams near Shanghai; maize was turning fields green in south China; and the sweet potato was on its way to becoming the poor man’s staple in Fujian [in the southeast]” (2003, 199). Sweet potato, originally from Central America, was particularly important; its introduction was credited with forestalling famine as early as the 1590s. Maize, sweet potato, and, later, potato were the first staple crops that could thrive in the dry hills of central and western China. So much upland terrain was cleared to grow them in the 18th century that the deforestation led to erosion and vast floods in the 19th century. The ensuing social conflict and refugee movements hastened the fall of the Qing dynasty (Marks 1998, 309–322; Osborne 1998; Richards 2003, 114–131).

Transoceanic botanical introductions continue to reshape ecosystems. In the last half of the 19th century, the Pará rubber tree, native to Amazonia, became the principal source of latex, the main ingredient of rubber. Because rubber belts, gaskets, seals, and tires were essential to the ongoing Industrial Revolution, demand for latex exploded. In the ensuing rubber boom, thousands of indigenous people were enslaved and forced to work tapping rubber trees in the forest. British officials, angered by the Amazonian rubber monopoly, promised a reward to anyone who sent rubber-tree seeds from Brazil to London. In response, the adventurer Henry Wickham shipped 70,000 seeds in 1876 and by 1910, Wickham’s trees were growing in large plantations across Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Brazil’s rubber industry, which depended on tapping widely separated wild trees, could not compete (Dean 1987). Chemists developed multiple varieties of synthetic rubber in the 20th century, but natural latex remained preferable for high-quality elastomer products like radial tires. After World War II, economic development (→ II/6) in East and Southeast Asia led to soaring demand for automobiles and trucks, and a concomitant demand for tires. Large areas of diverse native tropical forest in the Mekong River basin have been replaced with a monoculture of Pará rubber trees, most of them direct descendants of Wickham’s few surviving seeds. The

rapid change in forest cover is altering the region's hydrology and reducing biodiversity, leading to warnings of ecological disaster (Mann 2011, 238–278).

The botanical traffic has not been one-way. Grasslands in the central United States, northwest Mexico, and the Argentine pampas have been covered by European wheat; the dry *cerrado* forests of southern Amazonia have vanished beneath a tide of Asian soybean; African banana and coffee envelop swathes of Central America and Colombia; Australian eucalyptus plantations thrive in northeast Brazil, in some cases replacing sugar (United Nations Environmental Program 2010). Perhaps the fastest ongoing ecological transformation is associated with oil palm (*Elaeis guineensis*) (→ Land, II/15). Originally from West Africa, it has been grown in Southeast Asia since at least 1848, when four seedlings were planted in Java. In the 1950s, it crossed the Pacific. Since then, oil-palm plantations have spread across ever-larger areas in Central and South America (Richardson 1995; Corley and Tinker 2016, 1–22). Environmentalists fear that its continued rapid expansion will lead to large-scale deforestation and destructive erosion.

Mammals

Comparatively, few mammals have crossed the seas, but they have had large effects. Horses evolved in the Americas, went extinct there about 12,000 years ago, and were reintroduced by Columbus's second voyage. Cortés had sixteen horses in his force; the sight of mounted soldiers astonished the Maya and Mexica, who had never seen humans astride animals. Far from being overwhelmed, though, indigenous groups quickly realized their use for long-distance transportation, trade, and warfare. When Spain imported horses to Mexico, they were rapidly stolen and used to raid colonial settlements. Native trade routes spread the animals from the southwest up to the Mississippi Valley until they reached central Canada in about 1725 (Mitchell 2015, 59–190). Throughout what is now the southwest and central United States, Apache, Comanche, Shoshone, and Lakota reshaped their agricultural societies into what Pekka Hämäläinen has called “exchange-oriented dual economies of hunting and pastoralism,” based on vast herds of horses (2008, 251).

Horses played little role in the conquest of the Inka empire, but became significant after 1541, when Spain tried to expand into South America's southern cone (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and parts of southern Brazil). Indigenous resistance in the southern Andes crystallized in the Arauco Wars, where Mapuche forces adopted Spanish horses and Spanish technology, trading scattered attacks with bows and arrows for mass cavalry charges armed with iron lances and spears. Facing a mobile enemy with greater knowledge of the terrain and shorter supply chains, Spanish conquistadors were unable to seize the area despite repeated attempts. A major Mapuche victory in 1598 resulted in the de facto establishment of an independent indigenous state that survived, uneasily, until the late 19th century (Jones 1999).

As in North America, the horse embedded itself into Mapuche culture so deeply that it became fundamental to spiritual practice; shamans (*machi*) had special, never-ridden “spirit horses” for ritual and medicinal purposes. Further east, in the Pampas, other Mapuche groups not only absorbed the horse, but so rapidly adopted European crops – wheat, maize, potatoes, barley, and peas – that they created, in effect, an indigenous neo-Europe in the grasslands (→ Hybridity, I/30). So successful was the transformation that most Spaniards preferred to trade with indigenous groups rather than fight them. Angered, the viceroy of Rio Plata complained in 1798 that “a few annoying barbarians” had held back European colonization for 200 years (Mitchell 2015, 269).

The faster-moving communication networks based on the horse facilitated the spread of ideas, trade goods, and biological agents. Inadvertently transported by native riders, smallpox raced through the unconquered areas of North America in 1775–1782. The epidemic traveled from central Mexico to the Mississippi Valley before spreading to the Northwest coast and had such deadly impact on many indigenous groups that they were no longer able to resist European incursions (Fenn 2001; Calloway 2003, 415–426). Following the same horse path was the Colorado potato beetle. Native to Mexico, the 10-mm beetle feeds almost exclusively on buffalo bur, a potato relative with barbed seedpods that stick in hair and clothes. When indigenous groups sent horses and cattle north, buffalo bur – and the beetle – apparently came along, tangled in manes, tails, and saddlebags. By 1819, the insect had arrived in the Middle West. A fortuitous mutation then allowed the beetle to jump the species barrier and prey on potatoes. Today, it is a worldwide agricultural problem (Jacobson and Hsiao 1983; Lu and Lazell 1996).

Imported cattle, sheep, goats, and other farm animals now populate the Western Hemisphere, providing livelihoods to millions of people but also creating environmental turmoil. Because American grasses grow from the tip, rather than the base, like European grasses, they were vulnerable to excessive grazing. Sheep and goats proved especially able to strip landscapes. In the 1540s, Spanish chroniclers noted that the Valle del Mezquital, north of Mexico City, had stands of forest and rich soil. Forty years later, the region had become arid and eroded, home only to mesquite, maguey, and prickly pear cacti. The transformation was owed in equal measure to Spanish deforestation, which removed protective tree cover, and the Spanish introduction of sheep, which multiplied explosively and denuded the land. The region's original inhabitants, the Otomi, whose management practices maintained the forest, were forced by ecological impoverishment to leave (Melville 1994). Similar environmental transitions have occurred in the Caribbean, western and southern Amazonia, and the southern cone. As a result, in many parts of the tropical Americas, previously forested landscapes are now dominated by imported grasses, most of them African (Parsons 1972; Zenni 2013; Almeida et al. 2015).

Present and future effects

Air travel, container shipping, and climate change (→ II/30) have accelerated the Columbian Exchange, especially for invertebrates and microorganisms. Between 1900 and 1924, an average of 6.6 alien arthropod species per year were first observed in Europe; between 2000 and 2008, the corresponding figure was 19.5, almost three times higher (Roques 2010, 19). Like potato late blight, a fungus-like oomycete from the Andes that was shipped across the Atlantic in the 1840s and caused a ruinous famine in northern Europe, pathogens continue to voyage between continents. Contemporary examples that affect humans include AIDS, Zika virus, SARS, and several types of influenza, all transported around the world by jet. Shipping pallets have carried Asian tree pests like emerald ash borer, chestnut gall maker, and Asian long-horned beetle across the Pacific. Ecologists fear that South American leaf blight, a fungus deadly to the Pará rubber tree, will escape its Amazonian home and attack rubber plantations in Southeast Asia, potentially denuding entire areas. Aquatic ecosystems, too, seem increasingly affected – ship ballast has been estimated to transport more than 10,000 marine species every day across the oceans. Ballast is believed to have brought zebra mussels to North America, brook trout to Europe, and Mediterranean mussels to Africa. As climate changes, species will be migrating to newly opened terrain in the far north, far south, and at high altitudes. As Crosby observed, the ecological convulsion set off by Columbus has effects as much political as biological, and is not confined to the past.

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7

CONQUEST AND COLONIZATION

Christoph Strobel

Conquest and colonization, it is important to point out, were diverse and complex processes that differed and changed through time and place, and involved a number of European empires, their various successor states, and a diverse array of indigenous inhabitants (→ Indigenous Peoples, I/11). Scholars, who study the history of European empires in the Americas, often underscore the differences in the processes of conquest and colonization. While this entry does not negate the importance of those differences, it emphasizes that native peoples' experiences with conquest and colonization were not that dissimilar. Conquest and colonization undermined the sovereignty of indigenous peoples, generally subordinated American Indians in a marginal position in the colonial order, and altered native patterns of daily life.

The concepts of conquest and colonization are problematized by briefly outlining the diverse colonial holdings of European empires, as well as the differences, similarities, and how colonial processes became legitimized in the minds of Europeans (→ Colonial Rule, I/5). By using an Atlantic lens (→ I/3), both the European and indigenous precontact histories are, at least in part, considered in how they helped to influence patterns of conquest and colonization post-1492 (Strobel 2015). Moreover, disease (→ Columbian Exchange, I/6), indigenous allies, "ceremonies of possession" (→ Language, I/13), the limitations of the colonizers' power, and changing gender dynamics (→ Gender, I/9) shaped these complex histories. By exploring the abovementioned themes, an appreciation and understanding can be gained of the often complex, multidirectional, contested, and rarely linear histories of European conquest and colonization of indigenous peoples, and the damaging influences they had on Native American societies.

Problematizing European conquest and colonization of indigenous peoples

Between 1492 and into the 1800s, numerous European empires participated in conquest and colonization in the Americas, among those mentioned here are Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, France, and the Dutch. Spanish efforts focused in South, Central, and in parts of North America. The Portuguese Empire established a foothold in today's Brazil. The British, French, and Dutch established outposts in North America and the Circum-Caribbean region. Influenced by geographic location, the cultural, social, economic, and political realities of

their sending societies, the trans-Atlantic debates about empire, and indigenous capacities to shape the colonial order, various distinctive European colonies emerged in the Americas that legitimized their imperial ventures in a variety of ways. Despite these differences, European expansion in the Americas aimed to achieve the same overarching goals: conquer new lands for settlement, access trade, and impose a European-dominated colonial order often legitimized through Christianity (→ Migration, I/15; Colonial Economies, I/4; Religion and Missionizing, I/17).

Europeans legitimized conquest and colonization in a variety of ways. They used narratives such as the “right of discovery” (→ Foundational Discourses, III/8), a need to Christianize non-Christian peoples, to protect people unable to rule themselves for a variety of reasons, “just wars,” humanitarian intervention, reclaiming “wilderness” from “savage” and “hostile” native peoples, and the right to trade and explore. These justifications emerged from debates about the legitimacy of conquest and colonization among European intellectuals. Just like the “ceremonies of possession” discussed later, these narratives served to justify European conquest and colonization. Differences existed, however, in what kind of narrative particular European empires favored. For instance, the Spanish and Portuguese rationalized that they “Christianized” native peoples, the Dutch and English favored economic justifications, while the French generally justified conquest and colonization by arguing that they had a “civilizing mission.” This has led some scholars to characterize, for example, the efforts in Spanish colonies as being focused on “missionary” endeavors and that they were more “inclusionary” to indigenous peoples, while the English are generally characterized as being more preoccupied with “settlement” and with creating “exclusionary” colonies. While these observations certainly capture an important reality, they by no means encapsulate a complete historical picture. For instance, missions in Spanish colonies were important agents in pushing conquest and colonization forward, while places like Puritan New England had Native American “praying towns,” and despite violence, repression, and marginalization, indigenous communities and people have survived into the 21st century in this region.

While scholars of European intellectual and colonial history have done much work to underscore the differences in European efforts at empire building and on how these processes were legitimized, to the indigenous peoples in the Americas, conquest and colonization seemed often less nuanced but destructive. Beyond ideological justifications and rationalizations, European empires sought to conquer, control, and dispossess indigenous lands all over the Americas. Conquest and colonization brought destructive disease. European empires smashed Native American independence and sovereignty through warfare; enslavement; and political, economic, social, and cultural manipulation. In their efforts to seek profit and access to trade, Europeans used their colonies to obtain or grow various raw materials, which helped Europeans be more competitive players in global exchange networks (→ Global Commodity Chains, II/12). Finally, Europeans subordinated Native peoples to colonial orders often justified by a Christian belief system.

Conquest, colonization, and the Europeans’ and Native Americans’ old world

Histories of conquest and colonization had roots in the pre-Columbian past on both sides of the Atlantic. These earlier histories of engagements would help to shape the cross-cultural interactions of Native Americans and Europeans in the Americas (→ Interethnic Relations, I/12). At least in part, Europeans, Native Americans, and also Africans were influenced by their earlier experiences and cultural systems, and transferred their precolonial knowledge

and understandings to the new situation. These experiences are key components in understanding the history of conquest and colonization across the Americas and the entangled dynamics of cultural creation that emerged from these often diverse processes. Conquest and colonization in the Americas by European empires was motivated and influenced by geopolitical, economic, social, and cultural factors that were in motion long before 1492 (→ Geopolitics, II/34). European empires, to varying degrees, sought new lands to grow food or cash crops, access to global trade networks, searched for minerals, and were motivated to spread their particular Christian beliefs.

Atlantic roots and patterns of European conquest and colonization

In the 15th century, it was the desire to access trade, to obtain valuable and tradable natural resources or land to farm crops such as wheat and sugar, to loot through plunder (→ Colonial Economies, I/4), and an aspiration to expand Christendom at the expense of Muslim states, which pushed the states of Portugal, Castile, and Aragon to expand into Africa via the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Muslim states had blocked the Iberians' access to trade in northern Africa as a result of the ongoing *Reconquista* of the Iberian Peninsula. In these campaigns of conquest and during the years of colonization, Muslims as well as Jews were often targeted through violence, repression, and forced conversion. Conquest of northern African cities and territories brought riches through plunder, but it also enabled Iberians to gain needed agricultural land, and to access gold and trade goods through the trans-Saharan and North African trade systems.

Finding direct access to trade and gold encouraged the Portuguese and other Mediterranean states to explore the Atlantic wind patterns, a feat finally completed in the mid-15th century. In search for commerce, especially access to the vast gold resources of the famed Mali Empire, the Portuguese also worked their way down the West African coast. There, they found access to gold, malagueta pepper, and ivory, as well as other trade commodities, including, a very slow-growing number of African slaves.

Motivations for conquest and colonization were thus complex and diverse, but as a quick examination of them in an African context shows, these efforts also had their limitations. The Iberians had some success in creating footholds in North Africa in the 15th century, due largely to the weakness of the Islamic states in the region that failed to come up with consolidated resistance. These efforts folded, however, in the 16th century when a more effective opposition emerged. The Iberians were pushed out of North Africa, with the exception of a few footholds like Ceuta. Iberian and other European efforts of conquest and colonization in West and Central Africa were also limited. Europeans were often confined to trading posts and forts for much of the early modern period. For one, the disease environments in those parts of the continent were dangerous to Europeans who faced high mortality rates. These realities made consolidated efforts at colonization much harder. Second, and while the Iberians and other Europeans certainly attempted to violently raid for trade goods and slaves among the coastal African populations, after facing considerable and often deadly opposition, the Europeans quickly realized that collaboration with African states to obtain goods and laborers through trade was usually more effective. Thus, potential African resistance and political strength limited European efforts at conquest and colonization on much of the continent until the 19th century when realities changed.

Europeans would time and again run into similar dynamics in the Americas, where indigenous peoples (→ I/11) would keep their expansion at bay, despite the devastating impact of Afro-Eurasian disease on the local populations. Various Spanish, Portuguese, British,

French, and Dutch efforts at invading indigenous lands faced Native American resistance, and, at times, were repelled. Thus, from 1500 to the 19th century, and despite devastation, Native American societies and alliances, in various regions, and for significant periods of time, had the ability to contest European empires.

The various islands and archipelagos off the Atlantic African coast, especially the Canaries, served in many ways as testing grounds and provide a glimpse into the Iberian playbook and the dynamics of conquest and colonization in the Americas. It was the Iberian states of Castile and Portugal which took the lead in the invasion and occupation of these islands. Iberian colonists hoped to start enterprises that would be profitable with the African trade such as the breeding of horses and textile production. They also created farms and sugar plantations. Europeans had learned about sugar production via the Muslim world during the crusades, and from the 13th through the late 15th century had expanded their operation of plantations throughout the Mediterranean islands spreading from east to west, and into the Atlantic. Sugar would also become a major cash crop in the Americas.

The processes of colonization of the Canaries, shaped by violent conquest, the impact of disease, and the extraction of resources, would have some parallels and in several ways set the stage for European conquest and colonization in the Americas. The archipelago had long been settled by the Guanches, the people whose ancestors are believed to have arrived by boat from the African continent, at least 1,000 years before the European invasions of the 15th century. Like Native Americans, Guanches faced violent campaigns in which tens of thousands were killed and captured. Invading forces rarely distinguished between Guanche combatants and civilians, and strategically destroyed crops and other food sources, which resulted in famines and further population loss among the indigenous peoples of the Canaries. These strategies became a frequent part of the European playbook during campaigns against Native Americans as well. The Guanches resisted the invasion efforts and slave raiding as the Castilians took over one island after the other. But Iberian forces often spurred disunity among local peoples and sought Guanche collaborators who saw an alliance with Europeans as beneficial, and, often, it proved so for those groups pursuing such tactics if only for a short time. Similar dynamics also occurred in the Americas. In another historic parallel to the Americas, where forced indigenous labor (→ Unfree Labor, I/19), increasingly alongside African slaves (→ Slavery, I/18), was widely used in mines, on farms, and on plantations in colonies from the 1500s through the 1800s, the Castilians also used Guanche slave labor to work on the newly created farms and sugar plantations on the archipelago. As in the Americas, disease was the most powerful weapon in the European arsenal, and caused havoc among the local people of the Canary Islands, a development that led the Iberians to gradually replace Guanche forced labor with slaves originating from Africa.

The desire to extract resources either through trade, loot, or through agricultural production drove European conquest and colonization in the Americas (→ Extractivism, II/9). This strategy enabled European empires to participate and increase their access to global exchange networks, aided in the rise of the modern system of capitalism (→ II/2), and the western world's rise to global dominance by the 19th century. In various colonies, American indigenes worked as forced labor, often alongside peoples of African origin, in agricultural production. They helped produce cash crops such as sugar, cotton, and indigenous crops such as tobacco and cocoa that would fuel European commercial activity and wealth. Mining, especially for silver, gold, and emeralds, also became part of the extraction economy of the Americas. These commodities not only enriched Europe, but also provided European empires access to the markets of Asia and served as mediums of exchange to purchase silk, textiles, tea, porcelain, coffee, and several other Asian commodities desired in the markets of

Europe and throughout the Atlantic World. On the peripheries of Europe's colonial empires, Native American hunters also provided plenty of animal skins and fur, which again fed into global exchange networks. Otter skins and beaver, as well as other pelts and animal skins originating from various regions of the Americas were traded to Europe and Asia. In return, American indigenes would purchase European, South Asian, and Chinese made fabrics and many other products.

Centrality of indigenous precolonial patterns in the Americas

The precolonial patterns and histories that shaped Native American social development also helped, in part, to influence processes of colonization (Salisbury 1996). Native Americans had incorporated technological adaptations and participated in complicated trans-regional economic exchange networks before 1492. Native Americans transferred these precolonial experiences to their encounter with Europeans, and they influenced the way in which indigenous people attempted to shape and respond to European efforts at conquest and colonization. The precolonial Americas were a place of tremendous diversity and complexity. While some indigenous peoples survived as hunter-gatherers, the majority subsisted as farmers. European colonizers often moved right onto the settlements and farm fields that had been cleared by Native Americans. Native Americans had long known the most fertile agricultural lands, and, like the Europeans and Euro-Americans, appreciated close proximity to rivers for drinking water, easy access to trade, and transportation. Some of the Native American farming societies grew so large that they became significant states as well as influential empires. All over the Americas, major urban areas were tied into complex and far-reaching long-distance exchange networks. These established networks would help the spread of disease among Native peoples post-1492.

There had been many cities in the precolonial Americas. Tenochtitlan in the Central Mexican Highlands with a population of at least 100,000 in the 1510s was much larger than any European city at the time. Cahokia in the Mississippi Valley close to modern-day Saint Louis, at about an estimated 20,000 in 1200, was as big as the major contemporary European urban centers. Cities all over the Americas, such as Tenochtitlan or Cahokia, participated in various interregional trade systems. These established long-distance exchange networks would help the spread of disease among Native peoples post-1492.

Conquest and colonization of indigenous peoples in the Americas

From 1492 to the late 19th century, conquest and colonization had a long-term destructive impact on indigenous sovereignty (Kicza 2003). This section examines the impact that disease, indigenous allies, "ceremonies of possession," the limitations of the colonizers' power, and changing gender dynamics had on the history of conquest and colonization in the Americas. These phenomena turned Native American daily life upside down.

Disease

Disease was the most effective weapon in the European arsenal to undermine Native American sovereignty. Post-Columbian Native American societies and communities were hit hard by Afro-Eurasian pathogens to which they had no or very little immunity (→ Columbian Exchange, I/6). Scholars estimate that indigenous peoples in the Americas suffered from

50 percent, and with continued interaction with Europeans and Africans over sustained periods, up to 90 percent mortality rates. From the 16th through the 19th centuries, initially European fishermen, traders, explorers, shipwreck survivors, and slave raiders, and with sustained contact, European armies and colonists, as well as African slaves brought with them disease. As demonstrated, epidemics spread along the long-established interregional exchange networks throughout the Americas. Disease had dramatic depopulating impacts, often long before active efforts at conquest and colonization took place. The demographic decline was further reinforced by the impact of warfare, massive dispossession, poverty, and enslavement.

Indigenous allies

European empires, in their efforts to colonize, frequently relied on the assistance of indigenous allies in the Americas (→ Interethnic Relations, I/12). For instance, during the conquest of the Aztec Empire from 1519 to 1522, which, at the time, was a relatively recent and volatile tributary political structure, the sizeable armies of several subjugated states, such as the Tlaxcalans, joined forces with the Spanish. In the Inca Empire as well, several discontented factions, who had recently been defeated in a bloody civil war, saw the coming of the Spanish as a welcome opportunity to dispose the new “Emperor,” or Sapa Inca, Atahualpa. The discontented Inca factions played a key role in the capture of the capital Cusco and helped in the quick transfer of power to a new Inca ruler who the Spanish identified as a valuable ally. The Portuguese as well made use of Native American allies when they finally sacked Palmares in 1694. This sizeable runaway slave community had fended off both the Portuguese and the Dutch rulers of Brazil for almost 90 years.

European strategists and military leaders did not only consider Native Americans as indispensable allies during campaigns of conquest and during attacks, but they also relied on indigenous peoples for defensive purposes. This tactic was used, for example, by the French in 18th century, and, the British in 19th century, Canada. From 1492 to the late 19th century, in their campaigns of indigenous dispossession and imperial competition, European colonies as well as their later independent successor states would make ample use of indigenous allies. During these conflicts, indigenous peoples were not mere pawns, but they had their strategic reasons to seek such alliances. Native Americans fought the same wars for often very different reasons. A desire to defend their land, to increase their regional standing, to access trade goods, as well as ancient and long-standing rivalries with other indigenous groups, or a combination of those reasons, could all have been motivating factors for American indigenes. In the long run, however, European conquest and colonization undermined the sovereignty of native peoples.

Ceremonies of possession

The diversity of processes of conquest and colonization in the Americas can also be observed in the ways through which Europeans claimed indigenous lands. Spain, France, the Dutch Republic, and England had invented various “ceremonies of possession,” as coined by historian Patricia Seed (1995). Whether by setting up fences as practiced by the English, the planting of crosses by the French, the reading of a *requiermento* to claim the land, which was done by the Spanish, or by claiming Native American lands by right of “discovery” or conquest of non-Christian lands by a Christian nation, which was an influential contention for several empires, these all became ideological and also legal tools for European empires and several of their later successor states to justify the dispossession, to legitimize colonization, and to undermine the sovereignty of indigenous peoples.

There were many other powerful narratives to justify dispossession. The myth of the “savage” was one such powerful justification in the minds of many Europeans. Native Americans were imagined as people without “civilization,” religion, or as inferior beings, which, in the minds of many Europeans and Euro-Americans, meant that they had a much lesser or even no claim to the land. The myth of the “vacant land,” a related and prevailing notion of Anglo-American settler colonialism, in which North America had only been sparsely settled by Native Americans, served a similar purpose. Since North America had been “empty,” Anglo-Americans saw themselves justified to claim the land (→ II/15). As so often, these myths stand in clear contrast to the archeological and historical record, and such narratives as well as the “ceremonies of possession” were not considered reasonable justification by native peoples.

The limitations of colonial power

While there might have been ideological claims to owning indigenous lands, the actual territorial control of European empires in the Americas was often more limited throughout the early modern period, despite the destructive impact that disease had on Native Americans. Several attempts at establishing colonies failed miserably, and even successful colonies, especially at their outsets, had often limited holds over small areas. While the European empires might have claimed huge portions of the Western Hemisphere in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries on maps, numerous Native groups, societies, and peoples in those regions resisted European efforts at conquest and colonization and continued to control their homelands – several into the 19th century. While European invasions often came at a high human price as a result of violence and disease, Native peoples in South America and in the North American Southeast and Southwest also fought back several consolidated Spanish attempts at conquest, accomplishing what the Aztecs and the Inca Empires had failed in doing. French holdings in North America were limited and confined to parts of modern-day Quebec and to small outposts on the waterways of the Great Lakes region. The French presence there depended on Native American toleration. Until the American Revolution, British holdings in North America remained confined to the Atlantic seaboard (→ Independence Movements, I/10; Revolution, II/44). It was only in the 19th century, with the Industrial Revolution, and the development of more efficient systems of infrastructure and effective weapons technology, that a continental conquest became feasible in both North America and to a more limited degree in South America (→ Development, II/6).

Gender dynamics

Processes of conquest and colonization also complicated gender (→ I/9) dynamics throughout the Americas. In matrilineal Eastern Woodland Native American societies, for example, evidence suggests, colonization gradually undermined the status of women. A protracted state of war, which not only frequently destroyed the farm fields predominantly worked by women, but which also often necessitated their participation in warfare to obtain essential supplies, as well as European expectations to have diplomatic interactions with only men, and the growing importance of the fur and animal skin trade to obtain global consumer products from the outside world seemed to have aided in the decline of the status of women over time. Moreover, given the shortage of European women, especially during the early stages of the colonizing process, European men often sought liaisons with indigenous women. European colonists and traders established relationships with native women as wives and mistresses.

In the North American fur trade, native women often played a crucial role. They helped their Euro-American husbands during the hunt, in the processing and the sale of fur, and also assisted their spouses during negotiations with other indigenous groups. In Anglo-American North America, some native women, such as Sacajawea or Pocahontas, assisted as translators, diplomats, cultural brokers, intermediaries, advisors, and guides during colonial encounters. A notorious example of such an association from the Spanish colonial context was Hernán Cortés relationship with La Malinche, a Nahuatl woman who guided, translated, and advised the Spanish during the invasion of the Aztec Empire. She and Cortés had several children. While La Malinche never married Cortés who had a wife in Cuba, she would marry an influential Spanish landholder.

Throughout the Spanish colonies, numerous *encomendero* would wed indigenous women who frequently came from elite families. In postconquest Mexico, for example, several notable women from Montezuma's lineage married major Spanish landowners and members of the colonial elite. Yet, and while marriage and relations between indigenous Americans and the colonial populations existed throughout the Americas, it is important to underscore that significant differences in the way these unions were perceived also existed. While the Spanish system and the North American French holdings were more inclusionary and more tolerant to such relations, mainstream colonial Anglo-American societies frowned upon such unions and did not consider them respectable. Thus, the processes of conquest and colonization created widely varied, entangled, and constantly evolving gender dynamics throughout the Western Hemisphere.

Throughout the Americas, interracial unions led to the growth of groups of people of mixed native, European, African, and Asian ancestries (→ Hybridity, I/30), and, as a short examination illuminates, they provide a glimpse into the complex and diverse ways in which colonial empires and later independent nation-states constructed race (→ I/39) and ethnicity (→ I/25). Some rich Spanish landholders and members of the colonial elite, for example, who could afford to commission family portraits, had themselves depicted in them equally and proudly with their Native American or African wives and their mixed children. The life of Garcilaso de la Vega (1539–1616), who often called himself “El Inca,” today especially known for his writings on Inca history, provides a glimpse into some of the contradictions of these processes. He was the son of a Spanish father by the same name, and his mother Isabel, who was a niece of Atahualpa. Yet, people of European and Native American ancestries, even those of a privileged background, like de la Vega, could face discrimination by their Spanish families and society due to their mixed heritage. Thus, while the Spanish system might have been more inclusionary than Anglo-American societies, it was not without intercultural tensions. Individuals and groups of mixed ancestry, such as the *metis* of French Canada or the Seminoles in Florida, existed all over the Americas. They can provide interesting case studies of accommodation, intermixing, exchange, and a search for common meaning among whites, American indigenes, and Africans. But, at the same time, these communities also experienced complex histories of discrimination, prejudice, and at times violent persecution.

The legacies and continuities of conquest and colonization

Conquest and colonization led to changes and adaptations in colonial societies and native communities. Native Americans, to varying degrees, participated in the same global exchange networks as the rest of the world (Nash and Strobel 2006). They adopted Afro-Eurasian animals, plants, and material culture. In turn, Europeans and Africans adopted and borrowed

various plants, farming, and hunting strategies as well as technologies, such as, for example, terrace farming, the suspension bridge, and many other forms of indigenous knowledge from the Americas.

The legacies of conquest and colonization were not only confined to the Western Hemisphere where they led to often destructive changes in the daily lives of the indigenous inhabitants of the Americas, but resulting global developments from these processes altered the way of life of people all over the world. There was a biological and ecological component to conquest and colonization (→ Nature, II/39). Alfred Crosby (1973) has coined these phenomena as *The Columbian Exchange* (→ I/6), processes which dramatically shaped and altered not only the Americas, but the rest of the world. Native American crops such as potatoes, maize, manioc, tomatoes, chilies, and peanuts would be adopted into cuisines and would be farmed all over the Afro-Eurasian world in the centuries that followed 1492. These crops and foods aided significantly in population growth in various parts of the Afro-Eurasian world. In turn, and as noted earlier, diseases had a destructive impact on American Indigenous. Moreover, the arrival of Afro-Eurasian insects, animals, and plants, alongside the increasing demands of participating in global exchange networks such as, for example, the beaver trade, significantly altered entire ecosystems in the Americas.

European conquest and colonization dramatically changed, destroyed, assimilated, and unsettled the life of the indigenous peoples in the Western Hemisphere, but at the same time these phenomena spurred processes of cultural recreation, entanglement, intermixing, accommodation, persistence, and survival (→ Silencing, III/19; Indigenous Literatures, III/10). Conquest and colonization meant dramatic gains in land and natural resources for European empires and later neo-European settler societies. For Native peoples, it meant a long, painful, protracted, and often losing struggle to maintain independence and sovereignty in the face of European and neo-European conquest and colonialism. This history has left its mark on the peoples of the Americas in often complex and diverse ways.

The legacies of conquest and colonization for American indigenous – racism, discrimination, unequal development, poverty, and exploitation – still deeply impact the contemporary Americas (→ Social Inequality, II/20). Indigenous peoples faced and continue to confront discrimination as well as political, economic, social, and cultural marginalization (→ Indigeneity, I/31).

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8

ENLIGHTENMENT

Thomas O. Beebee

Enlightenment refers to an intellectual, political, and social movement, with strong ties to economics and technology, originating in Europe in the late 17th century. It culminates in the revolutions of North America, France, and Haiti at the end of the 18th century, as well as of Latin American independences at the beginning of the 19th (→ Revolution, II/44; Independence Movements, I/10). The most basic tenet of Enlightenment was the application of rational techniques and methods of inquiry to all areas of social life, an attitude that expressed itself in religious tolerance (→ Religious Beliefs, I/40), the birth of modern science, educational reforms (→ Education, I/24), political revolutions, and independence and antislavery struggles (→ Slavery, I/18). Like most broad-based movements of the West, Enlightenment left a legacy lasting into the present day. Furthermore, it gave birth to the opposing force of Romanticism, and the ensuing struggle between emphasis on the rational versus on the irrational and emotional has since repeated itself many times in both Europe and the Americas. Unlike many other movements, the influence of Enlightenment on government and politics is ongoing. In particular, the independence movements and nationalist ideologies of the Americas are generally ascribed to Enlightenment ideas, whereas the forces both of colonialism and resistance within the newly created nations drew on different sources (→ Nation and State Building, I/16).

Wherever Enlightenment thought took the stage, it emphasized four concepts: Reason, Nature (→ II/39), Liberty (→ Freedom, I/27), and Utility (Pappe 1973, 94). The first of these has already been mentioned, as the application of rational technique to every mode of life and dissatisfaction with the rule of tradition, with its prejudices and foregone conclusions. Nature was the object of the increasingly important inquiries of natural science, as in Isaac Newton's work that opened the era and that became one of the few models of the new attitude equally acceptable to all existing governments in both the Old and the New World. But nature was also subject to more subversive philosophical inquiry into the origins of language and social institutions, where the question was always how these arose out of a "state of nature" that did not include these things. This state of nature was argued to be one where liberty – whether beneficent, as in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, or parlous, as in Thomas Hobbes – was everywhere, and the question thus became one of how that liberty had been lost, traded in for "civilization," and of how this primal liberty could be restored without abandoning the benefits of society. Thus, a new utilitarian spirit gained ground in nearly

all Western societies of the time, a spirit whose foundations were the introduction of new technologies, and the broadening of educational opportunities, which included women and members of the non-elite classes (→ Gender, 1/9).

Unity versus difference in American Enlightenments

A strong preoccupation of thinkers concerned with defining the American experience has been the question of unity; for some, the commonalities of experience and of geopolitical positioning have appeared to create common cause among the different races and nationalities of the Americas, while for others, these differences are so fundamental as to constitute an American *apartheid* (→ Foundational Discourses, III/8). The relative penetration of Enlightenment dispositions is one of these crucial differences, and reflects, in a sense, the relative marginality or centrality of the governing metropole in its adaptation of Enlightenment ideas. England and France were the undisputed centers of Enlightenment thought, joined a bit later by Germany. The other main colonial powers of the Americas, Portugal, and Spain experienced Enlightenment in a different, belated, and more muted fashion (Aldridge 1971). For one thing, Enlightenment in the latter countries was focused on a strong political leader – Carlos III in Spain, and the Marquis de Pombal in Portugal, who attempted to introduce government and social reforms from the top-down. The struggle against entrenched interests of the nobility, the Catholic Church, the Jesuit Order, and the Inquisition met with only limited success. For example, the faculty of the University of Salamanca voted as late as 1761 against the establishment of a department of mathematics. Censorship was more severe in Iberia and thus Ibero-America (→ Freedom of expression and censorship, III/29), limiting the circulation of ideas. In addition, in Spanish America, the reforms tended to be carried out by peninsulars who largely retained control of the local governments, and who thus served to further alienate the *criollos* (i.e. Creoles in the meaning of those born in the Americas). Indeed, tighter government control in a variety of areas, from trade to marriage, was considered key to greater utility. In Portugal, the reaction to Pombal's reforms was an assassination attempt against the king. Pombal died in 1782, Carlos in 1788. Despite their limited ability to modernize their respective nations, the reformers did establish influential lines of thinking that eventually bore political fruit, including in the Americas.

Thus, Arthur P. Whitaker (1961, 3) identified two roles played by Latin America in the Enlightenment: participant and object lesson or negative example. This division could be extended to the whole of the Americas, but is perhaps also too limited; it is possible to add other roles, such as “native informant,” meaning, for example, that Creole intellectuals were frequently valued in terms of their ability to deliver specimens and data from the New World, but only rarely accorded full status as scientists by their European counterparts.

Entanglements

The development of Enlightenment through the 18th century presents a triangular circulation of thought, where European (e.g. Newton) developments influenced the Americas, American events (e.g. the North American Revolution) influenced Europe, and ideas traveled between North and South America in complex patterns of attraction and repulsion. It is best to begin looking at the entanglements between European and American Enlightenments by nuancing the assertion in the previous section that Enlightenment “originated in Europe.”

First, some would argue that the discovery of the New World set in motion intellectual repercussions that resulted in the freeing of Europe from the bondage of theo-political control

(→ America, I/2). Thomas More's *Utopia* (1519) clearly owes much to early descriptions of Native Americans and especially to the (inaccurate) observation that they possessed no private property (→ Indigeneity, I/31). The comparative reasoning in Michel de Montaigne's "Of Cannibals" essay (1578–1580) is a prime example of such readings of the Americas. The cannibalism that Montaigne speaks of became a topic in Europe due largely to observations reported by Europeans, and was used as a marker to label the original inhabitants of the New World as savages ("sauvages"). Montaigne defends this savagery as emerging from nature (→ Nature, II/39), but also troubles the contrast by providing examples of barbaric European practices that result from the civilizing process. The alleged democracy and equality of native American peoples (→ Indigenous Peoples, I/11) – which most Europeans, including Montaigne, could only experience secondhand through narrative or image, and which even for firsthand experiencers was often distorted through lack of ability to understand indigenous languages – was frequently held up in contrast to the feudalism, despotism, and unnaturalness of European societies. The most widely distributed of all such accounts were the Huron dialogues ("Dialogues curieux entre l'Auteur et un Sauvage de bons sens") written by Louis-Armand de Lom d'Arce, baron de Lahontan and published in 1703 as part of a larger memoir of his time in North America as a military officer (→ Travel Writing, III/22). The dialogue format allows the Huron to defend and promote the way of life of his people vis-à-vis his interlocutor, "Lahontan," and these defenses were inevitably read as critiques of their own society by European readers.

Second, the term "Europe" conceals the significant differences between different peoples and cultures in this sense. Famously, England was a leading model of Enlightenment, with the Glorious Revolution of 1688 often seen as a terminus de quo for the movement, coinciding almost exactly with the publication of Newton's *Principia*. The year 1688 depends in some sense on the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia that enshrined the notion of the nation-state (→ II/38). In both political events, national political interests triumphed over religious ones. Britain produced skepticism and rational economic theory, while France strongly developed materialism. Enlightenment in Spain and Portugal, on the other hand, was Catholic, imperialist, and monarchist. The towering intellectual figure in Spain was Benito Feijóo, and one can see in his most famous work, the *Teatro crítico universal* (1726), a cautious attitude of "sapere aude" – he is neither an iconoclast of all traditions, nor a supporter of simply maintaining the status quo (e.g. Scholasticism) for its own sake. According to Karen Stolley (2013),

after the obscurantism and Tridentine dogma of the 17th century, the reform of 18th-century scientific activity in Spain was spearheaded by a relatively small intellectual elite whose faith in rational thinking and empiricism was matched by a commitment to utilitarian goals and reformist practices.

(93)

In the Americas, the panoply of colonizers and subsequent intersection of cultures (→ Hybridity, I/30), and the influx of other groups, such as Quakers and German Anabaptists, created a highly variegated map of Enlightenment practices and persecutions. More importantly, perhaps, the century of Enlightenment saw the greatest expansion of the slave trade the world had ever seen, and this remained its "dark side," although the century also witnessed the first concerted efforts at abolition (→ Slavery, I/18).

Third, it is often difficult to ascertain whether a thinker or artist is American or European in this period, or what constitutes a genuinely American work. Due to the colonial situation, many individuals were born on one continent and moved to another, and a number

of them shuttled back and forth repeatedly across the Atlantic (→I/3), including to Africa. Opportunities for publication were much greater in Europe than in the Americas. No universities were allowed to be founded in Brazil, nor any printing press allowed to operate (→ Language, I/13). The result was that Brazilian and Portuguese elites together attended the University of Coimbra, and formed stronger loyalties among themselves than with their respective nations. There were more universities in Spanish America, and their number increased greatly in the 18th century, along with more primary education opportunities. As a result, the Grand Tour became more fashionable as a kind of graduate educational experience for male members of the elite. Simón Bolívar's long sojourn in Paris is a prominent example of this practice and its results.

Fourth, the Americas contributed heavily to the overall canon of Enlightenment writing (Bauer 2003), as, for example, with the Declaration of Independence (1776), which is a generically unique and innovative piece of writing. A "declaration" was a legal genre of limited purpose familiar to Thomas Jefferson and to other legally trained signers of the document, who transformed it into something broadly and overtly political. Similarly, captivity and slave narratives (→ III/20) took on new generic shapes in the Americas and produced some of their most canonical texts, such as by Mary Rowlandson and Olaudah Equiano, respectively. On the more literary side of things, scholars have come to focus more and more on innovative works such as the generically unstable satire *El lazarillo de ciegos caminantes* (1775) by Carrió de la Vandra.

Fifth, there were notable joint transatlantic projects, including some in which Creoles took the lead. One example is the reform of the Spanish legal system, the commission for which was headed by a Mexican, Don Manuel Lardizábel y Uribe (1739–1820). In the other direction, the delegation of Spanish mining experts who arrived in Mexico to teach the Creoles more efficient methods ended up taking as much advice as they imparted (Motten 1972).

Jesuits

The Order of the Society of Jesus, known as the Jesuits, was the center of a social and political upheaval that sits squarely in the middle of the 18th century, and of Enlightenment. Established specifically as a missionary order in 1540, the Jesuits founded and maintained most of the educational institutions in the Spanish New World. In Portugal, they were royal confessors and staffed the missions of Goa, Macao, and Brazil. The first Jesuit crisis was the Treaty of Madrid in 1750 that returned their Paraguayan missions to Portuguese control. The Jesuits were subsequently suspected of fomenting Indian resistance, which was fierce in some areas, and several were returned to the metropolis for trial. The empire's chief minister, the Marquis de Pombal, was only too ready to blame the Jesuits as coconspirators in an assassination attempt against the emperor Joseph I. Their property was confiscated and members of the order expelled from Portuguese territories in 1759. French dissolution of the Jesuits followed in 1764, a key role being played by the bankruptcy of the Jesuit mission in the French West Indies, which the order appealed all the way to the *parlement*, allowing that body to pass judgment on them. The expulsion of the order from Spanish territory occurred in 1767, on pretense that they had fomented serious popular unrest in Madrid in the previous year. Many have attributed this action to the minister Aranda, an avowed follower of the French Enlightenment, who saw the Jesuits as blocking his reforms and subverting the principle of enlightened despotism with their treatises on human rights (→ II/35) endowed by the creator.

The measures against the Jesuits amounted to both a purge of influential political actors and at the same time a brain drain, especially from Latin America, where many educational

institutions were left leaderless and without qualified instructors. Hence, while the diminishment of the Order's political influence no doubt contributed to Enlightenment goals of secularization, the damage done to education ran counter to the movement's democratic and physiocratic visions of improving the educational attainments of the general populace. As trainers of Creole elites, the Jesuits had been an important interface between Empire and the local populace. The vacuum created by their removal contributed to the political instability that eventually led to independence movements (→ I/10).

Ironically, the dispersion of the Jesuits caused them to become more broadly influential. Highly educated former missionaries, teachers, and seminarians now acquired new vocations as writers of histories, anthropologies, memoirs, and other genres (Bernier, Donato, and Lüsebrink 2014). A famous example is the Mexican Jesuit Francisco Xavier Clavijero, who was forced to leave his native land while in his mid-thirties to spend the remainder of his life in Bologna, Italy. There, he produced the landmark *Historia antigua de Mejico*, whose first printing was in Italian. Writing against prevailing European theories of "degeneration" of American species and peoples, Clavijero produced one of the earliest and most powerful counter-conquest narratives, which still remained a providential account of the coming of Christianity to the Americas. While Clavijero was writing about the Aztecs from Italy, Juan Pablo Vizcardo y Guzmán was attempting to interest the British government in helping liberate Spanish America.

Anti-Jesuit sentiment also influenced literary production in the Americas. For example, José Basilio da Gama's epic *O Uruguai* (1769), written as a palinode to the author's Jesuit sympathies, portrayed both the policies of Pombal and Indian resistance positively, while the Jesuits played the role of villains.

Independence

The British colonies of North America were the first to fight successful wars of independence against the metropole, followed by Haiti, which achieved independence in 1804 – and which unlike the United States underwent a true revolution and abolished slavery in the process (→ Independence Movements, I/10; Revolution, II/44). The countries of Spanish America began to violently throw off their controlling empire in 1807, the defining impetus being the French invasion of Spain that allowed revolt to appear paradoxically as support for the deposed Spanish monarch. Brazil took yet another route, becoming the home of the Portuguese emperor as he fled Napoleon. The former's son eventually declared the country's independence in 1822.

Despite the variety of circumstances and the different rhythms of rebellion, most of the American states owe their independence to Enlightenment ideas, writings, and rhetoric. The Haitian ex-slave who became general Toussaint L'Ouverture took inspiration from a passage in the Abbé Raynal's ten-volume *Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes* (1780) in which contributor Denis Diderot had strongly critiqued European imperialism and slavery in the Americas and had predicted the emergence of a "Black Spartacus" who would lead his people to freedom (→ I/27). The architects of Brazilian independence, above all José Bonifácio de Andrada, spent their formative years at the University of Coimbra, whose course of study had been liberalized by Pombal. While Pombal's reforms that began in 1772 were eventually reversed, the sudden return to a stultifying intellectual environment inspired satires and libelles from the students that were themselves an education toward freethinking. Despite censorship, Creole elites in Spanish America managed to read the forbidden works of Locke, Newton, Rousseau, Voltaire, and

Montesquieu. The Colombian Antonio Nariño privately printed his own Spanish translation of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and began circulating it widely in 1794, an act that earned him exile and a ten-year prison sentence in Africa. Simón Bolívar, the “Liberator” of Latin America, claimed in a letter to General Santander to have read Locke, Condillac, Buffon, D’Alembert, Helvetius, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Voltaire (Gandía 1984, 14).

The fact that the wars of independence occurred at varying times, spaced out over several decades, can be attributed to a number of factors, both to the relative success or failure of Enlightenment within the colonial power (→ Colonial Rule; I/5), and also to the particular social and economic configurations of each region. But none would have taken place without leading ideas grounded in Enlightenment thought. American independences are the culminating events and most practical applications of Enlightenment thought. Only much later would they be joined by the liberation of all inhabitants of the Americas, as slavery was gradually abolished throughout the 19th century.

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9

GENDER

María Amelia Viteri and Cristina Yépez Arroyo

Rethinking the Americas with a gender perspective allows for recognizing the biases that have built hegemonic masculinity as the standard parameter to analyze past historic periods. Gender refers to the socially constructed cultural expression of identities, sexualities, bodies, and social roles associated with perceived biological differences. As Conkey (2003) proposes, “peopling the past” is the key when reconstructing history. This means studying and engaging with the past beyond arbitrary periods, and dehumanizing institutions and ownerless actions, to assess experiences and contributions of the various forms of social action. Generating a critical theory that settles on notions of positionality and reflexivity is useful to avoid generalizations and to be mindful of the circumstances in which certain historical discourses have been produced and reproduced. According to Anzaldúa, “necesitamos teorías [we need theories] that will rewrite history using race, class, gender and ethnicity as categories of analysis; theories that cross borders, that blur boundaries – new kinds of theories with new theorizing methods” (1990, 26).

The importance of rethinking the Americas through the lens of gender lies in the tools this perspective allows to compare and contrast the polyvocality of voices and narratives in their interregional and intercultural dimensions. An Anthropology of Gender further allows us to delve into the past in order to make visible the hidden meanings, subtexts, assumptions, negotiations, and perceptions that have crafted gender inequality in its assemblage with racial, ethnic, and class inequalities (→ Social Inequality, II/20; Intersectionality, I/32). The earliest work on gender in the Americas focused more on women than men. However, more recent work has incorporated a view on masculinities and gender relations (with a focus on feminine and masculine identities). The analysis has often discussed the notion of gender “complementarity” to address the effects of colonization in precolonial societies (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7), with a shift toward topics related to inequality, globalization, capitalist development (→ II/6), and social movements (→ I/41) in the latter decades (Babb 2013).

This entry aims to look at particular cases that occurred throughout the Americas before 1900 with a gender perspective that does not victimize or essentialize, but rather discusses the conflicting narratives exerted upon these territories and communities. History has shelved multiple non-hegemonic voices by excluding the stories of the less privileged population (→ Silencing III/19). Traditional archaeological theories and methods have been based on finding an “objective” – and usually detached – idea

of the cultural landscapes of a past understood as unrelated to the present, or in Spector's words: "objective, object oriented, and objectifying" (1993) (→ Memorial Culture, I/14). The frameworks that social scientists select to understand and analyze the past, as well as what is deemed historical and hence "significant," remain androcentric, or male-centered. Androcentrically produced scholarship continues to be the lens through which artifacts and texts are understood and interpreted, as will be illustrated in the following sections.

Within the dichotomy of power/knowledge that has made the geopolitics of knowledge visible in the Caribbean and elsewhere, government-generated documents have dominated the colonial archive. As illustrated by Brereton (2013), by the 18th century, the British and colonial governments had developed elaborate record-keeping systems. For example, historians such as Mathurin Mair (2006) have used legal inventories to establish the "historicity" of otherwise unknown Jamaican heroines such as Nanny of the Windward Maroons, probing how Jamaican free colored women inherited land, slaves, and other property while slavery (→ I/18) was still enforced, and how they, in turn, amassed wealth and bequeathed it to their children.

Stereotypes and negative images of Caribbean women abound in the journals of Columbus, as well as in the writings of travelers, missionaries, and European planters in the 18th and 19th centuries (Shepherd 1999). White female writers portrayed women as being in need of civilizing. A similar discourse can be found in female moral reformers in New Mexico in the 1920s, who sought to maintain female purity through acculturation processes of Indian women whose sexuality was interpreted as "savage" (Jacobs 1996).

Translation was vital in the colonial enterprise (→ Language, I/13) (Viteri 2014, 39–40). This gave place to contradictory subject positions among the indigenous peoples (→ I/11) as those who spoke their native and the conquerors' languages were abducted from their communities to serve as translators. This was the case of the Aztec woman La Malinche. The controversy regarding La Malinche's role as a spokesperson of Spanish conquistador Hernán Cortés is only one among many points of contention surrounding this historical figure. Interpretations of La Malinche's role vary: some say she used her power, status, and proximity to Cortés to prevent the total devastation of her people, whereas others contend that she aided the Spaniards in conquering "her own people." None of these versions can be separated from a discussion on the gendered nature of La Malinche's character, as she is commonly depicted first as Cortés's lover.

Hand in hand with the geopolitics of knowledge is the idea or concept of "the West" and the resulting language for imagining a set of complex stories, historical events, and social relationships as discussed by Hall (1992). Western concepts of race (→ I/39) intersect in complex ways with concepts of gender. European women were most likely to be described as beautiful and cultured. Considering that European standards of beauty were dominant, black women were stereotyped as "ugly" (Shepherd 1999).

Religion, power, and authority

The complex dynamics of how power is shaped and authority is recognized has to do with the ways in which privilege and limitations are historically and socially constructed. Applying a gender lens to these topics may help to challenge a singular version of history that has been taught and presented as apolitical and neutral, though it has systematically silenced a fraction of the population and their own versions of past events and processes. In this sense,

gender crosses the different notions of power not only through a binary perspective that classifies certain bodies, activities, and capacities as feminine or masculine, but in the ways these are valued and recognized as important (or not) in a contemporary reading of the past. This discussion surrounding politics and religion shows how gendered and sexed bodies depend on a cultural geography to occupy space; perform certain activities; and have access to social, economic, and political capital.

Gender and Feminist Archeology have presented new approaches to look at people's agency from a gender perspective. Freidel and Schele raise the need to go beyond the notion of women as objects of exchange and examine "the more subtle and complicated scenarios in which women have emerged as powerful personalities and active politicians" (2001, 93). Mayan women, especially royal women, played active political and economic roles. Some examples are the Princess of Dos Pilas, who crossed the forest and reopened the Naranjo portal that communicated with the ancestors, and Was-Kanal-Tzuk, who was crucial because of her active military role.

Similarly, Conkey (2003) and Silverblatt (1978) highlight how the Incas' tremendous political and military expansion has mistakenly been conceived only as a masculine conquest. During the Inca Empire, textiles were the most prized objects. Woven tunics were often sent to Cuzco to close contracts between the empire's rulers and local administrators or leaders of conquered people (Rodman and Cassman 1995, 33). The textiles were thus an instrument of control and social stratification. Moreover, they stood out as the mnemonic tool used for administration, accounting, and the production of narratives. Traditional androcentric archaeology has overlooked the fact that almost all weavers were women and that this was one of the most important tasks given public recognition. Historians also tended to reproduce androcentric interpretations of the processes of colonization and failed to illustrate the gendered impacts of sexual vulnerability and pregnancy as for Pueblo women in 17th-century New Mexico as discussed by Gutierrez (1991).

Women have not had the opportunity to participate publicly in political and economic activities during all times and in all places. The conquest and colonization (→ I/7) of the Americas brought about a totally different social and political scenario. Gender, race (→ I/39), and class worked together throughout the Americas to produce very stratified societies. According to Migden Socolow, "These overlapping categories produced situations in which a person's position in society could be both complex and contradictory" (2000, 2). Independence and state formation are recognized as processes that only involved men of a certain class, "race," and ethnicity (→ Independence Movements, I/10; Nation and State Building, I/16), which meant that the demands for freedom (→ I/27) and rights (→ Human Rights, II/35) were gendered in a way that did not change the status of women or recognize them as citizens at the time of independence (→ Citizenship, II/27).

By the end of the 18th century, women across the Americas began to advocate for equal rights. Women played a key role in the construction of transnational and Pan-American ideas that laid the basis for modern feminism, including but not limited to the right to vote. Later, indigenous, Afro-descendant, working-class, and elite women proposed different ways of thinking about gender from their distinct positions, in relation to other inequalities, such as racial, ethnic, and class discrimination. At various points in the Americas, women fought against the specific discrimination that had been established in state institutions.

Before Christianity spread through the Americas as part of the colonial machinery (→ Religion and Missionizing, I/17), gender was understood in a variety of ways that challenge the Eurocentric binary structure. For example, Klein's study on the Nahua rituals illustrates that while there was a strong social disapproval of individuals whose gender

was ambiguous, there were some special occasions in the calendar in which ceremonies of cross-dressing, and gender and sexual transgression were allowed and valued (2001, 185).

Some societies found ways to resist and re-signify Christianity (→ Religious Beliefs, 1/40). An example of this is what happened during the 17th century when the Jesuits established a series of missions in the Amazon. According to Muratorio, images of Eve and the Virgin Mary were shown to the Napo Runa women in the Amazon to “colonize their consciousness into the missionaries’ own version of Christian and civilized gender behavior” (1995, 323). These women reinterpreted the images, changing the meanings from submission to defiance. Napo Runa women respected Virgin Mary as a mother. They believed that Christ blew his spirit on his mother to return to her the power that she gave him when he was born, and they compare her to the mothers of the most powerful shamans, who transmit their powers to their sons through breastfeeding (Muratorio 1995).

There are many other well-documented legacies of religious resistance by colonial native women: where Iberian gender ideologies made women witches, Andean women turned witchcraft into a means of resistance, both resisting the colonial system (→ Colonial Rule, 1/5) and defending their original way of life (Silverblatt 1987, 209). The most successful case of organized religious resistance was the development of a female community in the rural Puna grasslands, where female leaders defied the Spanish ideologies, particularly those around gender, thereby defending and maintaining Andean culture (197).

Another example is the connection between Haitian women and female voodoo spirits. These spirits are not deities, saints, or heroines, because they portray life in all its complexity. According to McCarthy Brown (2001), the voodoo spirit called Ezili Dantor is well known for protecting her children. This exaltation of motherhood is a different interpretation of Virgin Mary that arose in the context of the sugar plantation, an extremely hostile environment particularly for Afro-descendant mothers and children.

The 1692 witch trials in Salem, Massachusetts reflect gendered ideas in Puritan covenant theology. Events started with two girls who experienced disturbing symptoms that were diagnosed as witchcraft. Local women and some men were prosecuted. Gendered assumptions about who might traffic with the devil and gendered resentments against older, landholding women are apparent in the witness testimonies (Adams 2009, 14, 19). The Salem Witch Trials have been obsessively excavated and preserved as a cultural metaphor and a symbol to evoke the affective bonds of U.S. nationalism (→ Foundational Discourses, III/8). According to Adams, the 1692 Massachusetts Bay Colony charges of witchcraft have been used as a cultural boundary between desirable “American” behavior associated with reason and order and disordered, “irrational” undesirable behaviors and its consequences. As Adams states:

In the centuries afterward, in other moments of cultural crisis (most notably those involving religion or politics), the metaphor of Salem witchcraft has served much the same function. Beginning when the trials were still in living memory, Americans referred to the excesses of Salem’s witchcraft trials in public debates over such things as smallpox inoculation, religion, and revolution. Their descendants brought it to their own public arguments about sectional dominance, new religious and reform movements, capital punishment, sexual harassment, gay rights, terrorism, and a myriad of other contemporary issues.

(2009, 7)

The work of Ann Braude (1989) brings the link between gender and spiritualism into discussion. Braude argues that spiritualism should be taken seriously as a theological, intellectual,

and social movement (→ I/41), especially during the 19th century. According to this author, spiritualist mediums such as Achsa Sprague were the first large group of North American “white” women to speak in public and exercise political leadership (→ Whiteness, I/46). This passage of history, of women visible as leaders, has been left out of the historic record because of a type of morality that insists on qualifying spirit mediation as a “deviated” behavior that, as in the case of the Salem witch trials discussed later, exemplifies the opposite of the desirable national values related to order and rationality.

Catholic views on sexual difference are strongly influenced by cycles of theological debates in the Vatican, which are illustrative of how colonial ideas are constantly reinstated. Corrêa (2016) analyzes how modern Latin American nation-states are intimately linked with the Vatican’s imposition of a particular regime about sexuality, together with the predominant religions such as Protestantism. The war declared against the so-called “gender ideology” is, according to Corrêa, a contemporary theological elaboration with colonial heritage that, paradoxically, hinges on an idea of protection against colonization by ideas of gender.

Work

The reorganization of family patterns associated with colonialism included both a sexual and a gender division of labor where women’s activities were written as an extension of their reproductive capabilities, in turn, associated with caretaking tasks and house chores (→ Gender and Work, II/11; Family, I/26) (Tuhiwai Smith 1999). During the 17th century, the plantation became synonymous with single units of agricultural production – generally large-scale – that raised crops for export, hence strongly connected to transatlantic flows of produce, capital, human beings, and labor, altering permanently life on both sides of the ocean (→ Atlantic, I/3; Global Commodity Chains, II/12). The plantation depended heavily on forms of coerced labor (→ Unfree Labor, I/19), including indentured workers and – most significantly – enslaved workers (→ Slavery, I/18). The experience of enslaved Africans in the Atlantic was intimately connected to the rise of the “New World” plantation complex (Morgan 2004). Female-headed households were a prevalent force on plantation societies and economies.

Under colonial Spanish rule, Andean women could no longer own land independently of their husbands; hold important religious offices; access community resources; or enjoy the myriad of social, political, and economic rights that they had held previously. Instead, Andean women, through the Spanish imposition of foreign gender roles, were systematically disenfranchised and subordinated in colonial society. Silverblatt (1987) critically analyzes how the changing roles of men and women were legitimated with the Inca conquest and then again with the Spanish conquest. The hierarchical religious regimes were paired up with economics and politics and hence new gender ideologies came into place. The author provides illustrative examples on the multiple ways in which female labor was underestimated and discredited. The system of native reservations (known as *reducciones*) forced Andeans to abandon endogamy, while tribute collection schemes resulted in women being held responsible for both their husband’s tribute and a double tribute – in their birth villages and marital villages.

In terms of land access (→ Land, II/15), elite Andean women lost their land rights as Iberian law did not recognize female ownership which, in turn, deprived them of making independent legal decisions (Anton 1973). This made visible the stark differences in gender ideologies between Andean women in the pre-Columbian period and Iberian women who had been disenfranchised centuries before.

The Inca conquest introduced the notion of hierarchy, linking religious hierarchy and divine descent to political hierarchy, including the seeds of gender hierarchy, for example, by expressing the relationship of conqueror to conquered in both cosmological and gender terms that related gender and class in a prestige ranking. Conquerors were conceptually male, while conquered groups were the conceptual females with whom conquerors would find “secondary” descent groups. The structures of hierarchy and domination came into alignment with ideologies of gender and cosmology.

Additional illustrative examples of native indigenous women’s resistance toward the colonial imposition of a gendered-based system of inequality are seen in their active and important participation in uprisings such as the Tupac Amaru Rebellion of 1780–1782, the most notorious uprising of native population in colonial Andean history against the oppressive colonial system through military force. Tupac Amaru’s wife, Micaela Bastidas, is one of the examples of women who served in strategic military positions (Silverblatt 1987).

Race, class, reproduction, and sexuality

Euro-American societies have experienced a long history of discrimination based on social race, gender, sexuality, and class (→ Intersectionality, 1/32). How men and women are portrayed in different stereotypical ways that reassert gender imbalances that are both Eurocentric and ethnocentric has a direct impact on the worldviews that academic disciplines convey and the worldviews these perspectives influence.

For instance, a male-headed nuclear family organization has traditionally been described as a universal norm, reinforcing many western heteronormative dichotomies such as nature/culture or private/public which has led to a misrepresentation and overgeneralization of male and female roles throughout time. In Ecuador, Benavides (2002) critiques the heteronormative nature of historical production and interpretations by questioning the erasure of the homoerotic figure of the *enchaquirados*, a homosexual harem of young male religious/sexual servants in the pre-Hispanic past (2002).

Anthropologists were among the first to document indigenous gender variance practices (Katz 1983; Faiman-Silva 2011). Initially referring to these communities and practices as “berdache” (borrowing the pejorative category from 18th-century French travelers and missionaries), they reinforced the colonial legacy of stigmatizing what these colonialists deemed to be against their understandings of gender norms: transvestitism, gender role crossing, homosexual relationships, women who dress and behave as men, and men who dress and behave as women (Faiman-Silva 2011). Berdache comes from Arabic to signify “kept boy” or “male prostitute.”

As further discussed by Faiman-Silva, “although Native American berdache traditions had been documented in hundreds of tribes throughout Native North America in colonial and early modern accounts, by the early 20th century Native Americans were largely silent about their ancient gender non-heteronormative cultural practices” (2011, 7). In 1992, Randy Burns, cofounder of the Gay American Indians (GAI), met with AAA members and politely asked that the term be replaced by the term “Two Spirit” (Faiman-Silva 2011, 4).

Stoler (1989) also provides an archetype for the Americas although her work focuses on the Netherlands Indies and French Indochina. One of the central questions on imposed regimes of gender before and after the 1900s hinges on the sexual politics of the colonial settings that rendered gender inequalities as essential to both colonial racism and imperial authority.

The regulation of intimacy played a key role in social stratification and what the European authorities would understand as clearly defined differences between Europeans

and non-Europeans. Stoler has shown how since the early 16th century, “sexual sanctions and conjugal prohibitions of colonial agents were vigorously debated and carefully codified” (636). Marriage prohibition between European men and native women was both a political and economic issue (637–638), setting the stage for the social acceptance of concubinage which included sexual access to non-European women and demands on her labor and legal rights to the children she bore (Pollman 1986, 100). By the early 20th century, concubinage was denounced precisely for those things that it was charged with promoting decades earlier: local women, who had been considered protectors of men’s well-being, were now seen as the bearers of ill health and sinister influences (Stoler 1989, 647). This role would then be occupied by European women in a later period when new definitions of who was “white” or “native,” who could become a citizen, and which children were legitimate redefined the politics of colonial exclusion (636). Stoler uses the discourses surrounding health hazards in the tropics to further illustrate how and why biological and cultural distinctions were defined in gender terms, particularly during the early 20th century.

Sexual regulations and imaginaries about sex and gender were concomitant within the colonial apparatus. Law and punishment of same-sex intimate/sexual relations provided a framework to consider particular bodies as deviant. The corruption of the body acted as both a legal and religious category; therefore, “impure” acts were a manifestation of bodies as corrupt entities. Impurity then was the principle around which law, in conversation with religion, marked the allowed/forbidden dichotomy in relation to a binary conception of sexuality and “the sexual.” In this regard, sexual regulations and imaginaries about sex and gender were concomitant within the colonial apparatus. The legislation worked in two ways simultaneously; as it was concerned with punishing crimes that jeopardized heteronormative sexuality (such as rape, adultery, and incest), while also condemning “deviant” sexualities or sexual practices (such as homosexuality, pedophilia, or bestiality). As the historical documentation available on this topic comes mainly from court cases and medical files, there is an uneven representation of same-sex intimate/sexual relations or homoerotic practices. For instance, the designation of “sodomy” or “nefarious practices” was centered in men having sexual contact with other men, while there is not much information available on the regulation or punishment of homoerotic or sexual practices between women.

Throughout the 18th century, most British colonies in North America had adopted the criminal codes that were used in England. These generally determined castration as punishment for indigenous people convicted of committing sexual offenses, such as sodomy, bestiality, and incest which was also applicable to African slaves (Baker 2007, 328). According to MacMillan, “the crimes associated with sodomy (pedophilia, homosexuality and bestiality), depending on the severity of the damage, were sanctioned with penalties ranging from corporal punishment to death” (2013, 316).

In 1610, Thomas Gates, the governor of Virginia, published a legal code called *Articles Laws and Orders: Divine, Political and Martial*. Article nine of this law stated that “no man should commit the detestable and horrible sins of sodomy, since he will be punished with the death penalty” (Katz 1983, 256). In Connecticut, the law enforced in 1650 recognized the crime as “a man sleeping with another man” and was punished with the death penalty (Katz 1983, 301). Following Godbeer, “Puritans condemned sodomy as a sacrilege, an act of disorder resulting from the innate depravity of the human being. The cause of this was lust, a carnal impulse that distracted men and women from their spiritual labors” (Godbeer 1995, 263). Colonial heteronormativity was imposed through both judicial laws and societal norms.

Relationships

Anthropologists have discussed the universal underestimation of everything associated with “the feminine” since 1970. Ortner (1974), in her quest to unravel the universality of the undervaluation of women, exposes how being associated with nature (→ II/39) relegates women to a secondary and subordinate space. A woman thus identified is a symbol of something that every culture devalues, and something that every culture places at a lower order of existence (72). Similarly, Rosaldo and Lamphere (1974) explore how the public/private and savage/civilized dichotomies have diminished women’s power and shaped it as an informal and noninstitutional influence. This section discusses the topic of kinship and how this linkage configuration is fundamental to understanding the organization of gender and sexuality in a society. The importance of challenging the public/private dichotomy is that this permits further analysis that does not take for granted the arbitrary division of gender spaces and roles that assumes the monogamous couple–western family model as a universal pattern (→ Family, I/26).

As Lamphere (2001) shows with her literature review on the Iroquois, diverse domestic units have existed in the Americas, with particular division of house labor and roles. In this case, marriage does not necessarily constitute an unequal gender structure or suggest a segregation of women to a private space, “a separation of ‘domestic’ and ‘public’ spheres makes no sense because household production was simultaneously public, economic, and political” (103).

According to Brown (1996), white European masculinity was reinforced through a patriarchal social hierarchy in the Americas (→ Whiteness, I/46). In Virginia, the colonial government tried to exercise a vertical authority by regulating labor and sexuality, making slavery hereditary through the mother and making legal distinctions between English and African women. Van Kirk (2002) argues that in Canada during the conquest, marriages between European men and indigenous women were forbidden as they symbolized the mixing of irreconcilable dichotomies: civilized versus primitive and Christian versus heathen (→ Interethnic Relations, I/12).

León’s (1996) work on colonial Ecuador during the 18th century shows that violence that occurred inside Creole marriages was catalogued as “domestic” and as a private issue. The matrimonial contract demanded chastity, obedience, humility, and dedication to the home from married women while the roles prescribed to Creole men were authority, economic protection of the wife, honesty, and honor derived from female chastity. León argues that trial documents demonstrate that a husband’s violence against his wife was naturalized, understood as a legitimate punishment, and justified by the civil and ecclesiastical order of that time.

The colony brought a religious framework in which marriage was imposed, and understood as a monogamous relationship where women are submissive toward men. With marriage came the colonial imposition of a sexual division of labor that demeaned women and femininity. In this way, women lost to men their exclusive rights to land, child labor, and even to children in matrilineal communities such as the Pueblo Women in New Mexico (Gutierrez 1991, 79).

Additionally, Prior (2001) argues that some matrifocal societies in the Caribbean have been studied as deviant structures. The interpretation is that the men are marginal and absent, as if the matrifocal domestic units are deviations of patriarchal nuclear families. Matrifocal units may exist in patrilineal or matrilineal societies; however, a matrifocal unit is the one that emphasizes the mother–child bond and the mother plays an active role in the family economy and decision-making. According to Prior, “concentration on women’s

domestic tasks ignores the full extent of women's networks, their access to resources, control over resources, relations with men, and relationship between household and society, all of which are important considerations when discussing matrifocality" (Prior 2001, 373).

The 1848 Seneca Falls convention marked the origins of the women's rights movements in North America. Lucretia Mott, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucy Stone, and Susan B. Anthony were among the organizers of this meeting. The women who organized the 1848 convention shared an understanding of how family and gender norms oppressed women, as made visible through Stanton's work on the *Women's Bible*. None of them were alive when women's suffrage was finally achieved in the United States. However, they helped build the struggle for women's rights as a long-term and intergenerational project (McMillen 2008, 12).

The document that resulted from the convention, the Declaration of Rights and Sentiments, was a pioneer resolution that not only listed the different ways in which an unequal society excluded women, but provided recommendations and actions to take in order to achieve equality. The declaration clearly addressed the "civil death" that women experienced when they got married, that deprived them from owning property, annulling her as a separate being and relegating women to a second-class citizenship (→ Citizenship, II/27).

The "civil death" was intrinsically linked to the cult of "true womanhood" ideal that provided justification for the legal status of married women. Considered to be under her husband's protection and authority, women owed obedience to the husband and were raised to belong only to the domestic sphere, as opposed to men's social sphere. The public/private dichotomy was functional to the early national period in the United States, as the historian Linda Kerber (1980) explains with the concept of "republican motherhood," where the realization of women was found in raising and educating the next generation of citizens. "True womanhood" was associated with the mother's moral virtue as a caretaker and reproducer of civic values. Women who did and could not fit the ideal of "true womanhood," including enslaved women, Indigenous women, and working-class women, were all the more vulnerable.

The work of Peter Ward (1990) on love and marriage in English Canada in the 1900s traces the importance of revisiting a social history of gender, marriage, and family, paying special attention to the role of Christianity in constructing the framework of these relationships and its limits. The history of the denied property rights for women, both by Common Law and Equity Law (the two main legal frameworks used at that time), shows how marriage established a legally and socially diminished status.

Conclusions

This discussion and the analysis provided emphasize how difference is gendered before the 1900s and the ideological meanings supporting it. Questions of interpretation and standpoint are crucial, as those need to be "read against the grain... teasing out a subaltern reading" (Breton 2013) which is in itself a political methodology to further avoid Eurocentric accounts of the American history.

As discussed throughout the text, one of the main tenets for rethinking gender across the Americas before the 1900s is how class and gender discriminations were translated into racial and sexist attitudes for maintaining an otherwise indistinctive category between Europeanness and natives (→ Social Inequality, II/20; Intersectionality, I/32). Feminist approaches such as those in the Archaeological field pioneered by Spector (1993) have greatly and critically influenced the historicity of texts based on linear interpretations of objects.

Colonial records have been conveniently used to both naturalize gender disparities and hide the important roles women had prior to the 1900s. For instance, the roles that native women held in religious ceremonies including those of priestesses have been erased from official historical accounts. Spanish colonial officials were so appalled with what they saw as a mismatching gender system compared to Europe that women seeking to continue those ancestral traditions were harshly punished under the “defiance of colonial civil and ecclesiastical courts” in the Andes (Silverblatt 1987, 32).

When working with texts – be they archives, artifacts, and/or people’s narratives – Butler and Weed (2011) warn us that gender, or gendered meanings, cannot be taken for granted, since gender is precisely that which is being produced and organized differently and differentially over time.

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10

INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS

Roberto Breña

The independence of the Thirteen Colonies, the Haitian Revolution, the Spanish American independence movements, and the political process that gave Brazil its independence in 1822 were revolutionary in different degrees and in different senses. Their commonality, besides geographically taking place in the Americas, stems mainly from the fact that all of them ended in political independence. Of course, there were certain political *principles* that played an important role in all of them – national or popular sovereignty, political equality, division of powers, individual rights and liberties, representative system, elections, and constitutionalism. However, even these principles, as general as they seem, acquired specific connotations in each of these four revolutionary processes (→ Revolution, II/44). In other words, it could be said that all of the inhabitants of the Americas were searching for liberty and equality during the Age of Revolutions. Yet, for example, the liberty that the slaves from Saint-Domingue obtained and proclaimed in 1804 was very different from the commercial liberty that the North American colonists were, to a good extent, fighting for (→ Slavery, I/18; Colonial Economies, I/4).

In the same sense, Indigenous peoples (→ I/11) throughout the Americas fought for different aims during the Age of Revolution. In the case of the Spanish American emancipation movements, they fought mainly to keep their way of life; to that extent, *independence* as we understand it or as some of the creole leaders conceived it was almost a nonissue, sometimes on the side of the Spanish king, sometimes on the side of the Spanish American patriots, and often changing sides depending on the benefits they thought they would obtain, very often trying more than anything to stay alive, individually and in cultural terms.

Even the word “independence” should be used with caution, because, as conceptual history has shown, the term was used with very different meanings throughout the Americas and even within the same liberation process. In fact, the vast majority of Haitians did not look for their independence until 1802 (the Haitian “independence” movement had begun in 1791). In the case of Spanish Americans, while some territories declared their independence as early as 1811 (although they obtained it much later), others had to be made free by troops from other Spanish American regions because they were not interested in separating from the Spanish Empire. For example, the heart of the Viceroyalty of Peru did not become independent until 1824.

The aforementioned differences, and many others that are present or can be inferred from the following pages, do not deny that entanglements of different types existed or were

developed in the Americas during the Age of Revolutions. The commercial trade routes and the circulation throughout the continent of books and pamphlets are maybe the most obvious, but interconnections also manifested themselves in other ways. The best examples in this regard are the Colombian, Andean, and Continental projects of Simón Bolívar, the most important of the Spanish American liberators and the most perceptive analyst of the Spanish American independence movements. However, the failure of these three of Bolívar's projects should be a telling lesson regarding the obstacles that existed in the Americas in the last decades of the 18th century and first decades of the 19th century, which prevented easy, permanent, or smooth communication not only among the four different revolutionary processes, but sometimes also within each of them, as revealed by the Haitian process. Language (→ I/13) was an obstacle that few were able to surpass, but more important were the geographical obstacles and distances within an immense continent. This could explain, for example, the lack of coordination of the Spanish American territories in their fight against the metropolis, except when extraordinary individuals like Bolívar or San Martín were able to bring together men and resources from different regions in order to expel the Peninsular armies from American soil.

It can be argued that the Age of Revolution in the Americas had therefore a uniform character. It was an era of transfers and of a considerable level of communication between affected regions, including very peculiar geographical contexts, like the Caribbean. However, it was at the same time an era in which the contacts between regions that were not contiguous were often ridden with obstacles of different kinds (geographical, technical, linguistic, etc.). It is true that some men and many ideas flowed from one place to another in the Americas during the Age of Revolution, but this flow of men and ideas demands a series of material preconditions that sometimes were difficult to meet. These preconditions framed the way in which Americans from around the whole continent were or were not able to establish connections among themselves.

Emancipations, independences, and political transformations in the Americas (1775–1825)

England came out triumphant from the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) and from that moment, it was clear that France would not be able to stop the military, naval, and commercial developments of her eternal rival. In the Americas, the French Crown had lost an enormous continental territory of what today is Eastern Canada, but did keep New Orleans and some insular possessions in the Caribbean. Spain entered late into the conflict on the French side, but the temporary capture of the port of Havana by the British in 1762 was a terrible blow to the Spaniards.

The king of England at that time, George III, thought that one of the means through which the Crown could recuperate the vast amount of money spent during the Seven Years' War was increasing the taxes to the North American colonies. Just one year after the war ended, these intentions began to be put into practice with the Sugar Act of 1764. Notwithstanding the negative reactions of the colonists, these efforts to increase the metropolitan revenues continued with the Stamp Act (1765), the Townshend Acts (1767), and the Tea Act (1773). The violent reaction of the colonists to these measures led to the "Boston Massacre" and then to the Coercive Acts of 1774. As a reaction, twelve of the thirteen colonies elected representatives and sent them to the First Continental Congress, that took place in Philadelphia that same year.

The situation continued to deteriorate and the first direct confrontations between the British army and the armed colonists took place in Lexington and Concord in April of 1775.

The Second Continental Congress gathered just one month after these engagements and two of its decisions were to create a Continental Army and to put George Washington at the head of it. Open war with the British was now almost inevitable. The Declaration of Independence was slightly more than a year away; on July 4, 1776, the Constitutional Convention that had gathered in Philadelphia since the month of May decided to declare to the world the birth of the United States of America.

After overcoming adverse conditions of every kind, among them an army that lacked not only material supplies but also basic training, Washington's strategy to avoid major confrontations with the British army revealed its efficacy. In 1777, he obtained a very important victory in Saratoga and four years later, in Yorktown, he sealed the victory for the patriots. Two years after, in 1783, the British Crown recognized in the Treaty of Paris the independence of the United States. The victory of the patriots would have been impossible without the support they received from France, Spain, and the Netherlands, especially the French Crown, that had spent such a large amount of money and resources that the debt it incurred became one of the most important causes of the crisis (→ II/4) that would eventually lead to the French Revolution. With victory came the titanic task of supplying the new country with the political institutions that would enable the founding, existence, and continuity of the largest republic of the modern world (→ Nation and State Building, I/16).

The Articles of the Confederation, drafted in 1777 but not ratified until 1781, very soon showed their limitations. The main problem was the weakness of the federal government. To solve this and other shortcomings, a new Constitution had to be drafted. This document, elaborated by a Convention gathered in Philadelphia in 1787, was ratified the next year. Its longevity, which continues until today, is the most telling argument regarding the political deftness, institutional finesse, and historical vision of its authors. Its greatest weakness from a social perspective was the fact that it maintained slavery (→ I/18), an "institution" that was incompatible with the lofty principles of the Declaration of Independence. In the words of a reputed contemporary historian, regarding slavery, the 1787 Constitution was "a bitter mockery" (Countryman 2003, 228). However, it should be added that during the revolutionary period, the bases upon which slavery rested were put into question by some individuals and by several religious groups (→ Religious Beliefs, I/40).

The French Revolution can be considered the most disruptive event in the modern history of Europe. During its ten years of duration (1789–1799), the whole continent suffered its consequences, among them a political explosion of new principles, values, and ideas that radically changed not only the landscape of Europe, but of the entire Western World. What followed, that is, Napoleon Bonaparte's empowerment, would be even more disruptive in military and social terms for the continent. After his demise in 1815, Europe and the American continent were wholly transformed or in the process of being transformed, albeit for different motives and with different intensities. As part of the turmoil provoked by the French Revolution, the colony of Saint-Domingue, the most productive of all the European colonies in the Americas, was the scenario of what could be considered the only *social* revolution that took place in the Americas during the Age of Revolution. This is not to say that either the independence of the United States or the Spanish American emancipation movements did not have revolutionary aspects. However, these aspects were essentially political. In the case of the Haitian Revolution, the most radical social change in the history of Western civilization took place: all of the slave owners that were in control of the island were either killed or forced to leave Saint-Domingue. Haiti declared its independence on the first day of the year 1804. Its head of State, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, was a former slave.

The emancipation movement of Saint-Domingue is one of the most complex revolutionary processes that has ever taken place. Its main figure was Toussaint Louverture, an ex-slave who by the time the uprising began in 1791 owned several slaves. Until 1802, this movement was not an independence movement, but an internal conflict among whites, free coloreds, and black slaves, with volatile allegiances *vis-à-vis* the French King, the French Republic, and its envoys (who, on the other hand, were not always on the same side). Even more complicated was the fact that the conflict was also an international war in which Spain and Great Britain participated actively. Finally, the emancipation process that swept the western part of La Hispaniola can be divided in at least three identifiable regions: the province of the north, the province of the west, and the province of the south. It was Napoleon's decision to restore slavery in 1802 that finally united the different social groups and the various factions against the French. With the invaluable help of mosquitoes and yellow fever, the Napoleonic army was defeated and independence was achieved. Unity, however, would also be ephemeral: a few years later, Haiti was divided in two different regimes: a kingdom with a black king in the north and a republic, led by a mulatto, in the south. Unification would not come until 1820.

If political beginnings were complicated, exactly the same can be said regarding the economic situation of the new country. In this sense, two elements suffice to give an idea of the level of adversity: the opposition and diplomatic nonrecognition by the United States (this recognition had to wait until 1862) and the indemnity that the French government demanded from the Haitian government in 1825 in order to recognize independence. This unfair policy created a debt that directly hindered the development of Haiti until it was finally able to pay in 1893.

It can be said that the Haitian Revolution was the most revolutionary of the four processes considered here because none other ended slavery, a millenary practice that was the antithesis not only of natural right (→ Human Rights, II/35), but also of some of the core ideas of the Enlightenment (→ I/8), and of several of the central notions of the political and social modernities that the Age of Revolution engendered. This crucial role of the Haitian Revolution in the history of Western civilization, however, has fostered some idealizations of a political and military movement that, considering the political institutions put in place by Haiti's "Founding Fathers," cannot be considered one of the sources of political modernity. In the words of a contemporary expert on the Haitian Revolution, "Toussaint Louverture, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, and Henry Christophe, the main leaders who rose from slavery, were unashamedly dictatorial in their politics, as each of their constitutions make clear" (Geggus 2011, 547). Other recent historians are increasingly aware of the obstacles to turn the Haitian Revolution into a sort of symbol or highest point of the modernity of the Atlantic Revolutions in general (→ Atlantic, I/3) (Popkin 2012). The victory of the slaves of Saint-Domingue and the creation of Haiti are historic events of the utmost significance in Western history, but the metamorphosis of the Haitian Revolution into a model of political modernity is a step that should be avoided (Covo 2013; Gaffield 2016, 17).

The links between the Haitian Revolution and the emancipation movements in Spanish America are hard to establish, even in the regions where there was a considerable presence of slaves (Lasso 2007, 33). In addition, during the whole of the Spanish American emancipation movements, the Haitian Revolution served as a counterexample of something that had to be avoided at all costs. The main reason is very simple: an upheaval of such depth could radically modify social hierarchies, and this was the last thing that the *criollos* – the locally born people of Spanish ancestry in the Americas – wanted. Notwithstanding the vast historiography that up to this day keeps insisting in the animosity that the Bourbon reforms of the second half

of the 18th century created between *criollos* and *peninsulares* – the Spanish-born Spaniards in the “New World” – the truth is that the similarities, common projects, and shared social privileges *vis-à-vis* the rest of the population provided the social understanding and the social cement that kept the Spanish Empire running relatively smoothly for almost three centuries. Frictions between *criollos* and *peninsulares* had existed since the 16th century, but recent historiography has shown that they were disproportionately reported by Latin American nationalist historiographies. In the words of Mark A. Burkholder, “Despite repeated allegations to the contrary, the number of elite creoles genuinely hostile toward *peninsulars* was rarely large prior to 1808–1810” (2013, xiv–xv).

If we consider the negligible percentage of Peninsular Spaniards in America when compared with the total population, as well as the geographic extension of the Spanish territories in America and the scant presence of royal troops during the colonial period, it is difficult not to conclude that the Spanish Crown and its inseparable ally, the Catholic Church, were tremendously effective regarding the cooptation and control that they were able to exercise over the vast majority of the Spanish American inhabitants. This control started to crumble in 1808.

This crumbling first began due to an invasion that took place on European soil: the entry into Spanish territory of French troops in the autumn of 1807. This entry, that supposedly was just the crossing of the Napoleonic army on the way to capture Lisbon and that was contemplated in the Franco-Spanish Treaty of Fontainebleau, very soon became a full-fledged invasion of Spain. The final consequence was the crowning of Joseph I, brother of Napoleon Bonaparte, as the king of Spain and the Indies. While Joseph sat on the throne of the largest empire of that time, Ferdinand VII, the legitimate king of Spain, was kept by Napoleon as a pampered prisoner in the French city of Bayonne. Ferdinand would stay there until 1814. Meanwhile, the news started to spread in America that their new king was Napoleon’s older brother. During the whole emancipation process of a region as big and variegated in every sense as Spanish America, few things were unanimous, outside of this: Spanish Americans of all social and economic levels rejected outright the new monarch, who was considered an ideological and political inheritor of the sacrilegious French Revolution.

However, differences between the metropolis and the American colonies appeared quickly. Once the cards started to fall, there was no way of stopping them; among other reasons, between 1808 and 1814, the Spanish troops were fighting against the best army of that time, Napoleon’s. From the first signs of social and political unrest manifested in “Alto Perú” (contemporary Bolivia) in the year 1809, until the famous final battle of Ayacucho that took place in December 1824, war was almost a permanent fixture in several territories. The conflict was not only against the Peninsular Spaniards; in fact, the Spanish American independence movements were mainly civil wars. In ideological and constitutional terms, some territories (Venezuela and New Granada) were influenced by documents of the Revolution of the Thirteen Colonies. However, this influence was much less evident in other territories. In the case of New Spain and notwithstanding the geographic proximity, during the first years of its independence process, the knowledge of the political institutions of the United States was limited.

The first and foremost political dilemma in the case of the *revoluciones hispánicas* was the absence of the legitimate king, Ferdinand VII. His sovereignty had to be protected until he was able to regain his throne, not only in metropolitan Spain, but also in Spanish America (Guerra 1992). Differences sprang up because the Spanish Americans were reluctant to accept the kind of representation that the metropolis tried to impose on them: first, a series of *juntas* that claimed ascendancy in the Spanish America territories, then a Regency, and finally the Cortes of Cádiz.

The Cádiz Constitution, a liberal document promulgated in March of 1812, was the result of sixteen months of work by a parliament (*cortes* in Spanish) constituted of around 200 Spanish deputies and sixty Spanish American representatives who gathered in the port of Cádiz. The document, also known as the 1812 Constitution, was followed in some territories in America (among them, the two most important viceroyalties: New Spain and Peru), but several others refused to obey it. In every case, however, the influence of the metropolitan political events and ideas on the Spanish American emancipation or independence movements is undeniable (Breña 2006). By 1812, the emancipation processes had progressed greatly in regions like Venezuela and New Granada; others were either very near from declaring independence (Paraguay) or had advanced a lot in the sense of being capable of taking care of themselves in military and political terms, as exemplified by the port of Buenos Aires. In any case, once the crisis started, each territory in Spanish America followed particular political *tempos*. The reactions depended on different variables, starting with the geographic distance of each territory from the metropolis and the frequency of the arrival of ships with information regarding what was going on in the metropolis. Other important factors were the racial characteristics of each society (→ Race, I/39), the relationship between the capital of each territory and its neighboring cities (Montevideo *vis-à-vis* Buenos Aires, for example), or the rapport between certain regions with the capital city (Paraguay *vis-à-vis* Buenos Aires or Lima).

As with any other revolutionary process, another element that cannot be ignored was the role that some individuals played at certain junctures. Simón Bolívar, who was not only a military leader, but also a very acute sociopolitical analyst, played a crucial role in several territories. However, the list can be extended: José de San Martín in the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata, in the Captaincy General of Chile and in Peru; Miguel Hidalgo and José María Morelos in the Viceroyalty of New Spain; Bernardo O'Higgins in the Captaincy General of Chile; Bernardo de Monteagudo in Buenos Aires, Peru, and Quito; Antonio José de Sucre in the Captaincy General of Venezuela and in the Viceroyalty of New Granada; José Artigas in what was called at that time the "Banda Oriental" (contemporary Uruguay) or Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia in a region that roughly corresponds to contemporary Paraguay.

Under the chaotic conditions created by the war against the metropolis (that was particularly savage in the Venezuelan region), all of these leaders, with the exception of Francia in Paraguay, were incapable of providing their respective territories or countries with the political stability that, once the first stages of the armed struggle were over, was a precondition for almost everything else, especially economic development (→ II/6) (Rinke 2011). Another element that should not be ignored is that the long-lasting wars of the Spanish Americans amongst themselves and against the royalist troops created a military caste that, once the wars were over, would not stand still. In fact, they decided to play a political role that would have nefarious consequences for the political development of the region. Just to give an idea in this respect: the first civil president of Peru took office in 1872, that is, almost half a century after the independence of the country. The contrast with the United States in this regard could not be starker; in the words of the author of one of the very few hemispheric histories of the Americas that has been written, "The independence wars were, in short, the making of the United States and the ruin of much of the rest of the Americas" (Fernández-Armesto 2003, 126). Another important contrast with the United States was the lack of experience of the new Latin American countries with the republican type of government that heavily depended on the kind of representative institutions that the British colonies in North America experienced since their creation in the first quarter of the 16th century.

There is one more factor that cannot be ignored when trying to explain the enormous difficulties that besieged the Spanish American countries after independence: the international economic situation and, more specifically, the commercial conditions under which they were born (→ Colonial Economies, I/4).

The economies of the Spanish colonies were ruined by the wars, which had caused long and total cessations of foreign trade, whereas the states of the northern Union, enjoying the benefits of protection from the French and Spanish navies, actually gained new trading partners and multiplied their shipping in the course of the war.

(Fernández-Armesto 2003, 122–123)

In addition, at the time of independence, the British bankers were the only ones capable of giving the new countries the liquidity they required to stimulate their economies. The interest rates that some of these bankers imposed on Spanish American governments were so onerous that very soon they were unable to pay. The long-term consequences of this decision by the British bankers to not lend more money to any Spanish American government fall into the domain of counterfactual history, but its weight on the lack of political stability in the region can hardly be exaggerated.

It is impossible to delve here into each and every one of the independence processes that took place in Spanish America between 1811, when Venezuela declared its independence, and 1828, when Uruguay was born as a new country. However, there are very significant differences between the popular movements that the priests Miguel Hidalgo and José María Morelos conducted in New Spain between 1810 and 1815, and what happened in territories like Venezuela and New Granada, where a Peninsular army of more than 10,000 men disembarked in 1814 and where religion played a much less important role in the war against the metropolitan armies. In the case of River Plate, it was the only territory that the Peninsular armies were not able to reach during the whole emancipation period. In this Viceroyalty, even more clearly than in other territories of the Spanish empire in America, the fighting could be considered a civil war, as it was fought by Americans that were trying to keep their independence, though mainly from Buenos Aires and not from Madrid. Other regions were much less exposed to open war, like Central America. In other cases, like the Viceroyalty of Peru, from the beginning, there was an extended rejection of independence; in fact, independence had to come from outside first by the hand of San Martín in 1821 and then by the hand of Bolívar in 1824.

In the last years, some historians have contended that the Brazilian emancipatory process should be studied as part of the Spanish American independence movements; two very recent examples are Pimenta (2017) and Hamnett (2017). However, the inclusion of the Brazilian case within these movements is still under debate. Although there are certain similarities, there are also very significant differences that stem from its starting point, that was dramatically different.

Brazil, having served as the capital of the Portuguese Empire from 1808 to 1821 and then gaining independence under the leadership of the prince-regent in 1822, avoided most of the economic and social dislocations that proved so costly to its neighbors.

(Burkholder and Johnson 2001, 344)

The single historic fact that could justify a separate treatment of the Brazilian emancipatory process is that in 1808, just before the Napoleonic troops arrived to Lisbon to take possession of the city, the prince-regent, João VI, the whole royal family, and the court in general were able to

escape by sea from the Portuguese capital, protected by the British navy, and moved the capital of the Empire from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro. João would become king in 1816, while he was still in Brazil, and would stay there until 1822. This means that in the case of the Portuguese Empire, for fourteen crucial years, the Age of Revolution was viewed mainly from America, and not from the metropolis. During this turbulent period for the whole Atlantic world, the Portuguese Crown was able to maintain a legitimate government in Brazil, thanks to the presence of the king in its territory, compared to Ferdinand VII's captivity in Bayonne. This also meant that the whole Portuguese Empire in America remained united and relatively calm throughout this period. Additionally, when João became king in 1816, his title was king of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarve; that is, right in the middle of the independence wars of Spanish America, the Brazilian ex-colony acquired a political status that Brazilians never dreamt of enjoying.

In 1822, a revolutionary situation in Portugal forced João VI to return to the metropolis. This was the event that precipitated Brazilian independence. His eldest son, Pedro, decided not only to stay in Brazil, but very soon realized that considering the political situation in Portugal, independence was the only option in order to avoid a violent rupture between the metropolis and the ex-colony. He thus declared independence in September of 1822; three months later, he became Pedro I, emperor of Brazil. Thus, in the case of Brazil, the "transition from colony to independent empire was characterized by an extraordinary degree of political, economic and social continuity" (Bethell 1985, 195–196). This does not mean that upheavals were nonexistent, as the 1817 failed republican revolution in Pernambuco clearly shows.

Turning to the social conditions in Brazil, the first and foremost aspect to be considered is slavery (→ I/18). It was not only maintained after independence but it continued to exist until 1888. The number of reported slaves in Brazil at the beginning of the 19th century may vary, but there were no less than a million and a half. Slavery not only persisted after Brazil obtained its independence in 1822, but kept increasing steadily until 1850 when it reached a figure of close to three million. By itself, the continuation of slavery meant the persistence of the traditional corporate society of colonial times. Another important consequence of the way in which Brazilian independence was achieved was that the military did not play the political role they played in Spanish America. Other aspects contributed to the continuities that can be identified between colonial Brazil and independent Brazil: the backwardness of education and the scarcity of what could be considered a Brazilian "public opinion" – there was not a single printing press in Brazil before 1808 and not even one university. In both aspects, the contrast with Spanish America is noteworthy. For example, looking at just the Viceroyalty of New Spain, there were at least ten printing presses at the beginning of the 19th century.

The fact that a territory as immense as Brazil went intact throughout the Age of Revolution demonstrates the legitimacy of the Brazilian monarchy and is a proof of the control that landowners and slave owners were able to exercise during the transition from colonial times to independence. This control, violent on a daily basis and brutal when it was challenged, was essential in keeping the Brazilian economy working and, more than that, it made possible the continuation of Brazilian colonial society and the relative stability of Brazilian politics during the "Age of Revolution."

Discussing revolutions and connections in the Americas during the Age of Revolution

The origins, motives, development, *dénouements*, and consequences of the independence of the Thirteen Colonies; the revolution of Saint-Domingue; the emancipation processes in Spanish America; and, finally, the Brazilian transition from colony to Empire were contrasting in

so many aspects that it is difficult to find overarching heuristic criteria to explain all of them beyond the commercial and military rivalries of European empires and the Enlightenment progeny of political ideas and principles. Depending on the field of expertise and the analytical perspective each historian adopts, the word “revolution” may seem questionable when applied indiscriminately to each one of them. In this regard, Lester D. Langley concludes from his book on the American, the Haitian, and the Spanish American cases: “None of the three revolutions I have surveyed conforms sufficiently to any of the prevailing theories of revolution identified in history or in the social sciences so as to explain why they occurred or followed a particular course” (Langley 1996, 285) (→ Revolution, II/44). However, as mentioned, the presence of constitutional documents and ideas coming from the Thirteen Colonies in some Spanish American territories is undeniable, especially when the new Spanish American countries needed political inspiration for the republics they were creating from scratch, for they lacked any experience whatsoever in that kind of government. Likewise, the commercial and military “exchanges” between some parts of the Portuguese empire in America and the Viceroyalty of River Plate were also evident throughout the period, especially at certain junctures.

The United States, Haiti, and ten new countries in Ibero-America saw the light between 1783 and 1828. The achievement of independence in itself was revolutionary, of course, but this new status was eminently political. As many Latin American historians have remarked regarding the independence period, this political revolution did not have a social equivalent of the same magnitude. In the case of the United States, the continuance of slavery (→ I/18) is the most flagrant example of the social conservatism that, somewhat paradoxically, characterized the “Age of Revolution” in the Americas. In the case of Spanish America, independence implied the abolition of slavery in only two countries (Chile and Mexico), those with the lowest number of slaves. In the rest of the region, slavery continued to exist until the second half of the century.

The political revolution that transformed the Americas during the Age of Revolution turned around a series of principles: national sovereignty, political equality, individual rights and liberties, division of powers, elections, and constitutionalism. However, it is not only the oft-repeated and ahistorical notion that many social groups were excluded from these principles that should be put forward, but the much more interesting idea that these principles had different connotations and emphases depending on the political needs and social configuration of each society. Individual rights, property among them, were more important for the North Americans (→ Citizenship, II/27), the nation was the ideological centerpiece of the French revolutionaries (→ Nation State, II/38), who did not care much for the division of powers, and in electoral terms, the Cádiz Constitution and some Spanish American constitutional documents were the most open in participatory terms during the Age of Revolution (→ Democracy, II/32), although at the same time, they all maintained religious intolerance (→ Religious Beliefs, I/40). These differences, and many others that could be mentioned, are inevitable due to the ever-changing social contexts and the political contexts of debate that varied significantly from one territory to the other depending on a series of unique geopolitical, economic, and social features that characterized each territory (→ Geopolitics, II/34). This is one of the reasons why the discourse of “influences,” that was so common until recently in the historiography of the period, is gradually disappearing from the vocabulary of intellectual historians. “Interconnections” do not necessarily mean “influences,” a term that has a causal connotation that many contemporary historians tend to distrust.

Establishing influences among revolutions is more difficult than what some Atlantic or Global historians may make us think (Breña 2016). Connections are traceable in certain

political, social, economic, and cultural domains, but when talking about a revolutionary process, it is important to give proper weight to the specific circumstances of the territory or region under study and to be cautious when causal links between revolutionary movements are established without caveats.

Of course, the American Revolution was used as an example by some French revolutionaries and its chronological proximity and political daring attracted some others. The Haitian Revolution is unthinkable without the French Revolution, but the former was not an *independence* movement until the very end of the process and the influence of the latter over what happened in Saint-Domingue is ambiguous at times, when not in open contradiction with some of the principles of 1789. On the connections between the Haitian Revolution and the Spanish American independence movements, almost all of the Spanish American political leaders considered the Haitian insurrection as an evil that had to be avoided at all costs. Regarding the situation of indigenous peoples, the historians of the Spanish American independence movements tend to coincide that these were the social groups that were most negatively affected by the revolutionary process. The same can be said of the Native Americans to the North. “Whoever won the American Revolution, historians agree that Native American nations were the biggest losers” (Bernstein 2009, 23) (→ Indigeneity, I/31).

At one point or another, the debate about the independence processes in Latin America inevitably falls into the never-ending and in a certain sense a historic issue of the revolutions that failed.

There has been, to be sure, a strong sense among many that independence was a failed moment in which nations struggled but failed to cohere, and more recently in which political liberties never had the leveling social effects that many, especially more radical, historians inscribed into the very meaning of the term ‘revolution’.

(Adelman 2011, 175–176)

From the vantage point of the 21st century, this approach seems unassailable. At present, several countries in Latin America are some of the most unequal countries in the world. Even more striking maybe is the fact that countries with economies as big as those of Brazil or Mexico are included in this list.

Some years ago, Eric Van Young posed the following question regarding the Spanish American independence processes, “Was there an Age of Revolution in Spanish America?” (Van Young 2001). Strange as it may sound for an entry titled “Independence Movements,” one of the conclusions that can be arrived at after a cursory review of these movements is that in several respects, they were less revolutionary than what is still assumed by some historians. However, this discussion should not ignore that in aspects as important as political legitimacy, political culture, and political obligation, independence meant a radical transformation, more so if we consider the habits, contents, and longevity that characterized the Spanish *ancien régime*. If this element is considered, as it should if we want to understand the Age of Revolution in its context, the revolutionary character of the Spanish liberal revolution that took place in Cádiz between 1810 and 1814 and the Spanish American independence movements is undeniable. Elections, with all its social implications, a free press, and the public opinion that ensues from it and keeps it alive are only some examples that could be given in this regard (→ Civil Society, II/28, Freedom of Expression and Censorship, III/29).

Transfers and entanglements of different kinds took place throughout the Americas during the Age of Revolution; however, geographic distances, limitations regarding transport, and language barriers should also be taken into consideration when trying to calibrate them.

In the last twenty years, historians have shown that the levels of hemispheric communication were higher than we thought, but it should be kept in mind that the barriers were also considerable, if not insurmountable, for the vast majority of the inhabitants of the Americas, even for the most prosperous and the most daring. The Age of Revolution has gained an Atlantic ($\rightarrow 1/3$) and global dimension in the last two decades and it will continue to do so in the years to come. This tendency must live side by side with the unique features that become palpable the moment historiography delves into each one of the revolutionary processes that took place in the Americas during the half-century between 1775 and 1825.

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11

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

Alice Nash

Prior to the onset of European colonization, human beings in the Americas had no single word to describe themselves as a group. There were millions of people across the hemisphere, speaking thousands of different languages. Each group had its own unique histories of joy and sorrow, war and peace, ceremony, trade, work, and family life. Indigenous creation stories offer myriad explanations for when and where the people came into being (→ Indigenous Literatures, III/10; Foundational Discourses, III/8). The Haudenosaunee, or People of the Longhouse (also known as the Iroquois), whose homeland crosses the borders of New York, Ontario, and Quebec, say that the world as we know it began when a woman fell from her home in the sky. The birds and animals worked together to save her from drowning by piling dirt onto the back of a turtle to create Turtle Island (Calloway 2015, 49–51). The Diné (also known as the Navajo) in the southwestern U.S. have lived in a series of worlds, each time being forced to leave because of their mistakes, each time learning to do better (42–49). In the Andes, four couples known as the Ayares emerged from caves at Pacariqtampu, south of Cusco, or from Lake Titicaca in some versions. Carrying a mandate from Inti, the Sun, they gathered the first ten communities or *ayllus* and began the first journey on the Inka Road (Barreiro 2015, 3). For all their variety, Indigenous creation stories agree that the people were created in the Americas, inhabiting physical and cultural landscapes that are rich in history and meaning.

The term “Indigenous peoples” is a necessity of colonization (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7), the ongoing process whereby peoples from Western Europe invaded the Americas and sought to dominate those who already lived there (→ Colonial Rule, I/5), and to claim their lands and resources (→ Land, II/15; Extractivism, II/9). As today used in international forums such as the United Nations, it applies to culturally distinct peoples who have priority in time with respect to the occupation and use of specific territory; who self-identify as indigenous; and who are recognized as indigenous by other groups or by State authorities as a distinct group (Martinez Cobo 1986, 5). The term is anachronistic for the period before 1900 but for purposes of this entry, it is preferable to the racist, pejorative terminology found in too many sources.

Most Indigenous peoples, in their own languages, call themselves some variant of “the People,” or “the real people,” or “the people who live [here].” This is clear in the documents written by Indigenous peoples of Mesoamerica, who refer to themselves as *altepetl* in Nahuatl,

ñuu in Nudzahui (Mixtec), and *cah* in Maya (Horn 2014, 34). They became “Indians” or *indios* thanks to Christopher Columbus: a neat bit of semantic displacement that labels people from one continent as though they lived on another. Oneida stand-up comic Charlie Hill (1951–2013) used to joke, “I’m sure glad they weren’t looking for Turkey!” There is no single term that pleases everyone, even within one community: Indian, or its hipper variant, *ndn*; Native; Native American; American Indian; First Nations; First Peoples; Aboriginal; and Indigenous are each acceptable in different contexts. Best practice is to be specific rather than generic, where possible. Cree, Apache, Guaraní, Mapuche, or Waura people can all be described as “indigenous,” but they are not alike in their histories, cultures, languages, and present-day realities (→ Indigeneity, I/31).

Studies that use only generic terms, implying that “Indians” are all the same, are less useful than those that name names. At the same time, too much specific vocabulary can be overwhelming. Scholars often mix terminology, sometimes referring to people by tribal name, village name, language spoken, or language family (→ Language, I/13). Each of these terms is useful in its own context. However – since irony and contradictions are unavoidable with this topic – Indigenous scholars remind us that the predominant systems of naming and classification are Eurocentric, created by settler-colonial imperatives that aim to classify and control Indigenous peoples. In the 1970s, librarian A. Brian Deer (Kahnawake Mohawk) found that the commonly used Dewey Decimal and Library of Congress systems were of little help in organizing the library of the National Indian Brotherhood in Canada. He developed an alternative, known as the Brian Deer Classification System for First Nations Libraries (Bosum and Dunne 2017, 283–284). Historian Georges Sioui (Wendat) suggests that a paradigm be adopted of “Four Americas instead of one (dominated by the United States), two (North and South America), or three (North, Central and South).” This system acknowledges the European languages that Indigenous peoples today most often use to communicate with each other: Spanish, Portuguese, English, and French (Sioui 2016, 229). While studies of Indigenous people cannot avoid at least some discussion of colonization, historian Taiaiake Alfred (Kahnawake Mohawk) and political scientist Jeff Corntassel (Cherokee Nation) remind us that

there is a danger in allowing colonization to be the only story of Indigenous lives. It must be recognized that colonialism is a narrative in which the Settler’s power is the fundamental reference and assumption, inherently limiting Indigenous freedom and imposing a view of the world that is but an outcome or perspective on that power.

(Alfred and Corntassel 2005, 601)

Generations of history

Indigenous peoples inhabited the Americas before 1492, but for how long? Creation stories say, from time immemorial. In contrast to the story told in Genesis, where God creates the world from nothing, Indigenous creation stories often begin with a place and with social relations that already exist. The place may be in the sky or under the earth; in a world that might or might not seem familiar; where the people could be men and women similar to us, or other-than-human Persons in the form of animals or other beings. In some cases, a powerful deity demands obedience and tribute, as with the Aztec god, Huitzilopochtli (Restall and Lane 2011, 72), but more often, the story cycles tell about active Persons, male and female, who contribute to the shaping and ordering of the world in different ways. One effect of colonization and especially missionary activities is that too many creation stories have been lost or damaged (→ Religion and Missionizing, I/17). In the words of ethnohistorian

Fannie Hardy Eckstorm, the stories known today are often as incomplete as telling the story of Cinderella as, “Oh, it’s about a girl who wanted to go to a dance when she should have been at home washing dishes; and she lost one of her shoes” (Nash and Strobel 2006, 6). Important details are missing that might completely change the meaning. Even so, recent studies such as Julie Cruikshank’s *Do Glacier’s Listen?* (2005) suggest that Indigenous stories can be an important source of geographical, historical, and cultural information, beyond their importance for religious practices and worldview (→ Nature, II/39).

The dominant story told within academic circles is about immigration rather than creation (→ Migration, I/15). This argument – for it is both a story and an argument – says that human beings first came to the Americas by walking across the Bering Strait, a land bridge that connected Siberia to present-day Alaska, perhaps 12,000 years ago. They are known as the Clovis people on the basis of distinctive stone tools and projectile points found by archaeologists in the early 20th century near Clovis, New Mexico. These ancestors are sometimes referred to as Paleo-Indians, with *paleo-* from the Greek for “old” or “ancient.” They are ancient ones, unknowable except for the artifacts found today. Other types of evidence complicate these assertions. Archaeologist Paulette Steeves (Cree/Métis) began her doctoral research with the assumption that Indigenous oral traditions are not fables; that some stories contain “mnemonic pegs” that link to older histories; and evidence for these longer time-spans should be findable in the archaeological record. Steeves found over 400 published, peer-reviewed reports from across the Americas, published in the last eighty years or so, that identify older sites. Most fall into a range of 14,000–44,000 years before present, but some are 100,000 years old or more (Steeves 2015, 118, 127–136).

Academics may never accept the explanations offered in creation stories but new approaches, especially those that consider Indigenous knowledge, support the longer timelines of human habitation in the Americas (Calloway 2015, 19–20). It is extremely unlikely that the diversity of Indigenous languages and language families could have developed from one monocultural migration 12,000 years ago. Even if multiple migrations from different groups are assumed, 12,000 years is too little time for this degree of language change (Nichols 2008, 1112–1115). The question of how long Indigenous peoples have lived in the Americas generates strong emotion and little consensus. Charles Mann points out that the urban complex on the Peruvian Coast that includes the temple at Huaricanga existed about 5,000 years ago, when the ancient city of Sumer was the only comparable development on earth. The Monte Verde site in southern Chile was inhabited over 12,500 years ago, according to carbon dating of their bone and stone tools. Evidence of urban centers and other markers of “civilization” in the Americas that predate European contact pose deep epistemological challenges to Eurocentric views of human history (Mann 2011, 155–196).

Subsistence

Hunting, fishing, gathering, and planting are seasonal activities that require a deep knowledge of local environments. While these activities are sometimes depicted as “natural” (→ Nature, II/39) – animals also forage and hunt – food security requires more than luck. It requires an understanding of the local ecology derived from observing and correlating data; appropriate technologies; and protocols or cultural practices that guide daily and seasonal work. Traditional Ecological Knowledge is an emerging field of study that correlates cultural practices with scientific principles.

Certain foods go beyond subsistence to have a sacred meaning, closely tied to the well-being of the people apart from caloric intake, such as salmon for the Yurok, pine nuts for

the Western Shoshone, and wild rice for the Ojibwe and Menominee. One impact of forced removal and climate change (→ II/30) is that some people lost access to their sacred foods and consequently the ceremonies associated with them. The food with the highest symbolic valence across the Americas is corn, or maize. Ten thousand years ago, Indigenous peoples developed rudimentary corn into a sustainable crop. It spread north and south, contributing to changes that include sedentary or semisedentary horticulture, the rise of densely populated villages and urban areas (→ Urbanization, I/45), gendered responsibility for tasks associated with growing corn, and distinctive regional cuisines (Mann 2011, 220–228). Mexican American Studies scholar Roberto Cintli Rodríguez (2014) argues that *maíz* culture connects Indigenous peoples across the millennia and forms a “hidden transcript,” embedded in stories, recipes, dance, and material culture that documents ancient knowledge.

Trade and technology

The most basic technologies begin with food and shelter. The development of tools, weapons, and ceramics can be traced in the archaeological record. Certain items were so efficient and effective that their modern forms have changed very little, such as harpoons, fishing nets, and canoes, although they are made from modern materials today. Both natural resources and emergent technologies created opportunities for trade. Thousands of years ago, shells from the Pacific Coast were traded to people living in the Great Basin; copper from the Great Lakes made its way to the Atlantic coast; and pottery, marine shells, turtle shells, and shark and alligator teeth from the Gulf of Mexico were acquired by people living in the Ohio Valley (Dickason 2002, 59). Other types of exchange are recorded in stories rather than the archaeological record: ideas, ceremonies, alliances, and intermarriages.

Trade in perishable goods was, of necessity, fairly local. Long-distance trade required transport technologies. In the Caribbean, Arawak dugout canoes could carry eighty or more people across the open ocean. Lightweight birchbark canoes allowed Algonkian and Iroquoian peoples in the Northeast culture area to travel inland waterways, carrying the canoes across portages between rivers. Stories often include markers tied to navigation, such as a mountain with an unusual shape, or the number of days that a person travelled from one place to another. In the Pacific, Polynesian navigators used the sun, the stars, the ocean waves, and seabirds to travel over a thousand miles between islands. Since 2014, a reproduction double-hulled voyaging canoe called the *Hōkūleʻa* (“Star of Gladness,” also known as Arcturus) has sailed the waters of the Atlantic and Caribbean, visiting South Africa, Brazil, and the East Coast of the United States with only traditional navigation techniques (www.hokulea.com).

People also travelled by road. Perhaps the most well-known example is the system of highways known collectively as the Qhapaq Ñan (“Road of Power” in Quechua), the great Inka Road, an extraordinary feat of engineering that runs 40,000 km along the west coast of South America through Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile (Barreiro 2015, 1–10). Portions of the road predate the Inka, with trade routes established some 10,000 years ago (De la Vega 2015, 120). It traverses the high Andes and passes through deserts, valleys, and rain forests. Unlike the paved roads of today, the Qhapaq Ñan includes footpaths and bridges, planned and engineered to facilitate long-distance travel. A specific component is that a radial system marks its center, with four main roads meeting in Cusco, in southeastern Peru: the capital and spiritual center of the Inka world. The radial system reminds us that roads have many purposes beyond trade, including communication, administration, cultural identity, and ceremonial uses (Urton 2015, 61–62). Other road systems were built by the

Maya across the Yucatán peninsula, by the Puebloan ancestors at Mesa Verde, and by the Moundbuilders in Southern Ohio (Lepper 1995, 52).

Each of these roads is associated with permanent housing and elaborate ceremonial structures. The mysterious serpent mounds of the Ohio Valley, the cliff dwellings of Mesa Verde (America's first apartment buildings), and the pyramids of Mesoamerica rival the wonders of ancient Egypt or Stonehenge. In the south, Spanish invaders witnessed these advanced societies with their own eyes, and the first generations of post-contact Indigenous writers recorded their histories in detail (→ Indigenous Literatures, III/10). In the north, the English and French who saw only abandoned ruins found it difficult to explain cities like Cahokia, which at its peak ca. 1200 CE housed 30,000 to 40,000 people, making it larger than London or Paris at that time. The 17th- and 18th-century writers, confident in their belief that "Indians" did not work, decided that the best explanation must be that these places were built by the lost tribes of Israel, who somehow found their way east and into the Americas. In the 20th century, Erich von Däniken (1980) argued that these structures must be evidence of aliens from outer space, that being more believable to him than the likelihood of Indigenous ancestors who lived in cities and used sophisticated technology.

Villages, confederacies, and empires

On the eve of Columbus' arrival, there were as many different types of social organization across the Americas as one might expect with so much diversity. Hunter-gatherer societies lived in family units, coming together in larger groups or villages for social activities, trade, weddings, and other ceremonies. Trade was tied to alliance, based on protocols of gift-exchange that considered status and respect rather than profit. They tended to be relatively egalitarian, with prestige and status determined by actions rather than lineage. Horticulturalists lived in villages with women bearing the main responsibility for farming (→ Gender and Work, II/11). Corn was the major crop across the Americas, usually grown in conjunction with beans and squash in the triad known as "The Three Sisters." In general, horticulturalists organized along matrilineal lines, that is, family status was determined through the mother, rather than the father as in patrilineal societies (→ Family, I/26; Gender, I/9). This is sometimes misinterpreted as matriarchy, or a society where women have the same kind of power over men that men have over women under patriarchy. Rather, women and men had different, complementary areas of authority or expertise. Among the Haudenosaunee, who were the model for Lewis Henry Morgan's influential theories about kinship and matriarchy (Trautmann 2008), women played an important role in the structure of the Iroquois Confederacy. Clan mothers chose the (male) chiefs at the village, nation, and confederacy levels, and had the power to remove their authority, but women never held the title of chief. They reminded chiefs of their responsibilities; a word or a glance might be all that was needed.

Urban trade centers are associated with hierarchical societies, although the exact dynamics and social structure vary. Complex civilizations rose and fell over time: the Chauvins gave way to the Moche, Sicán, Nazca, and Tiahuanaco in the Andes, and the Olmecs of Mexico's Gulf Coast were succeeded by Teotihuacán and the Classic Maya. Each of these civilizations was characterized by cities with large stone temple complexes (Restall and Lane 2011, 7). Empires developed when groups such as the Aztecs extended their influence through military power. Other trade centers emerged as gathering places, not controlled by any one nation, such as Tadoussac, on the St. Lawrence River in Quebec, or The Dalles, on the Columbia River in Oregon, where converging waterways allowed distant peoples to

meet (Nash and Strobel 2006, 46–48, 196–197). The introduction of horses created a new dynamic on the Great Plains where hunter-gatherers such as the Comanche established “empires” of control through long-distance raiding, without the land claims and administrative mechanisms associated with other types of empire (Hämäläinen 2008).

The four Americas

The Indigenous peoples of the Americas share a common context of dealing with imposed settler-colonialism. One could argue that greed and violence have existed throughout human history, but what makes the European colonial project distinctive after 1492 is the way it is cloaked in the language of international law. These laws were invented by powerful men in Europe and modified by their successors as needed to maintain the guise of legality. The legal construct that is the basis for European and successor claims to “owning” land (→ II/15) in the Americas is known as the Doctrine of Discovery (→ Foundational Discourses, III/8), based on older principles developed by the Roman Catholic Church as early as the 5th century to establish papal jurisdiction over what they envisioned as a global Christian commonwealth. The hemispheric American aspect of the Doctrine has its origins in the Papal Bull of 1493, issued by Alexander VI to bring order to the competition between Spain and Portugal after Columbus brought the news of riches to be had for the taking. The Doctrine codified into a stable set of agreed-upon principles by about 1550, even among nations that rejected papal authority after the Protestant Reformation. The heart of the Doctrine is that Christians have rights that non-Christians do not, a principle developed through centuries of the Crusades and the Muslim rule of the Iberian Peninsula. Christian monarchs could claim land not already claimed by other Christian monarchs. Indigenous peoples became “conquered” at the moment of “discovery,” retaining rights of “occupancy” but not “ownership” (Miller 2010, 9–17). European nations had to follow certain parameters to legitimate their claims to each other, such as performing elaborate rites of possession, although their rites were not always mutually acceptable. As historian Patricia Seed notes, “Englishmen held that they acquired rights to the New World by physical objects, Frenchmen by gestures, Spaniards by speech, Portuguese by numbers, Dutch by description” (Seed 1995, 179).

The word “discovery” is associated with Columbus, which suggests that it is finished, past tense, something that happened 500 years ago and cannot be changed. In reality, the Doctrine is embedded in law, and legal precedents that are still used to deny Indigenous rights and land claims (→ Indigeneity, I/31; Human Rights, II/35). One alternative is to call it the Doctrine of Possession, which is the word that Columbus actually used. Another follows the lead of Indigenous activists who call it the Doctrine of Discovery and Domination, since “discovery” is in the past but “domination” is ongoing.

Hispanophone America

While this entry aims to decenter Columbus, there is no denying that 1492 was a watershed for both Europeans and Indigenous peoples (Rinke 2013, 16–22). Bartolomé de Las Casas, who came to Hispaniola in 1502, described the Caribbean as “a beehive of people.” Within about sixty years, most of them were dead, enslaved (→ Slavery, I/18), or displaced as a result of this invasion. Disease was a factor but, as historian Andrés Reséndez points out, not the only one. Early Spanish sources did not mention smallpox until 1518 (Reséndez 2016, 13–14). Medical doctor David Jones draws on modern understandings of immunology to argue that disease alone is not a sufficient explanation for the high death rates. Malnourishment,

drought, overcrowding, stress or trauma, enslavement, and even parasitic diseases can affect recovery rates (Jones 2003, 731–742). Absent other factors, groups that experience epidemic diseases can recover, as Europe did after the Black Plague (Reséndez 2016, 45). European colonization across the Americas created and exacerbated situations where people were vulnerable to disease and unable to recover (→ Columbian Exchange, I/6). Spanish colonization in particular brought harsh systems of slavery and other forms of unfree labor (→ I/19), initially for mining gold and silver but also for sugar plantations and other labor-intensive production (24–28) (→ Colonial Economies, I/4; Extractivism, II/9).

Different models for how to exploit Indigenous labor were tried. Under the *encomienda* system, soldiers and officials were “granted” a number of Indigenous people from whom they could then legally extract “tribute” in the form of labor. Masked as something other than slavery, the evident brutality of the system brought harsh criticism from de las Casas and others and was outlawed (though not entirely stopped) in 1542. A new system of *repartimiento* or allotment next required that Indigenous men work for meager wages in the silver mines of Mexico. A comparable system known as the *mita* drafted men to work in the silver mines of Potosí (Restall and Lane 2011, 86–88, 139–143). Reséndez calls this *The Other Slavery* in his 2016 book by that name, one of many systems of unfree Indigenous labor in the Americas that coexisted with, but differed from, the enslavement of African peoples.

In contrast to the other Americas discussed here, Hispanophone America began as a vast territorial claim that later became eighteen different sovereign nations, including parts of the United States. Spanish colonists aimed to control territory and extract resources – similar to what the Comanche empire would achieve two centuries later to the north. The Caribbean islands that were once the nexus of a hemispheric Indigenous world (Huehucoyotl, Personal communication, 2017) became the launch pad for a “chain of conquest”: Hispaniola to Cuba to the Yucatan and Central Mexico; Hispaniola to Venezuela, or Colombia; Hispaniola to Panama, which led to Peru and the Pacific side of South America (Restall and Lane 2011, 87, 92–96). The revolutions of the early 19th century brought independence from Spain to the former colonies (→ Independence Movements, I/10) but prevented the development of consistent policies aimed at Indigenous peoples, in contrast to the North. In rural or less accessible communities, people maintained traditional ways to a high degree, resisting the impositions of settler-colonialism.

Lusophone America

The earliest Portuguese accounts of Indigenous peoples in Brazil offer two contradictory images that persist to this day. The Tupi-speakers, described by scribe and nobleman Pero Vaz de Caminha in 1500, were characterized as simple, naked, and excellent prospects for conversion to Catholicism. At the other extreme, pilot Amerigo Vespucci sailed the Atlantic coast of Brazil down to its southern tip in 1501–1502 and claimed that the Tupi-speakers near the Rio Grande do Norte practiced cannibalism. While his description of Indians who had eaten hundreds of men may have been exaggerated – Vespucci was more reliable as a pilot than as a narrator – his description was useful for settler-colonial interests. As converts or cannibals, the Indigenous peoples of Brazil clearly needed to be civilized, and either the cross or the sword would do (Langfur 2014, 15–16).

Demographically, the precontact population of Indigenous peoples was much smaller than in other areas, with two to three million people in Brazil compared to perhaps twenty million in Mesoamerica and twelve million in the Andes. Some estimates say that the population declined by as much as 90 percent over the next hundred years – a dreadful number

of deaths. Linguistically, the numbers are startling in a different way. There were as many as 2,000 different Indigenous groups representing over forty language families from three main linguistic stocks: Tupi, Macro-Gê, and Arawak (16).

Convert/cannibal stereotypes in the primary sources continue to infuse the academic literature, where generations of scholars rarely noticed anything other than this unfortunate dyad. Historians, anthropologists, and other scholars who measured authenticity by an imaginary ethnographic baseline failed to see “Indians” who adopted European-style clothing, used the legal system to protect their rights, and intermarried with people of African descent (→ Hybridity, I/30). The Indigenous peoples of Brazil did not have the gold, silver, ceremonial architecture, writing systems, calendars, social hierarchies, or gold (worth a second mention) that the Spanish found in Mexico and Mesoamerica. In fact, they were more like the Indigenous peoples found in North America, with lifeways adapted to specific ecosystems, organized by clan and kinship rather than empires or states, moving their villages when the soil became depleted from horticulture. They adapted to the “New World” (Merrell 2012, 452) that came into being after 1500, just as Indigenous peoples did in the north. Jesuit missionaries developed strategies such as bringing converts to live in mission villages with the goal of weaning them from traditional lifeways that were duplicated by Jesuits in New France a century later (→ Religion and Missionizing, I/17) (Metcalf 2014, 32–34; Calloway 2015, 111–112).

Brazil became independent from Portugal in 1822. As in the U.S. and Canada, Brazil’s founding myths were all about progress (→ Foundational Discourses, III/8; Development, II/6). The ongoing presence of Indigenous peoples who asserted land rights and resisted the settler-colonial project did and does not fit the triumphal narrative. Historian Hal Langfur points out that it is difficult to write the history of Hispanophone America without mentioning Indigenous peoples; yet in Brazil, as in the U.S. and Canada, Indigenous peoples are largely absent from the dominant national histories except for token appearances. Indeed, Brazil is often overlooked in general histories of the Americas, although it is larger in size than the continental United States.

Francophone America

The early decades of French colonization in the Americas followed the model of extractive—rather than settler-colonialism (→ Extractivism, II/9). French fishermen visited the Grand Banks of Newfoundland to fish for cod, a desirable commodity because it could be dried and salted for reliable transport. The fur trade, at first, was seasonal, associated with these fishing voyages, but it quickly became a lucrative business of its own. In contrast to the Caribbean and southern regions, where Indigenous peoples could be forced into unfree labor, the fur trade required the active cooperation of Indigenous men and women to obtain beaver and other furs, and to process the furs for export. Poorly tanned hides would ruin the whole enterprise. Explorers, fishermen, traders, and missionaries in New France depended on Algonkian and Iroquoian peoples on multiple levels and learned Indigenous protocols of respect and diplomacy to best achieve their goals. In a world where people were either kin or enemies, good relations were essential for successful trade and diplomacy (Calloway 2015, 92–94). French men married Indigenous women – sometimes “according to the custom of the country,” but also in legal marriages, where the children were able to inherit the father’s patrimony (→ Family, I/26). Civil and church officials understood the benefit of fictive kin relations created by Catholic baptism, and baptismal records from the early decades are a “who’s who” of important French men and women who served as godparents, including

the King of France and his family. Intermarriage persisted even after the 1660s, when the number of French settler families increased thanks to the new policy of sending unmarried women from France (“Daughters of the King”) to find husbands (Dickason 2002, 144–149). Distinct Métis (mixed) communities developed along the fur trade routes (→ Hybridity, I/30), and Métis First Nations communities today are recognized as aboriginal peoples under the Canadian Constitution.

Colonial records show that the French spent much of the 17th century exploiting intertribal rivalries in an effort to control the river routes that were the lifeblood of the fur trade (→ Interethnic Relations, I/12). This ultimately proved deadly and unprofitable. In 1701, the Governor of New France presided over a major peace conference that took place in Montreal. About 1,300 delegates came from over forty Indigenous nations, thanks to the diplomatic skills of Kondiaronk, a Wendat leader, who unfortunately died of illness just before the meeting took place. The Great Peace of Montreal includes clan marks and other symbols drawn by the signatories, whose names and tribal affiliations reflect the reach of New France by this time: following the St. Lawrence River inland to the Great Lakes and down the Mississippi to New Orleans (Beaulieu and Viau 2002).

The end of this Eurocolonial period happened differently in Francophone America than in other places. New France fell to the English. The Treaty of Paris of 1763 transferred jurisdiction over the land and its people from France to England. Indigenous peoples were not consulted. Francophone Canadians (including Cajuns and Acadians) became second-class citizens (→ Citizenship, II/27). Indigenous peoples who lived along the St. Lawrence River and especially those near Montreal and Quebec City found themselves with many options. By the end of the 19th century, trilingual Indigenous peoples moved easily across the French-English, Canada-U.S. borders. Descendants of French and Indigenous marriages are often distinguishable by their anglicized French family names, such as the Deloria (Deslaurier) family that includes the prolific 20th-century writer and intellectual Vine Deloria, Jr. (Standing Rock Sioux).

Anglophone America

Canada and the United States both began as settler-colonial projects. They incorporated territories from other European nations without consent from the Indigenous peoples who already lived there. They established strong Federal governments and laws at the expense of Indigenous peoples, who were defined as wards as though they were children in need of adult oversight. The persistence, resilience, and legal claims of Indigenous peoples across North America created an “Indian Problem” that the settler-colonial states tried to resolve through treaties or overt violence, and through education policies (→ Education, I/24) that aimed to “kill the Indian, save the man,” in the infamous words of educator and U.S. Army officer Richard Henry Pratt.

The U.S. began as thirteen British colonies that each developed their own relations with Indigenous peoples. After its successful bid for independence in the American Revolution, the U.S. was preoccupied with establishing itself as a sovereign nation and with finding a balance between state and federal power. The Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, which declared that Congress must approve land transactions with Indian nations, was intended to limit the ability of states to purchase land on their own, not to protect Indigenous rights. In the 1970s, this act became the precedent that allowed tribes along the east coast to sue for lands taken by states in transactions that were never approved by Congress (Calloway 2015, 523). There were key moments when the U.S. recognized the importance of strong alliances,

as when President George Washington sent Timothy Pickering to negotiate the Treaty of Canandaigua with the Haudenosaunee in 1794. However, the imperative to establish U.S. claims to lands, territories, and resources culminated in three critical cases that were argued before the U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall. *Johnson v. M'Intosh* (1821), *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* (1831), and *Worcester v. Georgia* (1832) established contradictory principles that form the basis of Federal Indian Law. In brief, the U.S. holds title to land through treaties with Britain (and later, with France and Spain), which had title under the Doctrine of Discovery. The Supreme Court recognized that Indian nations are sovereign on their own territory, even when they exist within the borders of a state, but at the same time declared that they are “domestic dependent nations,” with a lesser degree of sovereignty. As the U.S. expanded, it acquired lands that were already shaped by French, Dutch, Swedish, Moravian, Spanish, and Russian influences. The resulting patchwork of contradictory, co-existing laws and legal principles is confusing even for specialists (Calloway 2015, 291–293) (→ Land, II/15).

In Canada, it took time for Britain to figure out how to manage and expand its control of this vast territory while keeping an eye out for U.S. aggression from the south. The Act of Confederation of 1867 united different administrative regions to form the self-governing dominion of Canada. To support its rapid expansion, Canada signed eleven numbered treaties with First Nations between 1871 and 1921, just after the U.S. stopped making treaties (Dickason 2002, 241–251). The open-ended treaty-making process in Canada allows for treaties to be (re)negotiated on a case-by-case basis. This is a sharp contrast to the U.S., where land claims must be litigated in court or resolved through special legislation. Canada established a more restrictive definition of “Indian” status than the U.S. with the Indian Act of 1876 and its later revisions. Canada recognized status through a patriarchal framework that only recognized women as “Indian” through their fathers and husbands. Until 1985, when the Indian Act was amended by Bill C-31, Indigenous women became “non-Indian” if they married non-Indigenous men, losing important rights for themselves and their children. The U.S. introduced the concept of “blood quantum” with the Dawes Act of 1887, which allotted different amounts of land to tribal members who were “full blood” versus those who had non-Indian parents or grandparents. Both Canada and the U.S. used bureaucratic means to reduce the number of Indigenous peoples on paper. These systems coexisted with Indigenous practices that emphasized factors such as family ties, cultural knowledge, or tribal citizenship.

Indigenous America

A consistent pattern in the academic literature is that scholars “discover” (and take credit for) topics that are already known in Indigenous circles – what the younger generation refers to as “Columbusing.” An emerging area focuses on the unity of Indigenous peoples across the Americas in a way that sidesteps government or academic classification systems. Like a Möbius strip, where local and global, and past and future are connected in a seamless twist of human experience, Indigenous peoples are recovering and regenerating the histories that connect them (→ Indigeneity, I/31). Ancient prophecies about the eagle and condor flying together have inspired intercontinental gatherings such as the one that took place in Quito, Ecuador in 1990 and periodically since then, including a series of intercontinental runs that revitalize a tradition from Mexico some 1,500 years ago (Huehuecoyotl, Personal communication, 2017). *Abya Yala*, *Turtle Island*, *Pacha Mama*, and *Itz'achitlan* refer to an Indigenous America that predates and will survive the European invasion.

Ongoing conversations

A full list of topics omitted from this entry would be longer than the entry itself. Ceremony and religion would include rituals that moved from one region to another, such as the cult of the Plumed Serpent, the Sun Dance, and peyote that moved north from Mesoamerica, or the Calumet (peace pipe) and the shake tent that moved from west to east around the Great Lakes, or wampum that moved from east to west. Christianity brought great changes, with some people adopting Christian beliefs with great sincerity while others found it meaningful for only a short while or presented the appearance of faith as a strategy for survival. Indigenous peoples were enslaved, but they also took captives and slaves through indigenous practices and became slaveholders who fought on the side of the Confederacy in the U.S. Civil War (→ Slavery, I/18). Definitions of Indigenous identity vary greatly across the Americas, and the relatively homogeneous peoples from the South may be confounded by people from the North who meet tribal definitions of citizenship but have light hair, blue eyes, or dark skin. “Two Spirit” is a recent term to describe nonbinary gender roles, but Indigenous languages have words that predate colonization and missionary censorship for people who might be classified today as gay, lesbian, or transgender (→ Gender Identities, I/28). Literacy, literature, education (→ I/24), diplomacy, intermarriage, forced removals, war, popular culture (→ Popular, I/37), Wild West Shows, and sovereignty are all important topics. However, two terms stand out for consideration: *genocide* and *survivance*. These terms are paired to acknowledge their complexity, separately and together.

Genocide focuses on the harm done to Indigenous peoples by European colonizers and their settler-state descendants. Discussions of genocide, while important, have an unintended consequence that is only partly rooted in grammar. Genocide is always past tense; it “happens to” Indigenous peoples in the passive voice, while their killers get all the active verbs. Discussions about genocide begin with the terrible history of Spanish violence in the Caribbean and other parts of New Spain. Dominican priest Bartolomé de las Casas, who spent time in Hispaniola, Cuba, Venezuela, and Guatemala, was so horrified that he wrote *A Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies*, which started a debate on slavery in the Americas (Restall and Lane 2011, 61–62). English Protestants used the Black Legend, the stories about the bloody cruelty of Spanish conquistadors in the Americas and the supposedly false conversions obtained by Catholic priests, to portray themselves as kind and caring, and their own conversions as true ones (Stevens 2004, 46–48, 166).

The other term – survivance – is adapted from the French by Anishinaabe author Gerald Vizenor to express something previously unexpressible in a single English word. Vizenor notes the power of the verb “to dominate,” or to have power over, and its related forms: dominant (an adjective) and dominance (an abstract noun derived from the active participle). These are clearly active words. In contrast, the main power of Indigenous peoples across the centuries has been to survive, an active verb that is implicitly passive. Derived from the French verb, *survivre*, “to live on,” it means to continue living after the end of something or someone; no agency required. There is no adjectival form with the resonance of “dominant.” The “surviving” heir is the person who did not die. In offering “survivance” as the abstract noun form, Vizenor has gifted us with a way to acknowledge the active, creative, powerful choices that have brought Indigenous peoples into the 21st century *as peoples*, not simply as individual persons whose ancestors somehow managed to avoid being killed. He says,

My idea is that we understand what dominance is, a condition; we know it in many, many forms in time and place and circumstance. We need a word like dominance that speaks and is understood in the context of our will to live.... [Survivance is] as powerful as dominance.
(Vizenor 1996)

Conclusion

For settler-colonial states across the Americas, the 19th century was a time of asserting independence from their parent nations (→ Independence Movements, I/10; Nation and State Building, I/16). Laws written to support political and economic expansion did not deliberately target Indigenous peoples in every case but the impact of being invisible, of *not* having their needs and interests considered when decisions were being made about things like railroads, canals, dams, land management, and extractive industries had a harmful effect on Indigenous communities whether intended or not (→ Development, II/6). Other types of harm were framed as benevolent, including forced removal; assimilative education that often separated children from their parents (→ Education, I/24); the outlawing of religious practices such as the sun dance; laws that took aim at breaking collective land ownership (→ Commons, II/31); and legal definitions for “Indians,” often famed as protective, that effectively turned genocide – the erasure of Indigenous peoples – into a mathematical exercise in blood quantum (→ Biopolitics, I/22). Every nation-state in the Americas had an “Indian problem” in the 19th century. Indigenous peoples and their pesky land claims stood in the way of development, expansion, and Manifest Destiny. As two recent books by Indigenous authors assert, Indians were and are “inconvenient” (King 2012) and “unsettling” (Manuel and Derrickson 2015). Historians did their part to promote the invisibility of Indigenous peoples through tropes of “firsting and lasting” in antiquarian local histories, where the “firsts” are always made by immigrants from Europe, and the “lasts” are always associated with Indigenous peoples (O’Brien 2010).

However, the late 19th century is also a period when Indigenous people were doing important cultural, spiritual, and practical works with future generations in mind. “Invisibility” could be a form of camouflage. The activism of Indigenous communities in the 20th and 21st centuries stands on the shoulders of prior generations; these histories can be known, if one only looks. What was once viewed as the “Dark Ages” for Indigenous peoples has become a thriving field of inquiry. The more we find sources and methodologies that place Indigenous perspectives at the center, the more we find evidence for survivance rather than destruction and loss.

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INTERETHNIC RELATIONS

Izaskun Álvarez Cuartero

The concept of ethnicity and ethnic genealogy

The concept of interethnic relations is anything but definitive. On the contrary, it is subject to dozens of possible variables related to ethnic group (→ Ethnicity, I/25), social class (→ Social Inequality, II/20), gender (→ I/9), environment, region, and historical context. The concept is dynamic, shifting, and, importantly, socially constructed. Those in power have often used interethnic relations as a means of control to create social divisions within a population and maintain the societal structures over which they preside (→ Colonial Rule, I/5). It is therefore necessary to examine several interpretive scenarios that aim to isolate some of the diverse circumstances through which this term can be unpacked.

We begin with the definition of ethnic group as the joining of men and women brought together by conquest or emigration, who maintain their own linguistic or cultural traditions, as well as a sense of identity that is “separate, shared, and ancestral” (Harris 2004, 478) (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7; Migration I/15). This definition complements that of Max Weber, who describes ethnic groups as “those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration” (Weber 1978, 398). Relations that emerged in the early days between Indigenous women and Pilgrim Fathers were very different from relations between Europeans and Blacks in the Caribbean. Equally different were the resulting self-perceptions and perceptions of others held by Mulattos, Chinese, Indians, *mestizos* (people of mixed race, typically Indigenous, and Spanish), and black slaves within colonial society’s labyrinthine system of identities.

To approach this subject properly, it is essential to begin with a terminological clarification. The adjective, “ethnic,” in its current meaning, appeared late in the languages of most colonial countries. In fact, the term brings back the original meaning from the Greek *ethnos* – of a people or nation – a word long reserved for “pagans” or “infidels,” as popularized in Late Latin. At the end of the 18th century, the term was used in French to label a population, and it was not until 1871 that it came to refer to “la race ou à l’ethnie” (ATILF – CNRS & Université de Lorraine: *Le Trésor de la Langue Française informatisé*). At around the same time, the term was incorporated into English with a similar meaning – “peculiar to a race or nation” (Harper: *Online Etymology Dictionary*). Its first usage in Spanish occurred even

later; academic dictionaries included the word, but only with the meaning “gentil” – idolater who does not recognize the true God – until 1884, at which point it took on the definition used today, “pertaining to a nation or race,” integrating, for the first time, vocabulary related to ethnography and ethnology.

Interethnic relations are, in essence, a perpetual historical, social, and cultural construction, which originated during colonial times and inherited the same framework established among the continent’s ethnic groups during the Pre-Hispanic period (characterized by extreme social hierarchy as with the ayllu or the calpulli-altepetl). The nation-states formed in the 19th century adopted this social configuration (→ Nation and State Building, I/16), and so it persists to this day. The historical construction of the Americas would not have been possible without the robust growth of relationships among the diverse ethnic groups. Here, ethnicity could be described as a universal dimension of human relations, “even if its relevance in social-action orientation and its actual virulence depend on the historical situation” (Francis 1976, XII).

In the first decades of colonization, the European invasion was synonymous with disorder and chaos. Hence, Serge Gruzinski does not refer to a “colonial society,” but rather a “mélange” that went through fairly distinct and fairly long phases of turbulence (2000, 74–75). For Frederik Barth, ethnic groups are “categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves, and thus have the characteristic of organizing interaction between people” (1969, 10). Koonings and Silva pointed out that ethnicity is not a fixed, immutable quality but emerges from social, cultural, and symbolic practices and often assumes a strategic role in situations of social competition or conflict (1999, 5). To gain a better understanding of interethnic relations, it is crucial to acknowledge that identity is imposed from the outside. Racial features (→ Race, I/39) – given that racism constitutes a significant tool of power – and the factors of class and gender, too, functioned as markers of differentiation, thereby impeding individuals from freely choosing their identities or associating themselves with a particular group. The so-called ascribed or obligatory identities (Navarrete 2004, 24) were an unavoidable fact of life during colonial times and in the 19th century.

The caste system and other miscegenations

The Indian administration did not distinguish between the innumerable Amerindian ethnic groups, preferring instead to use terms like “Indian” or “native,” which unified the groups (→ Indigenous Peoples, I/11; Indigeneity I/31). It was the system of evangelism that would introduce the first ethnic taxonomies (→ Religion and Missionizing, I/17). The project of indoctrination necessitated learning relevant languages and ethnographies, and drawing contrasts between groups, such as differences in dress, as well as ethnonyms to distinguish the groups. As the parish priests drew these distinctions, so too did rival groups themselves. The colonial regime of exploitation (→ Colonial Economies, I/4) exacerbated tensions between these rivals, commencing what Enrique Florescano has called “the art of cunning” or “engineering domination” (2001, 175).

Miscegenation brought about an extraordinary, never-before-seen ethnogenesis, which, in turn, converted into a veritable caste system. This system was fluid and came with its own rules of coexistence, determined by laws that, written or not, were accepted by everyone. The potential for mobility between ethnic groups, as well as the relations that existed between the groups, made this system unique. Other societies with a similar structure did not allow for such progression, nor for relations, for example, in India, where the caste system turned into a means of social control. With this reasoning, the term “caste” (common in

historiography) is rejected for the social segments that emerged from the mixing of America's original inhabitants and the exogenous population who came to the region for conquest (→ Hybridity, 1/30). Instead, a different framework can be suggested – a stratified society in which economic progression was possible, often regardless of a person's actually belonging to one “caste” or another.

The castes, each with a regional derogatory label (*zambaigo*, *cholo*, *coyote*, *caboclo*, *chino*, *zambo*, *lobo*, *negro horro*, *tentenelaire*, *cuarterón*, etc.), functioned as a marker of otherness in the first stage of colonial interethnic relations established between the Spanish and Indigenous peoples. The Indian was the irremediable Other, but the mestizo was the different, the strange, the *alienus* that could compete socially and economically with the privileged classes. Interethnic relations were frequently depicted in the series of paintings of castes made in the viceroyalties – a unique demonstration of the graphic visibility of exoticism that the *orbe novo* offered. And the practice of marking difference did not end with independence; newly independent nations, successors to the colonies, had to assign a social nomenclature to new paradigms, including regional paradigms. For example, in the case of Peru, José Carlos Mariátegui (1928) understood the Sierra as a refuge for the Indigenous race and language – a regionality that resembled a nationality. From there, Peruvian Cecilia Méndez builds off of Mariátegui's idea, suggesting that interethnic descriptors like “Serrano Indian” – or simply “Serrano” – provided an excellent example of the racialization of geography in the 19th century (2011, 76 et *passim*). Thus, when the legal and fiscal category of “Indian” disappears, its meaning and connotations remain, assigned instead to a geographical category – the Sierra in Peru or the plains and coast in Colombia.

In 20th-century Peru, the indigenous population was appreciated, even extolled, as opposed to other identities, who suffered insidious disdain in this time period. México now exalted the Mestizo, as part of the phenomenon of national affirmation. This high regard was in stark contrast to the stigmatization of Mestizos during the colonial period – a time when Spaniards' morals were called into question when, in violation of Catholic morality, they had illegitimate children with Indigenous people (Presta 2006, 555). The mestizo eroded the social structure envisioned by the mendicant orders, meant to replicate in the New World the city of God conceived by Saint Augustine. Missionaries suffered a great defeat in their effort to keep the souls and bodies of Indians “uncorrupted”; it was impossible to avoid the mixing of races, but they would not be discouraged. They convinced the Indian leadership that a segregationist policy was necessary and could be achieved by concentrating Indigenous populations in towns separate from the Spanish. The Indian republics were the first exercise in interethnicity in the colonies, an exercise carried out with a strong dose of ethnocentrism, as one ethnic or social group felt that its values were superior and in this way could reaffirm their identity. The segregation of the Indigenous population marked the beginning of an interethnic structure but did not prevent ethnic groups from mixing with one another. Mestizos did not distance themselves from the Indigenous community; there existed a kind of cultural hybrid that withstood the white establishment's and indigenous aristocracy's persistent contempt.

The cases of American ethnogenesis are many. To the existing populations – Indigenous, conquistadors, European colonists – black slaves were added, and brought in large numbers from various places of origin to the majority of American regions, especially those with robust plantation economies like Brazil, the Caribbean, and the southern United States (→ Slavery, 1/18). The Lucumí, Mandinga, Arará, and Carabalí peoples had little or nothing to do with one another, and yet they found themselves forced to form alliances in order to survive, not only in the plantation setting, but also when they were able to flee and settle

elsewhere. Indians and Maroons (escaped slaves) joined in rebellions and began to establish relationships on the margins of society, thereby forming their own interethnic universe. Examples of this include black Seminoles – a result of unions between Maroons and Seminole Indians in Florida and the southern United States – and the Central American Garifunas – descendants of Africans and Indigenous Caribbeans in Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Finally, it is worth mentioning several particular cases of miscegenation in North America because of their socioeconomic and cultural implications. Take the case of the Métis – a result of relations between Hudson’s Bay Company employees and primarily Cree and Ojibwa women living near the Canada–U.S. border. The Canadian case presents a typical colonial policy of reservations, demarcated by signed accords between First Nations and the British and Canadian administrations. The size of these reservations was determined by a proportional calculation of land area and number of residents; currently, these territories are proving inadequate to sustain their population economically, a shortfall resulting in social crises and heavy migration to urban centers (Olmo Pintado 1985, 242). Meanwhile, civil and ecclesiastical authorities – with the aim of assimilating the Indigenous population – became cruel executors of the government’s genocidal politics. Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, the policy of assimilation was an exercise in repression and cultural annihilation for hundreds of Indigenous children. The 1876 *Loi sur les Indiens* involved physical and sexual abuses for many of these children, while they were shut away in orphanages and residential establishments. There, they underwent a process of “re-education” to “normalize” them and strip them of their culture entirely (Lepage 2009, 23).

Interethnic conflicts

Relations between ethnicities culminated in an intense social debate in the Americas: “Ethnicity is, has always been, both one thing and many, the same yet infinitely diverse” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009, 1). The question of defining a national identity – asking ourselves who we are and what nation we want to be – occupied many important thinkers, coinciding with the ideas of determinism in all its forms, especially Spencerism and social Darwinism (→ Foundational Discourses, III/8). The Indigenous and Afro-Descendants were an easy social target. From the moment Europeans set foot on the continent, these groups were painted as a setback to be overcome. There were both detractors and defenders of their ways of life, their integration, and their relations with other groups, especially the “whites,” who considered themselves superior (→ Whiteness, I/46). This was the great social challenge, as demanded by the economic and political needs of heterogeneous regional development (→ II/6). For example, Thomas Jefferson, one of the founding fathers, was also one of the first to postulate the superiority of the white race (*Notes on the State of Virginia*, 1787). This assertion marks the beginning of the segregationist era, punctuated by events like the Civil War and measures like the Jim Crow laws (initiated in 1870), which established the black population’s “separate but equal” status and laid the groundwork for chronic interethnic conflict.

The horrific racial conflicts gained strength in the 19th century across the continent and were especially important in the slave and Indigenous areas. As Alicia Castellanos points out, in the case of Mexico, nation-building required civilizing the Other, spreading Catholicism, promoting Castilian as the national language, and *whitening* the Indigenous population (2005, 93). It is true that the preponderance of racial thought in the construction of imaginary Creole culture (Catelli 2012, 147) transcended interethnic relations beginning in colonial times. American racial discourse was bolstered by arguments as potent as those behind blood purity laws, and with the same racist character and social, normative quality. The so-called

estatuto de limpieza de sangre (purity of blood statute) emerged on the Iberian Peninsula in the 15th century. This rule required that any candidates aspiring to occupy important positions or offices within official institutions or congregations had to prove that they did not have any Jewish or Muslim ancestry and were “therefore not infected with their blood” (Salazar Acha 1991, 293). Emiliano Frutta’s theory about the case of New Spain maintains that this obsession with blood purity was carried over to the viceroyalty; his analysis can be applied to the rest of the colonies, too. Of course, the number of Jews and Muslims was smaller, but that did not mean the New Spanish nobility could not utilize such a rule to regulate access to their privileges (Frutta 2002, 218).

Examining the elaborate social pact developed during colonial times, one cannot understand interethnic relations without incorporating another element into the analysis: manipulation of social psychology. Mistrust and suspicion of the Other were prevalent across American territory. But it was in the Caribbean, largely because of the fear of slave uprisings (like the 1791 uprising in Haiti), where political and economic elites figured out the most extraordinary instrument of coercion. This instrument, when handled with skill, could maintain social order. The manipulation of fear was present since the beginning of colonial times, so one must differentiate between mere coexistence and interethnic relations: it is very different to live in the same place *separately* than it is to actually live *together*. The line between these two could be crossed in moments of crisis (→ II/4), as happened in Mexico in the 17th century when riots broke out over food shortages. In that case, Indians, Mestizos, Spanish, poor Mulattos, and Blacks came together to protest (Gonzalbo 2008, 22–23).

With regard to the United States, the very first settlement in Jamestown brought with it the Anglo-Powhatan War (1609–1613), the first of a series of conflicts over territory and resources. The fiercest of these conflicts would be the American Indian Wars (1775–1890), in which, it is estimated, more than 375,000 Indigenous people perished, one of the most horrific examples of ethnic cleansing to ever occur on the continent. One consequence of these racial conflicts was the Indian Removal Act (1830), which reconfigured the distribution of the American population, forcing the migration of Indigenous populations and concentrating them in territories distant from their natural environments (→ Biopolitics, I/22); the reservations on which they were placed have lasted to this day, and the displacement remains one of the darkest chapters of interethnic relations in the country’s history. For example, the Trail of Tears (1838), the forced removal of Cherokee, Seminole, Choctaw, and other mestizo groups to the west, resulted in the deaths of more than 4,000 people and gave rise to *Manifest Destiny* as a messianic justification of the unappealable expansion endorsed by Washington (→ Interventionism II/38).

Laws concerning ethnic groups were not only harmful to Native Americans. In the second half of the 19th century, the Gold Rush (1847–1855) and the need for abundant labor to construct the railroad brought hundreds of Chinese workers to the California coast. In 1882, the U.S. government passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, the first law to expressly prohibit the immigration of Chinese workers to the country. It should be noted that the Anglo-Saxons’ social perception of the Asian community marked them as strange misfits and opium users. At the same time, workers were arriving from other parts of the Americas – from nearby Mexico and from Chile’s Valparaíso port – eager for the opportunity to work. The “*gam-businos*,” individual workers with no contract or boss, who took advantage of abandoned mineral veins, were yet another component of the interethnic relations that formed in centers of intense and rapid capitalist development. The border between these two Californias saw a lot of traffic as workers crossed from one side to the other in search of better work opportunities, especially after the discovery of veins of gold in the North Territory of Baja

California (Taylor Hansen 2007). Anti-Chinese campaigns were not exclusive to the United States. In Mexico, the Chinese were thought of as dirty and accused of carrying diseases such as trachoma, syphilis, and leprosy. Such perceptions led to baseless measures at the beginning of the 20th century, like the prohibition of marriage between Mexicans and Chinese, until the latter left the state in 1931 (Trueba Lara 1990).

On the rest of the continent, we see interethnic conflicts like the rebellion of Tupac Amaru II (1780–1782) or la *Conspiración de la Escalera* (accusations of a planned slave revolt) in Cuba (1833), which reflected tensions between blacks, mestizos, and slaves on the one hand, and creole landowners and the Spanish on the other, with an obvious advantage. The arrangement was similar to that which brought on the terrifying revolution that had transpired in nearby Haiti (→ Revolution, II/44). In the 19th century, a Pan-American wave of anti-Indigenous policies and social control took place, such as the westward expansion in the U.S., the Conquest of the Desert, the Pacification of the Araucanía in Argentina and Chile, and the Caste War of Yucatán. The army of the River Plate executed extermination campaigns against the Indians, as the latter were considered an insurmountable obstacle to the young nation's economic and social progress. This voracious occupation of territory, initiated by Julio Argentino Roca and the executing arms of the Conquest of the Desert, like the Argentine Rural Society or corporations like the Argentine Southern Land Company, were responsible for the massacres of the Catrieles, Picunches, Boroganos, Pehuenches, and many other groups, reducing them to a miserable existence (Bonatti and Valdez 2015). However, despite pressure from the Argentine army, the border south of the Salado River was rebuilt into a complex social habitat and area of refuge for groups marginalized during the colonial period. It would be these “non-Indians,” those who had no lineage, those who came from a society based on kinship and prestige, who would foster the connection to European elite (Ortelli 2000, 192).

A domesticated society

The varying circumstances in disparate places gave rise to a corresponding diversity in behavior patterns among their inhabitants. There were notable differences in the countryside versus the city, when the time came for developing interethnic relations, just as there were differences with regard to marriage contracts, convents, armies, and border areas. The sudden increase in urban inhabitants led to increased policing measures against the Indians, who held no office, had not been converted, did not pay taxes, and so were seen as ignorant and blasphemous outlaws. Because of this situation, many Indians felt inclined toward mixing with other races as a means of resistance, and also toward traditional trades of the Mestizo ethnic group as a means of survival (Sánchez Bohórquez 2005, 145–158). This type of interethnic relation was a very common option in all American regions well into the 20th century and operated as a form of camouflage in unpleasant environments like the city, where the Indigenous used labor opportunities in order to blend into their new environment. Domestic service meant women were exempted from having to return to their home village (→ Gender and Work II/11), and marriage or cohabitation with whites or members of other estates provided them with more comfortable circumstances or the possibility of prosperity in their new host society.

Power lies in the ability to sow divisions or to reinforce them or, as seen in more contemporary times, to unify those who were once divided, in order to build a collective identity that will, in turn, serve as a concrete national foundation. In Hispanic America, the obsession with caste and racial differences was a chronic locus of enunciation for Creoles

and is crucial in understanding relations among ethnic groups. It was the white Creoles who established the rules of these relations, thanks to the privilege their light skin granted them to ascend to all orders of power. In any case, in America it was possible to assume an ethnic identity and participate in the global society because of relations developed between competitive groups within the Indian world and because those groups lived under a system of domination (Bonte and Izard 2005, 261).

The question of whether one had rights to inheritance or tax exemption also helped define relations. A 1574 law, included in the *Compilation of the Laws of the Indies* (law VIII, book VII, title V), enacted a tax payment system for Blacks and for free Mulattos. This development compels for the inclusion of an economic angle in this exploration of interethnic relations; economically speaking, it was very different to be a free Mulatto versus a Mulatto slave, even though they shared the same ethnic origin (Ares-Queija 2010). Economic position was a contributing factor in determining the configuration of different groups – including the Spanish – establishing considerable differences between conquistador families and their descendants, versus less fortunate settlers (→ Social Inequality, II/20).

Interethnic dependencies are rooted in alliances and survival strategies, based on whatever mechanisms of domination exist. The border was where colonists and Indigenous people forged peculiar relations, primarily around commercial exchange in both peaceful and violent contexts (Mandrini 1992, 62) (Borderlands II/26). In this regard, the case of the Eastern Yucatán peninsula is very significant because it acted as a refuge for Mayans who fled the encomienda system. There, they could practice their original ways of life and survive through commercial and political relations with other groups, well into the 20th century. The Itza people of Petén provide an excellent example of resistance against the attack on Indian troops, which can either be understood as an indication of having perpetual conflict or no relationship at all (Farriss 1984; Caso Barrera 2002). Border areas like the Araucanía were places of dormant war between Mapuches and the Spanish that would erupt in certain moments and periods (Foerster and Vergara 1996, 14). The case of the Mapuche in the Southern Cone is a significant illustration of their mobility in an area divided by a natural border. They took advantage of the commercial corridors used by farmers and ranchers, corridors that connected the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. It is amazing to observe these border areas, at the very edges of the empire, in which not only Mapuches but other groups like the Wayuu and Chiriguano (now Guaraní) came together. Such places were extraordinary laboratories where individuals, ideas, and objects circulated (Boccarda 1999, 425).

According to David Weber, in the mid-18th century, the Indigenous who remained unconquered controlled approximately half of the Hispano-American territory, occupying vastly diverse ecosystems, including tropical forests (Amazon and Orinoco basins), the arid territories of northern Mexico, lowlands of Central America and Gulf of Darién, the Gran Chaco, the Pampas, Patagonia, and Tierra del Fuego (1998, 147). Thanks to their nomadic history, these Indigenous peoples were very capable of living on the move, and the population soon transformed into a chronic problem for colonial authorities. The Mapuche of southern Chile, the Chiriguano of southern Peru, and groups in the north of New Spain called by the generic name “chichimecas” – synonym for uncivilized, barbaric, and pagan – achieved, on occasion, a conciliatory diplomacy that was very useful in controlling the Crown’s enemies, especially in the North against the wave of Anglo-Saxon immigration. This diplomatic activity would later turn into a series of treaties of accord, alliance, and conciliation with Indians on the margins; such treaties converted the Indians into consumers and producers, thus changing their consumption habits (Weber 1998, 152–159). Across America, there were new ties of dependence and collaboration being formed. A favor could

later function as a diplomatic weapon in a moment of crisis or as an instrument to buy the will of Indigenous elites.

Perhaps it is in the familial context and matrimonial relations where we see the subtler techniques of domination (→ Family I/26). It is essential to consider interethnic relations from this perspective because it is in this domestic sphere that we find false discourses of equality. Recent historiography has sparked interest in analyzing American daily life. There are dozens of regional studies on family, which conclude, almost unanimously, that more than half of the population residing in large cities at this time was the product of racial mixing. For example, at the end of the 18th century, 63 percent of the population of Córdoba comprised “castes” (Moreyra 2012, 92–93).

In the same way that various interethnic relations facilitated social ascent, Charles III’s 1776 royal decree, *Pragmática Real sobre Matrimonios*, declared the principle of equality between spouses, reflecting the Bourbons’ concern about control over its population. The legislation prompted dissent trials and with them, an increase in bureaucracy. Bernard Lavallé studied thirty-three cases in Quito, none of which referred to the grounds of ethnicity, but that does not mean that these grounds did not exist. A person’s ethnicity, though an imperceptible characteristic, could still be associated with a low status. By marrying a mulatto, one risked a “leap backward” in his or her family’s genealogy. The *Pragmática* did not affect Blacks, Mulattos, Mestizos, or “castas,” but rather protected Whites, exclusively (Lavallé 1998, 11–17). The Spanish Monarchy’s *cédulas de Gracias al Sacar* (certificates of pure blood) (February 10, 1795) became a popular, exclusive, and rather imaginative legal solution; those who wished to receive an exemption from the condition of being “brown” paid a tax of 500 *reales* for the certificate. This tax on race earned the local haciendas a lucrative income, segregation turned into a business. Nineteenth-century colonial society seemed to be stable, as long as there were no attempts to break the status quo. Interethnic conflicts only emerged when people attempted to envision equality. Here, the danger that certain social entelechies posed must be highlighted, taking into account that subordination was what allowed for relations between master or mistress and slave or servant. The dynamic of force and fear occasioned sexual relations between members of unequal groups or classes. This phenomenon grows more complex, though, considering that daily interethnic relations within a household could *also* be manipulated into a vehicle for promotion, whether a social or work promotion. As a class-based system, American society fiercely protected its cultural values, honor, and success in order to establish relations with the Other.

In contrast to what transpired in Spanish territories, interracial marriage in North America was rare. It is true that there were exceptions, such as unions with English, French, and Spanish merchants, which were quite common and became “the very symbol of mestizo America” (Nash 1995, 945). Not even Jefferson’s presidential power (though it should also be noted that he contemplated displacing Indigenous peoples) could help him assert his good intentions, as articulated in an address to the Mohican intermediary agent, Hendrick Aupamut, “You will unite yourselves with us and we shall all be Americans. You will mix with us by marriage. Your blood will run in our veins and will spread with us over this great Island” (December 21, 1808).

By way of conclusion

In his contentious essay, *La Raza Cósmica* (The Cosmic Race), José Vasconcelos envisioned “Universópolis,” a place where all the races of the world mixed together, in accordance with Vasconcelos’s very particular way of thinking about human relations. The last decades of the

19th century and first years of the 20th century produced many texts about the social dynamics of ethnic groups that were shaping the new American countries. These texts demonstrated a desire for utopian harmony, but that hope was far from being realized (→ Utopias, III/23). Interethnic conflict continued to prevail in American countries. Although the configuration of modern American societies would not have been possible without fruitful interracial dialogue, continuous miscegenation has been more forced than sought after, and subject to much opposition and debate. From the beginning of European settlement in the Americas, economic needs were the impetus for unions between different groups across the continent, but also the cause of ruptures that led to conflict (→ Colonial Economies, I/4). The dynamics of domination generated an entire constellation of discourse – administrative, legal, and scientific – all with the clear purpose of promoting differences among populations and reaffirming the superiority of one over another. Interethnic relations operate differently depending on the region and time period, with substantial differences between Anglo-Saxon and Hispano-Portuguese America. Likewise, the different regions had very different political implications for colonial governments and later independent governments. Miscegenation was a distinguishing feature in Latin America. Conversely, the norm in Anglo-Saxon America was estrangement from those who were different, a reality that would determine the region's political and social development up until the 20th century.

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13

LANGUAGE

Lilia Rebeca Rodríguez Torres and María del Carmen de la Peza

One of the main components of the existing configuration of languages in contemporary society in the Americas is the relationship between language and power. Not just philologists and linguists look at the subject; it has been chosen as well by anthropologists as the focus of multidisciplinary research. As a result, the relationship between social science and linguistics is crucial to understand the construction and consolidation of nation-states in the Americas from a sociohistorical perspective (→ Nation and State Building, I/16).

As the social sciences divided into different disciplines during the 19th century, the field of linguistics emerged as a positivist social science. According to Wallerstein (2004), the disciplines divided along certain axes, with the opposition of the past, represented by the study of History versus the present represented by Economics, Political Science, and Sociology. These four disciplines, on the other hand, constituted another axis where they represented the West, as opposed to the rest of the world represented by anthropology and Oriental Studies. When these fields were split apart, philology was separated from linguistics. Philology retained its focus on the study of the transformation of different ways of speaking throughout history, whereas linguistics became something else. Anthropological linguistics focused on the “pre-modern” Amerindian languages, while the larger field of linguistics and literature studied the “modern” Indo-European languages as systems of signs.

The establishment of linguistics as a positivist social science was a leap forward in understanding the internal functioning and grammatical formation of languages. However, the separation of “modern” Indo-European languages, which have phonetic writing, from the Amerindian languages, which are essentially oral or have totally different systems of writing, stratified not only the languages but the cultures of their speakers as well (→ Indigenous Peoples, I/11).

The contrast between “modern” languages with, and “pre-modern” ones without phonetic writing, imposed Eurocentrism and an ethic of progress as the dominant ideologies on the American continent. Logocentrism was hegemonic in the field from Jean Léry’s 1578 book *History of a Voyage to the Land of Brazil* (originally *Histoire d’un voyage fait en la terre de Brésil*) until Lévi-Strauss’ 1955 essay “A Writing Lesson” (which originally appeared in his book *Tristes tropiques*) which drew on his ethnographic work among the Nambikwara in Brazil. Western ideologues established a hierarchy among the indigenous cultures and their languages (which they considered premodern) and the modern cultures and languages.

Their idea was that the latter characterized modern Western society and, owing to its written form, temporality, and characteristics of identity and consciousness, had the ability to create its own history. The former, however, because of its orality, spatiality, alterity, and unconsciousness, was unable to be part of history (Derrida 1976; De Certeau 1988). Based on this supposedly scientific understanding, European colonizers justified the imposition of modern language with phonetic writing through universal literacy as a way for indigenous people to become part of modern Western civilization (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7).

Dissemination of the national languages was due to political reasons more so than the nature of the languages or the number of speakers of those languages. In order for a small group of elites to be able to impose a national language, both its literary form and its administrative use must be standardized and formalized. The invention of the printing press as well as printed books were essential, as well as what Hobsbawm (1991, 70) calls “the great correctors and standardizers of the language of culture in literary history.” Next came the development of dictionaries and the scientific study of grammar, and finally, public education (→ I/24) and other administrative mechanisms that actually imposed the language.

In the case of the Americas, there are four types of languages. First, the European languages which are the result of colonization. Second, the indigenous languages which are also known as original languages. Next are the hybrid languages known as pidgins which are mixtures of Afro-Caribbean and European languages (→ Hybridity, I/30). Finally, the languages spoken by immigrants from all over the world who arrived after colonization and independence (Lastra 2003) (→ Migration, I/15).

The fraught relationship between indigenous and European languages can be divided into three periods. The first is the colonial period, which stretched from the 16th century to the 18th. It was characterized by the creation of the necessary mechanisms for evangelization (→ Religion and Missionizing, I/17). These mechanisms faced the cultural resistance of indigenous communities. The second period is that of independence of different states in the Americas (→ Nation and State Building, I/16). During this period, Spanish, Portuguese, English, and French were imposed as national languages in opposition to a mosaic of indigenous languages that survived colonization. This period stretched from the 19th century through to the first half of the 20th. The third period is the globalization of capitalism (→ II/2) and the linguistic commodification, multiculturalism (→ I/36), and recognition of the rights of communities to their own language (→ Human Rights, II/35). This era began in the 1990s and continues today.

Spanish and Portuguese colonialism

The colonial expansion of Spain and Portugal through the evangelization of indigenous communities was part of the larger imperialist project of the Catholic Church. In 1493, Pope Alexander VI divided the rights for colonization between the Spanish and Portuguese crowns and the Catholic kings were given the responsibility of converting the inhabitants of their respective territories to Christianity (Pellicer 2010, 620). Evangelization of indigenous peoples justified colonization despite the controversy around the morality of the expansionist project.

Military conquest, economic exploitation (→ Colonial Economies, I/4), and genocide were objects of extensive theological, economic, and philosophical discussion. Almost all aspects of indigenous cultures, their beliefs, religious practices, and even their nonphonetic forms of writing, were seen as primitive and wild (→ Indigeneity, I/31). Christianity and European civilization, on the other hand, were seen as positive because of its supposed foundation of

moral, scientific, and technological progress (→ Development, II/6); capitalist market-based economy (→ Capitalism, II/2); and phonetic writing. According to Thomas Aquino, it was the application of universality to Christian values that justified the wars of colonization and conquest. Derived from the theory of divine law and natural law, they were therefore the birthright of humanity (Todorov 1984; Quijano 1992; Dussel 1994; Wallerstein 2006).

By controlling knowledge of Latin, which meant control of writing and learning, the Catholic Church controlled a fundamental strategy for the conquest of America. Colonization of the “New World” brought with it machinery to implement control. While evangelizing the inhabitants, colonial powers instituted an administrative regime whose lifeblood was the flow of documents between the colonies and the home-country (→ Colonial Rule, I/5). According to Estrada and Grageda (2010, 562), from the very beginning of the process of colonialism, the Crown dictated which language all indigenous people associated with the monarchy’s institutions and laws – meaning councils and administrative procedures – had to use. All legal matters, verbal and written, had to make explicit reference to the Christian God, imperial authorities, and classic rhetoric.

The introduction of phonetic writing into indigenous languages favored those which were languages of first contact in various regions. One of them was Náhuatl which today is spoken by more than a million people in Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. There are over thirty variants; however, not all are thriving and one variant, Náhuatl Pipil in El Salvador, is almost extinct. Another language of contact was Quechua in the Andean region and western Amazonia, which today is spoken by around ten million indigenous people in Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Another is Guaraní, whose speakers number eight million and is an official language in Bolivia, Brazil, and Argentina. In Paraguay, because the Spaniards used the Guaraní language as a defense against the Portuguese expansionist threat, it is currently a national language on the same level with Spanish. Its use by the Spaniards resulted in a unique relationship in communication and cultural relationships amongst the various ethnic groups (→ Ethnicity, I/25).

The variants that resulted from the introduction of Spanish into the indigenous languages are known as the classical variants of those languages. They share phonetic writing using the Spanish alphabet and standardized grammar. Suárez (appearing in Lastra 2003) calls them Classical Náhuatl, Classical Guaraní, and Classical Quechua. However, these variants were produced artificially and represent the introduction of phonetic writing, which could be said to be the imposition of a whole different system of beliefs. Their use is restricted today to scholars, historians, anthropologists, and an orthodox current of linguists oblivious to the ways in which languages are currently used by communities of speakers.

Colonizers minimized the number of people who had access to writing first by destroying and invalidating the culture, religion, language, and in this case indigenous writing which was fundamental to the wisdom of the indigenous communities. Second, it was followed up by the imposition of a new religion, new language (either Spanish or Portuguese), and phonetic writing. Only the colonial elites, in other words the clergy and those working directly with colonizers, had access to this. As Quijano notes (1992, 13),

cultural repression and the colonization of the Latin American consciousness was accompanied by the massive extermination of indigenous people. Considering just the area occupied by the Aztecs, Maya and the Caribbean Islands as well as the ancient Incan empire, 35 million people were slaughtered in less than 50 years. This is not just a demographic catastrophe but the destruction of society and culture.

[translation by author]

However, evangelization as a means of imposing the language of the colonizers on the indigenous peoples in the Americas proved problematic. The Franciscans, who were in charge of evangelization in the areas with the highest population density, relied to a lesser extent on the imposition of Spanish. Their strategy was more tolerant of open lines of communication and flexibility. There was a greater degree of exchange between the colonial authorities and their subjects, especially in areas where mining was the main economic activity (Estrada and Grajeda 2010, 568). Fearful of the advance of Lutheranism, they occasionally preached in what they called “Mexican” and performed religious rites in Latin.

The Jesuits took charge of evangelizing the nomadic peoples and the widely dispersed communities that were isolated from the Spanish and Portuguese urban centers. When the conquest of Brazil began in 1500, the existing social structure of the indigenous peoples in this area was tribal, as opposed to the structure of indigenous communities in Mesoamerica. The majority of the indigenous languages were within the Tupi–Guaraní language family. Up until the end of the 17th century, the *lingua franca* in this region was the Guaraní which was adopted by the colonizers, above all by the Jesuits. Pidgins of Portuguese were spoken in the rural areas where the Portuguese and their descendants evangelized indigenous people, and slaves of African origin lived in contact with one another (Lastra 2003, 142).

One reason why the Jesuits preferred to evangelize in the local languages in the southernmost part of South America as well as the far northeast was to avoid contact between the indigenous inhabitants and the European colonizers. This certainly permitted the conservation of indigenous languages but also meant a process of acculturation and loss of indigenous religious practices and traditional cultural identity (Estrada and Grajeda 2010, 566–569).

The policies of different religious orders that evangelized in the “New World” resulted not just from demographic and geographic conditions, but from their different relationships with the Spanish and Portuguese royal authorities. Despite the fact that Philip II (1596) insisted that the instruction of the people who are subjects of colonial authority, as well as catechesis, should be done in the language of the conqueror, the Jesuits were not bound by the rule because at that time, they reported directly to the Pope and not to the Spanish crown.

The colonial language policy changed during the 18th century when the authorities began to further restrict the use of indigenous languages in the colonies. As part of Carlos III’s Enlightened Despotism during the 18th century (→ Enlightenment, I/8), Spanish became the mandatory language throughout the Empire. The goal was the extermination of all the other languages. It was also during this century that the Jesuits were expelled not only from the Iberian Peninsula, but from the Spanish and Portuguese colonies as well.

However, interpreters and bilingual scribes still were used in court and as notaries in a linguistic concession that had to be granted by the Viceroyalty of New Spain (Pellicer 2010, 652). This, combined with daily use, contributed to the conservation of indigenous languages, if only in their oral forms, not their public and institutional ones.

At the end of the 18th century, the Spanish crown suffered not only a series of setbacks in its efforts to consolidate power in the north of New Spain, but they also lost their dominant position in the global order (→ Geopolitics, II/34). Spain had established its first colony in Florida in 1561, with subsequent expeditions to the Alaskan coast in 1603 and the Santa Fe Mission in New Mexico in 1610. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the Spanish authorities in New Spain endeavored to consolidate power in the territories which today are Texas, California, and New Mexico in the United States. However, they encountered “well-organized resistance from some tribes...in 1680 a full-fledged rebellion broke out by Native

American communities and in 1740 an uprising by the Yaquis left 1000 Spaniards dead” (Jenkins 2005, 29). The expansion of the Spanish language toward the northern part of the North American continent would become seriously limited first, by resistance by indigenous communities, and second, by the imperial expansion of the United States. In 1846, the U.S. invaded Mexico, which had finally won its independence from Spain in 1821, and annexed the territory that would become California, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, Texas and parts of Arizona, Colorado, Wyoming, Kansas, and Oklahoma.

European imperialism and the spread of English in North America

The British colonization of North America started out with the creation of three overseas companies by the Parliament in 1606 – London, Plymouth, and Virginia (Jenkins 2005, 33). Rights for colonization of the “New World” were given to these private commercial shipping companies.

However, the companies finally failed to expand the British influence in North America and the Parliament had to redirect its strategy. It did so with the creation of the first royal colony in North America in 1624. This time, the success of tobacco cultivation and export by the shipping companies (→ Colonial Economies, I/4), along with the pledged support of the British Army, was a successful impulse for the economic development of the British colonies.

Throughout the 17th century, English colonial expansion took place principally along the Atlantic coast with the creation of the thirteen colonies. The influx of white European dissidents looking for a place where they could freely practice Protestantism and purify religious practices that had been degraded by the established church, which was subordinate to the English crown, was a determining factor in the configuration of the civic identity in what would become the United States.

Starting in the 17th century, North American society constituted “a multitude of religious denominations competing amongst themselves” (→ Religious Beliefs, I/40) (Jenkins 2005, 57). Anglicans, Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Baptists, Quakers, and Methodists were some of the principal sects that flourished in North America where they found a refuge of tolerance which was totally lacking in Europe. Religious liberty and the separation of church and state originated during the colonial period.

Colonists of different religious denominations, interested in the expansion and consolidation of their own sects, created their own universities (→ Education, I/24). Harvard, in 1636 and Yale in 1701 were founded by Congregationalists. Anglicans founded the College of William and Mary in 1693, Kings College (which would become Columbia in New York City) in 1754, and the Philadelphia School, which would become the University of Pennsylvania, in 1755. Presbyterians founded the University of Princeton in 1746, while the Baptists created Brown University in Rhode Island in 1764. In 1766, the Dutch Reformed Church founded Rutgers in New Jersey. Educational and linguistic policies allowed for the growth of a literate secular society capable of reading Scripture.

The different religious communities all had the same demands of the new government, namely the freedom to preach what they wanted, freedom from paying taxes, and an end to discrimination based on their faith (→ Freedom, I/27). Among the demands of both the radical and the reformist religious groups was a system of free and equal education for all (Bosch 2005, 108). The result was that by 1840, 78 percent of the general population and 91 percent of the U.S.-Americans of European descent were able to read and write, so that North Americans had the highest rates of literacy during the colonial period. The development of mass communication (→ Media Flows, III/35), national literature (→ Foundational

Discourses, III/8), and the educational system to the masses allowed for the standardization and consolidation of English as the national language.

A fundamental element of the process of the standardization of American English was the appearance of Noah Webster's dictionary. In 1789, he recognized the need to standardize American English as a political matter as well as a practical one. He believed that as an independent nation, the United States ought to systematize its own politics as well as its own language (→ Nation and State Building, I/16). As a practical matter, he thought that the British writers were suffering a kind of decline and that their country was too far away to serve as a model for the language of the new nation. With a new nation, he believed, would come new words. Webster considered that the reform of American English grammar would have important political implications. Thus, in 1828, Webster published the *American Dictionary of the English Language* (Crystal 1991, 80).

The publication of the third edition of *Webster's New International Dictionary* in 1961 was very controversial. The dictionary acknowledged the lexicographical diversity and popular usage of the language. The editors asserted that language is alive and that lexicographers must document its transformations and variety of uses without prejudice. Its detractors, on the other hand, maintained that the function of a dictionary is to establish standards for the language and to distinguish correct from incorrect.

Slavery and Creole

Facing the growing demand for cheap labor, the British government supported the southern plantations by providing prisoners who, in lieu of being put to death, were deported to the colonies (→ Unfree Labor, I/19). They worked as slaves, along with poor immigrants who fled Europe's miserable conditions at the time (Bosch 2005, 1). When economic conditions in Europe improved, the lack of workers of European descent meant that the planters switched to slave labor from Africa (→ Slavery, I/18).

The colonial-era slave trade resulted in an immense population of African Americans whose original languages have produced pidgins and Creoles. Interaction between the slaves and the British sailors resulted in pidgins, a reduced language created to facilitate communication between speakers of different languages. One of these, Black Creole, became a mother tongue in the southern plantation and coastal cities. It was more than a language – it generated a counterculture as a result of multiple cultural legacies that it inherited from the period of slavery and later during the period after abolition (→ Subcultures, I/43), including the civil rights movement. These new cultural features extended to the Antilles as well as other regions with a connection to Africa (→ Social Movements, I/41).

The expansion of the colonies and cultural assimilation

Religious persecution, food shortages, and poverty in various European countries resulted in multiple waves of migration (→ I/15). The hope of land, liberty, and economic improvement in the "New World" (→ Utopias, III/23) accelerated the territorial expansion of the North European settlers in the Americas. As they expanded, so did the English language.

Their expansion also meant a state of permanent war with indigenous peoples (→ I/11). Ever since the massacres in 1622 which precipitated the English Crown's direct intervention in colonization, conflicts between the colonists and the indigenous communities were aggravated by economic and demographic changes. Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the population of European settlers swelled in territory controlled by indigenous peoples.

Indigenous communities defended themselves against the attacks from white settlers by the adoption of new ways of living. Members of the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole tribes formed villages and took up agriculture as well as European ways of dressing and social organization (Jenkins 2005, 111). Cherokee tribes even drafted a constitution and printed a newspaper in their own language (→ Indigenous Literatures, III/10; Journalism, III/32). The invasion of their territory continued however, and in 1830, the United States Congress illegally and unilaterally approved the *Law of Forced Relocation* of the communities in the southern part of the country to lands west of the Mississippi River. In 1832, the U.S. government created the position of Commissioner of Indian Affairs which began the attack on the indigenous cultures and religions. It abolished what was seen as witchcraft, as well as polygamy and the supposed buying and selling of wives. It mandated that adult indigenous Americans cut their hair, dissolved religious ceremonies, and confiscated what it saw as cult objects (Bosch 2005, 233) (→ Indigeneity, I/31). Beginning in 1850, indigenous communities were once again besieged by the expansion of white settlements and relegated to reservations.

As part of assimilationist policies, schools were founded modeled after the Carlisle Indian Industrial School, founded in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in 1879. It was the policy of the schools to remove young children from their tribe, force them to speak English, and follow European or American customs. These boarding schools were cruel, unhealthy places where the children frequently fell ill and died. The Protestant Churches took charge of assimilating indigenous people to Christian, specifically Anglo-American, culture for a time period before leaving the responsibility to the state.

In the 20th century, the policy of assimilation lost support but the pace at which land (→ II/15) and resources were taken from indigenous people quickened. What was left to them promised a life of marginalization, poverty, and alcohol addiction on the reservations. Forced relocation and permanent harassment of their small reservation-bound communities were nothing less than the genocide of the indigenous people as well as their languages.

Latin American independence and linguistic unity

Once accomplished, the independence of the Latin American nations would lead to a debate regarding the ideals of the political philosophy of Simón Bolívar (→ Independence Movements, I/10). Though each nation would proclaim its sovereignty, they would strive for unity across the continent. The creation of the laws and political and legal structures as well as the requirements for citizenship (→ II/27) was carried out by those whose identity was *criolla*, which is to say, Eurocentric. Language would become the bastion of cultural identity. From the Enlightenment (→ I/8) comes the liberal ideal that a nation be constructed around linguistic unity (→ Nation and State Building, I/16), which implied a second attack on indigenous languages. Would Spanish – or Portuguese in the case of Brazil – be the only way to communicate, the only way to become a citizen within the new state's laws? Elites in different Latin American nations made the twofold move to at once assert their European roots and strengthen their sovereignty by promoting the Hispanic identity as a new form of glotopolitics.

Alfonso Reyes' perspective on language synthesizes the evolutionary and the neocolonial approaches. In it, these two ideas support the politics of language in furthering the unity among Spanish speakers in Latin America throughout the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries. The Mexican philologist and writer was a student of Menéndez Pidal and considered Spanish a universal language. He believed that due to its vigor and superiority, it was a

vehicle for Latin American culture which was rightly imposed on indigenous people whose language and culture were inferior. From the Pan-Hispanic point of view held by the elites of Latin America, indigenous languages were destined to disappear naturally as Spanish became dominant (De la Peza 2016, 2017)

However, more liberal thinkers among the Latin American intellectuals had different approaches. They took issue with their counterparts' ideas on linguistic unification and the more or less conflicting relationship with the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language, known by its Spanish acronym, RAE (→ Postcolonialism, I/38). Domingo Sarmiento, of Argentina, believed that, as opposed to French, English, or German, Spanish left behind it the seeds of intellectual delay. Sarmiento believed that it linked his generation to colonial domination and to religious and inquisitorial values which made it poorly suited to secular society. Where the RAE sought to impose orthography based on peninsular Spanish, Sarmiento saw this as an attack on the sovereignty of the new nation which had its own voices and variants.

Other thinkers such as Rufino José Cuervo of Colombia and Andrés Bello of Venezuela and later of Chile saw the possible fragmentation of Spanish as a danger, owing to the example of the fragmentation of Latin. Bello believed that local influences from the multitude of indigenous languages, combined with the emergence of different customs, voices, and stratification, would corrupt the Spanish language and result in disconnected variations. His 1847 book *Gramática de la lengua castellana destinada al uso de los americanos* (Grammar of the Spanish language in America) was a response to the drive for linguistic unity. From the second half of the 19th century into the 20th century, his book was used to teach Spanish throughout Latin America.

The appearance of various academies of the language, related to the RAE (which was founded in 1713), perpetuated a linguistic colonialism. Until the end of the 19th century, such academies appeared in Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, El Salvador, Venezuela, Chile, Peru, and Guatemala. The first third of the 20th century found them in Costa Rica, Panama, Cuba, Paraguay, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Argentina. The politics of the spread of Spanish in Latin America continue to this day, such as through the programs administered by the Cervantes Institute, which teach Spanish as a foreign language.

The situation in Brazil and its language of Portuguese is different. Due to the country's large size and population, it is now the main Portuguese-speaking country in the world. It also has the largest number of dialects due to the diversity of its population, with people of European, indigenous, African, and Asian descents (→ Hybridity, I/30). The dialects are associated with rural and urban social stratification (→ Social Inequality, II/20; Interethnic relations, I/12) (Lastra 2003). Given these conditions, it has been important for the state to conduct large-scale campaigns to standardize its national language. Such campaigns are conducted largely in the cities and their surrounding areas where obstacles to standardization include opposing vernacular and academic variants as well as severe discrepancies in levels of education (→ Urbanization, I/45; Education, I/24).

However, despite the linguistic and social asymmetries, Portuguese has found its greatest expression in Brazilian culture, which is attractive to tourists for its music, celebration, and sports (→ Consumerism, I/31). Brazil has accomplished not just worldwide recognition of Portuguese, but also greater visibility of Spanish and even Guaraní as languages of regional economic integration (→ Regional Integration, II/18) due to its role in founding Mercosur along with Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, which is a regional body dedicated to promoting socioeconomic development (→ II/6).

Conclusions

New ways of describing the shifting global patterns of linguistic progress are necessary in light of a dynamic whose history demonstrates the dialectical relationship between the history of languages, scientific development, and strategies for social control. Yet not to be forgotten is the issue of access to language as a tool as well as restrictions on human development according to Bourdieu's idea of symbolic capital (1982) and the consequent repercussions in people's daily lives.

In this sense, there are two areas of sociolinguistic transformation which have coexisted since the beginning of the 1990s, but not without tension between them. They are the commodification of the languages of colonial domination and the vindication of the linguistic rights of indigenous people (→ Indigeneity, I/31).

Under the influence of late capitalism (→ II/2), languages have gone through a process of commodification (Heller 2003). In the case of the four Indo-European languages of the colonial period in the Americas, this phenomenon is obvious in the context of the hyper-internationalization of English given the role that the United States plays as a global and continental economic power and leader (→ Geopolitics, II/34). However, other languages, such as Spanish, have also played a role in the designs that Latin America has had for expansion, whereas the relationship between Brazil and Portugal is increasingly becoming more a relationship of equals than one of domination and dependence (→ Postcolonialism, I/38). Finally, it is important to mention that the phenomenon of commodifying of language highlights the difference in how a language has become to be valued. National languages are sources of pride, whereas international languages are more often valued for their economic and political benefits (Heller and Duchêne 2012).

On the other hand, the weakening of indigenous languages has been the explicit aim of European colonial policies and neocolonial policies in independent nation-states as well as imperialism practiced by the United States. The tacit or explicit prohibition of indigenous languages in schools and other parts of public life represents as much the cause as the effect of "the growing uselessness and organized marginalization of such languages" (Derrida 1998, 38). Marginalization, discrimination, and stigmatization of indigenous languages and popular dialects have impeded the development of such languages as well as the expansion of western languages.

The discourse of scientific Eurocentrism has systematically hidden the struggles of indigenous peoples. Nonetheless, in 1992 when there was a commemoration of the conquest of the Americas, indigenous communities raised their voices once again, making their demands of recognition of their rights to their own territories, languages, and cultures (→ Social Movements, I/41).

The 1998 Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights (also known as the Barcelona Declaration) gives various fundamental linguistic rights (→ Human Rights, II/35). First, the promotion of individual and collective plurilingualism; second, the recognition that linguistic diversity is "an indispensable contribution to humanity because each language gives us multiple ways of understanding the world." Respect for these individual and collective rights toward public and private use of the language with equality and the development of their written forms constitutes an indispensable condition for their survival. These rights include at least: teaching of one's own language and culture in school (→ Education, I/24), the existence of cultural services, the presence of languages in the media in equal measure (→ Indigenous Media Production, III/30), recognition by official bodies, and that social and economic interactions are in one's native tongue.

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14

MEMORIAL CULTURE

Scott Manning Stevens

The term memorial culture evokes a range of associations across historical periods and geographic spaces. Memorialization is an act that may be practiced in many forms, be it monumental or ceremonial, secular or religious; human societies demonstrate an enduring desire to commemorate those events and individuals they consider most significant. Even if we were to restrict our consideration of memorial culture to the Western Hemisphere during the period following the rise of modern nation-states in the Americas, we would still find ourselves faced with a dauntingly heterogeneous range of memorial practices. Generalizations concerning regions or historical epochs often prove misleading upon close scrutiny but a few basic observations on a region's predominant religions (→ Religious Beliefs, I/40), languages, and colonial inheritance may serve as organizing principles when attempting to provide an overview of memorial culture throughout the Americas. This entry is concerned with the official memorial cultures of the Americas and this is perhaps most easily reviewed by a comparative consideration of the monuments that each nation builds to help define its past.

At its root, a memorial is about remembering, from the Latin *memoralis* "serving as a reminder," from *memoria* "memory." In the West, that has often meant looking to the physical monuments of the ancient world for a visual language for recording the deeds of great leaders or major events. The pyramid and obelisk of ancient Egypt endure in both public monuments and private funerary markers throughout Europe and the Americas, as do stelae, memorial columns, and triumphal arches from the memorial vocabularies of Greece and Rome. To these structures, we can also add monumental crosses, sepulchers, and shrines from the Christian traditions of the medieval West. All of these physical embodiments of the desire to remember the past and remind future generations of those subjects considered central to our identities, as particular societies and peoples, are part of the memorial cultures of the Americas. For the most part, given the public nature of these monuments and memorials, they represent the perspective of those in power. If "history is written by the victors," then monuments and memorials similarly represent the will of their creators; even when they memorialize a vanquished enemy, they are the creation of those in power.

Yet, monuments are only one aspect of memorial culture, as we need to also acknowledge public holidays and days of remembrance or annual ceremonies and parades, or towns and streets and geographic landmarks named after figures and events in the past. Public memory is maintained through actions as well as monuments. Celebratory parades marking a nation's

independence day or a significant military victory in their nation's past serve to underscore the ongoing need to recreate civic identity through memorialization (→ Citizenship, II/27). Cultural memories are preserved in songs, in feast days, in literature, and in festivals throughout the hemisphere but the disparate colonial legacies of North, Central, and South America require us to consider where commonalities end and national traditions begin. The predominant national languages of Spanish, English, Portuguese, and French in the majority of nation-states (→ II/38) that make up the Americas naturally point to commonalities between Latin American nations and their differences from the largely Anglophone societies of North America, but the settler colonial policies of the United States and Canada toward their Indigenous populations (→ Indigenous Peoples, I/11) may have more in common with nations such as Argentina, than Argentina has with the mestizo societies of Mexico and Peru.

Memorialization of indigenous cultures

One cannot overestimate the impact of Indigenous societies and cultures on the respective memorial cultures of the nation-states that came to occupy the Western Hemisphere. Demographers have long debated pre-Columbian population levels throughout the hemisphere. Estimates have ranged from as low as ten million people for both continents to as high as one hundred million people. Many scholars come down somewhere in the middle, around fifty million people, living in the Western Hemisphere before the European invasion (Taylor 2001, 40). The distribution of populations centers is equally contested but contemporary demographers and historians place about five to seven million people north of the Rio Grande, with much denser populations inhabiting Central America and Andean portions of South America. This means that the more urban populations of central Mexico and the Andes created memorials of their own, many of which have remained to the present day. The nation-states of Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and Belize, as well as Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia are all sites of major archaeological monuments in the forms of temples, pyramids, stelae, and the like from the Indigenous urban cultures of the pre-Columbian world. However, throughout the Americas, Indigenous memorial cultures also live on in ceremonies, songs, and traditions passed down through the centuries (→ Indigeneity, I/31). All of these stand behind the memorial cultures which developed in modern nation-states to various degrees. Mexico and Peru cannot ignore the physical monuments left by the Olmec, Mayans, Aztecs, or Incan civilizations.

While such archaeological monuments are fewer and less dramatic in North America, the physical presence of Mound-builder cultures or cliff dwellings remains silent memorials to earlier Indigenous societies just as ancient memorial traditions and ceremonies inform contemporary Indigenous life in the United States and Canada. While European immigrants to those portions of North America often chose to ignore or in some cases destroy Indigenous sites, the Latin American monuments of Teotihuacan, Chichen Itza, and Cuzco made an unavoidable impression on the modern citizens of Mexico and Peru, the vast majority of whom are of mestizo descent. To embrace a national identity in nation-states with large or even majority Indigenous populations meant incorporating the memorial cultures of societies that predated European influences (→ Nation and State Building, I/16). Among the clearest illustrations of this notion is the evolution of the Mexican celebration of the *Día de los Muertos* (Day of the Dead), which grafts Christian memorial practices brought by the Spaniards onto preexisting Indigenous commemorations of the dead and constitutes a major annual public celebration in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America where it may be known by different names, such as the *Día de los Difuntos* (Day of the Deceased) in Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia (Garciaogodoy 1998, 109–129).

The impact of Indigenous peoples on memorial culture is dramatically less in the settler colonial nations of North America or the Southern Cone of South America, while Brazilian and Caribbean memorial cultures (including Columbian and Venezuelan) are likewise heavily influenced by the African populations brought to the Americas as slaves (→ Slavery, I/18) (Andrews 2004). We quickly begin to see that even our initial divisions between language and colonial legacies become increasingly complicated when we account for the persistence of Indigenous cultures and the diaspora of African peoples throughout the Western Hemisphere. The demographic catastrophe that wiped out millions of native people and forever disrupted their cultures did not erase them altogether, and in some regions of the Americas, Indigenous peoples still make up the majority. This fact requires those assessing the enduring impact of those native societies on contemporary memorial cultures to pay close attention to regional histories and demographic information.

While Indigenous cultures rarely distinguished between the sacred and the secular and the monuments left by Mississippians in Cahokia or that the Aztecs in Tenochtitlán may have blended the human and the divine in a manner foreign to the West (outside of the person of Jesus), a broader civic mentality still may see in those Indigenous monuments (Martin 1999, 30–35). This includes a desire to focus larger social aspirations and collective identities in structures expressing those values visually. This is cognate with some of the earliest memorials created by the nation-states that emerged out of the colonial empires of Spain, England, Portugal, and France. Given the extremely broad range of customs, monuments, and means of memorializing events and individuals across cultures, it may be useful to concentrate on memorial structures or monuments as a way of focusing our consideration of memorial cultures in the Western Hemisphere. Every modern nation-state in the Americas has a tradition of public monuments and memorials but the same diversity that can be found in their respective societies can be found in the memorials their nations erect to the past.

Memorialization of discovery and independence

Considered chronologically, the first monuments memorializing the political struggles for independence that would mark almost every region of the Americas appeared in the unlikely place of New England (→ Independence Movements, I/10). Unlikely, in that New England was neither the oldest nor the most populated of the European colonies in the Western Hemisphere, and its religious culture was known for its iconoclastic relation toward images and monuments (Peterson 2013, 68–84). While the Spanish had been active in Mexico since the 1520s, the English foothold in New England came a full century later. New Spain was busy building magnificent churches and missions decorated with iconography that combined Indigenous and European aesthetics many decades before the Puritans of New England would erect their aesthetically spare meetinghouses (→ Religion and Missionizing, I/17). Even following such a violent and widespread conflict as King Philip's War in 1675–1676, no permanent memorials to that war were erected by settlers until 1838 in South Deerfield, Massachusetts, with the majority of markers erected between the bicentennial of the war in 1875 and the early 20th century (Schultz and Tougas 1999, 173–233).

But it was in New England that the struggle for independence from European colonial rule began and the first permanent memorial to that struggle was erected in Lexington, Massachusetts in 1799. This modest memorial, a squat obelisk on a square base, served as a memorial “Sacred to Liberty & the Rights of Mankind!!!” and to those eight militiamen who lost their lives in the outbreak of hostilities with the British on April 19, 1775. In some respect, this monument was not much different than a gravestone, save that it commemorated

eight men. Gravestones were among the few memorials that did exist in New England previous to the American Revolution but this memorial makes larger claims for that first step in the struggle for independence, since “The Peace, Liberty & Independence of the United States of America was their glorious Reward” (Peterson 2013, 72). The monument, erected in what would be the final year of George Washington’s life, commemorated the independence movement that began just a generation earlier. The builders drew on the Enlightenment (→ I/8) notion of the Egyptian obelisk, popularized in Europe by the ancient Romans, as a fittingly civic, rather than religious, memorial to the sacrifices made in Lexington in the name of liberty (Foote 1997, 289) (→ Freedom, I/27). The base pedestal is, in this case, taller than the truncated obelisk that it supports. In form, it looks more like a pyramid surmounted with a pyramidion. The base carries an inscription commemorating the battle and the fallen militiamen and it is situated on the site where the event actually took place. This marks the modest beginnings of what would become a memorial tradition of creating monuments to the struggles for national autonomy in North and South America.

The first such national memorials and monuments required both the passage of time and a degree of political stability. In the United States, the desire to memorialize the American Revolution corresponded with the period in which the generation of veterans and citizens of the Revolutionary period were nearing the ends of their lives (Peterson 2013, 73). A permanent memorial project such as the construction of the Bunker Hill Monument, begun in 1827, was meant to replace a more temporary wooden monument that had been erected by the Masons in 1794 to honor a fallen fellow Mason, General Joseph Warren. The permanent memorial, now to honor all the men who fell and the event itself, was a colossal 221-foot obelisk that took sixteen years to complete. By 1836, another obelisk had been erected in Concord, Massachusetts on the sister site of American resistance to British rule back in 1775 (Peterson 2013, 84). Civic leaders in Baltimore, Maryland commissioned the first public monument to George Washington in 1815, which resulted in the 178-foot Doric column surmounted by a statue of Washington, completed in 1829. Monuments to other leading figures of the Revolution and battle site memorials were erected throughout the original Thirteen Colonies during the course of the 19th century – especially to mark significant anniversaries, such as the centenary of United States’ independence in 1876.

In Latin America, the movement for independence (→ I/10) from Spain arose largely in conjunction with the Peninsular War in Spain (1807–1814), which saw Napoleon’s brother Joseph placed on the Spanish throne in 1807. Patriots from Mexico to Argentina saw the moment as propitious to launch their bids for independence. As early as 1808 in Quito and Chuquisaca (modern-day Sucre, Bolivia), regional governments rebelled against the Spanish government after the abdication of the Bourbon king; though suppressed within a year, the spirit of revolution spread (Lynch 1986, 50–54) (→ Revolution, II/44). Father Hidalgo in Mexico would issue his famous *Grito* or “Cry” to reject the new Spanish government in 1810 and thus launch the Mexican War of Independence. In South America, Simón Bolívar would begin his continental struggle for an independent Latin America in 1810 in Caracas, while other leaders such as José de San Martín would offer his service to rebels in the United Provinces of the Río Plata who had begun their struggle in 1810 and were joined by San Martín in 1812. The Wars of Independence in Spanish South America would stretch from 1808 until 1826 and would accomplish the independence of Venezuela, Columbia, Ecuador, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Peru (Lynch 1986). Also during this same period, the Haitian Revolution (1791–1804) liberated the French colony formerly known as Saint-Domingue and the Brazilian War of Independence (1822–1824) resulted in the founding of the Empire of Brazil.

Yet, sociopolitical situations in the various former colonies were far from stable. Between 1811 and 1819, three successive republics were declared in Venezuela, before it united with New Granada and Ecuador to form the Gran Colombia, which lasted from 1821 until 1831 (Lynch 1986, 190–227). The political geography of South America would also prove as volatile elsewhere until at least the mid-19th century, which meant that in many cases, the monuments that would come to be associated with national memorial cultures were not created for up to fifty years after independence (→ Memory Politics, I/34). This should not be surprising given the general lack of permanent political monuments and memorials in the United States for the first two decades following its independence. Some notable exceptions to this observation exist; in Buenos Aires, a monument celebrating the first anniversary of the May Revolution of 1810 was commissioned in 1811. The resulting monument, one of the oldest national monuments in South America, took the form of an elongated pyramid atop a quadrilateral pedestal – all constructed out of cement, adobe brick, and plaster. The structure had been altered and restored over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries but remains in the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires.

As was true in the United States, monuments to the heroes of national independence began to be erected around significant national anniversaries. In Venezuela in 1874, fifty years after Bolívar's final military victory at the Battle of Junín in Peru, the government founded the National Pantheon on the site of a former 18th-century church and placed the repatriated remains of Simón Bolívar at its center in a monumental sarcophagus. That same year in Caracas, an equestrian statue of the Liberator was erected in the Plaza Bolívar. This statue is a cast made from the original erected in Lima, Peru in 1858 and still in place at the Plaza Bolívar before the National Congress. Bolívar would go on to become one of the most frequently depicted American liberators with statues in perhaps the most capital cities in the Western Hemisphere, including Washington, D.C. and Ottawa. Likewise, statues of José de San Martín would be commissioned in the decades following his death in 1850. The city of Buenos Aires erected an equestrian statue of the general in 1862 and later named the square in which it stood in his honor at the centenary of his birth in 1878. Other Latin American nations would follow this trend and honor San Martín along with fellow revolutionaries Bernardo O'Higgins, Antonio José de Sucre, and José Gervasio Artigas. Statues of both Bolívar and San Martín, along with the Cuban patriot, José Martí, also stand in prominent positions at the south end of Central Park in New York City, while public statues of George Washington occupy places of honor in Buenos Aires, Lima, and Bogotá.

Both Canada and Brazil prove interesting exceptions to the rule of memorializing liberators, such as Washington or Bolívar; in the case of Canada, there is no war of independence, no leader toward sovereignty but instead a slow movement to home rule, confederation, and dominion that has resulted in a less dramatic narrative of their founding as a nation (→ Foundational Discourses, III/8). Brazilian independence did come with a brief war for independence but its independence came in the form of Portuguese Prince Dom Pedro declaring independence from Portugal and creating the Empire of Brazil in 1822. Lacking republican ideals and retaining the institution of slavery until 1888, Brazil's commemorative culture is less around national liberators and more focused on progressive leaders who advanced the nation.

Both Mexico and Peru prove interesting cases in terms of memorializing national figures because of their large mestizo and Indigenous populations (→ Hybridity, I/30). Statues of the conquistador Hernán Cortés are not on display in Mexico, where he is largely remembered as the brutal destroyer of an Indigenous empire. This is partly due to the contempt in which he is held by those Indigenous descendants who make up a huge portion of Mexico's

mestizo population. Even Lima, a city long under the sway of Creole elites and founded by the conquistador Francisco Pizarro, had never honored that founder with a statue until one was erected in 1934, only to have it removed in 2005 (Tobar, March 28, 2005). Columbus fares better in the memorial cultures of the Americas than the conquistadores that followed him, but not without continued or even growing controversy.

The memorialization of Columbus has long been focused on his presumptive discovery of the so-called *New World* (→ America, I/2; Pan-Americanism, II/40). Because most nations chose to celebrate this legacy over the military invasion which followed his explorations (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7), he has fared better than Cortés and Pizarro in popular memory. In continental North America, which had long celebrated the legacy of Britain's colonial efforts there, the desire to memorialize Columbus has been more partisan than general. There were some early uses of the name Colombia as a poetic alternative to America. In part, this was due to the notion that if the continents of the Western Hemisphere should be named after any person, that Columbus made more sense than Amerigo Vespucci. In the U.S., that led to the naming of the District of Columbia and Columbia, South Carolina, as well as Columbia College in New York but this early trend never displaced the name America (Stewart 1945, 169–174).

With the influx of Catholic immigrant groups from Ireland and Italy in the 19th and early 20th centuries (→ Migration, I/15), Christopher Columbus was seen as creating a foundational connection between the early Christian (i.e. Catholic) missionary efforts that followed his landfall and the legitimacy of Catholicism as an American religion (→ Religious Beliefs, I/40). This is particularly the case in the United States where Catholic fraternities such as the Knights of Columbus, founded in 1882, promoted Catholic civic commemorations, among its many service-oriented activities. Through their lobbying efforts, October 12 was declared a national holiday in the United States in 1934 (Sale 1990, 359). This is very different than the Día de la Raza (Day of the Race) commemorations that have developed and been celebrated in Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, and until more recently, Venezuela. In many of these celebrations, the emphasis has evolved from celebrating the Spanish *discovery* of the Americas to acknowledging the Hispanic *race* created by the intermarriage of Europeans and Indigenous peoples throughout the colonial process. In 2002, Venezuela renamed the holiday, changing from the Día de la Raza to the Día de la Resistencia Indígena.

Statues of Columbus have been present in Latin American cities since the 19th century and became popular in the United States at the beginning of the 20th century. The oldest U.S. monument to Columbus can be found in Baltimore, Maryland (Erlandson May 21, 1992). It is not a statue of Columbus but rather an obelisk in his honor, commissioned by the French expatriate in Baltimore in 1792 for the 300th anniversary of Columbus' voyage. Lima, Peru would erect a statue to Columbus in 1850 and Mexico City would follow suit in 1877, and other cities throughout the Americas would erect statutes of their own – especially as the date of the 400th anniversary approached (Curtis 1893, 57–59). In 1887, Mexico City officials also placed a monumental statue of the last Aztec leader, Cuauhtémoc, on the Paseo de la Reforma not far from the Columbus statue in order to balance the legacy of colonialism with Mexico's Indigenous history. In contemporary times, we have seen increased pressure from Indigenous peoples and their allies to rename or abolish Columbus Day celebrations. Perhaps most dramatically, in 2004 a group of supporters of President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela gathered before the Columbus monument of Caracas and pulled down and destroyed the statue which had stood for over hundred years. A statue of the Caribe Indian resistance fighter, Guaicaipuro, was placed on the same marble base as the former Columbus statue in 2015 (Rojas October 13, 2015).

Contested memories and memorials

Besides founders and liberators, nations in the Western Hemisphere also commemorate historical struggles which they understand to have profoundly shaped their histories or add legitimacy to their status as sovereign nations. For the United States, the trauma of the Civil War had the largest impact on memorial culture there for the remainder of the 19th century. Perhaps one of the most unique features of the commemoration of that struggle lies in the memorials created by the opposing sides. Confederate monuments and place names abound through the American South, just as memorials to the Union dead can be found throughout the North. Richmond, Virginia, the former capital city of the Confederacy, created Monument Avenue to memorialize the former leaders and fallen soldiers of that struggle. One has a hard time imagining other nations where the losing side of such a bitter struggle could so publicly celebrate their part in a rebellion against the union to which they now belong. Unlike the two World Wars of the 20th century, which pitted the U.S. and its allies against foreign powers, the American Civil War remains a contentious part of memorial culture in the United States.

South American nations often had conflicts with one another or interfering European powers over territory and resources during the course of the 19th century. Such struggles often resulted in a sort of reaffirmation of national sovereignty. One thinks of the Mexican victory over the French at the Battle of Puebla in 1862 and its subsequent commemoration in popular culture with *Cinco de Mayo* celebrations. Peru's contest with Spain over the Chincha Islands in between 1864 and 1866 resulted in the Battle of Callao on 2 May 1866, an inconclusive naval battle that saw Spain eventually withdraw and so is celebrated in Lima's Plaza Dos de Mayo, which was inaugurated in 1874 with an ornate column crowned with a statue of Nike. Perhaps Canada's most analogous monument of this type would be Brock's Monument on the Niagara River in Ontario along the U.S. border. This 185-foot-tall column, created in 1856 and surmounted with a statue of Sir Isaac Brock, is the second one on the site dedicated to the general who fell defending Queenston Heights from an American invasion during the War of 1812. The first was bombed by the anti-British activist Benjamin Lett. While the War of 1812 is seen as largely inconsequential to the U.S. or Great Britain, it is of great importance to Canadian national identity (Malcomson 2003, 216). Memorials in Canada do exist honoring the memories of the fallen generals Wolfe and Montcalm of the Seven Years War, which ended in the loss of New France to Great Britain in 1763, but because the results of the war remain contentious to modern Quebecois, the memorials to that war dwell on individual sacrifice and not English victory.

Canada, the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay all report Indigenous populations of less than 5 percent of the general populations. Given that the precontact percentages were 100 percent Indigenous, such statistics are dire. One can imagine that little was done to memorialize the Indigenous populations who were in the process of being decimated during the colonial and early nationalist periods in these respective nations. Indian killers might be memorialized but not Indians. In the United States, the invasion and conquest of Indigenous homelands were rarely acknowledged in public memorials in the early colonial period and would not be memorialized with monuments and statues until the 19th century. Many of these memorials championed the conflicts between Natives and newcomers as the inevitable struggle between progress and the primitive world. Those rare individual Native Americans depicted on monuments by the majority settler culture were usually celebrated as individuals regarded as accommodating of European colonialism, such as Pocahontas, Massasoit, or Sacagawea. This contrasts with monuments to Indigenous leaders who resisted colonial rule in Mexico and Peru. The fact is that in the 400 years following the Columbian encounter of 1492, almost no

memorials or commemorative traditions have attended to the plight of the first inhabitants of the Western Hemisphere outside of the nations with large Indigenous populations.

The tide turned in the 20th century in many nations in the Western Hemisphere. This has been called an “age of memorials and monuments” in the United States and that description may apply to a lesser extent to other nations in the Americas (Doss 2010, 1–28). While the bulk of public memorial culture was expressed in civic and historical monuments in the past, now we have memorials commemorating natural disasters, tragedies, historic injustices, social struggles, and the like. While it would have been unthinkable to find statues to Indigenous resistance fighters in the United States a century ago, we now have monuments to the Native resistance fighters who defeated Custer at Little Big Horn or one honoring Popay, the leader of the Pueblo Revolt of 1680, which stand in the U.S. capitol. At the same time, monuments commemorating massacres perpetrated by the U.S. Army or settler militias against Native peoples, such as those at Sand Creek or Wounded Knee, remain controversial subjects. In both North and South American nations, monuments exist to victims of repressive political regimes (→ Authoritarianism, II/25) or to slavery, such as we see in the plans for a Slavery Memorial in Rio de Janeiro (Michaels March 17, 2015) or the recently opened National Museum of African American History and Culture in Washington, D.C. Struggles remain for memorial culture and the reconciliation commissions, as the disenfranchised demand that their history be acknowledged. Monuments and memorials, which were meant to make material and permanent our respective histories, have resulted in a remarkably dynamic element of our various national cultures.

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15

MIGRATION

Silke Hensel

The Americas are influenced by migration processes to a wider extent than perhaps any other world region. Societies today are the result of numerous and complex migratory flows from all over the world, as well as internally, and the subsequent formation of new societies. Although the 20th century is often considered the most important era with respect to migration, it is questionable whether this is accurate. The American continents were populated through various migrations and the history of migration was an important founding myth for some societies, especially the Aztec. In addition, the conquest of America by European powers initiated a process that brought the New World into contact with other societies than European ones. In the aftermath, millions of Africans were taken to the Americas, connections were established to Asia, and these invasions and immigrations triggered migrations by Amerindians (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7); Indigenous Peoples, I/11). Independence did not stop the massive spatial movements of people into the Americas. However, emigration from the Americas only became a major phenomenon in the 20th century (→ Independence Movements, I/10).

The forms of migration and their impact on the receiving societies varied over time and regions. One of the main patterns differentiating migratory flows to the Americas consisted in the difference between free and unfree migration, although neither were homogeneous. A huge gap existed between the forced migration of African slaves who had to live under the system of chattel slavery (→ Slavery, I/18), and indentured servants from Europe who wanted to leave their home country due to economic need and hoped for freedom after their term of indentured labor ended (→ Unfree Labor, I/19). While unfree migration was more important during the colonial period, free labor migration became more significant after independence. A changing world economy during the first half of the 19th century together with improved transportation and communication technologies altered the conditions and parameters of production, markets, and transoceanic migration. Millions of people had to leave their home regions in order to find a life elsewhere. Europeans received more information on the Americas and could travel cheaper and faster. Thus, until the beginning of World War I, migration from Europe to some regions in the Americas became an option for many who could not make a living in their home region.

Peoples on the move in Ancient America

The American continent was populated relatively late, probably 15,000–20,000 years ago. Theories on the time and origin of these first migrations differ considerably. The oldest and most accepted one contends that Asians moved across the Bering Straits to North America and spread southward. Scholars have perceived the 11,200-year-old Clovis culture as the starting point of the peopling of the continent for a long time. However, questions arose with the 12,500-year-old archaeological findings in southern Chile (Dillehay 2000), as well as artifacts in Mexico dated at 28,000 years old. Some researchers suggest that humans arrived to America as early as 40,000 years ago and that more than one migration from Asia and Oceania by land and sea actually took place. But due to a lack of sources, this remains disputed.

Migration of whole peoples remained a common pattern in Ancient America well into the second millennium. In Mesoamerica, Toltecs moved southward in the 800s C.E. During the 9th and 10th centuries, Maya peoples migrated to the Yucatán and 400 years later went on to Guatemala (Hoerder 2002). Institutionalized population transfers played an important role in empire building in the Andes from the 9th century onward. The Inca sought to integrate newly conquered peoples into their empire by unifying political, religious, and economic practices. To achieve this goal, loyal subjects were sent to establish communities in newly conquered areas and resistant natives were removed to distant regions (Vieira Powers 1995, 13–14). The Aztec empire was erected by Mexica who migrated into the basin of central Mexico from a mythical place called Aztlán around 1300 (Cowgill 2000). Stateless peoples were also moving before 1500, e.g. the Chiriguano of eastern Bolivia formed out of Tupi-speaking migrants and Arawakan Guana (Schwartz and Salomon 1999, 446).

The colonial era

During the colonial era, migration was ubiquitous all over the Americas. For indigenous societies, the Spanish conquest meant upheaval and disaster and resulted in several forms of population shifts. Forced migration was particularly pervasive in the early colonial period. Through conscription, Amerindians were coerced into serving as warriors or servants in the Conquista (Cook 1990, 53) (→ Conquest and Colonization, 1/7). In addition, Spaniards decided to resettle millions of Amerindians into so-called *congregaciones* or *reducciones* in order to better control and exploit them (→ Colonial Economies, 1/4). But these *congregaciones* were less stable than colonial authorities wished them to be because many of their inhabitants left for their old homes. Especially in the Andes, Spaniards forced hundreds of thousands of Amerindians to move to the mining areas. The colonial system of the *mita* not only resulted in temporary migration, the *mitayos* and their families often took up residence in mining areas, urban centers, or haciendas in order to avoid the strenuous and dangerous way back to their villages (Vieira Powers 1995, 46).

Flight from oppression and exploitation was another migratory behavior. Many Amerindians fled into regions not yet controlled by the colonial state (MacLeod 2000, 17), like the rainforest areas of Yucatán or Guatemala and the lowlands in the Andean region. This type of migration was especially important during the first decades of Spanish invasions. Another way for Amerindians to avoid at least part of the exploitation by the Spaniards was emigration from their home community to live in other villages or Spanish towns where they had the status of *forasteros* (foreigners). Even though they often lost social status and land rights by moving, exemption from *mita* service or tribute payment was attractive enough to increase the number of *forasteros*, especially in the Andes where in some towns they comprised up to

80 percent of the inhabitants (Sánchez-Albornoz 1983). Finally, flight from natural disaster (→ II/33) or disease was another important cause for population shifts.

Voluntary migration of Amerindians also occurred due to educational opportunities in urban centers, services, or proximity to important people. While silver mines attracted people who wanted to take the risk, many Amerindians – both men and women – settled in Spanish cities working as artisans or servants and thereby avoided the *mita*. Many women were kidnapped, as complaints and royal decrees for the *audiencia* of Quito suggest (Vieira Powers 1995, 46). Sometimes, this type of migration depopulated nearby villages for decades. The most important voluntary migration for work in colonial times was probably the shift of labor force from villages to private properties, such as haciendas or ranchos (Robinson 1990, 13–14).

In North America, many Native Americans were forcibly relocated in the wake of British colonization. Many settlers came to the British colonies in search of land and therefore perceived the Native Americans not as potential workers (as did the Spanish colonists), but as competitors (Takaki 1993). Farther north, the fur trade and French interference with Native American societies led to wars between Iroquois and mainly Algonquian-speaking people in the middle of the 17th century. These conflicts pushed Algonquians and others westward into the Great Lakes region where they began to create new communities together with the Frenchmen (White 2011).

Transatlantic migration

From the beginning of the Conquista, the Atlantic (→ I/3) became a connecting space between America, Europe, and Africa. People, ideas, and artifacts crossed and circled the Atlantic. Migration was often not a unilinear process, but happened in several stages and brought migrants to different parts in the Americas. The ability to maintain contact with the society of origin rose considerably over time and return migration became more frequent. Thus, migration to the Americas and new forms of knowledge obtained in the process influenced not only American, but also European and African societies. New identities developed due to migration, like the Yoruba identity in western Africa (Lovejoy 2000). Even though European and African migrations to the Americas were differentiated by the forced nature of the latter, both population shifts were closely interconnected. The freedom (→ I/27) Europeans hoped to find in America was only possible through African slavery (Morgan 1975).

European migrations to the Americas

European colonization of the Americas resulted in the need to facilitate migration overseas in order to take possession of the new regions and render them profitable. The dynamics of European migrations depended heavily on the technologies of transportation, development of trade with the Americas, availability of labor and/or land, and prospect of economic success in the New World. Additionally, emigration was rendered an attractive option by population growth in Europe, which led to price increases and food shortages, as well as efforts to enclose common land (→ Commons, II/31) and place restrictions on the poor. Voluntary immigration was largest to Spanish America because of its silver production and resulting prospects. The Spanish Crown tried to restrict this immigration along with emigration from Spain. During the Brazilian gold and diamond boom in the 18th century, Portugal also had to control the outflow of migrants. In contrast, other European empires had to solve the problem of transporting some of their subjects to the territories claimed in the Americas (Moya 2015, 18–20). In the 16th century, 2,500 Spaniards crossed the Atlantic per year.

Portuguese migration started later and in the 18th century reached 3,000 people a year going to Brazil. For six decades, from the 1630s onward, no more than 5,000 migrants left Great Britain heading to North America. Thus, before 1800, European migration to the Americas never passed 10,000 people a year. This number rose considerably after the independence of most of the colonies in America.

Spanish migration started with the conquest because many of the conquerors and those who joined them as servants, artisans, merchants, and clerics stayed in the newly subjugated regions. Crown policy contributed to this trend by requiring that *conquistadores* become *vecinos* or householders in order to receive an *encomienda* as reward for their services in the conquest. From 1492 to 1650, most of the emigrants came from a small number of communities in Andalusia, Extremadura, and New Castile. Emigration therefore never became a widespread experience, but was to a great extent determined by the pattern of chain migration. Relatives, friends, and neighbors followed those who had already migrated. This pattern explains the spatial concentration of migrants from specific regions in the receiving countries. Members of minorities (Jews, Moors, Roma, and later Protestants) were banned from moving to Spanish America, as were foreigners. Nevertheless, some did manage to make their way to the New World. During the Iberian Union (1580–1640), the Portuguese emigrated in increasing numbers to the Spanish Indies. Especially at the beginning, most migrants were male and relatively young. Nevertheless, migration became a family strategy already by the 16th century. When transatlantic crossing became more frequent and safe, women and children traveled in larger numbers to America, even though the gender imbalance never fully evened (→ Gender, I/9). From 1560 to 1579, when emigration peaked in the 16th century, women did not even account for a third of the passengers (Altman 1991). The social origins of the emigrants soon included almost all social strata in Spain, excluding only the highest and lowest strata. The number of Spaniards moving to America during the second half of the colonial era is harder to determine because of changes in transatlantic shipping and documentation, but their total number is estimated at 250,000 persons, among them 60,000 soldiers who were shipped to America from 1739 to 1798 (Sánchez-Albornoz 1994, 33).

Spanish colonization was an urban undertaking. Most Spaniards settled in towns which were primarily founded in regions with a dense native population. The central highlands of Mexico and the *audiencias* of Quito, Peru, and Alto Peru received most of the Spanish emigrants. By 1580, Spaniards had established some 225 towns and cities and fifty years later, this number increased to 331 urban settlements (→ Urbanization, I/45). Spanish migrants not only shaped the evolving colonial society in multiple ways, but were also important for the Spanish empire. Their networks of association, kinship, and patronage ties spanned the Atlantic, and their multiple and enduring connections in political, administrative, economic, and private matters held together the different parts of the empire (→ Colonial Rule, I/5) (Elliott 2006).

The organization of English colonization in North America differed from the Spanish colonizing project by relying heavily on private initiatives. Early modern England sent more migrants to America than any other European power. A first wave of migrants left for America during the 1630s, about 21,000 went to Massachusetts, 10,000 to Virginia, and over 20,000 to the Caribbean. Early settlements could not survive without the help of Native Americans. When production of commercial plants like tobacco began to prosper in the colonies, propertied settlers exploited indentured servants, who came to the Americas in growing numbers. They migrated voluntarily, but could not afford the costs of transportation and therefore came as indentured servants. Initially, indentured servants were less expensive than African slaves in the northern colonies; however, this was not the case in the English Caribbean. In addition, convicts and prisoners were transplanted to the English

colonies, sometimes as servants for life. During the 18th century, 17 percent of all Europeans coming to the thirteen British colonies were convicts (Moya 2015, 20).

Unfree migration dominated the British colonial era, when nearly two-thirds of all immigrants arrived as slaves, servants, or convicts in the British mainland colonies. While in the 17th century, indentured servants accounted for 49 percent and slaves for 17 percent of all immigrants, their relation reversed in the 18th century, when slaves comprised 47 percent and indentured servants 18 percent of all immigrants. Total immigration during the two periods rose from almost 200,000 human beings to 586,000. Between 1776 and 1819, immigration patterns altered considerably, as the number of free migrants rose to 368,000 persons, comprising almost two-thirds of all immigrants (Fogleman 2011, 384–385). During the 17th century, most of the European immigrants in the British mainland colonies were English, comprising almost 148,000 of a total of 165,000 immigrants. This changed between 1700 and 1809, when out of 580,600 Europeans, over one-third were Irish, and Germans arrived in almost the same numbers as English migrants. Thus, the 18th century exhibited a larger diversity among European immigrants – and this was to be continued after independence. European colonists in British America hoped for economic betterment and often wanted to become farmers. In addition, the search for religious freedom was an important incentive to migrate (→ Religious Beliefs, I/40). Thus, the colonization and settlement structure differed from Spanish America. It was less urban and relied on occupying the Native Americans' land, instead of exploiting Native Americans as the Spaniards did.

Compared to other European powers, French transoceanic settlement during the French-American Empire was modest. Insofar as population growth and social problems induced emigration, French inhabitants had fewer reasons to leave their country, as French America never attracted many migrants. In New France, the fur trade was the main economic activity and was not conducive to a settled agricultural economy. Furthermore, members of the lower classes had little reliable information on the colony's assets and the Atlantic passage was costly and dangerous. Not even government campaigns to populate the colonies could make a notable difference in the unwillingness of French people to move to the Americas. During the 1600s, rarely more than 300 newcomers a year set foot on these lands. Their number dwindled until 1740 until New France had between 45,000 and 62,000 European inhabitants around 1760. French government administrators, army officers, indentured servants, and regular soldiers who had come to Canada were so eager to return to France, that not even a third of these migrants stayed in the colony (Moogk 2011). French Guiana had only 600 French settlers in 1760. After the Treaty of Paris (1763), the French government launched a campaign to bring more settlers to this colony. But of the 15,000 migrants who left France during the next years for Guiana, 9,000 died of disease within the first months. The Caribbean constituted the most attractive region for French migrants because of the economic success of the French islands. In 1645, 8,500 French settlers lived in the Caribbean and their numbers increased steadily thereafter. In Martinique, for example, the number of white settlers rose from 4,770 in 1683 to 14,000 in 1756. Saint Domingue, the most valuable and largest French colony in the Caribbean, counted 30,000 European inhabitants in 1789. However, compared to the increasing forced migration of African slaves to the Caribbean, white settlers only made up a small percentage of the total population.

The transatlantic slave trade

From the 15th century onward, millions of Africans were taken captive and forced to migrate to the New World as slaves (→ Slavery, I/18); approximately, 12.5 million embarked in Africa

and only about 10.7 million reached America alive. The slave trade, which constituted the largest intercontinental migration until the 19th century (Curtin 1991, 10), can be divided into three periods. During the first 150 years, Portuguese traders carried almost 950,000 captives across the Atlantic. The second period (1650–1807/1808) witnessed a sevenfold increase. In the 1640s, about 12,000 slaves a year came to American shores, their number rising to 80,000 a year from 1766 to 1775. This expansion coincided with the Netherlands, France, England, and Scandinavian countries entering the slave trade (Voyages: Transatlantic Slave Trade Database; Eltis 2011, 272). The third phase saw a change because of the British efforts to abolish the transatlantic slave trade. Slaves were then sold within the Caribbean and the US, as well as in Brazil. Africans were also still taken directly to Brazil, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. 39 percent of all slaves taken to the Americas landed in Brazil; 44 percent in the British, French, and Dutch Caribbean; 13 percent in Spanish America; and 4 percent in the United States.

African slaves came to America with the first conquistadores. Their numbers rose when indigenous populations in America declined rapidly due to warfare, exploitation, and disease. Furthermore, the Spanish and, somewhat later, the Portuguese Crowns forbade indigenous enslavement. Spaniards felt that they could legitimately enslave Africans because the slaves' temporary suffering in bondage would be redeemed by the salvation of the souls of people who could only be brought to the true faith via enslavement. A more profane reason for the massive enslavement of Africans was the fact that they were not protected by a major power (Bennett 2003).

Africans played an important role in the transatlantic slave trade. In Africa, prisoners of war were usually enslaved. Some of them – mostly women – stayed with the enslaving society, whereas men were more often sold to European traders. During the early transatlantic trade, the West African coast was the principal supply area, i.e. between the Senegal and Niger rivers from where more than four-fifths of the early slave population in Mexico and Peru originated (Curtin 1991, 12–19, 100–101). When French and Dutch traders sought to make a fortune in slave trading and demand for slaves rose, the Portuguese expanded their activities into the bights of Benin and Biafra and further south into Angola. In the 19th century, the Oyo Empire became a major supply zone of slaves when its breakdown resulted in a prolonged period of civil war (Law 1977). The extent of the regions integrated into the system of the transatlantic slave trade should make it clear that “Africans” is a misnomer for designating the slaves' regional or ethnic identities. There did not exist anything close to a continental consciousness of belonging. The enslaved came from multiple societies and had varied cultural and social backgrounds. Europeans ascribed regional origins to the port where the slaves had been taken aboard. But these ascriptions did not represent ethnic identities (→ Ethnicity, I/25) (Thornton 1992).

While the supply of slaves in Africa depended on the political and social situations in West Africa (Klein 1999, 162–163), two main factors in America explain the importation of African slaves and its variation over time. The demand for African slaves was determined by first, the integration of the local and regional economies into the international market (→ Colonial Economies, I/4), and second, the availability of indigenous labor. The centers of slave presence were those with an extended plantation economy producing to supply international markets, but with an insufficient supply of indigenous labor. Brazil became a main sugar-producing colony from the late 1500s and remained so until the end of the colonial era. On Brazilian shores, 4.86 million Africans disembarked. Most of them worked on sugar plantations in the northeast. During the 19th century, the economic focus shifted from sugar production in the northeast to coffee growing in the southeast, and more slaves were also taken there. In the second half of the 18th century, the Caribbean, i.e. Santo Domingo, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, became a major supplier for the world market of sugar. About 1.07 million slaves

arrived in the Spanish circum-Caribbean, about 1.1 million slaves disembarked in the French Caribbean, and the British Caribbean islands received 1.3 million Africans in the whole era of transatlantic slave trade. In some regions in Brazil and the Caribbean, the population was mainly of African ancestry, comprising 75–90 percent of all inhabitants. Finally, the North American mainland, especially the Chesapeake, the Carolinas, and Georgia, received almost 390,000 slaves. Plantations producing tobacco, cotton, rice, and other products became important in the southern colonies during the 18th century and peaked after independence. The plantation system differed from Brazil and the Caribbean with respect to size. While in the Caribbean often 200–300 slaves worked on one plantation, the properties on the northern mainland were usually much smaller. In 1850, only half of all plantations in the US counted 30 slaves or more. Importation numbers of African slaves could also be lower because mortality rates on the northern mainland were lower than in the Caribbean or Brazil. In addition, reproduction of the slave population was possible due to a more balanced proportion of men and women (Curtin 1991, 7) (→ Plantation Literature, III/15).

Although the plantation complex, especially the production of sugarcane, represents the quintessential image of slave societies in the Americas, slaves were important in almost all parts of the Spanish-American economy in the 16th and 17th centuries. Until 1650, Spain had imported between 250,000 and 300,000 Africans to Peru and New Spain and at the end of the 17th century, about 4,000 slaves a year disembarked onto one of the Spanish colonies. Spaniards could afford the importation of slaves because of precious metals, like silver, they exploited in their new colonies. Hence, slaves were brought in increasing numbers and they soon outnumbered European immigrants. Until 1640, the majority of Africans was brought to Peru, and in Lima particularly, the number of slaves quickly rose from 4,000 in 1586 to 20,000 in 1640, comprising 30,000 in the viceroyalty (Bowser 1974, 75). In the urban environment, slaves worked as domestics, artisans, in construction and transportation, or as petty traders. In addition, they played an important role in mining and commercial agriculture. Without their contribution, the colonial economy and thus the consolidation of the Spanish empire would hardly have been successful. The same holds true for New Spain, where, in the middle of the 16th century, slaves were already so numerous that the viceroy warned the king to stop further importation. In 1646, a census counted 35,089 Africans and 116,529 persons of African ancestry, not all, but most of them, being enslaved (Aguirre Beltrán 1972, 219). Even though some slaves worked in commercial agriculture or mining, most of them were employed in the urban economy of Mexico City, where slaves already outnumbered Spaniards in 1570 and represented more than double the number of Spaniards in 1646 (Bennett 2003, 22).

In these urban settings, cultural entanglements had different patterns than in plantation societies with their strict division of a social sphere for slaves and another for colonists of European descent. While the Africans and their offspring on plantations quickly began to develop new cultural patterns by mixing different African influences, the smaller and more dispersed urban population of African descent came into closer contact with Europeans and indigenous populations (→ Interethnic Relations, I/12; → Hybridity, I/30).

Migration after independence

Forced migrations in the 19th century

In the United States especially, forced migration of Native Americans became an important feature of the era after independence. The newly won economic freedom was also taken as freedom to convert Native American land west of the Appalachians into the private

property of white owners. Westward expansion was violent and legitimized by an ideological dehumanization of Native Americans (→ Foundational Discourses, III/8). Various strategies of the government and white settlers brought about the dispossession of Native Americans and their removal into regions, often restricted areas called reservations, which they were not familiar with and where they had to change their way of life, often living in poverty.

Notwithstanding the increasing initiatives to end the slave trade, slavery and the slave trade did not end with independence due to the reemerging importance of Brazil, Cuba, and the US as centers of slave-based commodity production (Tomich 2004, 56–71). Between 15 and 20 percent of all Africans transported to the Americas arrived in the 19th century. The main receiving areas were Brazil with one million and Cuba (a Spanish colony until 1898) with 600,000 slaves. However, as it became clear in the 1830s that the slave trade was ending soon, plantation owners began to search for other options and found one in so-called *coolies* from Asia. Until 1876, 124,000 Chinese men were taken as contract workers to Cuba, making up 3 percent of the total population. During the contract period of eight years, these workers were treated similarly to slaves. From 1848 to 1874, Peru also received an increased amount of Chinese workers of almost 90,000 people. Most of them were employed on the sugar and cotton plantations on the coast. Because of the harsh treatment of Chinese contract workers, the Chinese government outlawed the trade in 1874. Labor migration from Asia also became important in other Caribbean regions. Almost half a million Indian workers were transported mainly to the British Caribbean from 1839 to 1917, some also landing in the French and Dutch Caribbean and 33,000 indentured servants from Java were taken to Surinam (Emmer 1992, 250–251).

Free labor migration from Asia

Even though there had been some Chinese in the Americas during the colonial era, Asian immigration became numerically significant only in the 19th century. Chinese not only migrated as unfree coolies, but also on a voluntary basis. The construction of railroads in the USA and Canada from the mid-1860s onward mainly lay in the hands of Chinese workers. When the US Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, Chinese workers looked for other options. Free Chinese migration to Mexico started with the Exclusion Act, most of the migrants settling in northern Mexico, especially Sonora. Chinese looked for economic niches and were relatively successful in the service sector and retail trade. During the 1870s in Peru, some free Chinese migrants contributed to the penetration of the Amazon, cleared land, and introduced small-scale agriculture and manufacturing. But until the end of the 19th century, only a few free Chinese migrants who engaged in commerce came to Peru. Their presence and economic success over the long run reversed the gradual integration of Chinese workers who had come as indentured servants into the lower classes. They were now pulled into the networks of the migrant community (McKeown 2001, 140–141).

The Caribbean was not only receiving immigrants from Africa, Europe, and Asia, but it was also shaped by highly mobile populations. Slaves were taken from one island to another, sometimes by their similarly migrating owners. After abolition, the free descendants of slaves took advantage of their freedom of movement and circulated in the region. West Indians searched for work in cacao farming, gold mining, or rubber gathering in the circum-Caribbean. With the rise of banana production in Central America in the 19th century, many migrated to work on these plantations (Putnam 2011).

European immigration

During the 19th century, free labor migration from Europe to the Americas became a mass movement and constituted the largest intercontinental migration until that point. European migrants amounted to fifty-one million and became the largest immigrant group in most regions. While the expanding United States attracted 85 percent of all Europeans coming to the Americas from the 1820s onward, most of the Latin American independent nations lived through phases of political instability and economic downturn and therefore attracted fewer migrants. In the latter decades of the 19th century, more Europeans chose to migrate to Latin American countries, on the one hand for political and economic betterment and, on the other, because of a negative attitude toward immigrants in the United States.

Until the 1880s, migrants from northwestern European countries, e.g. Germany (five million people from 1820 to 1880), Ireland (four million people from 1820 to 1910), England (2.2 million people 1820–1900), and Scandinavia (1.4 million people 1820–1900), predominated in the United States. In the 1880s, migratory flows started to change, when migration from southern (especially Italy and Spain) and eastern Europe (mainly Jews) grew considerably. These migrants, as well as Irish Catholics, suffered from the negative effects of nativism which culminated in anti-immigration laws in the 1910s and 1920s. The motives of European migrants were diverse due to their different places of origin, but most of them sought economic betterment while some left their home country for political or religious reasons. For some groups – like Jews from East Europe especially Russia – discrimination and persecution were the most pressing reasons for migration. Even those who migrated for economic reasons did not make the decision on an individual basis, but rather as part of a family strategy for survival. Chain migration became a major pattern of European migration flows. That is, people followed their relatives or neighbors who had already migrated because they could obtain information on the receiving countries and, once migrated, could count on the help of those who had already settled there.

The westward expansion of the United States and the Homestead Act of 1862 attracted many European migrants who came in search of land (→ II/15). During the last decades of the 19th century, however, more immigrants stayed in cities and integrated into the growing industrial labor force, which in 1900 made up 60 percent of the total labor force. Ten years after the US Homestead Act, a comparable law came into being in Canada and contributed to the rise of 100,000 immigrants a year in the 1880s.

From the 1870s, European migration also increased in Latin America. The turn of the century was not a significant date with respect to immigration, which ended instead with the Great Depression (→ Crisis, II/4). Between eleven and thirteen million Europeans chose a Latin American country as a destination. Argentina and Brazil received the largest amount of immigrants, with almost five million and four million people, respectively, followed by Uruguay and Cuba with 600,000 immigrants each and Chile with 200,000 Europeans. These numbers do not include so-called *golondrinas* – mainly Italians who went back and forth across the ocean for seasonal work in Argentina (Sánchez-Albornoz 1994, 133). Almost half the immigrants to Argentina came from Italy (47.5 percent), followed by Spaniards (32.5 percent). In Brazil, Italians also dominated immigration, with the second largest group coming from Portugal and Spaniards being the third largest group.

Latin American governments supported European immigration in several ways, often because of racist ideas centered on a necessary “whitening” of the population

(→ Whiteness, II/46). The Argentine Constitution of 1853 gave the federal government a mandate to promote immigration. Some provinces provided between 30 and 40 acres of land in addition to tools, animals, and seeds. Buenos Aires and São Paulo maintained immigration stations where new arrivals were provided with food, medical attention, and employment information. Passages were also paid for by government agents. But most of the immigrants came without such help. Most regions that attracted many European migrants had been peripheral during the colonial era and had a relatively low population of Amerindian and/or African ancestry. European migrants preferred regions without slaves out of fear of bad treatment in such areas. Therefore, southern Brazil attracted many Europeans, whereas northeastern Brazil did not. In addition, technological changes in transportation turned international trade in wheat and meat into attractive business options in the Southern Cone. The large demand for labor brought Europeans to the countryside, as well as into the cities, where they soon dominated the industrial labor force (Moya 2006).

Final remarks

Modern American societies were constructed to a great extent by multiple migrations within the Americas, across the Atlantic, and, to a lesser extent, across the Pacific. From the very beginning of colonization, migration movements shaped the patterns of social organization in the Americas. This holds true for all parts of the population. Conquest, colonization, and economic exploitation altered the forms of physical mobility of Amerindians and transatlantic population shifts changed the component elements of society. Until the 19th century, the status of immigrants was predominantly unfree and most of the coerced migrants originated in Africa. During the entire colonial era, three out of four migrants to the Americas were African slaves. Thus, only Europeans could conceive of America as the land of freedom (→ I/27). At the beginning of the colonial era, when many Europeans came as indentured servants to British and French America, this was especially true of migrants from Spain and Portugal.

Migrations from Europe and Africa to the Americas contributed in the making of the Atlantic World (→ Atlantic, I/3). The various population shifts were tied to each other in one way or another. Coerced African migration and slavery contributed to higher incomes in the Americas, as well as stronger commercial ties with Europe. In the long run, the economic connections and the evolving international labor market made voluntary mass migration from Europe to the Americas more likely (Eltis 2002, 11). Coerced and unfree migrations from Africa and Asia were also interconnected because the latter were intended to replace the former. Furthermore, migrants from different parts of the world maintained contacts with compatriots who had moved to different destinations, thus contributing to diaspora communities.

The multiple migration movements and the interaction of the different populations shaped the cultural and social patterns in American societies. Transculturation (Ortiz 1973) became an important feature of all societies (→ Hybridity, I/30). Old social and ethnic boundaries were destroyed and new ones erected (Schwartz and Salomon 1999) resulting in processes of ethnogenesis (→ Interethnic Relations, I/12). These were more obvious in Spanish America due to the smaller numbers of predominantly male European settlers and the form of colonization. Nevertheless, processes of transculturation and ethnogenesis also took place in Anglo America, even though they were neglected in the self-perception of European immigrants and their descendants.

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NATION AND STATE BUILDING

Stefan Rinke and Mirko Petersen

Nation and state building are terms which are not only of historical importance. They also constitute an important part of current discussions, especially when it comes to political, social, and economic developments in regions where the European idea of the nation-state (developed since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648) has never been fully established or where existent political structures have been destroyed by warfare.

Besides some exceptions, the Americas are usually considered a zone of stable statehood (→ Nation State, II/38). Indeed, the double continent does not find itself in the middle of recent nation- and state-building processes (although it is, in general, nearly impossible to determine a starting and an end point for these processes (Osterhammel 2010, 585–586). Instead, the problems attached to the way nations – in the sense of “imagined communities” (Anderson 2006) – and states were created in this part of the world in the late 18th and throughout the 19th century remain of crucial importance until today.

In this entry, three dimensions of nation and state building (which are often intertwined) will be discussed: geopolitical changes (→ Geopolitics, II/34), political participation (→ II/41), and economic development (→ II/6). The focus will concentrate on comparisons between the different processes of nation and state building in the Americas, as well as on transatlantic and inter-American entanglements within these processes.

Geopolitical changes

Since the second half of the 18th century, fundamental changes have taken place in the Americas. To understand these changes, several developments in the European empires must be taken into account which have had strong repercussions in the Americas (Rinke and Stüwe 2008, 14–15). At that time, Spain wanted to reinforce its grip on its overseas territories. Officially, these territories had enjoyed the same status as the “motherland.” However, this changed and they were officially transformed into colonies. This change coincided with political, economic, and military reforms which enforced a centralization of power in Spain and a stronger orientation toward the crown. Yet instead of gaining more control, the Spanish crown’s decision caused strong protests. Creole elites feared a loss of power and spoke out against the reforms.

At about the same time, England had also decided to reform its concept of colonial rule (→ I/5) to increase political and economic control. In the new legislation of the 1760s, the

English parliament had even claimed exclusive control over the colonies. London considered this necessary because of the rising economic importance of the colonies (→ Colonial Economies, I/4) and an increasing amount of rebellions in these territories, especially in North America and the Caribbean. Like in the case of the Spanish colonies, the English reforms caused contestations by the colonists and are recognized as an important reason for the American Revolution of 1776 (→ Independence Movements, I/10; Revolution, II/44).

Meanwhile in Spanish America, the Crown's problems caused by the reforms were compounded by other factors which eventually led to wars of independence. In addition to the discontent among the creoles, an additional factor was the occupation of Spain by France in 1808, consequently disrupting the political influence of Spain in its colonies. Spain and France had considered the American Revolution an opportunity to contain the rising English influence in the Americas and supported the revolutionaries. However, despite the loss of what became the United States of America, England was able to strengthen its economic position in the Americas and worldwide, while Spain became unable to control or protect its colonies anymore. Additionally, the United States, initially supported by Spain, in the long run became an even more dangerous rival for the Iberian kingdom than its European adversaries.

While the wars of independence built the foundation for the construction of republics in Spanish America, the development in the Portuguese colony of Brazil was different. In 1822, the prince regent of Portugal, Dom Pedro I declared himself the emperor of the newly independent Brazil which remained a stable monarchy until 1889. Brazil and the Dominion of Canada (part of the British Empire) in the North were the two nonrevolutionary political entities in the Americas in these times of unprecedented change (Rinke 2011).

Unlike in the case of the United States, the independence movements of the continent's southern part did not lead to the formation of a larger political entity (except for Brazil). In the South, strong regional dynamics caused Argentina, Bolivia, and Paraguay to become separate states. Later, in 1828, Uruguay also became an independent state. In 1830/1831, Gran Colombia disintegrated, and Colombia (first called New Granada), Ecuador, and Venezuela were founded. The United States of Central America declared themselves independent from Mexico in 1824, but then was quickly disintegrated in 1839. Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua were named as the newly founded independent states on this territory.

Transregional cooperation in Latin America usually lasted as long as an outer threat existed. When the bastions of royalism were defeated, the common base for cooperation disappeared. Distinct economic interests, political and administrative structures, and ethnic compositions (→ Ethnicity, I/25) rather promoted regional loyalties (Buisson 1969). Small-scale border wars were a typical symptom of disintegration in Iberian America and demarcations often remained contested.

Although large-scale warfare was the exception in Iberian America, two major events changed the region in the second half of the 19th century. The first one was the War of the Triple Alliance from 1864 until 1870. Paraguay, one of the leading powers in the region at that time, declared war against Brazil because of the latter's regime change policy in Uruguay (the Uruguayan government was an important ally of the Paraguayan one). Later, Argentina and, after a successful regime change, Uruguay joined forces with Brazil and literally destroyed Paraguay in a devastating war. Paraguay lost about half of its population and incurred heavy structural and financial losses. After the dust settled, Brazil was not only the victor, but had also gained significantly more power in the entire region. The second large-scale war was the so-called Pacific War from 1879 until 1883. Chile was able to win

this war against Peru and Bolivia and to annex the Peruvian region Arica and the Bolivian department of Litoral (the loss of this department cut Bolivia off from the sea). The conflict is also known as the “Saltpeter war” because the access to this important strategic raw material was at stake. For a long time, Saltpeter was the most important Chilean export good.

Even after the disintegration into smaller units, nation and state building in Latin America remained difficult throughout the 19th century (for the case of Mexico, see Escalante Gonzalbo 1992). The wars of independence were not only wars against an outer enemy, but also a fight for power within the new postcolonial order (Lynch 1992, 35–83). The dividing line was often to be found between centralists and federalists. The support of each of these positions was usually driven by economic interests, with conflicts being especially visible in the La Plata region and in Gran Colombia. Rural caudillos, who used regional antagonisms for their political and economic goals, played a vital role in this constellation and caudillos were often charismatic landowners or cattle breeders who aimed at political power (→ Clientelism, II/29). Men like Juan Manuel de Rosas in Argentina or José Antonio Páez in Venezuela were even able to take power on the national level. There was a tendency toward a ruralization of power: urban elites lost influence because they did not possess the same military capacities as the caudillos (Lynch 1992, 205–216) (→ Military, II/37). Only in the 1860s and 1870s was a series of Latin American states able to consolidate further (for the case of Argentina, see Halperín Donghi 1992). The three decades from 1880 until 1910, when the Mexican Revolution took place, constituted the peak of relative political stability in Latin America (Osterhammel 2010, 768). However, this does not mean that violence was absent in this historical phase. On the contrary, the mass murdering of indigenous peoples (→ I/11), like in Northern Argentina (the so-called Conquest of the Desert), constituted an integral part of the nation- and state-building processes at that time.

In contrast to Latin America, North American settlers were able to form a larger political entity which expanded dramatically in the 19th century. In the first years after the Revolution, this was far from obvious. However, by the late 19th century, the United States had become a political and economic giant. Yet, the first century of its existence was marked by strong regional antagonisms and even witnessed a bloody civil war. A contentious issue, from the beginning until today, has always been the role of the central government which has been opposed by several societal groups. It was the constitution, finally ratified between 1787 and 1791, which was able to milden the tensions, and which also laid the foundation for the transformation from a loose confederation of states to the establishment of a more centralized power. Nonetheless, secessionist tendencies remained. In 1814, the region of New England threatened to leave the Union because of a war against England. Later, in 1860/1861, the Southern states left the union because of the abolition of slavery (→ I/18). The two different models, the slave-based society on the one hand, and the free labor capitalism on the other (→ Capitalism, II/2), were believed to be too different to coexist within one state. After the hard-fought victory of the North, the South had to be reintegrated into the state. This phase, between 1867 and 1877, was called “Reconstruction.” Remarkably, and this is a sign of its stability, the constitution had not been changed during this entire process (Waldmann 2001, 70–71). In the end, the United States was not only able to prevent secession, but to triple the size of its original territory. In 1803, during the presidency of Thomas Jefferson, the U.S. government bought Louisiana from France and began its westward expansion. From there on, the frontier continuously moved westward, driving the indigenous peoples out of their areas of settlement. In the East, the last piece of land missing was Florida, for which the United States used the Spanish weakness during the Napoleonic occupation to annex Western Florida in 1810. Later, in 1819, the U.S. also bought Eastern Florida from Spain.

With regard to the Spanish American wars of independence, the United States initially remained neutral as the acquisition of Florida was more important. Washington's neutral position made the obliging position of Spain regarding Florida possible. Once the deal was made, the U.S. changed their attitude and started to recognize the new regimes in the southern part of the continent. In the famous Monroe Doctrine of 1823, U.S. President James Monroe announced a new vision for the political future of the Americas and declared that a continent that was "free and independent" was "not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers..." and that any bid to invade "any portion of this hemisphere [should be considered] dangerous" (Holden and Zolov 2000, 12–13).

Despite this construction of a common republican identity and of this clear stance against European colonialism, the U.S. could not be considered an ally or supporter of the newly independent states in the South. John Quincy Adams, U.S. Secretary of State under Monroe and his successor as the president, made especially clear that there could not be an alliance based on principles or interest between North and South (Langley 1989, 41). Theories about the inferiority of Latinos and Latinas were widespread in the U.S. (→ *Latinidad*, I/33): they were regarded as uncivilized and dulled by Catholicism (→ *Religious Beliefs*, I/40). More importantly, the announcement of solidarity in the Monroe Doctrine remained an empty promise. As mentioned earlier, the newly founded states in Latin America were having tremendous problems to consolidate and thus European powers used this weakness for new colonializations: England in Central America and the Falkland Islands, Spain in the Dominican Republic, and France in Mexico. Ultimately, the Monroe Doctrine did not constitute an effective defense against this new wave of colonializations (Rinke 2015, 67–69) (→ *Conquest and Colonization*, I/7).

New ideas for the future of the Americas were not only developed in the United States. Intellectual elites in the southern nations considered the ideas of the Anglo-American revolutionaries an important inspiration for their political goals (Rinke 2001). The idea of a Pan-American unity had already been present in prerevolutionary Iberian America and was also repeatedly mentioned as an ideal during the wars of independence. The most prominent advocate of Pan-Americanism (→ II/40) was one of the most decisive figures in the wars of independence, Simon Bolívar, who even organized a Pan-American conference in Panama in 1826. The conference did not achieve as much as Bolívar intended, but a treaty of friendship was signed at the conference, although later only ratified by Colombia. Concrete projects like the creation of a Pan-American army could not be realized and in 1829, Bolívar dismissed the idea of integrating the United States into a Pan-American association and became much more pessimistic about the relations between North and South toward the end of his life.

His pessimism was not without warrant as a clear break in the relations between the United States and Latin America was the war between the United States and Mexico, which broke out in 1846. This was the only formal war between the U.S. and a Latin American country in history. First, the U.S. offered to buy Texas from Mexico. When the Mexican government declined the offer, U.S. troops entered Mexican territory. After the United States won the war, a peace treaty was signed with the result of the United States gaining what today are the states of California, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Arizona as well as parts of Wyoming and Colorado. This was a clear win for the United States in the race for influence with England. In relation to Latin America, Washington now appeared as a potentially dangerous imperial power (→ *Interventionism*, II/36). At the end of the 19th century, when the U.S. finally pushed Spain out of the Americas (in the war on Cuba), the imperial ambitions of the United States became more obvious. This tendency deepened in the context of the construction of the Panama Canal which was finished in 1914.

In due course, concrete manifestations of cooperation between Latin American states could be observed when they faced a threat from outside. Inspired by the French idea of *latinité*, political elites established the very name “Latin America” in the middle of the 19th century to form a loose bond against the expansion of U.S. influence toward the South (Gobat 2013) (→ America, I/2), as well as against European attacks, for example, in support of Peru in its war against Spain from 1864 until 1866.

Political participation

As mentioned earlier, the reasons for the contestation of colonial rule were quite similar in many parts of the Americas, but there were also significant differences in the situation prior to the revolutions of independence. In North America, decentralized political structures existed which included elections, where even parts of the lower white societal classes were able to participate in politics (→ Participation, II/41; Whiteness, I/46). This led to the formation of a political culture which, at least temporally, strengthened social ties (also between different classes) and built the base for the contestation of colonial rule (→ I/5).

In colonial Iberian America, political power was much more centrally organized and more authoritarian (→ Authoritarianism, II/25). Experiences of political participation by broader masses were rare. When uprisings of racially stigmatized indigenous groups took place, like the one under the guidance of Túpac Amaru in the Andean region in 1780/1781, the creole elites took sides against them and therefore made the formation of a broad anticolonial movement impossible (→ Interethnic Relations, I/12). These differences were reflected in the revolutions which led to independence: the American Revolution of 1776 was carried by a coalition of the upper and middle class while the independence of Spanish America resulted from military battles between 1810 and 1826 which secured the military (→ II/37) an extraordinary role within the newly founded political entities and its constitutions.

The constitutions of the new independent states were an important part of nation and state building because they had a strong impact on the establishment of new political practices. Distinct ideas were visible in the constitutions of the United States and Latin America (Waldmann 2001). The U.S. constitutions were dominated by a critical conception of man as well as a balancing between individual and group interests. Furthermore, the constitution was designed as an untouchable guaranty for the rights of citizens (→ Citizenship, II/27; Human Rights, II/35). The Latin American constitutions were contrastingly inspired by an idealist conception of man and were supposed to educate people as well as contribute to the development of society (→ Education, I/24). It was more a means to an end and not untouchable, which made the Latin American constitutions more vulnerable to misuse by militaries and oligarchs who appropriated republican language for their own interests. The vulnerability of Latin American constitutions can be exemplified by the permanent changes to constitutions: in the 19th century alone, 115 constitutions were introduced in eighteen states (Rinke and Stüwe 2008, 21).

Among the Latin American constitutions, we can distinguish between three different types: radical, conservative, and liberal (Gargarella 2005). The radical ones, e.g. in the Banda Oriental, highlighted the will of the majority and strengthened the legislature. The conservative ones, e.g. in Chile, favored a strong executive authority and pleaded for binding social norms. The numerous liberal constitutions stressed the importance of balancing between legislature and executive authority and trusted in individual initiatives. Despite temporal appearances of dictatorships and the maintenance of monarchy in Brazil, by 1830, the Americas

constituted the only part of the world where the principle of popular sovereignty dominated (Sabato 2001, 1291).

Nonetheless, political participation was not possible for all societal groups: women were not allowed to intervene in politics (→ Gender, I/9), and indigenous as well as black people were in many cases excluded from the nation- and state-building processes altogether (→ Indigeneity, I/31). Crucial for the understanding of the exclusion of black and indigenous people is the slave revolution (inspired by the French Revolution) which took place in the French colony of Saint Domingue in 1791. This different and more radical type of revolution starkly contrasted to the revolutions in Anglo- or Iberian America. In 1804, the slave revolutionaries were able to defeat the colonial power and the independent state of Haiti was founded (→ Revolution, II/44). Haiti constituted an example of exactly how creoles and colonists (Thomas Jefferson himself was a slave keeper) did not want their independent states to look: they feared a different kind of revolution which stood for ethnic equality (→ Interethnic Relations, I/12).

Initiated by this revolution in Haiti, the abolition of slavery (→ I/18) was an important result of political developments in the Americas in the 19th century. Later, in reaction to British pressure, slave trade was formally abolished in almost all Latin American states during the 1820s. Because of the introduction of certain legal exceptions (for example, regarding age), the end of slavery was delayed in some states until the 1850s (in Paraguay until 1869). After the end of the Civil War in 1865, slavery was done away with in the United States. The Spanish colonies Puerto Rico (in 1873) and Cuba (in 1886) also followed this trend and in 1888, Brazil was the last American state to abolish slavery.

Nonetheless, the rapidly developing public sphere in the Americas remained ethnically exclusive (→ Civil Society, II/28). In Latin America, as the sociologist Anibal Quijano points out, “the small white minority in control of the independent states and the colonial societies could have had neither consciousness nor national interests in common with the American Indians, blacks, and mestizos,” because the privileges and the dominance of the former were founded on the exploitation of the latter (2000, 565–566) (→ Class Struggle, II/3). The creole elites created new national discourses, which had much in common with European ones regarding language, culture, and religion (→ Foundational Discourses, III/8). Indigenous people were considered irrational and politically immature by these elites (Forment 2003, 285) (→ Indigeneity, I/31). They were also kept away from elections by making literacy a precondition for voting and by introducing census suffrage (Sabato 2001, 1297) (→ Democracy, II/32). If attempts of integration into the new national communities took place, it only served the purpose of homogenization. This led to a widespread mistrust of indigenous people toward the state.

Although black and indigenous people were also strictly excluded from political participation, we cannot speak of the same kind of colonial relations in the United States (Quijano 2000, 560–561). Here, the new nation-state was much more representative for a greater part of society, that is to say the white majority. The millions of European immigrants who came to the United States in the second half of the 19th century could also be integrated into this community (→ Migration, I/15). The possibility of political participation for these people built the foundation for a strong national identification. Nonetheless, it is true for all parts of the Americas that the legacy of colonialism and the way new nations and independent states were created weigh heavy on societal relations until today: “[E]ven when formal colonial status would end, coloniality would not. It continues in the form of a socio-cultural hierarchy of European and non-European” (Quijano and Wallerstein 1992, 550).

Economic development

The nation- and state-building processes in the Americas were also strongly influenced by the economic development (→ II/6) in this part of the world and vice versa. In Latin America, the weakness and instability of the newly founded states were reasons for the unsatisfying economic progress in the region in the first phase after independence. Under these circumstances, Latin America became increasingly dependent on England and, later, the United States. Unequal trade relations and debt crises became chronic problems of the region (→ Crisis, II/4). Latin American states were not able to form their own branches of production and to create strong internal markets, thus remaining in the position of raw material exporters for the centers of global capitalism (→ Extractivism, II/9). The integration into the global economy therefore had certain similarities with colonial trade relations (→ Colonial Economies, I/4).

Free trade appeared as one of the great promises for a prosperous future of independent Latin America. The Spanish restrictions on trade were considered the main obstacle for positive economic development. Yet, this optimism proved to be unjustified. Despite the relatively favorable terms of trade at that time, the Latin American export sector expanded very little. Instead of the economic growth Latin Americans had hoped for, the macroeconomic figures were worse in 1850 than in 1800. The case of Mexico is an especially striking example as it was one of the best developing areas in the Spanish colonial empire during the 18th century, but the state descended into economic chaos after independence (Rector 1985, 295). In economic terms, the phase between 1820 and 1870 can be called the “lost decades” (Bates, Coatsworth, and Williamson 2007) for Latin America, although regional differences must be considered. The economic orientation also became a source of several inner-state conflicts, for example, between supporters of free trade and protectionists, or between centers and peripheries.

One of the main problems with regard to economic development for the independent Latin American states was the lack of capital. This was a direct consequence of the wars of independence. The withdrawal of the Spaniards and royalists coincided with a withdrawal of their capital and know-how (Rizo Patrón Boylan 2001) creating opportunity for England to become the main economic profiteer of Latin American independence. While Spain and Portugal, with their anachronistic monopolistic claims, rapidly lost influence, England achieved direct and unlimited access to Latin American markets, and from 1817 even in the Spanish colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico.

The foundation of Latin American foreign trade after independence was friendship, trade, and shipping contracts signed with the European powers and the United States based on most-favored-nation treatment. In reality, only the European and U.S. contracting partners profited. For the Latin American parties of the contracts, restrictions on open ports and free trade limited possibilities of well-directed promotion of the respective national economy. In addition, the most-favored-nation treatment also prevented agreements between neighboring Latin American countries and thereby some form of regional economic integration (→ Regional Integration, II/18). So, while on the one hand the contracts constituted a base for the recognition of Latin American independent states, they on the other hand produced new forms of economic dependence. Free trade was a clear obstacle for Latin American proto-industrialization. It meant the end for almost every producer who had to compete with the imported products. Only regions like Buenos Aires, which were integrated into transatlantic economic cycles, were (at least temporally) able to profit from free trade (Prados de la Escosura 2009, 287–290, 297).

Without solving any structural problems, the increasing integration of Latin America into the world market by a new generation of liberal reformers brought about more economic growth from the second half of the 19th century. Argentina was especially able to increase its wealth because of its trade with England and other European countries (Escudé 1996, 39–52). Argentine agricultural products were sold, and European industrial goods imported. A rich class of oligarchs profited from these relations and controlled Argentine politics. The weakness of the Argentine model, which brought about its greatest successes between 1880 and 1930, was the extreme dependence on Europe. When the European economies crashed in the crises of 1929 and later when European powers lost most of their influence in Latin America by the middle of the 20th century, Argentina experienced an extreme economic descent.

In contrast to Latin America, the political stability and legal security in the United States allowed early advances in the fields of capital accumulation and industrialization (→ Capitalism, II/2). Based on prerevolutionary structures of landed property, trade, and shipping, relative economic autonomy was possible, and a new class of entrepreneurs came into existence. In the first half of the 19th century, the U.S. had been growing constantly, “by the 1850s had begun the takeoff toward sustained economic growth and industrialization,” but only in the time after the so-called Reconstruction, did economic development reach “a truly stunning pace” (Zakaria 1999, 45). By 1895, the U.S. had surpassed Great Britain in terms of manufacturing output and the years between 1870 and 1900 became known as the Gilded Age.

Before that, the appropriation of an enormous amount of fertile land (→ II/15) during the westward expansion had paved the way for the spectacular economic rise of the United States. The success story of the North American frontier was at the same time the story of the continuous and irreversible loss of land for the indigenous peoples that were driven out of their territories (Osterhammel 2010, 500). The victory of the U.S. Army in the Apache Wars in the Southwestern United States in 1886 indicated the end of almost three centuries of hostilities. During the westward expansion, land was mainly distributed in middling and small pieces among white colonists. This model was different from the one in South America, especially in Argentina. While land was taken from indigenous peoples in both places, the redistribution of land (→ II/15) among the white population was far less equal in Argentina than in the U.S. The extreme concentration of land possession in Argentina formed the basis of an oligarchically controlled state and society (Quijano 2000, 563) (→ Social Inequality, II/20).

For a long time, foreign trade could not keep pace with the U.S. economic growth in general. The conquest of Latin American markets appeared as a solution for this problem in the second half of the 19th century. First, there were rather venturesome individuals like Henry Meiggs, William R. Grace, or Minor Keith who invested in Peru, Chile, and Costa Rica. Some of these people were able to build their own trade empires. Keith, for example, became the world biggest producer of bananas and in 1899 founded the infamous United Fruit Company. Later, the U.S. systematically promoted the expansion of trade with Latin America.

Concluding remarks

The different dimensions of the nation- and state-building processes in the Americas were absolutely crucial for the history of the double continent in the late 18th and the 19th centuries. When North and South are compared today, usually a certain form of distinction is made. The historian Jeremy Adelman describes this distinction as the one where Latin America

seems doomed to constant “[t]roubled politics, boom-and-bust economics” and “a healthy passion for personal loyalties over impersonal identities” as well as “[remaining] anchored to social relations, modes of behavior, and cultures of an earlier era.” Whereas the U.S. is “a country born ‘free’” and “adapted to future horizons” and has “made perpetual ruptures in the hallmark of its history” (1999, 1).

This way of comparing Latin America to the United States (and sometimes Canada) is problematic in several ways, especially when it comes to the analysis of nation and state building. On the one hand, it is very important to outline the existing (geo-)political and economic differences between North and South in the past and present (→ Geopolitics, II/34). On the other hand, we should be aware of “some teleological traps” (Adelman 1999, 12) when explaining these differences. Looking for transhistorical truisms in order to distinguish North from South prevents us from historical analysis. Furthermore, it is important to not consider the North and South as fixed units. Differentiations between different states, nations, and/or regions must be made to detect the many variations of difference as well as similarity. Finally, it must be stressed that nation and state building in the Americas did not take place in isolated environments, thus underlining the importance of shared histories of different spaces and places and the entanglements between them.

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RELIGION AND MISSIONIZING

Claude Gélinas

At the dawn of the 16th century and in the wake of the Protestant Reformation, Western Europeans had begun to conceptualize religion not only as a plural reality but as a distinct and independent sphere of their social life. In the Americas, indigenous peoples rather conceived the sacred as transcending all relationships with the natural environment (→ Nature, II/39) and among individuals so that proximity with the supernatural was underlying every daily action. And where Christians prayed to a single God located at a distance from the terrestrial world, indigenous peoples (→ I/11) lived among a large number of deities or spirits with whom constant and adequate interactions were necessary to ensure a suitable existence. The term “cosmology,” rather than “religion” probably better translates this ontological reality where spirits, nature, and humans lived in such coextensive relations. Confronted with this, newcomers in the Americas sought to identify and categorize what appeared to relate to the realm of religion among indigenous peoples, if only to allow missionaries to target what pagan beliefs and practices they came to eradicate. Meanwhile, indigenous populations were taken to set themselves with a categorized “religion” to be contrasted with that of the Europeans, whether for purpose of identity affirmation toward their Christian counterpart, or as a specific field of resistance against assimilation. Along with the fact that Christians were convinced of their cultural superiority, their worldwide jurisdiction – illustrated through the 1493 Papal Bull *Inter Cetera* which granted Spain all lands west and south of a meridian hundred leagues west and south of the Azores and Cape Verde – and their divinely guided mission to spread Christianity and civilization eventually known as the Doctrine of Discovery (→ Foundational Discourses, III/8) (Jeffers 2013; Miller 2015) were important elements of the ideological context in which evangelization in the Americas took place.

Missionizing in the New World has long been represented through a simple dichotomy between Western Christian vectors on the one hand and indigenous pagan receptors on the other. However, a now large and fast growing body of studies suggests a more complex reality. Not only did missionizing take several forms throughout the Americas according to geographical and political settings, but missionaries themselves often came to question their goals and actions while mediating between colonial authorities and native populations. Some even experienced forms of acculturation in their methods of evangelization or became advocates for the protection and survival of local cultures. As for indigenous populations, they hosted the missionaries and welcomed their doctrine in different ways,

displaying various forms of religious engagement including individuals acting as vectors of the Christian faith. Thus, by defining missionizing as only taking into account European initiatives to spread Christianity and eradicate indigenous belief systems has become too restrictive. It seems more accurate to envision missionizing in the Americas as a larger dynamic process of transmission and diffusion of Christian beliefs and practices among individuals and populations within and well beyond cultural boundaries. This seems especially relevant considering the diversity of actors, strategies, and results associated with such an endeavor, as will be seen here. With this in mind, the following portrait will be restricted to missionizing as it relates to Christianity among indigenous peoples in the New World, regardless attempts directed toward other individuals of European origin or African slaves brought to America (→ Slavery, I/18), among whom a significant number were Muslims. Nor does it relate to the movements among native populations to promote or revive traditional beliefs and practices which might also be considered as a form of indigenous missionizing.

Missionizing and colonization

Missionizing in the Americas has long been studied for the purpose of documenting both the main institutions of Christianity, which includes the Churches and religious orders and the conversion strategies they used, as well as their effectiveness upon indigenous populations. While a hagiographic perspective prevailed initially, recently a more critical point of view has stressed the importance of looking at the motivations of the stakeholders, primarily the missionaries and the indigenous peoples. From the outset, the former are now fully recognized as part of the colonial enterprise (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7). Without completely linking their fate to it, missionaries logistically and morally supported the implementation among indigenous peoples of the social, cultural, and religious changes considered by the political authorities, at least to a certain extent (→ Colonial Rule, I/5) (Prudhomme 2004, 95–130). Indeed, sometimes missionizing came into conflict with the interests of other colonial actors such as fur traders, landowners, soldiers, or colonial officers. For instance, indigenous hunters could no longer supply furs if they were to settle in Christian missions, while strong measures to eradicate traditional beliefs and practices could prove detrimental to relations with politically and militarily native allies. Effective support for the colonial enterprise was also tributary of the indigenous social realities. Among nomadic populations as in the Canadian Subarctic, efforts to consolidate colonial control and convert local populations rested on the shoulders of a few itinerant missionaries who tried, to the extent of their means, to educate small groups of families otherwise in a favorable position to preserve their political and cultural autonomies. Elsewhere, as in California or Latin America where indigenous populations were more numerous, missionizing took a more institutionalized and influential form. Permanent establishments were created to settle native families and redirect their lifestyle according to colonial economic and political imperatives, and to transform their belief system to render it compatible with the moral and behavioral ideals of the colonizers.

By themselves, Churches and religious orders did not share the same approaches and methods to spread Christianity, nor did they look for the same results in terms of conversion (Bowden 1985). Protestants in the American colonies were not interested in implementing unique centralized doctrinal and administrative churches, favoring a more personal experience with God and, thus, being less interested in mass conversions. From the French perspective, large-scale adoption of the Catholic faith in the Americas was a requisite in order to place entire native populations under the hierarchal authority of the Church and

ultimately the King, while in the Spanish Empire, conversion of the local natives was considered a pillar of the colonial project as missions were given not only a religious role, but a political and economic one as well. Religious orders, among which Dominicans, Franciscans, Jesuits, and Augustinians were especially instrumental in the early propagation of Christianity, also showed marked differences in their organization and actions. Catholic orders like the Franciscans in California or the Jesuits in New France and South America resorted to centralized institutions like the missions or *reducciones* and usually showed more assimilationist ambitions. They intended to change the way of life and the belief system of indigenous peoples for them to progress from savagery to civilization, by force or violence if necessary and to the point of where some missions took the form of genuine labor camps (→ Unfree Labor, I/19) (Jackson and Castillo 1995, 50). Dominicans were more cautious than others regarding the effectiveness of conversion, thus being less inclined toward mass baptisms. Variability in approaches also occurred within the orders themselves following the convictions of each missionary, where some were more doctrinaire or romantic, idealistic or pragmatic (Servais 2005).

However, diffusion and promotion of Christianity in the Americas were not exclusive to European missionaries. Besides the colonial and religious authorities that supported evangelization, spreading Christianity was also at heart to devout and secular individuals, whether they were conquistadors, *encomenderos*, or ordinary civilians. Such individuals in search of a personal salvation or a religious justification for their involvement in the colonial context helped propagate the doctrine by their own actions or by financially supporting those of the churches and missionaries (Maldavsky 2012). Also, scholars are slowly taking the task of measuring the influence indigenous peoples themselves exerted on the diffusion of Christianity and evangelization (Andrews 2013). From the Arctic to South America, native individuals introduced to Christianity outside of their community educated their peers and facilitated the task of the first missionaries that would later come. Elsewhere, local indigenous leaders engaged in Christianity used their influence to gain new adepts, thus assisting the missionaries and enabling the process of evangelization to circumvent several linguistic and cultural barriers (Roulet 2008, 215–224). But the influence of these indigenous carriers, like that of Western missionaries, remained subject to the nature of the more global relation their communities experienced with the colonial society. Thus, missionizing in the Americas can no longer be perceived solely as a European effort to convert native populations of the New World to the Christian faith. Rather, it was a complex movement of propagation of Christianity across the Americas, supported by a wide range of actors, both of Western and indigenous origins, clerical and lay. And because of this multiplicity of actors, local colonial contexts, and specific interests at stake, many forms of Christianity, whether European, colonial, or indigenous, came to develop, circulate, and interact throughout the continent. And such an inherent complexity was also fostered by the actual strategies used to diffuse and promote the faith.

Ways of evangelizing

When leaving European ports starting in the early decades of the 16th century, Christian missionaries were convinced of the universality of their religion and the legitimacy of their initiative to win over the New World's peoples for the sake of saving their souls and defeating heresy and the influence of the Devil (Cervantes 1994), and in some cases justifying land appropriation and enslavement (Maxwell 1975). For example, the conquistadores read the *Requerimiento* of 1513 to indigenous populations at the first encounter in which it was

mentioned that “[God permitted the Pope] to have his seat in any other part of the world, and to judge and govern all Christians, Moors, Jews, Gentiles, and all other sects” (Newcomb 2008, 33). And while in 1537, the Papal Bull *Sublimis Deus* recognized that natives were humans with fundamental rights (→ Human Rights, II/35) and should not be subjected to enslavement, discussions remained engaged for decades in Europe on the morality of the treatment reserved to indigenous populations in the colonies. This was best exemplified by the Valladolid debate in 1550–1551 between Dominican Bartolomé de las Casas and theologian Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda about whether or not the indigenous had a soul and could therefore become Christians and achieve salvation, or if they were instead naturally predisposed to slavery. Still beyond such disagreements remained a shared belief in European cultural and religious superiority over the primitiveness of the indigenous peoples and the necessity to lead a charge against what was considered pagan superstitions.

However, strategies of evangelization quite different from those previously displayed in Europe would be needed to convert the natives of the Americas. From a broad perspective, Protestants and Catholics opted for contrasting missionizing approaches. For the Protestant churches – as well as for the Mormon Church, for instance – evangelization required first and foremost civilizing the native subjects through an acculturation process that merged them into the colonial society. Conversion was to be obtained by encouraging literacy and personal reading of the Bible and the inclusion of indigenous priests. Catholics were more divided as discussions, clashes, and reorientation shifts occurred among and between congregations about the interpretation of the doctrine regarding indigenous populations and the strategies to convert them (García-Ruiz 1992, 8–9). Jesuits did not wait for convincing signs of acculturation before evangelizing and chose to exercise a strong influence over the indigenous populations by restricting both access to the doctrine and the ordination of native priests. A similar approach characterized the work of many Orthodox missionaries in Alaska in the 19th century (Kan 1988, 509–510). Conversely, certain Franciscans in New Spain considered evangelization compatible with the effort to protect indigenous peoples against dispossession, exploitation, and slavery, if not to ensure their survival as distinct ethno-cultural entities (Sheridan Prieto 2000); liberation theology would later emerge in the continuity of such a preoccupation. Individually, Isabel Flores de Oliva known as Rose of Lima, a member of the Dominican Order, and patroness of the indigenous peoples of Latin America came to exemplify this sensitivity toward the hardships experienced by indigenous peoples through colonization. At the other end of the spectrum, Jewish newcomers apparently never resorted to organized forms of missionizing following their arrival in the Americas in the late 16th century. But overall, the extent to which a chosen strategy of evangelization was to be implemented remained subject to factors over which missionaries did not always have complete control.

First, the social structure and complexity of the different indigenous peoples throughout the Americas had an immediate influence on the amount of energy missionaries devoted simply to initiate and carry their ministry. In state-like societies as in the Andes and Mesoamerica, already existing institutions and infrastructures related to cultic activities could be seized and given a Christian character, thus facilitating implementation and ensuring quick effectiveness for their evangelization and civilization efforts. Indigenous forms of scriptures and imageries were used likewise. In Peru, Mexico, and Florida, Spanish authorities also created catechetical units or parishes known as *doctrinas* over existing indigenous settlements where natives were to be instructed under the authority of a Dominican or Franciscan friar. In Northeast America, missionaries opted to integrate seminomads or semisedentary communities and work from the inside, as did the Jesuits among the Hurons

and the Iroquois, thus depending on local hospitality. Elsewhere, nomadic populations had to be encouraged or forced to settle in permanent establishments. In Paraguay, Alta and Baja California, or New France, such *reducciones* served as isolation and acculturation laboratories dedicated to the transformation of indigenous customary lifestyles and beliefs. These missions were expected to be self-sufficient, based on the economical production of the local native population through agriculture, herding, or metallurgy. And where other nomadic populations would not settle, as in Northern Canada, missionaries such as the Recollects, the Jesuits, and later the Oblates resorted to itinerant forms of missionizing, visiting small group of families for a short time, with more or less the hope of making a lasting impact in terms of religious education.

Indigenous attachment to their culture and identity also triggered various responses to Christian doctrine and forced missionaries to adjust their strategies for evangelization. From their first encounters, most of the missionaries realized the importance of understanding native cultures, if only to better identify and grasp what needed to be eradicated or transformed in terms of beliefs and practices, and to target elements of compatibility through which Christianity could be more easily introduced through preexisting cosmologies. To translate foreign concepts and facilitate their adoption within local populations, it became instrumental to learn indigenous languages, to standardize catechisms and doctrinal texts in vernacular languages, to produce vocabularies and encyclopedias, and to adopt elements borrowed from native systems of representations, even when contrary to the principles of the official Christian doctrine (→ Language, I/13). Thus, integration of local music and dances (→ Dance, III/7) in Christian ceremonies, reference to local nonhuman entities to convey the concepts of God or the Devil (Shapiro 1987, 129–130), tolerance toward veneration of local deities as a way to introduce the cult of saints, valorization of high-profile native converts like Kateri Tekakwitha (Greer 2005), and recourse to native normative concepts such as reciprocity and redistribution as structuring elements in the organization and functioning of the missions (Wilde 2001, 86) were often used to promote the advancement of Christianity through indigenous cultural channels, whether this occurred through a strategic paternalistic form of seduction or a truly respectful attitude toward local belief systems. However, other religious authorities and missionaries sometimes opted for more iconoclastic or brutal approaches, especially after moderated efforts to convert proved unsuccessful. This led to violent actions such as the assaults against idols in Mexico and the extirpation of idolatry campaigns in the Andes where images and remains of ancestors were destroyed and native individuals accused of perpetuating pre-Hispanic beliefs and practices were tried and often severely punished, if not executed.

Ultimately, whether it was intended for the purpose of domination, enslavement, humanization, or civilization, evangelization usually required a form of dialogue between missionaries and indigenous peoples through which forms of acculturation occurred more or less on both sides, depending on the context of interaction and the balance of power. This opened the way for particular forms of transcultural religiosity to emerge.

Natives and Christianity

The latter portrait contrasts with previous conclusions that tended to polarize the consequences of missionizing for the indigenous populations of the New World. For example, for a long time, North American historiography carried the idea that missionaries had efficiently eradicated indigenous cosmologies. In the wake of the pioneering writings of historian Francis Parkman, the study of North American Jesuit missions, largely based on their own

writings, was characterized by descriptions and valuations of the missionaries' actions, much to the detriment of any indigenous cultural perspective. Especially during the first half of the 20th century, this representation was counterbalanced by a tendency among anthropologists, in both North and South America, to engage in primitivism, where contemporary indigenous populations were represented as timeless and still attached to traditional cultures and belief systems that supposedly had not been affected by colonial policies and modernity.

Only with the growing interest toward ethnohistorical studies starting in the mid-20th century, as scholars contextualized colonial writings in light of anthropological concepts and theories, did indigenous peoples begin to appear as agents of influence whose past relations with missionaries and Christianity needed to be studied according to their own motivations and aims, both collectively and individually. Dimensions of missionizing other than the structural and consequential components were now taken into consideration, such as the way indigenous populations perceived and welcomed missionaries, how they adopted and adapted Christianity, and how the latter sometimes became an instrument of resistance and salvation for natives in the wake of colonialism (Martin and Nicolas 2010; Bradford and Horton 2016). From this emerged a more realistic picture of evangelization according to which missionaries, while sharing the same initial motivation to bring Americas' indigenous population into Christianity, met peoples who already related to a variety of cosmologies and who expressed different matters of concern about the new colonial context, all this translating into a wide range of attitudes toward evangelization.

Contrary to Europeans and their hegemonic perspective, indigenous peoples may have been predisposed to welcome diversity in a more open manner. As their cosmogony was rooted in a local geo-social reality and articulated around a worldview where all things are interconnected, it was hardly conceivable to envision the colonizers and Christianity in a relation of opposition from the outset; rather, they were inclined to find ways to integrate these new realities among their ontological order (Klor de Alva 1992, 17–18). Nevertheless, contacts took place in local settings where natives were simultaneously trying to cope with transformations induced by colonialism and preserve their identities, cultures, values, and autonomy, and so different contexts of encounters conditioned different forms of response to the missionaries and their doctrine.

From the beginning, for pragmatic or ideological reasons, some natives displayed an attitude of closure and denied interaction with the missionaries, while others saw them as factors of actual or potential disruption of social order, if only by the divisions they might foster between religiously engaged and unengaged individuals (Richter 1985). The epidemics and demographic collapses that often followed their arrival, the intermingling of identities they sometimes help create through their multiethnic missions (→ *Interethnic Relations*, I/12), and the political authority that some sought to acquire or to impose among native communities as well as their efforts to keep the latter away from modernity were also factors of mistrust.

Other populations showed more interest toward missionaries, sometimes to the point of fully integrating them into their sociocultural dynamics. Missionaries could be perceived as a type of shaman connected to a potentially beneficial supernatural power, especially for protective purposes, or essentially as curiosities on the basis of their behaviors or modes of expression. As well, missionaries were not only bringing new religious practices and beliefs, but also useful knowledge and opportunities to help coping with a rapidly changing world. Missions may have offered protection and a better chance of survival when local populations were affected and destabilized by epidemics or wars, while facilitating access to resources, exchanges, and better material conditions from an economic standpoint. Close relationships

with missionaries could also help native individuals acquire higher social status or even access to the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Finally, in some cases, missionaries could be sought as useful intermediates with political authorities, if not as allies who could help local populations protect their interests or even resist or emancipate from the colonial domination. Thus, beyond the spiritual dimension, political, economic, social, and cultural considerations influenced the relationship indigenous peoples intended to develop with missionaries, and consequently the latter's ability to carry out evangelization by their own means. As such, indigenous peoples actively contributed to shaping the evangelistic enterprise.

From a missionary standpoint, a native convert was the one who adhered exclusively to Christian doctrine and put it into practice in all aspects of their daily life. But from an indigenous perspective, adopting Christianity was not necessarily inconsistent with the preservation of endogenous cultural traits, or even as a way to perpetuate them. Elements of Christian beliefs and practices, considered more or less differently from the official doctrine, were selectively filtered through preexisting indigenous material, social, and cosmological realities and integrated when considered effective in regards to subsistence activities, curing procedures or divinatory practices, for instance, or when they helped make sense of broader transformations experienced in the colonial context. For instance, throughout the New World and from one period to another, the figure of the Devil was indigenized for different purposes usually linked to the notions of evil within local systems of values. In Mexico, the Christian character of the Virgin of Guadalupe came to personify the pre-Hispanic goddess Tonantzin and her fertility attributes. Among several northern nomadic populations, St. Ann symbolically embodied the importance of the grandmother in the traditional culture, as in the Andes, the worship of Christian representations became part of the same dynamics prevailing toward pre-Columbian deities or *guacas*. Thus, the adoption and adaptation of Christian beliefs and practices were often inscribed in continuity rather than rupture within native local cultures, so much that the concept of "conversion" is now being considered too simplistic or exclusive. Other terms such as "affiliation" or "religious commitment" have been proposed to better qualify the relationship indigenous populations experienced with Christianity (Fisher 2012, 86, 89). Meanwhile, other concepts such as "syncretism" and "hybridity" have been widely used to characterize the apparently new practices and beliefs that emerged from the contact between Christianity and native traditions, even though their utility remains contested as they tend to downplay or mask the persistence of enduring cultural schemata among indigenous populations (→ Hybridity, I/30).

Such manifestations reflect the many ways indigenous populations across the New World tried or managed to domesticate Christianity in the broader context of a changing world, as did others such as the African slaves in the Caribbean who remained attached to their traditional beliefs and practices through voodoo and santería that survived by assuming a Christian appearance. However, this should not distract from the fact that evangelization in the Americas also had detrimental consequences for indigenous peoples. Epidemics, displacement, mistreatment, imposition of harsh conditions of life, interference in local affairs, and assaults against cultural institutions and practices all contributed to social disorganization and subjugation to colonial powers, this on a large scale and with long-lasting effects. The dark legacy of the residential school system (→ Education, I/24) in Canada is a case in point as numerous native communities are still coping, several generations later, with the destructive social and psychological effects of these institutions dedicated to the assimilation of native children and administered by Christian missionaries from the late 19th century (The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada 2015).

Conclusion

Overall, the objectives and specific policies of the colonial powers, the doctrinal and corporate priorities of various churches and orders, individual missionaries' personalities, geographical and material conditions, as well as the variety of local responses to foreign preachers and their message were all factors that contributed to rendering missionizing in the Americas into a multiform enterprise. Christianity did not follow a unidirectional way from Western missionaries to the indigenous peoples, and missionizing cannot be reduced to one set of particular actions and implements systematically called upon. If missionizing as a way to propagate Christianity in the Americas did begin with the arrival of European men, it soon took a transcultural character involving all those convinced more or less profoundly of the superiority of this faith, or at least of the relevance of some of its components. In parallel, various contexts of encounters demanded different evangelistic strategies. Missionaries themselves, accompanied in their effort by other actors including religiously engaged natives, were divided regarding the methods to use and the goals to reach. They had to adapt their approaches by being receptive toward indigenous cultures and cosmologies to the point where native traits became integral parts of the conversion strategies. Such amalgamations meant that missionizing became a field where each party tapped into the sociocultural universe of the other to a certain extent, resulting in a complex process of cultural diversity and miscegenation that cannot simply be analyzed through a simplistic European/Native, Christianity/Paganism, and tradition/modernity dichotomy.

In terms of results, acceptance of Christianity among indigenous peoples varied considerably as their attitude toward it went from absolute denial to complete and sincere conversion, with in between a wide range of alternative postures. From this emerged different reconfigurations of local cosmologies, at least among populations and individuals that showed interest toward Christianity. Christian traits and indigenous traditional beliefs and practices were often shuffled and articulated more or less concurrently in an effort to adjust to the new colonial reality, but often along persistent and basic cultural patterns deemed necessary for social coherence and identity preservation, although the brutality of certain colonial politics did not always render such continuity possible. This perspective which takes into consideration the standpoint and the role played by indigenous peoples offers a more comprehensive understanding of the configuration taken by the evangelistic enterprise and its legacy in terms of success. By the same token, it forces a reevaluation of the extent to which colonialism affected indigenous cosmological beliefs considering there may have been paths to ensure a certain level of preservation. Thus, allowing for a deeper consideration toward contemporary references to "traditional spirituality" in natives' political discourses and actions, too often seen as a form of "invented" cultural identity for opportunistic purposes.

As such, it is through the dynamics of encounter and wider cohabitation and cooperation between the colonial societies and indigenous peoples, the oppositions and complementarities between Christianity and native cosmologies, and the motivations and aspirations of all individuals and interest groups involved that missionizing can better be locally contextualized and understood in all its complexity, and as the vector of cultural intermingling it was. And yet, no matter the results obtained in terms of religious engagement and civilization, and no matter the social and cultural proximities that it may have fostered, missionizing did not contribute to eradicate the racial boundary in colonial times (→ Race, 1/39). Even the most deeply converted or assimilated individuals were most likely bound to remain indigenous in the eyes of the newcomers.

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18

SLAVERY

Christine Hatzky

Enslavement – especially of Africans – has been an inextinguishable and integral part of the history of North and South America, indeed of the whole Atlantic world (→ I/3), and its consequences are clearly perceptible to this day in the discrimination of people of African origin. Slaving, slavery, and all related topics also point to the close historical interconnectedness of the two part-continents. Since the studies of David Brion Davis (1966), one of the most influential historians of slavery and the abolition movement in the Atlantic world, research on this topic has increased significantly, from the points of view of history, social sciences, anthropology, economics, and literary studies (→ Slave Narratives, III/20; Plantation Literature, III/15). It is one of the best-explored subjects in the history of the Americas, the Caribbean, and the Atlantic world. For this reason, there exists today a pool of sources, regional studies, micro- and macro-studies, surveys, and interpretations, so extensive that an overview is scarcely possible, illuminating the manifold of interconnections and providing excellent bases for further comparisons.

The Atlantic perspective, partly originating in the paradigm of the “Black Atlantic,” pointed and continues to point the way for research on slavery in the Americas because it no longer interprets the Atlantic as a space for interaction only on the basis of European hegemony, (slave) traders, and settlers, but has made visible the influence of African slaves and their descendants in constituting societies on both sides of the Atlantic. However, new concepts that adopt the perspective of global history emphasize that slaving and slavery cannot fundamentally be recorded and comprehended in terms of national or regional history, nor solely within the context of the Atlantic. They have rather always been elementary processes of global history and existed in many places, many varieties, and alongside other labor systems: in Paleolithic and modern cultures; in those with agricultural, agro-industrial, and industrial backgrounds; in precapitalist and capitalist environments; in the context of kinship and of smaller and larger enterprises; in export-oriented and subsistence economies, as Joseph Miller (2012) states.

Slavery is a term usually applied to extreme forms of subjugation, mostly for the purpose of labor exploitation. It has been practiced in most cultures of the past and is still widespread today. It is one of the most extreme forms of domination, approaching the limits of total power from the viewpoint of the master and of total powerlessness from the viewpoint of the slave. All slaves, whether enslaved by capture, barter, debt, natural disaster (→ II/33), or

crime, are perceived as owing their lives to the master or to institutions, a state from which all else in their condition flows – a condition which can be inherited. Slaving means the transport and trade of human beings as well as the accumulation of capital through barter, purchase, and sale. Slaving is the generic term for manhunt, abduction, capitalization, and commodification, the extortion of labor and services of slaves in close connection with the development of modern capitalism (→ II/2). The bodies of enslaved people and their labor were the most important capital in Atlantic slavery and within the respective slaveholding societies (Sanz Rozalén and Zeuske 2017).

Transatlantic slave trade and slavery in the Americas

During the European expansion over the Atlantic from the 14th century onward, Europeans, and especially Iberians, familiar with many different forms of unfree labor (→ I/19) – including forms in the so-called Roman tradition – encountered all types of slavery on the coasts of Africa and in the Americas. Resultant from this, until around 1650 and in combination with new technological advances concerning naval architecture and the improvement of the sugar mill, the Atlantic slavery system was formed. Since the treaty of Tordesillas (1494) had excluded Spain from direct trade with Africa, the Spanish Crown resorted to a system of exclusive licenses (*asientos*) granted to foreign – and in this early period especially Portuguese – contractors to introduce slaves to its New World possessions. The centerpiece of the slave trade was the Middle Passage – the crossing of the Atlantic of about ten to twelve million Africans (Eltis et al., The Transatlantic Slave Trade Database) to the Americas and the Caribbean islands by the end of the 19th century when slavery was finally abolished in Cuba (1886) and Brazil (1888). Slaving on the coasts of Africa started as raids undertaken predominantly by Portuguese traders (and financed by Mediterranean banks and trading firms) but from around 1500 onward, it was transformed into an alliance-based trade with local elites and rulers, especially on several coasts from South-Central Africa (today Congo and Angola) to West Africa (from Senegal to Nigeria). Slave traders (the Portuguese were substituted by Dutch, English, and French traders) offered high-quality goods such as cloth, tools, or weapons in exchange for African men, women, and children. On the other side of the Atlantic, a Plantation Revolution, based on slave labor, first on the Caribbean islands (main goods: indigo, tobacco, sugar), in the 18th century in Brazil (sugar and later coffee), and the south of North America (cotton) took place. Yet also in other Atlantic and Pacific regions (today Peru, Venezuela, or Columbia) of the South American continent, plantation slavery emerged as well as slavery in gold and silver mines. Furthermore, in all cattle breeding regions, African slaves were employed as workers. In urban spaces, and especially in emerging harbor cities like Cartagena, Veracruz, Havana, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, New York, Charleston, and New Orleans, slaves were employed in all sectors as workers, craftsmen, domestic servants, and in other segments of the service sector. However in contrast to the colonies in North America, a strong element of free African-American people emerged relatively early in urban spaces in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Until the abolition of the slave trade in the Atlantic through British legislation in 1807, English traders were mostly responsible for the enslavement of Africans and their transportation in inhuman conditions to the Americas. After 1808 until around 1870, an estimated two to three million slaves were smuggled into the plantation zones of Cuba, the South of North America, and to Brazil. These activities in the so-called “Hidden Atlantic” (Zeuske 2006) were carried out by Portuguese-Brazilian, Cuban, or Catalan smuggle-traders. In the 19th century, Brazil emerged as the biggest slave society in the Americas, to which around four

to five million African slaves had been transported. Cuba developed between 1830 and 1886 as the technologically and organizationally best-designed slave society, with highly effective sugar production for the world market. During the almost four centuries of the Atlantic slave trade and smuggling, an estimated number of 200–300,000 slaves were taken to Mexico; around a million to Cuba; around 400,000 to Puerto Rico and St. Domingue; 20,000 to Central America; 200,000 to Columbia, Panama, and Ecuador; 120,000 to Venezuela; around 100,000 to Bolivia and Rio de la Plata (today Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay); and around 6,000 to Chile. By 1790, around 700,000 slaves had been brought to the U.S. Their numbers reached over a million in 1808 and had risen to around four million in 1860. This rise is, however, also attributed to the natural growth of the slave population (Finzsch, Horton, and Horton 1999).

When the Atlantic plantation system, which was based on slave labor, was at its height at the end of the 18th century, a strong antislavery movement emerged that contributed to destroying the institution of slavery by the end of the 19th century in North America, the Caribbean, and South America. The American Revolution eroded slavery but was unable to destroy it (→ Independence Movements, I/10; Revolution, II/44). The Declaration of Independence in 1776 elevated all civic conceptions of liberty into human rights (→ II/35), but the new constitution acknowledged slavery tacitly. Enlightened thoughts and ideas (→ Enlightenment, I/8), but also related liberal economic reforms, often corresponded to a critique of the British, French, and Iberian colonial systems (→ Colonial Rule, I/5). This enlightened criticism, however, only rarely included an explicit rejection of slavery. Although the prelude to a final abolition of slavery emanated from the Revolution in St. Domingue (1791–1804) carried out by slaves who liberated themselves from slavery, long before in the British colonies in North America and in England religiously motivated abolitionism had emerged, emanating from the Quakers, a Pietist revivalist movement outside the Anglican Church. In England, they formed an abolitionist Society of Friends as early as 1650. In the long run, they were successful in anchoring rejection of slavery in the public consciousness, because they were able to make a religious moral issue out of the question of slavery. Only later did the economic arguments that Adam Smith leveled against slavery combine with these moral and religious arguments. The antislavery consensus needed time, however, to become accepted amongst all Quakers because many of them owned slaves themselves, as did many members of the political establishment, among them one of the main protagonists of the Declaration of the Independence, Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson owned hundreds of slaves, as did George Washington, who became the first president of the United States in 1789.

The culmination of slavery in its capitalist form of exploitation was reached only after the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade after 1807 and 1836, as exemplified by Brazil, Cuba, and the Confederate states. But while Cuba was still a Spanish colony until the end of the 19th century and Brazil in fact independent though an empire with a monarchist constitution, slavery and the plantation economy boomed in the United States, an independent nation whose politicians saw themselves as the pioneers of civic rights (→ Citizenship, II/27). England abolished slavery in its Caribbean colonies in 1834 – with a transitional period until 1838, after the American Union states, Chile (1823) and Mexico (1829) but before France (1848), the United States of America (1865), and the remaining Latin American independent countries. The last abolitions of slavery took place in Cuba (1886) and Brazil (1888).

The very different levels of time and space in which slavery and slaving took place make it extremely difficult to shape a definition which would include most of these phenomena in a satisfactory way. Even a narrower understanding implying “absolute control,” the “exercise of a right of ownership” over the person, is difficult to define, and an overarching definition

of slavery does not exist. Robin Blackburn (1997) asserted that slave status is a purely social construct – that of a social isolate, an outsider, a person without kin, a person subject to the complete and arbitrary authority of a master, a person who could be whipped or tortured or sexually abused, a piece of property, and by virtue of the foregoing an instrument. The sociologist Orlando Patterson (1982) has, also from a Marxist viewpoint, defined slaves as “social dead,” as did the classicist Moses Finley (1964) in a much broader view – given their total exclusion from society, their alienation when displaced by force from their places of origin, and the fact that slaves throughout the world have been engaged in a ground-level struggle to redeem themselves from non-humanity or chattelhood through persistent artifice. Patterson’s definition has been challenged by many empirical studies during the last three decades for not adequately considering the slaves’ capacity for agency, their ability to establish new social environments, the family lives they built even in the most adverse circumstances, and the valor they showed in resistance and rebellions.

Micro-historical and anthropological research on slavery in the Americas carried out in the last decades has been able to carve out many details of slaves’ living conditions: they married, forged families, worshiped together, staged funerals, established associations, engaged in market activities, or initiated legal actions in courts. They also built hierarchies among themselves and differentiated by status, occupation, ethnicity, gender, and color. These findings were possible due to a perspective that aims to examine slaves’ lives, providing a bottom-up analysis of slavery. Nevertheless, the biggest problem in digging deeper into the life histories and living conditions of the slaves is the sources, because relatively few direct accounts of slaves exist that refer to their personal experiences in the world of forced labor. Research reverts, for example, to juridical documentation, reports, pleas, and file documentation which is able to open a window onto the lives of enslaved people. Slaves lives, the conditions under which they worked, their diet, or their possibilities to develop their own culture and religion were – within the Americas – dependent on a whole set of criteria: time, place, work patterns, and their African origin; whether a slavery region was under English, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French, or U.S. jurisdiction; whether the slaves lived in societies with slaves or in proper slave societies; whether they were skilled, toiled under a task system, or were performing gang labor; whether they produced sugar, coffee, tobacco, cotton, or rice; their proximity to indigenous people or to Maroons; and whether they lived in times of peace or war.

All of these criteria also defined the diet of the slaves, which was always one of the most important means of exerting pressure for amenability and good conduct. Although dependent on time and region, the diet consisted mainly of corn, yucca, peanuts, beans, or salt meat and salted fish. In the Iberian colonies and the Caribbean, plantation slaves had access to small plots of land for establishing gardens in order to improve their food supply. Plantation slaves had a life expectancy of 40–60 years in the 19th century and, generally speaking, the plantation economy could not exist without a permanent supply of new slaves.

Religion, religious beliefs, and practices, in most cases a fusion of very different African religious systems and Catholic Christianity in the Iberian colonies and on a much smaller scale with Protestant Christianity in North America, varied as well over time and space (→ Religious Beliefs, I/40). Brazil and the Caribbean islands experienced a more pronounced African emphasis in slaves’ religious lives than North America. In the Iberian colonies, slaves could develop their religious beliefs in controlled spaces like the so-called *cabildos de negros* (officially recognized assemblies), benefitting from the fact that the Catholic Church has always accepted popular religious cults. This advanced the fusion of African beliefs with Christian ones. The Church also accepted the practice of drumming within religious cults.

Cults in the Protestant regions were much more controlled and regulated. The most explicit religious cults developed in the plantation societies in Brazil and the Caribbean: *candomblé*, *vudú*, or *santería* to name but a few. Some of them incorporated indigenous, Jewish and Islamic elements. Religion was not only an important space for slaves to restore sociocultural ties, but was also one of the most important spaces for transcultural processes and creolization (→ Hybridity, I/30).

Slave rebellions and resistance to slavery

In the Americas revolts, manumission, demographic shifts between male and female slaves, and later the institutional reconfiguration of slavery from a patriarchal institution based on brute force to one that intended to translate power into authority changed the shape and the meaning of slavery not only toward masters and slaves but toward the whole society. From the beginning, there was resistance against slavery, starting on the African coasts. For example, in Luanda, one of the most important slave harbors of South-Central Africa, attempts to escape enslavement were recorded from the beginning of the slave trade. Many Africans were fully aware that being taken to a harbor city like Luanda as slaves could mean a journey of no return across the Atlantic. Much of the resistance was due to the fear of being cannibalized by white men after having been taken onto the ships. By the end of the 17th century, escapes had become so frequent in Luanda that a governor reported business troubles to his agents because of the numerous flights. In the first half of the 18th century, the numbers of runaways in this region were so high that even the existence of several Maroon communities was reported (Ferreira 2014). Resistance continued on the slave ships during transport over the Atlantic. Around 600 ship rebellions have been verified so far. In the Americas, rebellions and flight were often connected to indigenous peoples (→ I/11) and to Maroon communities of other runaway slaves. Escaping the system proved the most flexible and frequent form of slave revolt. In all slave regions, resistance and runaway cultures emerged, but more frequently in the Iberian colonies and the Caribbean. The biggest Quilombo (settlement and Maroon society) was Palmares with around 30,000 inhabitants, in the northeast of Brazil, which existed from 1600 until its destruction in 1694. Nevertheless, individual escapes were more frequent than group escapes.

Many slave rebellions occurred in Brazil, the most famous being the Bahia Rebellion of 1822–1830 and the so-called Malê Revolt of 1835 by predominantly Muslim slaves from West Africa. In other regions, too, rebellions were frequent, especially on the Caribbean islands and in the Circum-Caribbean region. The only successful slave rebellion in world history that led to the abolition of slavery occurred in St. Domingue/Haiti in 1791–1803. There is documentary evidence of more than 250 uprisings or attempted uprisings involving ten or more slaves in North America. The most important were the Stono Rebellion in South Carolina in 1739 led by native Africans and, in the 19th-century United States, the Nat Turner Rebellion in Virginia, in 1831. Despite these more visible acts of resistance, there is no doubt that *petit marronage*, daily resistance against hard living, and working conditions such as sabotage, refusal to work, but also the adaptations and adoptions were much more important for survival. The most obvious gendered resistance involved reproduction, as many slave women resisted childbearing because they were unwilling to enrich their owners and reproduce bondage (→ Gender Identities, I/28).

Research into the relationship between slavery and gender was a feature of the 1980s that has continued to this day. Gender shaped the work that enslaved men and women had to do: in the United States (→ Gender and Work, II/11), planters often measured all slaves

against the standard of the male “prime” slave, which means that a strong woman might have been a three-quarter hand, while an old man or a pregnant woman only a half hand. The latter, together with children of both sexes, joined the trash gang in the fields. Both in the Caribbean and in North America, women were allocated to gangs that performed the hardest labor. Beyond the fields, gender continued to shape work. Men occupied almost all occupations considered as skilled. Women had a smaller range of skilled work tasks, often tied to the house. Research has also revealed that – as in all slaveholding societies – women slaves were sexually available to their masters. Women, not men, were overwhelmingly the targets of sexual opportunism, and not only by the masters but also by overseers and drivers. In the case of the masters, this involved another important dimension besides sexual abuse and assertion of power: reproduction. In the slave societies of the Americas, the intention of masters to have children with their female slaves differed over time and region: in some slave societies, female slaves were deliberately encouraged to have children – also with other male slaves – in order to increase the owners’ workforce. In Latin America and the Caribbean, a master was more likely to openly acknowledge children born by a slave than in North America. Manumitting one’s sexual partner and children was most common in the Spanish Caribbean. In the French colonies, planters mostly ignored the requirement of the Code Noir (passed by King Louis XIV in 1689, the first ordinance to define slavery and its conditions) to emancipate their own enslaved children.

Varieties of slavery

In historical terms, the institution of slavery was often connected with the ordering of societies and communities, and equally with control of the “irrational” and “bestial.” For the most important commentator on slavery in antiquity, Aristotle, slaves were dull-witted instruments that had to be guided by a master equipped with higher moral and intellectual faculties. For Aristotle, this distinction between slave and master was one of the fundamental dualities of existence, of the natural order of things. In antiquity, this was linked to the concept of cultural superiority, to which Aristotle subscribed. Slaves were among the “barbarians,” the “others,” who lived outside the society of the masters and were therefore foreign. For Orlando Patterson, it was no accident that the first and greatest mass democracies of the ancient and modern worlds were ancient Athens and 18th-century North America, both representing a profound commitment to the principle of political participation – on the basis of slavery. Did political freedom (→ I/27) then demand the existence of bondage?

The systems of slavery in the Americas and the Caribbean in the early modern period were, however, not a continuation of ancient slavery but were based on medieval forms of unfree labor that existed around the Mediterranean. Contact with Islamic societies in which slavery had always existed reinforced the practice of slavery within the Christian world. Nevertheless, forms of slavery and captivity existed in preconquest times. Native Americans had enslaved each other for millennia and captivity was not a static institution for Indians, but rather a practice they adopted over times to meet changing circumstances: native peoples such as Zapotecs, Mayas, and Aztecs took captives to use them as sacrificial victims; the Iroquois waged campaigns called “mourning wars” on neighboring groups to avenge and replace their dead. Indians in the Pacific Northwest included male and female slaves in the goods sent by the groom to finalize marriages among elites. However, with the arrival of Europeans, the practices of captivity originally embedded in specific cultural contexts became commodified and expanded in unexpected ways. The crises surrounding U.S. expansion as well as their expulsion prompted native people to redefine their communities, change

their economies, and eventually develop a form of racial slavery (→ Race I/39). In the late 18th century, peoples such as Choctaws and Chickasaws in the Indian territories of the South purchased slaves – men, women, and children of African descent – to work on their farms (Snyder 2010; Krauthamer 2013).

Organized mass slavery, as it is characterized by the Roman system and as it existed in the Caribbean and the Americas from the 16th century, did not exist on the eve of European expansion. Although there were European societies with slaves, in contrast to the situation in antiquity, they were not pure societies of slave owners. Europeans introduced mass slavery in the New World only after it had almost disappeared from Europe. At the time when the plantation system based on slavery was established in the Americas and the Caribbean by Europeans, only relics of state or private labor obligations and serfdom still existed in Europe and Russia. Paradoxically, the states on the eastern Atlantic seaboard that founded a new system of mass slavery in the western Atlantic were precisely those states in which the rule of law, economic development (→ II/6), and civil rights were most advanced (→ Nation and State Building, I/16). Between the 16th and the 19th centuries, what we today describe as “Western modernity” (Osterhammel 2009) emerged in this Atlantic world in a highly paradoxical process. European expansion and the associated establishment of mass slavery are among the central, constituent processes of European, American, and Atlantic histories. The transatlantic slave trade through the Middle Passage and institutionalized slaving in the Atlantic region and its hinterland contributed crucially to the development of the mercantile and industrial, and later the financial phase of the capitalist system in this region (→ Capitalism, II/2).

In the age of Enlightenment (→ I/8) in the European-dominated “New World,” forms of mass forced labor were combined with the most advanced forms of organization and production of this whole era, resulting in the plantation based on slave labor. Slavery in Europe was, however, no longer directly visible, but now existed only at its colonial periphery. It reached its peak at the time of the late European Enlightenment – in North America, Cuba, and Brazil even later, in a period regarded as the flowering of liberalism. Together with the Southern States of North America (1820–1865), Brazil (1800–1888), Puerto Rico (1815–1860), Suriname (1815–1863), and Cuba developed the most efficient slavery systems based on mass slavery. These forms denominated by Michael Zeuske (2013) as “hegemonic slaveries” in the mentioned zones of “second slavery” (Tomich 2004) – distinguished from colonial slavery by new commodities, produced in unprecedented quantities in regions formerly marginal to the Atlantic economies – proved to be an extremely stable and a highly efficient economic system immediately before their destruction, the final implementation of abolition.

Academic reflections on slavery

Historical, anthropological, and sociological research on slavery in the Atlantic and the Americas has passed through various phases in the course of the 20th and 21st centuries and manifested itself in diverse ideological points of view, but has been marked by lively intra- and intercontinental dialogues and an extremely interdisciplinary character. At an early stage, comparative perspectives that examined the specifics of slave societies in the two Americas and the Caribbean were adopted. Only at the beginning of the 20th century did slavery and its societal consequences become a topic for a broader audience in the United States, for example, by the publication of the works of the former slave and abolitionist Frederic Douglass and through the writings of the sociologist and civil-rights activist W. E. B. Du Bois (1903), who thematized the notion of “double consciousness” among African

diasporic individuals, meaning the sense of measuring oneself by the standards of others, of uniting in one person the conflicting feelings of being both an American and of African descent. The debates that followed, although they have taken place only recently, revolved around the question, raised in principle as long ago as the 1930s by the US ethnographer Melville J. Herskovits, of what influence African slaves had on the formation of American societies – even though Herskovits' positivist and culturally relativistic perspective was subject to criticism from the 1960s onward. Regardless of this, theories about the African background of the slaves proposed by him and others pointed the way for research on slavery and slave societies within and outside the United States.

A further determining influence on research into slavery in the United States from the 1940s onward was the assimilation model for immigrant societies shaped by the Chicago School. This model also influenced research on slavery through discussions of the acculturation processes of African slaves under the conditions of slavery. Here, the focus was on adaptation on the part of (former) slaves to American (majority) societies. According to the assimilation model, this adaptation was regarded as being a largely one-sided process. The principal representative (and adversary) of Herskovits was the African-American sociologist Franklin E. Frazier, who put forward the hypothesis of the complete atomization of African cultural elements in the New World. Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz referred to these debates with his concept of transculturation (→ Hybridity, I/30). On the basis of numerous studies of the Afro-Cuban population that he had already begun at the turn of the century, originally developed alongside questionable approaches of criminal ethnology about the evilness of the Cuban population of African descent, in the mid-1940s, he presented the re-approved and today influential concept of “transculturation” as a description of the dynamics of cultural elements. He thus departed from the hitherto prevalent concept of acculturation of social and cultural anthropology and at the same time coined a critical term that was to lend a new direction to anthropological theory and practice in the Americas (Ortiz 1995). In his 1940 study *Contrapunteo Cubano del Tabaco y el Azúcar* [Cuban Counterpoint. Tobacco and Sugar], Ortiz defined transculturation as a multilayered process that included the partial appropriation of new cultural elements, the partial loss of culture, and the creation of new cultural articulation. With this approach to transculturation, he showed that African, indigenous, and European cultural elements were of importance in the construction of “Cuban-ness,” “the Cuban” (*cubanía*) (97–103).

In the 1960s, the phenomenon of mass slavery, the slave owner, and plantation societies of the Americas were examined using, above all, two different methodological approaches. On the one hand, historians who for the first time attempted to express in numbers the transatlantic slave trade and slavery by means of demographic investigations created pioneering studies on the demography of slavery and the economic history of the transatlantic slave trade in the United States and these studies initially dominated research activities. Many works, the most important of which was Philip Curtins' *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census*, published for the first time illustrations and tables with estimates of the number of Africans who survived the Middle Passage between the 16th and the 19th centuries. This tradition of quantitative research on the basis of social history has continued. The figure of twelve million Africans, who are estimated to have reached the Americas alive by the end of the 19th century (of whom, however, only 5 percent were taken directly to North America), received impressive confirmation by a milestone of quantitative research: *The Transatlantic Slave Trade Database* (Eltis et al.), which covers today around 40,000 slaving voyages across the Atlantic.

This intensive, initially comparative, later also quantitative debate in social history about slavery, mainly conducted in the United States, combined in extremely fertile ways with new

approaches by historians of the British West Indies such as Eric Williams, C. L. R. James, and Walter Rodney from Guyana. From the 1960s, slavery researchers in the United States engaged with these challenges of Caribbean “post-colonialism before post-colonialism,” especially with Eric Williams’ provocative work *Capitalism and Slavery* (1944). Specialized in the study of the abolition of the slave trade, Williams argued that the British abolition of the Atlantic slave trade in 1807 was motivated primarily by economics – rather than by altruism or humanitarianism. As industrial capitalism and wage labor began to expand, eliminating the competition from slavery became economically advantageous. Stimulated by Williams’ theses, in the last five to six decades, historians have been able to prove a high output of plantation products for the world market such as sugar, rice, cotton, or coffee in the mentioned regions, and therefore the efficiency of plantation economy based on slave work. Influential research was done by practitioners of “New Economic History,” Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman (1974), who applied sophisticated economic models and statistical methods of social science to study the efficiency of slave-based economic production. Their findings on the positive performance of slavery concerning profitability and efficiency were pathbreaking and in contradiction to Williams’ thesis, which is why slave emancipation in the 19th century must have been the result of “extra-economic factors,” namely politics, morality, and ideology, and not of economic considerations.

This triggered a further wave of research that opted for structural approaches guided by the interests of social and economic histories. The studies of Herbert Klein (1978), Joseph Inikori and Stanley Engerman (1981), and Joseph Miller (1988) – to name but a few – examined both the economic effects of the slave trade on Europe, Africa, and the Americas, and the organization of plantation economies and the phenomenon of mass slavery. A further early branch of slavery research was occupied with resistance to slavery, taking as its starting point the publication on slave resistance of Marxist historian Herbert Aptheker in the 1940s (1943). Aptheker’s work has deepened and broadened the debates and research about the characteristics of slavery, the master–slave relationship, and the conditions of slave resistance in the Americas. The result is a consensus that insurrections in the United States or what became the United States broke out less frequently and generally to a lesser extent than in the Caribbean and South America – Brazil, Cuba, or Jamaica. But all of them revealed powerfully the tension between freedom and bondage as well as the universality of resistance against enslavement. While research into the resistance to slavery long focused on uprisings, revolts, and rebellions, in view of diverse regional studies and micro-historical approaches, it is clear today that there were many forms of everyday resistance, both passive and active.

Intensive – both comparative and quantitative – social historical research about the various forms of slavery in the Americas was initiated in the aftermath of Frank Tannenbaum’s theory about the alleged “mildness” of slavery in the Ibero-American colonial system (Tannenbaum 1946). This ultimately ushered in a new phase of global comparative slavery research. As part of this, researchers interpreted the history of slavery from the slaves’ perspective for the first time. This was dominated by the question of the consequences of contact between Africans and the neo-European societies of the Americas, and above all the transcultural results of this. Most studies assumed that continuities in African traditions were an exception under the sociocultural conditions of slavery, and that this led to a “creolization” of Africans at an early stage (→ Hybridity, I/30). They concluded that the African-American culture was constituted entirely anew by ethnically and culturally isolated individuals from a diverse range of African societies, cultures, and religions that had come together on the plantations or in slave societies. Only a subsidiary role was ascribed to African cultural elements that they had brought with them. This view of the new construction of

African-American culture expressed from an anthropological and cultural sociologists' perspective focused especially on North American and Caribbean colonial and slavery societies. An example of this is the influential study of Sidney Mintz and Richard Price in *An Anthropological Approach to the Afro-American Past*, published in 1976. However, these models neglected the diverse frameworks of social conditions of various slave-owning societies and above all the specific conditions and developments of slave societies in the Ibero-American colonial empire.

Nevertheless, this Marxist-inspired research opened up paths to new concepts and theoretical considerations. They laid the basis for a history of slavery "from below," from the point of view of slaves and former slaves as protagonists in a transnational and transcultural history of the Americas and the Caribbean. It was also the foundation for research on slavery informed by anthropology that was applied to other regions (Stephan Palmié 1995; Rebecca Scott 2005; Michael Zeuske 2013) and drew comparisons between slavery regions in North and South America as well as the Caribbean (Scott 2005). Inspired by these comparisons, new empirically rich, micro-historical, and anthropological studies on the lives of enslaved people throughout the Americas permitted a much more differentiated perspective on the everyday life of slaves and showed that it depended on a wide diversity of particularities: the ethnic origins of the slaves (→ Ethnicity, I/25), the time of their deportation to the Americas, the type and size of the plantations, the type of crop they produced, the stage of economic development of the region, the climate, the age, and gender of the slave, the particular predispositions and personalities of masters and mistresses, the religious conditions, and the power constellations.

These intimate insights allowed a perspective on how slaves managed to live in a tense and conflict-laden dialectic of accommodation and resistance. Another incentive for a new perspective on the entanglements of slavery, colonialism, abolition, and post-emancipation derived from the "historical turn" of U.S. anthropology (Cooper 1980; Stoler 1985). The connection between anthropology and history opened new avenues of research on slavery and racism providing a fresh view of the transnational connections of the slavery and post-emancipation experience.

Comparative debates about slavery in the Americas and transcultural studies have since been extended to Africa. John Thornton's *Africa and the Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World* (1998) and further works about slavery societies in Africa make it clear that forms of slavery and the slave trade were widespread in Africa too, and that research into slavery in the Americas and its consequences is incomplete without knowledge of the African side. Two pioneering collections edited by Claude Meillassoux (1975) as well as Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff (1979) opened the door for research on slavery in Africa. Empirical studies have considerably extended knowledge about different systems of slavery, of the trans-Saharan slave trade, and of slavery in Muslim societies for many African regions. What is obvious now, and of interest for our inter-American and Atlantic perspectives, is that internal slavery in western and western central Africa did not only exist because of the transatlantic slave trade but was part of the societies there, as African rulers and slave traders have always been involved significantly. What is also clear is that the transatlantic trade was a major stimulus: as the European demand for workforce increased, so did slavery. The sugar revolution in the Americas called for a massive supply of slave labor, which only an expanded captive procurement area in Africa could meet. The Atlantic trade continued even after the British abolition of the slave trade in 1807 and flourished directly between the Atlantic regions for several decades, especially further south, between Angola and Brazil.

For historians of Africa with an Atlantic perspective, the emphasis is less on the transformation processes that took place under slavery, but more on the continuities of African

cultures and traditions in the two Americas. A point of culmination emerged in the question of “creolization,” i.e. when and under what conditions Africans in slavery became Americans. Slavery historians in the tradition of the history of ideas such as Ira Berlin (1998), who put transformation and identity-forming processes in North American slavery societies at the center of his investigations, argued that the emergence of African-American identities among slaves and former slaves was a continuous construction and reconstruction in adaptation to the (changing) historical conditions of slavery. He concluded that these processes by no means worked in only one direction. From his study of the “creolization” of Africans through the transatlantic slave trade, in 1996, he introduced the concept of “Atlantic Creoles” to denote population groups that, as a result of their experiences or birth, were part of a new Atlantic culture that had evolved since the 16th century through the slave trade along the coasts of Europe, Africa, and the Americas.

Yet, this Atlantic dimension of the concept in no way changes its lack of precision, as it was not able to differentiate between the social and ethnic hierarchies, places of origin, and cultural transformations that it claims to describe. The very use of the terms “Creoles” and “creolization” points to its contradictions and lack of clarity. They originally derive from Spanish and Portuguese expressions: as long ago as the late 16th-century “criollo” and “crioulou,” respectively, denoted persons who were born in the Ibero-American colonies of the “New World,” regardless of their ethnicity and their social status. Initially, it was mainly white Europeans who were described as “Creoles” (→ Whiteness, I/46), but during the colonial period, the meaning of the term altered, and it was later also used for Africans (free and slaves) born in the colonies. In the slavery and diaspora research of the 20th and 21st centuries in the United States, today these two terms have an exclusively ethnic and cultural connotation. “Creolization” is used in general terms to describe social and cultural transformation processes of slaves and former slaves with slavery and post-emancipation societies.

A remarkable feature of this transcontinental, regional, and transatlantic perspective is that it developed from two directions: from African historiography and from Latin American, Caribbean, and especially from Brazilian historical studies and ethnology. Notable names here are historians of Brazil such as Luis Felipe de Alencastro (2000), James Sweet (2003), José Curto (2004), and linguists like Martin Lienhard (2001), who specialized in translocal and transregional interactions between Africa and America or transfers within the Americas and the Atlantic world. They, too, emphasize the significance and influence of slaves of African origin in the Americas. This is not a coincidence, as most of them specialized in research into slavery in the former Portuguese colonial empire, the direct slave trade, and the associated exchange processes in the south Atlantic between central Africa (the Congo region and what is today Angola) and Brazil. Particularly in this region of the south Atlantic from the 16th century, intense and even mutual exchange processes had developed between Africa and America – in which African protagonists, especially, had played an important part.

Recently, views of slavery in the two Americas and the Atlantic world were revolutionized by the interest in researching the revolution of Sainte Domingue (1791–1804) (→ Revolution, II/44), the only successful slave revolution worldwide, which was manifested around the time of the 200th anniversary of Haitian independence in 2004. David Geggus (2003), one of the most renowned historians of the revolution in Sainte Domingue, pointed out on the occasion of the Bicentenaire in 1989 that all significant historians of the French Revolution had completely neglected the so-called colonial question. In 1995, the historian and anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot criticized the fact that the importance of this revolution had been systematically played down and attacked the silence of

historiography about this “unthinkable history.” Since Trouillot’s criticism, major changes and shifts in perspective have taken place that are attributable not least to the postcolonial turn but to even more recent discussions about new approaches in global history. In the last decade, an astonishing number of monographs and anthologies have been published about Sainte Domingue and its Atlantic and inter-American significance (Fischer 2004).

As David Geggus (2003), Laurent Dubois (2004), and others have indicated, the triumph of black slaves over their white owners alarmed slaveholders across the Americas. On the other hand, this revolution inspired several conspiracies, revolts, and assertions of black pride from Brazil to the United States. Thanks to their in-depth research, they were also able to overcome older assumptions – which reduced the significance of the slave revolution to its authoritarian and ethno-national character. They, in contrast, highlighted its pioneering role for abolition in the Americas, the Caribbean, and the Atlantic world, as well as for the creation of modern democracies (→ II/32) and demands for the universalization of human rights (→ II/35). This revolution, with its consequences and aftermath, is perhaps one of the strongest symbols for the entanglements of the two continents and the Caribbean as its articulation.

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19

UNFREE LABOR

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Defining unfree or forced labor is a rather complex task, first because, in a sense, all labor is forced, as most people are forced to work to survive. The theoretical opposition between free and unfree labor may therefore be regarded as constructed. Nevertheless, one should distinguish between unfree and free labor according to some basic criteria. One criterion is whether labor is offered voluntarily or obtained without the worker's consent; another is whether a worker is free to leave the employer without the threat of punishment. The definition of free labor versus unfree labor has always been the subject of debate (Brass and Van der Linden 1997) and raises a whole series of questions. By a Marxist definition, at least three attributes characterize classic free wage laborers: (1) they are free from direct compulsion ("extra-economic coercion"); (2) they have no means of production; and therefore (3) negotiate the sale of their labor. Steinfeld and Engerman (1997), whose economic approach is largely neoclassical, emphasize that whether or not coercion exists is ultimately a question of law, because both free wage labor and economic coercion are governed by laws. These debates were not only marked by disputes between contributors using a Marxist and those using a neoclassical economic framework, but also by disagreements about the epistemology that structures the contrast between unfree and free and that occurs within both neoclassical economics and Marxist approaches.

Second, a distinction should be drawn between forms of unfree or forced labor and slavery (→ I/18). Some of the typical features of slavery have been modified or weakened over time and in space, but they can still be regarded as basic elements of the institution that distinguish it from other forms of unfree labor: slavery lasts until the death of the slave, and the status is inherited by his or her children, who also remain slaves until their death. Slaves are not regarded as human beings but as chattels and can therefore be traded like other commodities. Slave families or marriages are not respected; they may be torn apart at any time, for example, by selling family members and marriage partners to different buyers. Because slaves were originally captives from kidnapping raids or war, they are regarded as dishonored. All of this legitimates the absolute power of the owners over their slaves. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to draw a clear line between slavery and other forms of unfree labor (Zeuske 2013).

Since Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman (1974) in their seminal study *Time on the Cross* succeeded in demonstrating, in contradiction to the view of classical economists, that slave labor both on plantations and in artisan and industrial operations was at least as efficient

and rational as free wage labor, the assumption of a linear development from coercion to freedom has been obsolete. What is clear is that in the 19th century, with the dissolving colonial legacy in Latin America and with a process of change, innovation, and capitalist economic development (→ Capitalism, II/2; Development, II/6), forms of unfree labor were dramatically extended and strengthened at a time when formal chattel slavery was on the wane. Viewed globally, the 19th century was a period of transition from unfree to free labor (Osterhammel 2009). This transition accelerated at a time when chattel slavery was on the wane in the zones of “second slavery” (Tomich 2004) – United States, Cuba, and Brazil – and other parts of Latin America became involved even more closely in global market demand for agricultural goods. And finally, tracing the history and genesis of free labor in the Americas and the Atlantic world (→ I/3), one should take into consideration that free labor was the exception rather than the rule in history, according to Seymour Drescher and Stanley Engerman (1998). This has been confirmed by many other scholars who investigated the topic (Kabadayi and Reichardt 2007; Lovejoy and Rogers 2012).

Different forms of unfree labor undoubtedly had a strong influence on the development of the Americas and the Atlantic world. At this point, it is important to say that, adopting a global history perspective, phenomena such as unfree or forced labor cannot fundamentally be recorded and comprehended in terms of national or regional history, nor solely within the context of the Atlantic. They have rather always been elementary processes of global history, existing in many places and many varieties, and alongside other labor systems. There was demand for unfree labor in all areas of the world where labor was scarce. This was the case both in what became Latin America and the Caribbean after the Spanish Conquest and in North America (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7; Migration, I/15). Given labor scarcity due to high mortality among indigenous workers (→ Indigenous Peoples, I/11), namely in the first century of the conquest, from the beginning, masters tried to restrict the mobility of their workers. Due to the diversity of the conditions of production and in order to meet the peculiar needs of time and place, mixed labor regimes combining slavery, other forms of unfree labor and free labor existed in parallel from the 16th century onward (→ Colonial Economies, I/4). In addition to slavery, there were other forms of unfree or forced labor, four of which are usually distinguished: serfdom, indentured labor, debt bondage, and penal servitude. Apart from specific forms of forced labor that were developed during the conquest of the Americas, partly on the basis of indigenous labor systems, there are two forms of unfree labor that especially need to be discussed here: indentured labor and debt peonage, because they were the most widespread in the two Americas and in the Caribbean. To summarize, coercion was essential to labor regimes throughout this emerging new world order, whether it was to control impressed gangs of seamen for the British navy, Irish indentured servants in English colonies in North America and the West Indies, or enslaved Muslims from the Sokoto Caliphate in Brazil.

In the three centuries of colonial expansion in the Americas, Europeans experimented with highly diverse forms of unfree labor. Though the Americas contained bastions of chattel slavery, especially of Africans, other forms of unfree labor were more widespread during both the colonial and national periods. Until the mid-18th century, African slaves and later their descendants constituted the overwhelming majority of unfree laborers in the whole of the Americas. However, in the first two centuries after the conquest, African slaves were expensive and not always available, while local labor supplies in the Caribbean proved numerically inadequate and politically unsuitable due to the vast demographic decline. Therefore, English and French colonists did what the market and the political environment dictated; they turned back to Europe for bonded labor as the Spanish had done before them. In order to stimulate this supply without creating a major legal, social, or political crisis

(→ II/4), they turned to the closest and most accepted labor system, indentured servitude, in Europe, a widely respected and legitimate institution. The French called such indentured workers *engagés*. They were expected to serve employers for a fixed term of years in return for passage to the colony.

The Spanish initially wanted to copy the Portuguese model, and enslaved the indigenous population. After the demographic catastrophe because of super-exploitation, slave raids, and diseases introduced by the Europeans, the Castilian Crown proscribed the enslavement of indigenous people. In the course of the *conquista*, the conquerors learned about local Indian forms of forced labor and slavery, adopting, adapting, and institutionalizing them (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7). These new forms of forced labor were known as *repartimiento de indios*, the distribution of prisoners of war and female slaves as loot or the *navoría*, with women forced to perform household and sexual services, and men to wash gold, dive for pearls, or work as porters (→ Gender and Work, II/11). Another form was the Andean *mita*, deriving from the Inca Empire, which included the regular but temporary provision of laborers. Another form of forced labor for the indigenous population, the *encomienda*, was introduced soon after the *conquista*. Its purpose was to control the indigenous population and reward the conquistadors. Each conquistador was allocated land and laborers, and in return had the obligation to convert them to Christianity (→ Religion and Missionizing, I/17). De facto, however, the focus was always on the exploitation of indigenous labor rather than on conversion to Christianity. After the prohibition on enslaving indigenous people at the beginning of the 16th century, the *encomienda* became the most important system of forced labor in the early colonial period. It proved impossible to fully enforce a ban on the *encomienda* issued in 1542, but as a consequence of the dramatic fall in population, the significance of the *encomienda* declined in the course of the 17th century. In marginal colonial regions, however, it remained until the end of colonial times (Belaúnde Guinassi 1945; Zavala 1978, 1992).

Exploitation through this *encomienda* system was part of what prompted the Dominican Fray Bartolomé de las Casas to publicly criticize the brutal treatment of indigenous laborers to the Spanish Crown. His untiring commitment to the welfare of indigenous people led not only to the abovementioned prohibition of the *encomienda*, but also to an especially bitter moral, intellectual, and political debate between theologians, missionaries, and conquerors on both sides of the Atlantic about the right way to treat indigenous people, their rationality, and the missions' methods (→ Indigeneity, I/31). In 1537, Pope Paul III thus declared in his bull *Sublimis Deus* that the Indians possessed reason and were capable of receiving Christianity. In view of this debate, the Dominican Francisco de Vitoria, a scholastic and moral theologian, belonging to the "School of Salamanca," argued for the establishment of an *ius gentium* ("law of peoples"), which de facto formed the basis of modern international law (→ Human Rights, II/35). Las Casas and other missionaries tirelessly drew the attention of the Spanish Crown and colonial authorities to mistreatment of the indigenous population by Spanish conquerors and settlers, and demanded the abolition of slavery and forced labor for Indians. The conquerors, for their part, referred to the necessity of forced labor for the continued existence of the colonies and vehemently demanded the recognition and extension of their privileges. Tragically, in consequence of this, Las Casas argued for the import of African slaves in order to spare the indigenous people. He later retracted this view, but by that time the transatlantic slave trade could no longer be prevented. Las Casas' concern for the welfare of indigenous peoples did, at least, lead to a discussion about their status. No other colonization in global history was ever again accompanied by a comparably critical and far-reaching debate about colonial practices and the conditions of exploitation of human labor.

Indentured labor

The Spanish implemented this model in the Greater Antilles during the 16th century, and in the 17th century, it provided an attractive template for French and English colonizers. Barbados in 1636 established guidelines for colonists. Voluntary contracted workers from “back home” would serve between five and seven years, those deported from the state, ten years. The few “negroes and Indians” would serve for life. This, asserted the Barbadian historian Hilary M.D. Beckles (2011), was the core plan for the labor regime that remained intact as long as colonial times lasted. In the first stage, indentured laborers (or servants) were free white Europeans (→ Whiteness, I/46) – mostly from England, Scotland, Ireland, or France and in the second stage Asians, mostly Chinese, called *coolies*. As for other workers employed in the 17th century in the English colonies in North America and the Caribbean under master and servant acts, indentured labor generally involved voluntary contracting, but it could be enforced using penal sanctions. Most of the English emigrants to the North American colonies financed their Atlantic passage through indenture contracts. In return for the cost of the passage, they were contracted to work for a specific number of years in a determined colony. The remuneration normally did not include a cash wage, but consisted of food, accommodation, clothing, and medical care during the indenture. It was common to pay “freedom dues” (for example, in seed, equipment, or other commodities) at the end of the indenture in order to help the immigrant to find an independent settlement. Drescher and Engerman (1998) point to the differences in contracting indentured servants and list the case of German immigrants to the British colonies; after their arrival, they were given a short period to find relatives or friends who could pay for their passage. If unsuccessful, they were indentured through an auction process.

The system of indentured labor continued after the American War of Independence (→ Independence Movements, I/10), initially on a very reduced scale, but was revived with the prohibition of the slave trade (1807) in the Atlantic by Britain, the abolition of slavery in the British colonies in 1834, and the gradual disappearance of slavery. This revival of indentured labor that followed during the 19th century was quite different from the form practiced in the 17th and 18th centuries involving the immigration of Europeans to North America and the Caribbean. In the 19th century, it was particularly Asia that provided labor for employers and planters in both Americas and the Caribbean. In fact, (forced) labor migration from Asia, Africa, and the Pacific islands was globalized in the 19th century as it led indentured laborers not only to the plantations and mines in the Americas, but around the world. Several hundred thousand Indians from north and south India were recruited as indentured laborers for work on the sugar plantations of Guyana, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and the smaller islands of the Caribbean. From the second half of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century, over half a million Chinese indentured laborers, called *coolies*, mainly from the southern maritime provinces, were recruited to work on the sugar plantations of the English Caribbean colonies as well as in Cuba, where they were set to work in the plantation economy in addition to slaves (Look Lai 1993). In the late 19th century, many more were brought to work on the American Pacific coast – namely in the guano mines and sugar plantations in Peru. In the United States – to where most of them came – and Mexico – where the “coolie trade” ended in 1874 – they were mainly used for building infrastructure, especially railways. The story of Chinese immigration on both sides of the border between Mexico and the United States, which was initiated by the coolie trade, is a good example of the entanglements between both Americas. On the one hand, there were exclusion laws by which U.S. governments repeatedly tried to prevent Chinese migration to

the West of the United States, and on the other hand corresponding contracts on the part of the Mexicans, who took in Chinese, and vice versa. Attempts were made on both sides to prevent Chinese immigration. Here, the migrants were able to take advantage of the legal situation on the other side of the border, respectively, and to commute back and forth across the border (→ *Borderlands*, II/26). Up to the 1930s, an intensive exchange between Chinese diaspora communities took place on both sides of the border (Hu-Dehart 1980, 1992, 2005).

Debt peonage

The phenomenon of debt peonage, as it developed in Latin America in the colonial era and spread especially after independence, takes diverse forms, on the one hand, and on the other hand is the subject of continual debates about its specific characteristics. In particular, the question arises here of how and to what extent changes took place in forms of debt peonage in the 19th century in view of the challenges presented by increasing interconnection with the world market. Generally speaking, debt peonage was a possibility for poor people, in return for the advance of a sum of money, to work for their creditors until the debt was paid. Even though indebtedness is voluntary, people often found it impossible to repay their debt due to coercive practices of their creditor, such as dishonest bookkeeping, overcharging at the creditor's store, payment in vouchers that could be redeemed only at the store of the hacienda, or the arbitrary imposition of discounts for supposedly unsatisfactory work. An initially voluntary agreement could in this way turn into involuntary servitude in which debtors were forced to work to repay their ever-augmented debts, which could even be transferred from one creditor to another or inherited.

The historian Alan Knight (1988), who studied the subject of debt peonage in Mexico, concludes that in 1908, there were still five million debt peons there. This picture was to change fundamentally in the course of the Mexican Revolution (1910–1940) (→ *Revolution*, II/44), which was accompanied by a surge of modernization in relation to working conditions. Knight suggests both a diachronic and a regional typology of debt peonage in Latin America that he derives from Mexico, as the region where debt peonage was most widespread in all of Latin America. All debt peons shared the element of debt, but they radically differed in respect to their characteristics and the impact on rural society, and should, according to Knight, therefore be split into three types.

The first type of debt peons was wage laborers, often temporary, whose debts consisted of advances paid in order to recruit them for (seasonal) work on the haciendas or commercial plantations. The advance payments served as an incentive and were thus part of an emerging free wage system. Nevertheless, here too there were elements of compulsion, which disappeared however when this system successfully developed. Knight cites various examples of this. In northwest Mexico, a region where mining and plantations competed for labor, measures of compulsion were no longer suitable, and the closeness of the U.S. border made forced recruitment of workers difficult. On the coffee plantations of the Soconusco region (the far southwestern tip of Mexico), too, incentives by means of advance payments were soon able to attract tens of thousands of seasonal workers annually to the coffee plantations. Here, according to Knight, the global coffee boom of the 1890s played a role, enabling the economically flourishing coffee barons in Soconusco to attract workers away from the traditional haciendas, which still worked with forced labor.

Knight describes the second form of debt peonage as “traditional,” because it originated under Spanish colonial rule (→ I/5). It was also based on advance payments that served as an incentive for laborers to take employment on a plantation or hacienda. Especially due to

the slow spread of the money economy, work on a hacienda or plantation offered indigenous communities a more or less regular income and, depending on whether they were resident peons, accommodation too, especially for those who had lost their lands to the expanding plantations. The resident peons remained on the hacienda not because they were bonded or coerced, but because of market pressures. This form of debt peonage was prevalent not only in Mexico, but even more clearly in Andean America, where the hacienda owners of the Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian uplands allowed the rural indigenous population to plant crops on their land or to pasture animals in return for their labor. If opportunities existed for additional earnings, for example from sharecropping, this system proved to be very stable, although there were always regional variations. Charles Gibson suggested that for the colonial Mexican heartland, the development sequence of *encomienda* labor – *repartimiento* – debt peonage occurred in response to the notoriously declining demographic curve for native peoples, concomitantly increasing the difficulties for hacienda owners in recruiting and retaining laborers. Gibson and others have also proposed that debt peonage in colonial times depended upon the ability of workers in relatively labor-scarce environments to maximize their position by extracting credits from their employers as a wage premium (Gibson 1964).

The third type is characterized by its unmistakably servile and coercive form, representing a new and calculating response to enhanced market demands, reproducing aspects of slavery, despite the formal abolition of slavery. In some ways, this type was possibly even more repressive than slavery. In contrast to the Mexican Soconusco region, in neighboring Guatemala, coffee planters used debt peonage as a means of disciplining and cheapening labor. Forms of debt peonage overlapping with slavery have also existed in rubber-producing areas, including the Putumayo region in Columbia and Peru as well as in Yucatán's henequen plantations.

From the early 1920s onward, coercion was legalized through vagrancy legislation whereby indigenous people were compelled to work on coffee plantations for a stipulated number of days per annum (McCreery 1997, 303–324). Here, alongside economic and political factors, the psychological factor was also decisive for the maintenance of debt peonage: the heritage of history. This historical heritage took effect in Latin America in peonage of the extreme, coercive kind that derived from chattel slavery. In the United States, peonage represented the “shadow of slavery” in the South. In Peru, plans to import Chinese coolies began in 1849 as the abolition of slavery loomed (1854). Cuban planters similarly looked to Chinese and Yucateco contract labor to offset the inexorable decline of slavery after the 1850s. The first two forms of debt peonage survived much longer, but the third type was rendered unprofitable and unviable through revolutions and reforms, the resistance to coercive measures, and increases in labor supply through population growth. The necessity to maintain harsh controls and physical coercion was expensive, and ultimately undermined this form of unfree labor, too.

Conclusion

Debates about the definition and characteristics of unfree labor have repeatedly revolved around the question of why and under what circumstances free and unfree labor could co-exist in the Americas, and what role they played in the development of a capitalist economy (→ Capitalism, II/2; Development, II/6), or how the transition from unfree to free wage labor took place. The answers are diverse, which is a result of the diversity of the forms of labor in different regions and of their lack of synchronicity. A now huge number of regional studies that examine the phenomenon, not only in the Americas and the Caribbean but also on a

global level, have confirmed again and again what Fogel and Engerman (1974) concluded for slavery in the antebellum South: unfree labor is highly compatible with capitalism. In Latin America, research into the historical roots of the use of unfree or semi-free labor cannot be separated from the debate about the characteristics of the *hacienda* (→ Colonial Economies, I/4). The issue of whether it was a capitalist institution – commercialized and economically rational, but organized along paternalistic lines or carrying more feudal characteristics of a “moral economy” – culminated in a heated debate in different studies of rural economic history in the 1970s and the 1980s (Bazant 1975; Semo 1977; Brading 1978; Van Young 2006). The anthropologists Sidney Mintz and Eric Wolf established criteria for the differences between lowland plantations (staple-producing and characterized by wage-labor systems in the 20th century, but in many regions based on slave or unfree labor in the 19th century) and highland haciendas (nominally free labor, farming, and livestock) in terms of six variables: capital, land (→ II/15), labor, markets, technology, and modes of social control (Mintz and Wolf 1957). Research on the nature of markets and the different forms of labor has had the best diagnostic impact for characterizing rural economic systems from the colonial epoch to the 20th century.

Furthermore, studies about conditions of capital accumulation and labor in the South of the United States in the period from the Civil War to the present point to entanglements in this respect between North and South America. The anthology edited by Brass and van der Linden (1997), containing several regional studies that confirm the validity of the “shadow of slavery” proposed by Knight, is still an outstanding survey. Profitable agribusiness in the South of the United States after the abolition of slavery remained dependent on the existence of a racially segmented rural working class (→ Social Inequality, II/20; Race I/39), which permitted capitalists to exploit the labor of a succession of immigrant and indigenous groups, beginning with the unfree and low-cost labor of Chinese and Japanese workers in the last third of the 19th century, and continuing with Mexican workers under the *bracero* program from the 1940s to the 1960s. The contribution by Krissman (1997, 201–208), especially, demonstrates how this ethnic workforce segmentation continues into the present through the work of low-cost and undocumented workers (→ Interethnic Relations, I/12), especially from Mexico and Central America – a development that has very likely increased in the 21st century.

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PART II

History and society in the Americas in the 20th and 21st centuries



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20

INTRODUCTION

History and society in the Americas in the 20th and 21st centuries. Inter-American thresholds and critical key concepts

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The 20th century has often been referred to as the “American Century.” The United States emerged as a global superpower and after the end of the Cold War, it was widely considered to be the only remaining superpower in a complex age of new globalization processes (Fernández-Armesto 2005, 159–188). This political–economic dominance of the U.S. went hand in hand with a worldwide “U.S.–americanization of culture” (Tota 2009), which not only refers to hegemonic formats but also to countercultural elements. Latin American political events – from the Mexican and Cuban Revolution to the Chilean neoliberal dictatorship – hinted at the conflictive energies, the deep social transformation, and ideological wars in the 20th century. Meanwhile, the 21st century is characterized by contradictory conjunctures of globalization, entangling different elements like the new information technologies and ethnic demands for recognition, rooted in the colonial constitution of the Americas.

As we are contemporary witnesses of the 20th and 21st centuries, we have experienced several recent transformations and the subsequent resemantization of key concepts of the social. Nevertheless, for historians, the periodization of the 20th century is a delicate task. Of course, from a historical point of view, the definition of a century, beginning on the 1st of January 1900 and ending on the 31st of December 1999 is not satisfactory, since the Gregorian calendar does not usually correspond with the man-made historical conjunctures with which historians are concerned. Periodization is a basic and contested task of historians, as criteria for the beginning or ending of historical cycles depend upon the theoretical approach as well as on the geocultural locus of enunciation.

For British historian Eric Hobsbawm, the 20th century is a short one in comparison to the “long 19th century,” which began with the French Revolution in 1789 and ended with the beginning of World War I in 1914. The “short 20th century” is in reality marked by the rise and fall of the Soviet Union and its confrontation with the United States, as the leading power of the capitalist block, from 1917 to 1989. Following Hobsbawm, the 1900s and 1910s before World War I were in cultural, economic, and technical terms characterized by its continuity with the 19th century.

Fundamental transformations occurred with the catastrophe of World War I as well as the social revolutionary unrest that found its highest expression in the October Revolution and the foundation of the Soviet Union on the ruins of the Czarian Empire.

Nevertheless, Hobsbawm, although very concerned with Latin American social history (Hobsbawm 2016), largely argues in regard to the global historical periodization of the 20th century from a European point of view. Giovanni Arrighi (1994) instead looked toward the rise of the U.S. and its embeddedness in the capitalist world-system to define the 20th century, which for him is a “long” one. This “long 20th century” comprises the rise of the U.S., including the beginning of its decline with the economic crisis of the 1970s and the turn from productive capitalism to financial speculation. In the same vein, Partha Chatterjee (1986) criticizes Hobsbawm’s “derivative model” not only as historicism but as a perspective that neglects the generation of histories outside the model of the modern nation-state invented by Europe and “gifted” to the rest of the world by process of conquest, invasion, or indirect pressure. In this sense, this *Handbook to the History and Society of the Americas* aims to also recover critical concepts in order to rethink the endogenous American processes (→ Postcolonialism, I/38), its relations with frames of unequal exchange, and the specific modalities by which American societies have responded with inner processes of political subjectivation to the imposition of global hegemonies (→ Alter-Globalization, I/21).

For the inter-American perspective applied in this handbook, we have chosen the emergence of the U.S. Empire in the aftermath of the Spanish-U.S.-American-Cuban-Filipino War in 1898 as a fundamental threshold and thus as a starting point for this second part of the present handbook. This war has also transformed the self-understanding of the United States in regard to its Southern neighbors as expressed in its growing political interventionism (→ II/36) and economic imperialism, as well as cultural influence. With the beginning of the 20th century, a profound geopolitical shift in global power relations toward the Western Hemisphere, and in particular the U.S., could be observed that led journalist Henry R. Luce to baptize this century as the “American Century.” Luce argued in the early 1940s for the possibility of choice – not of necessity – for all U.S.-American citizens to accept their nation’s exceptional role in world politics,

As America enters dynamically upon the world scene, we need most of all to seek and to bring forth a vision of America as a world power which is authentically American ... now in this moment of testing there may come clear at last the vision which will guide us to the authentic creation of the 20th Century – our Century.

(1999 [1941], 169)

In this context, the quest for U.S.-American hegemony, in competition with the British Empire and the emerging German Empire, is linked to a plea for freedom on the one hand, and to a *realpolitik* on the other hand that considers Latin America as its neo-imperial backyard. In this sense, the Pax Americana is also based on military force, from the gunboat policy over counter-insurgency to the atomic superpower (→ Military, II/37). At the same time, the U.S.-American way of life fostered by the cultural industry and mass consumption became a leading set of values (→ Consumerism, I/23), often experienced in Latin America in terms of cultural imperialism.

Thus, the emergence of the U.S.-American 20th century is periodically contested south of the Rio Grande by anti-imperialistic expressions ranging from José Martí and Roldó to Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Hugo Chávez. Here, Pan-American integration is seldom understood in hemispheric terms, and instead Bolivarian ideas of a Pan-American union of Latin America are focused upon (→ Pan-Americanism, II/40). In this sense, Che Guevara criticized U.S.-led inter-American integration (1961), “Only the mind of some university student could deduce an obligation to political union from the geographic coincidence of our living together in the Americas.”

From the 20th onward to the 21st century, Latin American political and cultural thought has been deeply inspired by socialist ideas (→ Socialism, I/42). In global history, the history of socialism has been written from a fairly Eurocentric point of view; yet from an inter-American perspective, the experience of the Mexican Revolution has to be highlighted as the first social revolution of the 20th century that possessed open socialist and anarchist aspects. Throughout the 20th century, socialism has been a point of reference for political thinking in Latin America, and even after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, a rebirth of a socialism occurred in Latin America in the 21st century within the so-called “pink tide” related to the presidents Hugo Chávez, Inacio “Lula” da Silva, Ernesto Kirschner, Rafael Correa, José Mujica, and Evo Morales (Webber and Carr 2013).

In this sense, this second part of the *Routledge Handbook to the History and Society of the Americas* also follows the discussions that have claimed, on the one hand, the political nuance of revolutions and counterrevolutions (→ Revolution, II/44) in the Americas during 20th and 21st centuries; and on the other, the politics of inclusion, citizenship (→ II/27), and production of difference in each context. Formulaic syntheses of these processes were different in each case in the first half of the 20th century with concepts such as *mestizaje* in Mexico and Peru, *melting pot* in the United States, *crisol de razas* in Argentina, and *cadinho de razas* in Brazil (→ Hybridity, I/30). Each one of these concepts has generated its proper syntaxes of hegemonic national composition – and its contestation. The *indigenismos* (→ Indigeneity, I/31) from diverse nature have had a direct – and at the same time, tense – relationship with citizenship policies between inclusion, assimilation, and protection. Moreover, at this stage, different contemporary scholars coincide that the results – from a long-term scale of analysis – were ambivalent. In the 1930s and 1940s, these processes implied certain models of access to more equitable material conditions and republican symbolic fields and even initiated a new wave of hemispheric decolonization (Luis-Brown 2008), but in other cases, they have also contributed to fix the 19th-century erasure of the *indio* and the native American from the current citizenship forms (fixing the category as a part of folklorization, atavism, or a “form of the past”), while the concept of the popular (→ I/37) – especially in Latin America – has fulfilled an important role in ideological constructions and identity building. Contrastingly, these models have enhanced differentiation and distinction processes, often bodily encrypted, in order to produce a racialization of populations in particular nation-state modulations (→ Biopolitics, I/22). At the end of the 20th century, politics of recognition in regard to so-called ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, and other subaltern groups have dominated the politics of culture with concepts such as affirmative action, inter- and multiculturalism (→ I/36), or even in the Andean region plurinationalism, while in the “age of migration” (→ Transnational Migration, I/44), new antagonist debates on citizenship and whiteness (→ I/46) have also arisen.

Although the U.S. was the only remaining superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union, its geopolitical dominance is vanishing. On the one hand, economic globalization and the rise of the network society have caused power to become increasingly disconnected from the nation-state. Power is more often located in the command centers of transnational corporations and its think tanks than in national governments. On the other hand, new geopolitical centers such as China have emerged contesting the economic hegemony of the U.S. (not only) in Latin America. In this sense, it seems that the American century is coming to its end.

After this short panoramic discussion on the problems of periodization of the 20th century, the following pages of this introduction to the second part of the *Handbook to the History and Society of the Americas* will provide snapshots on the most important turning points or thresholds

within this period. These thresholds usually are represented by a single year, but – as historical processes cannot be reduced to linear time – in some cases, several years were chosen. The main concern is to identify decisive moments where the meaning and cultural significance of important social and cultural–political concepts in the Americas changed profoundly. Namely, this introduction focuses on 1917, 1948, 1968–1973, 1989/90, 2005, and 2016/17 to grasp the main thresholds of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century.

1917

The first inter-American threshold in the 20th century is marked by the success of the Mexican Revolution, probably best expressed in the new Mexican constitution and the U.S.–American entry into World War I, both in the year 1917. In 1910, a broad uprising began in Mexico against the technocratic and authoritarian regime of Porfirio Díaz that culminated in the first revolution of the 20th century. Demands against the Porfiriato mixed with calls for more social rights and an Agrarian Reform. In 1911, the Partido Liberal Mexicano, more an anarchist movement led by Enrique and Ricardo Flores Magón than a liberal political party, organized a military uprising with cooperation from the Industrial Workers of the World and other U.S.–American volunteers, controlling the border-cities of Tijuana and Mexicali for six months (Akers Chacón 2018).

Among the revolutionaries was not only tension but open conflict between more radical, peasant-based, and conservative, upper-class-based, fractions that found their highest expression in the assassination of Emiliano Zapata in 1919, a crime ordered by President Venustiano Carranza. Nevertheless, the revolution found a prominent institutionalization in the constitution, where important social rights have been granted, e.g. in regard to the redistribution of land, labor rights, or to health. This constitution was not only inspired by the U.S.–American one but also by the socialist constitution of the recently founded Soviet Union, as it also contains crucial demands of the anarchist movement.

The Mexican Revolution was also a reaction against U.S. imperialism and interventions such as the expedition led by General Pershing in Mexican territory against Francisco “Pancho” Villa (1916–1917), the intervention of U.S. marines in Veracruz (1914), and other actions of secret warfare (Katz 1981). Mexico was of special geopolitical interest for the U.S. as well as for the Central Powers, under the leadership of the German Empire, which tried to form an alliance with Mexico and to provoke a political rupture between Mexico and the U.S.

In this sense, the inter-American dynamics between Mexico and the USA were also decisive for the actuation of the U.S. in the global arena of World War I. The last decisive aspect that led to the final active engagement of the USA in the Entente Cordiale was the so-called Zimmermann Telegram case. In 1917, British secret agencies managed to intercept a delicate telegram sent by the German Foreign Minister Zimmermann to the Mexican government. The German Empire invited Mexico to join the war as an ally against the United States proposing to support the Mexican military efforts to recover the territories of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona that Mexico had lost in the Mexican–U.S.–American War in 1848. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, who before had hesitated to join the war, saw this telegram as a *casus belli* and declared war against the German Empire. In the same year, Brazil also declared war against the Central Powers, while most of the Latin American countries – especially in the Andes and the Cono Sur – remained neutral (Rinke 2012).

The decisive intervention of U.S. troops in World War I shaped a new horizon of expectation to conceive of the U.S. not only as the dominant power of the Western Hemisphere, but

also as a leading world power. However, the realization of this aspiration had its shortcomings. Looking back on the post-World War I period, the above-cited U.S. journalist Luce claimed, “In 1919 we had a golden opportunity, an opportunity unprecedented in all history, to assume the leadership of the world – a golden opportunity handed to us on the proverbial silver platter. We did not understand that opportunity. Wilson mishandled it. We rejected it. The opportunity persisted. We bungled it in the 1920’s and in the confusions of the 1930’s we killed it” (1999 [1941], 166–167).

Instead, the U.S. foreign policy was basically focused on the Western Hemisphere – oscillating between the Big Stick policy and the Good Neighbor approach. Especially in the period of World War I, the U.S. expanded its geopolitical power in the Western Hemisphere through the occupation of Nicaragua (1912–1933), Haiti (1915–1934), the Dominican Republic (1916–1924), and Cuba (1917–1922) followed by several interventions in Central America (Panama, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras) at the beginning of the 1920s. This interventionist policy was accompanied by a dramatic expansion of U.S.-American economic activities in Latin America until the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the subsequent Great Depression. In the context of economic crisis, Latin American anti-imperialist movements, social revolutionary protest, and the rise of fascism and Nazism in Europe, at the end of the 1920s and especially in the 1930s, the relations between the U.S. and the Latin American countries were shaped by the noninterventionist Good Neighbor Policy.

After the turning point of 1917, the U.S. government’s primary concern remained to be to gain firmer control over its Southern neighbors in the post-World War I period on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine; on the other hand, the debilitation of the European powers, the expansion and neo-imperial control of the Western Hemisphere, as well as isolated geopolitical interventions beyond the Western Hemisphere began to shape the concept of the U.S. as a possible world power that waited for its realization. This beginning of the end of European geopolitical power was also echoed in Latin America. South American elites, traditionally orientated toward Europe, began to lose confidence in the cultural superiority of Europe due to the devastating human consequences of the war.

Nevertheless, in Latin America, the newly emergent U.S. power and investment was not only welcomed, but also accelerated existing anti-imperialist and national attitudes. In this sense, 1917 was not only a turning point for the emergent global power of the U.S. The Mexican Revolution demonstrated that a social or even socialist revolution in the Western Hemisphere was possible, even in the backyard of the U.S. despite its growing political, economic, and military power. The anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist options became an even more influential aspect of a (near) horizon of expectation through the victory of the Bolsheviks in Russia in the October Revolution in 1917.

The time around 1917 was a threshold for the emergence of a whole set on concepts related to revolution (→ II/44) and socialism (→ I/42), class (→ Social Inequality, II/20), and social rights such as health (→ I/29) and education (→ I/24), land (→ II/15), as well as notions of freedom (→ I/27), such as women’s suffrage (→ Gender Identities, I/28) which was granted in New York State in 1917 (and in 1920 in the whole U.S.). In the United States, 1919 and 1920 are thought of as a high-water mark for radicalism, but also as a period of reaction and repression. The United States entry into World War I prompted the emergence of a massive antiwar movement, led by socialists, anarchists, labor movement radicals (such as Industrial Workers of the World), and pacifists. Congress responded with the passage of the Espionage Act (1917) and the Sedition Act (1918), which were used to round up radicals for a variety of antiwar activities. After the war ended, labor strikes all over the country – particularly the general strike in Seattle – only heightened government concerns

about the threat of socialists and communists. The raids authorized by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer led to a widespread crackdown on radicals, many of whom – including Emma Goldman – were deported. The arrest, trial, and execution of anarchists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti defined, in many ways, the 1920s as an age of reaction (→ Class struggle, II/3). Yet, the onset of the Great Depression suddenly made possible many of the reforms for which socialists and radicals had been lobbying for decades: the right of unions to organize, state pensions for the elderly, welfare programs for the poor, etc. According to historian Alan Brinkley (1995), this era marked “the end of reform,” with the administration of Franklin Roosevelt introducing with his New Deal policy just enough reform to undercut calls for revolution, to preserve capitalism.

1948

The end of World War II marked the beginning of a global geopolitical transformation that can be described best as the Pax Americana: the reordering of the world under U.S.-American hegemony. Geopolitically, this was the period described by historians as the Cold War. U.S.-American political advisor Bernard Baruch was the first who used this term in a speech in 1947 written by journalist Herbert Bayard Swope to describe the confrontation.

Usually, the beginning of the Cold War period is related to the year 1947. U.S. President Harry S. Truman’s announcement of what became known as “the Truman Doctrine,” the first public articulation of a U.S. foreign policy dedicated to “containment” ushered in a nearly fifty-year-long epoch in which the United States consistently justified its actions as necessary to contain the spread of communism. Truman claimed that the United States had the responsibility to intervene anywhere on the globe to “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” Until the fall of the Soviet Union (and beyond) in 1991, this doctrine was the backbone of U.S.-American foreign policy. It led most immediately to passage of the National Security Act of the same year, the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as well as the National Security Council, and the United States Air Force. It also led to proxy wars in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In 1946, the U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA), located in the U.S.-controlled Panama Canal Zone, was founded in order to instruct the armed forces of Latin America using training programs that were compatible with United States customs and geopolitical trajectories. From the 1960s onward, the School taught specific anti-communist counterinsurgency strategies, including torture. Several future Latin American dictators passed through the School of the Americas, as part of a general pattern of U.S. support for right-wing dictatorships (Schmitz 1999; Gill 2004).

In 1947, anti-communism not only determined the foreign policy of the U.S., it was also a main operator in domestic politics, jerking the country back to another period of political repression. The persecutions by the House Committee of Un-American Activities reached a new peak investigating New Deal government officials and a number of figures in the cultural industry (→ III/27), especially from Hollywood, who had flirted with communism during the darkest days of the Great Depression. Although Red-baiting Senator Joseph McCarthy was ultimately censured for launching political witch hunts, the intensity of anticommunism contributed to a stifling of political discourse for a generation or more.

The climate of anti-communism extended beyond the United States throughout the Western Hemisphere (Iber 2015). Instead of a Panamerican integration based on a dialogue among equal neighbors, a Pax America international institution building took place. Notably, the USA and nearly all Latin American countries committed to hemispheric

anti-communism by signing the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in Rio de Janeiro, commonly known as the Rio Treaty (1947). This treaty formalized the agreement made at the inter-American Pact of Chapultepec in 1945. In light of the Truman Doctrine, the Rio Treaty formalized the principle that an attack against one of its members is to be considered an attack against all of them, with implicit reference to the communist fear.

Having arranged a military-political alliance among nearly all countries of the Western Hemisphere under U.S. hegemony, the inter-American system made another important step on April 30 of 1948 to its formalization through the foundation of the Organization of American States (OAS). The OAS was established at the Panamerican conference that took place in Bogotá in 1948. Precisely during this Panamerican conference, the anti-oligarchical presidential candidate Jorge Elcier Gaitán was assassinated in Bogota. The U.S. used this incident to raise anti-communist sentiments, while most Colombians attributed the assassination to the political right. In Colombia, this political incident led to the riots, the so-called *bogotazo*, that initiated the Colombian Civil War. Hobsbawm (2016) saw this event as one element of a sort of chain reaction of movements on national liberation that World War II set free. In Colombia, the revolutionary movements failed to develop and the country slipped into a long-lasting Civil War. In Bolivia, a social revolution occurred in 1952, while the victory of Fidel Castro in Cuba in 1959 marked a new cycle of national liberation within the formal decolonized Latin-American countries.

In the context of the Cold War, a more dialogical relation between the Latin American countries and the U.S., as it has been envisioned by some protagonists of the Good Neighbor Policy, vanished and was replaced by a geopolitical power-policy (Brands 2010). By recognizing the dictatorship of the military *junta* in Venezuela in 1948 after the coup d'état against elected president Rómulo Gallegos in Venezuela, the U.S. demonstrated that geopolitical considerations triumphed over values such as freedom or democracy. Nevertheless, in the face of the national revolution in Bolivia in 1952, that was supported by workers, miners, and peasants with an anarchist-socialist and also Trotskyist background, the United States reacted with a moderate political intervention using development aid as a tool to prevent a radicalization of the revolution (Field 2014). Two years later, the U.S. acted more aggressively against Guatemala (Siekmeier 1999). After the failed attempt to convince the delegates of the Panamerican Conference in Venezuela in 1954 that Guatemaltecan President Jacobo Árbenz represented a communist threat to the hemisphere, applying the standards of the Rio Treaty, President Dwight Eisenhower acted unilaterally and supported a coup d'état against Árbenz who had initiated an agrarian reform that would also have affected the plantations of the United Fruit Company.

On a global scale, the Pax Americana also led to a considerable building of international institutions that followed the bipolar logic of the Cold War. In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington to create the NATO as a defense alliance against the communist block. While several concepts have been overdetermined by the rhetoric and imaginary of the Cold War since 1947, new important key concepts have emerged. The beginning of the Cold War marked the invention of the concept of development (→ II//6) policy. In his inaugural speech as the U.S. president on January 20, 1949, Harry S. Truman not only announced the foundation of the NATO, but also invented the underdevelopment of the majority of the world population and thus new attitudes toward biopolitics (→ I/22),

More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.

And he proposed development and capitalist modernization as a solution for these problems, “For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering of these people.” (Truman 1949) This plea for modernization (→ I/35) was accompanied by an accelerated process of urbanization (→ I/45) in the Americas.

The Truman announcement coincided with the emergence of the development of institutions for structuring and fostering the capitalist world market, such as the International Monetary Fund (1947) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt 1947). These institutions completed the set of global financial institutions – the World Bank was established in 1945 – that were envisioned in the Bretton Woods Conference (1944).

Beyond this block-related institution building, in 1947, important international agreements of the United Nations were also adopted, such as the Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Through its universal character, these global agreements changed the meaning of concepts such as human rights (→ II/35) and genocide significantly, planting the seeds for a cosmopolitical emergence of a world civil society (→ Cosmopolitanism, III/5).

While 1947/8 was a threshold for the establishment of the bipolar Cold War order, at this same time, it opened a horizon of contestation and creative searches for a third path. In Argentina, it was Juan Domingo Perón, elected in 1946, who promoted on an international stage the idea of an Argentinean third way between “greedy capitalism” and “totalitarian communism” (Petersen 2018). On a smaller scale, Costa Rica decided – in a context of worldwide growing militarization (→ Military, II/37) – to be the first country to abolish its army after the short, bloody Costa Rican Civil War in 1948.

Nevertheless, in the following years in the backyard of the U.S., it became nearly impossible to establish a third position beyond the U.S. lead capitalist and the USSR-led communist bloc. A striking example is the Cuban Revolution of 1959. First, this revolution against the dictatorial regime of Batista, supported by the U.S., was an ideologically diverse movement for national liberation, but it was especially after the missile crisis and the failed U.S.-organized invasion in the Bay of Pigs that Cuba reinforced its alliance with the Soviet Union.

Of particular importance for the introduction of new concepts and the resemantization of existing ones in an inter-American context was the theory-production of the 1948-established UN-Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (in Spanish: Cepal) in Santiago de Chile. In Cepal, a group of critical economists – such as Raúl Prebisch, who became executive secretary of the Cepal in 1950, and Brazilian Celso Furtado – opposed traditional theories of modernization and development highlighting the structural inequality of power relations between metropolitan and peripheral countries. The Prebisch hypothesis on unequal exchange in the world is considered to be a foundational work of Dependency Theory. In the 1960s and 1970s, Dependency Theory became the main critical approach to Latin American societal realities that also openly addressed inter-American relations of dependence (Kay 1989). With its origins in Latin America, Dependency Theory soon became an inter-American approach related to U.S.-American Neo-Marxists, such as Paul B. Baran and Paul Sweezy as well as German intellectual Andre Gunder Frank. Dependency Theory oriented approaches spread over different Latin American countries and entered into an emerging critical youth culture. It had an enormous impact on the reconceptualization of a whole slew of political-economical terms such as modernization (→ I/35), dependency, and development (→ II/6).

In the United States, inter-American relations also increasingly became a matter of domestic policy for the U.S. Mexican anthropologist and indigenist Manuel Gamio who had already written on *Mexican Immigration to the United States* and *The Life Story of the Mexican Immigrant* in the early 1930s and was obviously also influenced by the emerging chicano and

latino-movement that had founded the Confederación de Uniones Obreras Mexicanos (1927) and the League of United Latin American Citizens (1928), as well as the La Asociación de Jornaleros (1933). However, it was the Bracero-program and its effects that profoundly accelerated the question of *latinidad* (→ I/33) in the U.S. The Bracero-program was intended to fill the labor shortage in agriculture during World War II (Chavez 2008). Mexican migrant workers often suffered racism and although approximately 350,000 Mexican Americans served in World War II, they were not completely recognized. In response, veteran and physician Héctor García founded the American G.I. Forum in 1948, a nongovernmental organization of Hispanic veterans, to promote the rights of Mexican-American veterans, education, and civil rights (Gonzalez 2000). While they had some success in the politics of recognition, in 1950, mass deportations of Mexican migrants started establishing a continuing important field of conflictive inter-American relations. Nevertheless, from 1951 to 1964, a yearly average of about 200,000 men and women continued to come to work in the U.S., contributing to a growing latinization of the Anglo-American North.

1968–1973

In the midst of the Cold War, social and political tensions in the Americas increased dramatically. Immanuel Wallerstein interpreted the year 1968 as a real “world-revolution” contesting the hegemony of the U.S. within the capitalist world-system. This challenge was probably best expressed in the worldwide opposition to the United States involvement in the Vietnam War between 1964 and 1973. In Cuba, and elsewhere in Latin America, anti-imperialists expressed solidarity with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front. At the height of the war, Che Guevara called for “two, three, many Vietnams” to be fought against the United States, “the great enemy of mankind.” Only if anti-imperialist forces around the world united in this way, could the United States be contained, Guevara explained. Although the U.S. ended the Vietnam War in 1973, it concentrated its anti-communist hegemonic efforts in its traditional backyard. Latin America became, as Greg Grandin (2006) has explained, “empire’s workshop,” a place where soft power was replaced with Reagan-era “hard power,” sponsoring death squads and paramilitary regimes.

In Latin America, the turn from the 1960s to the 1970s came to a crossroads between social(ist) revolution or capitalist-conservative renovation, supported by the Alliance for Progress (Taffet 2007). In the Americas, the threshold between 1968 – a paradigmatic year for social revolutionary activities and revolts – and 1973, the coup d’état against the socialist government of Salvador Allende and the subsequent military dictatorship as well as the establishment of a neoliberal model in Chile, condensed this transformation. A similar emblematic condensation of this turning point took place in Mexico where the utopian horizon of the Mexican 1968 movement vanished with the Tlatelolco massacre where police forces and the military killed around 400 peaceful demonstrators. In several Latin American countries as well as in the U.S., the libertarian and emancipative cycle closed, or was stopped by violence, burying the ideas of social and cultural revolutions, and initiating a new conjuncture of neoconservative backlash and neoliberal hegemony in the 1980s. The latter found their best expression in the neoliberal triad of president Ronald Reagan in the U.S. (1981–1989), prime minister Margret Thatcher in Great Britain (1979–1990), and dictator Augusto Pinochet in Chile (1973–1990). The rise of neoliberalism (→ II/16) went hand in hand with the beginning of the worldwide oil crisis that led to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 and the establishment of the neoliberal doctrine in the global financial markets.

The violent strategies against social movements (→ I/41) were manifold, and culminated in the threshold of 1968. In 1967, the Bolivian military ended, with the support of U.S. secret service, the guerrilla of Ñancahuazú with the symbolic execution of Ernesto “Che” Guevara in 1967. One year later, the powerful mobilization cycle of the civil rights movement in the U.S. that began in 1955 came to a violent end with the assassination of Martin Luther King in 1968. In 1973, Chilean socialist president Salvador Allende died in the midst of a U.S.-supported Chilean coup d’état that led also to the torture and murder of the famous singer-songwriter Víctor Jara, as well as the deaths of more than 3,000 Chileans at the hands of the new military dictatorship. In the dictatorships of the Cono Sur, such as in Argentina, a new political category was imposed without translation: the *detenidos desaparecidos* in more than 360 Clandestine Detention Centers between 1976 and 1982 (Pollak 2006). In 1968, in the so-called Operation Condor, a joint cooperation between the Latin American dictatorships and the U.S. CIA, almost 42,000 people went missing or were killed in Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

The year 1968 also marked a threshold of cultural transformations. Throughout the Americas, the 1960s were shaped by new youth movements as well as sub- and counterculture movements that had strong roots in the U.S. They challenged established conservative norms in regard to family (→ I/26) and lifestyle, as well as new subcultures (→ I/43), race (→ I/39), gender identities (→ I/28), and their intersections (→ Intersectionality, I/32). In part, this youth uprising sprang from the structural reality of the postwar baby boom which shifted the demographics of the United States to the younger end of the spectrum; anything young people did en masse was bound to have a dramatic effect on U.S.-American society. Most importantly, youth politics arose as a challenge not only to traditional values, but to the liberal consensus of mid-century. Young people challenged the structures of racism, patriarchy, religion, heteronormativity, corporatism, environmental devastation, and militarism. One important expression of these new cultural movements was the Woodstock Festival in 1969 that also marked the beginning turning points of these youth cultures toward drug addiction, depoliticization, and a growing importance of the cultural industry (→ III/27) and consumerism (→ I/23). It did not take long for advertisers to co-opt all that was hip about U.S.-American youth in what Thomas Frank (1998) calls “the conquest of cool.” In sociology, this change of values has later been analyzed as a transformation toward a post-material society.

In Latin America, a cultural movement emerged – partly in exchange with the songwriter movement of the U.S. – that recuperated the musical heritage of the region. The Nueva Canción Chilena (Víctor Jara, Inti Illimani, Quilapayún) or the Nueva Trova Cubana (Silvio Rodríguez, Pablo Milanes) expressed the revolutionary feelings of many young Latin Americans. In the 1970s, the inter-American musical exchange also produced new musical styles, like the invention of salsa by Puerto Rican musicians in the clubs of New York. In literary terms, the new self-confidence of a revolutionary Latin America proud of its heritage found its expression in the boom-literature of magic realism (→ III/12).

1989/90

Globalization is the key term that characterizes the profound transformations at the threshold of the years 1989/1990. The informational–technological innovations with the first proposals for the World Wide Web in 1989 and the establishment of the first Internet connections as well as the programming of the first known Internet webpage made a big difference in all social fields. Furthermore, new biotechnological innovations, especially in the field of gene-manipulation for agro-industrial purposes, led to a new “green revolution” in agriculture.

Coincidentally, this technological innovation occurred parallel to the collapse of the Soviet system and the fall of the symbolic Berlin Wall, which led the president of the Soviet Union Mikael Gorbachev and U.S.-American president George H. W. Bush to declare the end of the Cold War in 1989. The collapse of the socialist block marked the end of an existing alternative to the capitalist system. According to Hobsbawm (1994, 17), the short 20th century came to an end, and neoconservative thinkers such as Francis Fukuyama (1992) even claimed the “end of history” in a global neoliberal capitalism. In the midst of the crisis of socialism, Latin American revolutionary movements and governments had their own problems. In Cuba, the economy nearly collapsed. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas, word-wide role models for an alternative non-Soviet left, were defeated in the 1990 elections, by conservative Violeta Chamorro.

From a Latin American perspective, this threshold was often interpreted as marking a turning point toward a new wave of democratization, ending the Cold War dictatorships and authoritarian regimes (→ Authoritarianism, II/25) following the anti-communist doctrine of national security. The most striking example for the transition toward democracy was the end of the Pinochet dictatorship and the assumption of office of the first democratically elected president in Chile since the violent end of Allende, Patricio Aylwin on March 12, 1990. Three days later, Fernando Collor de Mello took office as the first democratically elected president in Brazil after twenty-nine years of dictatorship. And in 1993, Juan Carlos Wasmosy became the first elected president in Paraguay, after nearly forty years of the Alfredo Stroessner dictatorship. In El Salvador, guerilla leaders and government representatives ended twelve years of Civil War. In Haiti, liberation theologian Jean-Bertrand Aristide waked the aspirations for liberation and social equality and was elected in 1990. In the following year, he became a victim of a military coup, but – with the pressure of the U.S. – he was reestablished in 1994. Nevertheless, the United States did not completely cease to rely on military interventions in Latin America. In 1990, they invaded Panama to depose President Manuel Noriega.

With the end of the bipolar world, the United States of America established itself as the unique world power. In geopolitical terms, this situation required from the perspective of the U.S., a New World Order. Free trade became a core principle for the post-Cold War era. In Latin America, the common market of the South, the Mercosur, was established and the United States envisioned the whole Western Hemisphere from Alaska to the Antarctic as a free-trade area. The first step to realize this vision was the establishment of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico in 1994 (Schmalz 2013).

A new element of the post-fordist regime (→ State Transformation, II/21) was the rapidly growing importance of the financial markets in the 1990s. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system provided the conceptual room to understand money as a commodity, and the informational–technological innovations in the stock markets accelerated the worldwide circulation of huge amounts of money, including financial speculations, in real time. The unregulated financial speculation and the new global financial regime created new economic crisis. After the NAFTA agreement and the subsequent de facto dollarization of Mexico, the Tequila crisis and its effects rippled across the South American continent, where among other effects, Ecuador was forced to replace its national currency completely with the U.S. dollar in 1996.

However, globalization was not only an economic issue. The wave of democratization also opened a window of opportunities for other societal concerns, such as the ecological question. In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held the Earth Summit, or Rio Conference, in Rio de Janeiro, putting the concepts of sustainable development on a global agenda. In the context of an accelerated

process of globalization, the early dynamics – namely the conquest and colonization of the Americas – also came to the forefront. Facing the preparations for the commemoration of the 500th anniversary of the beginning of the conquest marked by the arrival of Cristobál Colón in the Americas, massive indigenous protests broke out. The indigenous uprising in Ecuador in 1990 was a starting point for the emergence of a new pan-national indigenous movement that put indigeneity (→ I/31) on a global agenda and that would shape cultural and political debates in all American countries in the following two decades. The political outcomes from this new cycle of indigenous mobilization were overwhelming. In the 1990s, there were several constitutional changes in American countries, beginning with Colombia (1991), Peru (1993), Bolivia (1994), and Ecuador (1998) that recognized the specific cultural rights of indigenous peoples. Furthermore, ILO Convention 169, which recognizes cultural rights and limited autonomy for indigenous peoples, was signed by nearly all Latin American governments (Kaltmeier 2017). In the United States, such recognition of indigenous peoples lagged behind that of the rest of the hemisphere, as Native American populations struggled to persevere on U.S. government established reservations.

In this sense, 1990 not only marked the consolidation of a neoliberal worldwide free-trade regime, it also marked the beginning of new contestatory and social movements – such as the indigenous, the environmental, and the alter-globalization movements (→ I/21) – that envisioned new utopian horizons of expectations of social change, democratization, and multicultural recognition. Thereby, the core values of the economic globalization were also challenged. The start of NAFTA on January 1, 1994 was contested by the uprising of the indigenous-based guerrilla EZLN in the Mexican southern state of Chiapas. The EZLN – with the poetic communiques of Sub-Comandante Marcos – became an important global point of reference for a libertarian left movement envisioning an alter-globalization.

2005

The 21st century began in the Western Hemisphere with an unexpected loss of political control of the United States over their Southern neighbors. After the emergence of U.S.-democratic imperialism in 1898 and the following establishment of the U.S. as the only remaining superpower, in the 2000s, Latin American countries took self-determined development paths in a way they had not done in historical periods before. The failure of the negotiations to transform the Americas in a free-trade area – the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) – under U.S.-American hegemony failed in 2005, because of the rejection of most Latin American countries. And even more, in a seemingly paradoxical historical *détournement*, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez proclaimed in January 2005 at the fifth World Social Forum, the Latin American project of the “Socialism for the 21st Century.” Socialism (→ I/42) had become – surprisingly a decade after the end of the Soviet Union – a political alternative in Latin America. Hugo Chávez came into power in 1998 followed by Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva in Brazil and Néstor Kirchner in Argentina in 2003 as well as Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay in 2005. In the same year, Bolivian coca-unionist Evo Morales won the elections in Bolivia with his “Movement to Socialism,” after Benito Juárez in Mexico 1858, the second indigenous president in Latin America. This process went hand in hand with attempts to decolonize Latin American societies (→ Postcolonialism, I/38), redefining traditional concepts of memory politics (→ I/34), race (→ I/39), and ethnicity (→ I/25), as well as development (→ II/6) through the introduction of new concepts such as “buen vivir,” or *sumaq kausay* in Kichwa.

In the following years, a real turn to the left occurred in the region, with most Latin American countries ruled by leftist or social democratic governments. This turn found its expression also in new regional institutionalizations. In 2005, the Latin American broadcasting network TeleSur was established to break the news monopoly of U.S. news agencies and oligarchical media-oligopolies in the region. To confront the neoliberal free-trade integration, namely the FTAA, in 2004 the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América – Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos was founded to foster Latin American integration (→ Regional Integration, II/18) based on mutuality and solidarity. A further step of political integration in Latin America without the involvement of the United States was the foundation of the intergovernmental regional organization Union of South American Nations (Unasur) in 2008. Parallely, the foundation of the Banco del Sur in 2007 was meant to break the hegemony of the World Bank as a development bank. In 2007, elected president Rafael Correa ordered the closure of U.S. military bases in Ecuador. Nevertheless, the United States generally accepted the democratic elected leftist governments, with the exception of the coup d'état against President Manuel Zelaya in Honduras in 2008. The South American progressive turn also found its echo in the North. In the United States, Barack Obama became the first elected president of African-American heritage in 2009. And yet, during the Obama presidency, police violence against unarmed black civilians became so widespread (and well-documented on social media) (→ Security, II/45) that a new movement, Black Lives Matter, formed to combat it.

Parallel to these political transformations, the digitalization of all societal fields proceeded, penetrating daily life with social media (→ III/41) such as Facebook in 2004 and Twitter in 2006 facilitated through the introduction of the iPhone in 2007, a prototype of a new smartphone-generation. Among these new entrepreneurs in information technology and its sector of financial speculation emerged a new social group of global billionaires that have led to a highly polarized global social stratification.

2016/2017

The years of 2016 and 2017 marked the threshold of the end of the progressive conjuncture most notably with the impeachment – or cold coup d'état – against president Dilma Rousseff from the Brazilian Worker's Party and the election of Donald Trump as the president of the United States. Both cases went hand in hand with a significant shift in political language. Offenses, defamations, and fake news were used to dismantle political correctness, multiculturalism (→ I/36), as well as feminism and LGBT+ rights (→ Gender Identities, I/28). Supported by conservative religious beliefs (→ I/40), and especially by fundamentalist protestant churches, ultraconservative attitudes were promoted. The promotion of whiteness (→ I/46) – against the multicultural politics of recognition – is a particularly important feature of the 2016/17 threshold in identity politics. Trump appealed to white working-class voters by demonizing others – notably Mexican immigrants – for stealing jobs and made empty promises to bring jobs once sent overseas back to the Rust Belt communities that lost them to globalization in the first place. Moreover, in Argentina, the presidency of Mauricio Macri (2015–2019) – a businessman and former president of Boca Juniors who created a political party in Buenos Aires with the help of financial capital and soccer political networks – implied the end of a cycle of traditional parties and the recovery of a conservative economy of “austerity,” the abandonment of social policy and the return to International Monetary Fund credits; last but not least, this panorama sealed a new Mercosur profile in the Southern Cone of Latin America.

The year between 2016/17 also marks a significant turning point in regard to multilayered conjunctures of international and regional institution building. The United States – under the lemma of “America first” – withdrew from several international agreements, such as the Paris climate agreement. Furthermore, institutions of inter-American integration, such as the NAFTA, are under reconsideration, while the U.S. pursues a more protectionist policy abandoning the paradigm of global free trade. In a similar vein, ultraconservative Latin American governments in Brazil and Argentina have dismantled the institutions of Latin American integration founded in the 2000s, withdrawing themselves from Unasur, Banco del Sur y TeleSur.

National protectionism also reveals itself in regard to transnational migration. The amplification of the fortified border between the United States and Mexico is the highest expression of a broader phenomenon of xenophobic anti-migrant attitudes, not only in the Western Hemisphere, but worldwide. In this sense, it seems that 2016/17 will turn out to be a significant turning point that stops the international institution building of the post-World War II period, as well as the globalization peak of the 1990s. As we are in midst of this threshold, it is too early to analyze the cultural and political impacts on key concepts in the Americas. Nevertheless, it seems that especially in the field of identity politics, massive transformations are taking place, while the horizon of expectation is mostly not directed toward a utopian better future, but in a nostalgic way toward the recuperation of a supposed lost idealized past.

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21

ALTER-GLOBALIZATION

Guiomar Rovira

The term “alter-globalization” or “alter-mundialization” refers to a series of global protests in which social movements (→ I/41), organizations, and political collectives from all continents participate in opposition to the neoliberal unification of the planet and its consequences. It is believed that this movement began with the network of transnational solidarity generated as a result of the indigenous Zapatista rebellion of 1994 (→ Indigeneity, I/31), earned its credentials after the massive protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle in November 1999, and was extended by the enormous marches against the war, particularly the simultaneous mobilizations on February 15, 2003, of over ten million people in different cities around the world against the U.S. military offensive in Iraq.

The news media were the first to baptize this wave of protests against the neoliberal model as an “anti-globalization movement.” The term was the object of intense debate within the movement: “an absurd name,” according to Callinocos (2003, 27), nor was it appreciated by the Canadian Naomi Klein (2001), who referred to it as a “cloud of mosquitos.” At the First World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in January 2001, more than 12,000 activists agreed to the description of a “movement of global resistance,” for “global justice,” which was defined in its declaration of principles as a “a plural, diversified, non-confessional, non-governmental and non-party context that, in a decentralized fashion, interrelates organizations and movements engaged in concrete action at levels from the local to the international to build another world” (WSF 2001).

The self-described Italian Disobedients spoke of a “movement of movements” and eventually felt comfortable with the designation, “global movement” (in favor of globalizing the struggles). At the same time, another term with Latin roots appeared: “alter-mundialist” or “alter-mundialism,” linked to the idea of a struggle for “another possible world” (Echart, López, and Orozco 2005, 53–57).

The alter-globalization movement is composed of many groups and collectives of various natures (including consumer groups, alternative communication collectives, base communities, social organizations, NGOs, and even unions and political parties), all coordinated online and capable of mobilizing at a given moment without losing individual autonomy regarding form of participation or choosing their own repertoire of forms of protest for every particular location. In 1992, the protests against the Fifth Centennial

(*V Centenario*) supported the struggles and resistance of Abya Yala. Abya Yala (“land in its full maturity” or “land of vital blood”) is a name from the language of the Kuna people, who live between Panama and Colombia, which is the Pre-Columbian name for the American continent and has become the battle standard for the indigenous peoples (→ I/11) of the Americas.

As a global-action movement, alter-globalization may be characterized as an enemy of world economic institutions such as the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the free-trade summits. At the dawn of the century, what was innovative about the repertoire of actions adapted by the alter-globalists was their transnational dimension beyond their national or *inter*-national framework. These strategies included the anti-summits, the mass demonstrations to block access to conferences of the economic institutions, the decentralized conferences against capitalism (→ II/2), and the World Social Forums in opposition to the World Economic Forums in Davos, Switzerland. To the preceding must be added the most important novelty from the end of the last century: the intensive use of the Internet and the development of hacking, activities using digital networks not only as a means of communication, contact, and extension for activist networks (Rovira 2017), but also as a space for coordination and protest.

“Act local, think global”

Alter-globalism signals the inexorable emergence of a transnational dimension for all social struggles, not only because the financial system governs the world and subordinates states, but because legal and illegal businesses, telecommunications, transportation, and cultural industries cut across the planet without respecting borders. According to Saskia Sassen (2003, 13), the multilayered processes of globalization may be described as “denationalizing” states as containers of social phenomena (→ Nation State, II/38).

On an interconnected planet, in a so-called “network-society” (Castells 1997, 2012), contentious political activities configure a space that is simultaneously local and global. A rebellion in one corner of the planet, such as the Zapatista uprising in the southeast of Mexico in 1994, became an event that raised a wave of sympathy in many parts of the world. The call, “Ya Basta!” (“Enough is enough!”) by the indigenous peoples of Chiapas, just as NAFTA was being implemented, established a kind of Benjaminian “Jetztzeit” – the slogan “Now is the time” was extended into a global “Here now” in which the words/actions of the Zapatistas were charged with meaning. “Enough is enough” became a “global mediatic event” in response to which heterogeneous sectors of Mexican society and other countries expressed solidarity with the insurrectionists. Anti-NAFTA activists in the United States, unions, environmentalists, and human rights groups proclaimed that the Zapatista uprising was part of the violent consequences of neoliberalism. U.S.-President Bill Clinton himself felt compelled to deny that there were connections between the rebellion and the signing of the treaty in early February 1994. Alert to the issue, the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) included in their demands for the first peace dialogues the “renegotiation of NAFTA.” Subsequently, in 1996, the Zapatistas called upon the Continental Conferences and the Intercontinental Encounter for Humanity and against Neoliberalism (EZLN 1997, 125–126).

This call for a struggle beyond borders spread like a network of networks, with extensive organizational and planning efforts at a time when the World Wide Web had scarcely existed for more than a year and the use of the Internet was just beginning to reach around the world. In February 1998, in a meeting with grassroots movements from seventy-one

countries in Geneva, Switzerland, People's Global Action (PGA) was founded as the first coordination of groups and movements whose objectives were:

- (1) Inspiring the greatest possible number of persons and organizations to act against corporate domination through civil disobedience and people-oriented constructive actions;
- (2) Offering an instrument for co-ordination and mutual support at global level for those resisting corporate rule and the capitalist development paradigm, and;
- (3) Giving more international projection to the struggles against economic liberalization and global capitalism.

(2000)

Participants in the PGA include activists from organizations such as European Marches against Unemployment, Job insecurity and Exclusions (which emerged in 1997 in Europe), the British movement, *Reclaim the Streets!*, the National Alliance of People's Movements in India, the Committee of Working Women in El Salvador, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, the Confederation of Education Workers of the Argentine Republic, the Movement for Maori Independence of New Zealand, the Rural Organization for Mutual Aid of Mozambique, the Black Communities Process of Colombia, the Canadian Union of Postal Workers and the Russian Socio-Ecological Union (a federation of more than 200 organizations in different countries of Central and Eastern Europe), among others. The second actual meeting of the PGA was held on August 23–26, 1998, in Bangalore, India. Since then, numerous demonstrations have been held, consolidating the connections between groups from diverse countries and spawning a global movement.

Many factors and struggles promoted the extension of these networks in the last decade of the 20th century. Consumer-protection organizations, environmental associations, and direct-action movements, in addition to large and small nongovernmental organizations, have worked for years around the world, often in cooperation. North American student movements during the 1990s specialized in launching campaigns against important trademarks, as demonstrated by Naomi Klein in her famous book, *No Logo* (2001), and unmasking what was happening in third-world *maquiladoras* (textile factories), inhuman conditions for female workers, and child labor practices. In July 1998, the organization United Students Against Sweatshops was officially launched in opposition to manufacturers of clothing and quickly became the largest U.S. university movement in recent decades. The counterculture movements of the 1970s continued as counter-information, anarchist and artist groups linked to the worlds of hackers and computers.

From Seattle to the demonstrations against the war in Iraq

For the 1999 Seattle protests against the World Trade Organization, independent producers of news and media created the information center *Indymedia* – Independent Media Center – with an Internet platform that revolutionized the alternative communication world by enabling anyone to upload not only texts but also photographs, video, and audio files to the Internet. This web page was replicated in numerous places and within two years, there were more than 200 in the world.

Subsequent to Seattle, such protests proliferated: in February 2000, in Bangkok, the director of the IMF, Michael Camdessus, received a pie in the face; in early 2000, the World Economic Forum in Davos was paralyzed. In April 2000, in Washington, some 10,000 people

marched against the meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committee, the governing body of the IMF, which was nonetheless held by establishing a security perimeter of thirty blocks. In June 2000, the movement traveled to Brussels where the European Business Summit was held. At the end of that month, tens of thousands of people “attacked” the United Nations Social Summit in Geneva and organized the Alternative Social Summit with the slogan, “Oppose neoliberal and sexist globalization: globalize resistance!”

Melbourne, Australia hosted the World Economic Forum in September 2000 and was invaded by thousands of protesters, or “globalifóbicos” (“global-phobes,” as they were called by then Mexican President Zedillo), in a pitched street battle that lasted almost seventy-two hours. That same month, the so-called “European Seattle” took place in Prague where about 20,000 activists demonstrated against the IMF–World Bank Summit.

On October 17, 2000, some 20,000 women from all parts of the world arrived in New York for the World March of Women at the United Nations where they delivered hundreds of jars filled with signatures supporting a broad range of proposed global solutions. In January 2001, the World Social Forum was held in Brazil, also called the “anti-Davos of the South,” with the slogan, “Another world is possible.” This was followed by the protest against the World Economic Forum in Cancun, Mexico. In April 2001, in Quebec, tens of thousands took to the streets in opposition to the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). In June 2001, in Gothenburg, Sweden, the most violent confrontations to date took place between police and opponents of the European Union. That same month, the World Bank canceled the summit planned for Barcelona in fear of the protests being prepared for the Catalan capital.

In July 2001, one of the largest demonstrations against the G7-plus-Russia summit ended in repression and the death of a young man, Carlo Giuliani, caused by police gunfire. After Geneva, the first fissures within the very heterogeneous alter-globalization groups began to turn into chasms. *Attac*, for example, a network of French intellectuals (and extending to various other countries) and linked to the newspaper, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, a supporter of the Tobin Tax on financial transactions, blamed the violence on the most anarchistic groups. The *Black Block* protested and condemned *Attac*’s “sweeping reformism.”

The distance separating the large international NGOs that accepted engagement with forums of negotiation and those that opposed all conversations and negotiations with world economic agencies was becoming increasingly obvious. The controversy within the movement spilled into face-to-face meetings and Internet forums.

The alter-globalist movement received its final death blow after the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The anti-war marches in February 2003 mobilized more than ten million people in the largest cities of the world but did not succeed in changing the military decisions of the United States and its allies, Spain and Great Britain. Restrictions on liberties and the logic of war hindered the advance of this wave of protests, which receded once more to more local venues, albeit with the nascent power of being interconnected by the Internet.

America: the struggles against free-trade agreements

In Latin America during those same years, a movement was growing and it was not just the Zapatistas in Mexico but one that dated back to the protests in 1992 against the 500th anniversary of the so-called “Discovery” of America (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7; America, I/2). At the turn of the century, Quito, Ecuador, and Cochabamba, Bolivia awoke and found themselves surrounded. The Andean region, including Peru, was being shaken

by enormous demonstrations. In Argentina, the economic crisis of 2001 led to huge protests on December 19–20, a network of self-organized demonstrations, without any central command, in which a myriad of collectives and individuals worked together from various spaces of dissidence and daily life. Thus, they succeeded in deposing several successive governments with the slogan, “Throw them all out.”

As a consequence of these protests at the dawn of the new century, the so-called “progressive governments” were established in several countries. The movement that carried Evo Morales to power in 2005 as the first indigenous president of Bolivia sprang up with the Cochabamba Water War in 2000, followed by the blockades in La Paz and El Alto during the Gas War of 2003, the demonstrations by coca growers, the takeovers of oil wells, and the land occupations that dated back to the 1990s. In Ecuador, the irrepressible movement that lifted Rafael Correa to the presidency had its roots in the struggle for indigenous rights (→ Human Rights, II/35). The Ecuadorian CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador), in the words of its leader, Luis Macas, recalled that in the Quechua language, power “is the ability to collectively advance ourselves.”

As part of the alter-globalist movement, in May 1997, activist groups from all over the continent met at the Third Trade Union Summit in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, and called for the establishment of a Continental Social Alliance. It was in April 1998 that more than 1,000 representatives from different activist organizations met in Santiago, Chile for a massive conference: the First People’s Summit, which took place simultaneously and in opposition to the Summit of the Americas at which presidents from thirty-four American countries were in attendance. At that time, only two governments – Venezuela and Brazil – opposed the intentions of the United States to create a free-trade area under its control, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) (→ Regional Integration, II/18).

The Second People’s Summit in Quebec, Canada, in 2001, mobilized thousands of people in the streets and resolved to launch the Continental Campaign against the FTAA and a Continental Popular Referendum. The latter was carried out in Brazil in 2002 with the participation of ten million people; in Argentina in 2003 with 2.25 million people; and in Paraguay in that same year with about 160,000 people. In all cases, more than 90 percent of the votes were cast against the treaty. In 2002, Cuba joined the campaign against free trade and hosted the Hemispheric Conferences to fight against the FTAA annually in Havana until 2005. Hugo Chávez, for his part and on behalf of Venezuela, launched the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) which brought together continental political powers and progressive governments.

After 2001, the alter-globalization movement met annually at the World Social Forums in Porto Alegre, Brazil. During the second forum, in 2002, decentralized demonstrations were planned to hinder the negotiation conferences held by Latin American countries. The victory that put an end to these protests against the FTAA took place in 2005 in Mar del Plata, Argentina, where a massive demonstration was attended by Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales in celebration of the decision by the United States to abandon the treaty (De la Cueva 2015), although it continued to negotiate with several countries individually.

Alter-globalization in Latin America has been absorbed into other important issues such as environmental struggles, opposition to mining, and the protection of lands (→ Land, II/15). Progressive governments in the region, in most cases, however, have not abandoned the extractivist development model for raw materials as their primary source of public revenues (→ Development, II/6; Extractivism, II/9), which has generated divisions between their popular bases and the social movements supporting them.

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BIOPOLITICS

Rodrigo Parrini and Nattie Golubov

In the final chapter of the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, Michel Foucault (1978) sets forth and defines the concept of biopolitics in a mere twenty pages that have had an enormous theoretical impact. Published in the following decades, the philosopher's lectures at the *Collège de France* offered further details about his thought (Foucault 2007, 2008). Foucault elaborated upon the concept by means of a detailed analysis of sociohistorical, demographic, and economic processes that took place in Europe between the 16th and 19th centuries. He brought together a series of dispersed phenomena (ranging from the count of the deceased to debates about the price of grains) to reach a constant: modernity has developed a growing interest in the vital processes of populations. Although the concept was not invented by the French philosopher and there have been many different efforts that trace its origins back to European eugenic thought at the beginning of the 20th century (Esposito 2008; Lemke 2011a), Foucault's reflections undoubtedly dominate the contemporary configuration of the concept.

When it comes to the Americas, there is, broadly speaking, a difference in inclination between the U.S. and Latin American uses of the concept that runs along these lines: in the U.S., there seems to be a preference for the study of the intervention in the "vital characteristics of human life"; whereas in Latin America, using the same concept, academics seek to explain thanatopolitics, that is, an interest in exploring the relationship of power, politics, and death, rather than the management of life and the intervention into human vitality. Although Foucault resists this divide when he sustains that biopower (unlike sovereign power that takes life or lets live) simultaneously fosters and disallows life in such a way that economic and political imperatives are coupled with the government of life (Lemke 2011a, 36), particularly by the 19th century, it seems evident that in Latin America, because of its history of colonialism (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7; Indigeneity I/31), authoritarianism (→ II/25), systematic human rights violations by the State (→ Human Rights, II/35), and dramatically uneven projects of modernization (→ I/35), reflection seems to focus more on the thanatopolitical drive of sovereign violence because the State continues to play a decisive and unmediated role in the control of populations (→ Nation State, II/38).

Thus, the concept is split by a central tension: it either sheds light upon those processes linked to life and vitality or it fundamentally points toward its destruction and death. The emphasis placed upon either one of the possible readings establishes a polarity between a

positive use of biopolitics that privileges its productive effect on the vital processes of populations and another – *negative* – deployment of the concept that emphasizes the production of death. This polarity overlaps in the appropriations of the concept: the *negative* notion of biopolitics prevails in Latin America, while in the United States, the *positive* is emphasized. This polarity may also be read as a discontinuity or continuity in relation to “hegemonic theorizations” (de Oto and Quintana 2010, 115). Continuity does not necessarily imply the positive use of the concept, just as the negative use need not imply discontinuity. This tension is not exclusive to the debates that take place throughout the American continent since, as Esposito (2008, 32) has pointed out, it is a characteristic of the concept itself and the reflections that have derived from it. Apparently, it is not only a matter of the internal dynamics of the concept itself, which presents ambiguities and allows for a variety of interpretations, but, rather, a historical process that will unfold unevenly and diversely in different societies and states, which the concept helps to understand and describe (Lemke 2011a, xx).

The negative pole: biopolitics in Latin America

In Latin America, the concept of biopolitics was widely adopted in its different variants. One central feature of this appropriation and subsequent use is the effort to contextualize it within the historical coordinates of the continent and its cultural and sociopolitical specificities. Thus, while the reception of the concept in the USA may be read as continuous with Foucault’s approach, in Latin America, the discontinuities have become more relevant. However, given that this displacement is currently under way, a new concept has neither fully emerged nor been radically reformulated, nor does a history of the continent exist that would trace the specific features of the biopolitical process.

There are two types of discontinuity in relation to the concept that can be identified: one is sociohistorical and the other epistemological. The first responds to the singularity of social and historical processes that have occurred or are taking place in Latin America and which require a critical attention to the concepts and European analyses; this constitutes a contextualizing strategy that does not necessarily involve a broader theoretical discussion. This discontinuity takes two directions: one is restrictive, in which the concept is bounded by sociohistorical processes; the other is expansive, because the concept is displaced toward areas that were unforeseen by more canonical formulations with the result that there is a new proliferation of related concepts or of different research interests.

On the other hand, the epistemological discontinuity is more radical because it implies both a re-contextualization of the concept and a critique of the geopolitical configuration that sustains its dissemination and use; this break is sustained by theoretical discussions that emerge from the postcolonial and decolonial studies of the continent (→ Postcolonialism, I/38). Although the distances with respect to Western theorizations are both conceptual and historical, Foucault’s take on the concept would certainly encourage such a critique and contextualization; the analytic possibilities of the concept would come into view “in the minutiae of historical processes,” given that biopolitics does not constitute a “general category of a historiographic nature” (Castro 2008, 191).

However, the developments that came after Foucault privileged biopolitics as a “general category” with a historiographic as well as a philosophical inclination. The critique, formulated from the postcolonial and decolonial perspectives of this historical narrative that sustains the concept and its conceptual reformulations, addresses the historical localization that produces a conceptual generalization that is blind to other contexts. In this respect, in a critical reading of Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) thoughts on the issue, de Oto and Quintana (2010) ask whether

“the theoretical operation does not end up affirming trajectories that are immanent to Eurocentric culture and time, and therefore neglecting other paradigmatic figures” (51). The answer, which does not simply add facts to a historical process but redraws its coordinates, shows that “the problem of biopolitics lacks colonialism as a constitutive dimension either by its omission or its inclusion” (114). Hence, a historical rereading would resignify the concept “in view of other historical evidence and other conceptual regimes” (58).

Santiago Castro-Gómez (2007, 164) believes that Foucauldian thought in general, and specifically his biopolitical considerations are Eurocentric in their content, yet not in their form. Seen from this perspective, it would be possible to sever the concept from its original sociohistorical coordinates so as to read other coordinates. This is precisely what Castro-Gómez accomplishes with respect to New Granada between 1750 and 1816; he interprets the tensions that emerge between the reforms driven by the Bourbons in the territories under Spanish rule (→ Colonial Rule, I/5) and the resistance put up by the *criollo* elites as a biopolitical dispute in which a global metropolitan plan is confronted by “the local histories of the periphery marked by the coloniality of power” (2005, 176). Although these reforms were purportedly intended to “diminish the privileges of the nobility and increase of the social mobility of the castes” (125), the local elites interpreted them as “an extension of the privilege of whiteness” (142) (→ Whiteness, I/46).

Although Castro-Gómez places an emphasis on the tension between the global and the local in his discussion, de Oto and Quintana (2010) argue in a different direction that presents a structural difficulty: a concept that explores social and political phenomena of the countries that sustain colonial expansion, but that is relatively blind to colonialism. It is not simply about reading biopolitics into local contexts to understand other non-European local contexts, because this invisibility marks the emergence of the term and its reformulations.

The difficulty seems to be more historical than anthropological and sociological, and biopolitics is not as susceptible to the same critique when applied to contemporary contexts. Although a continuity in certain interpretations may be presumed, especially those efforts to interpret the biopolitics of the present offered by Agamben (1998) as well as Rabinow and Rose (2006), this is also the path that leads to a conceptual proliferation that does not signal its historical register but rather its present – and future – cultural inscriptions. As a concept that analyzes the present, it should be asked whether it continues to be marked by its constitutive colonial *blindness*, because the phenomena and scenarios are different and the concept may be reconfigured globally, stimulated by the unprecedented phenomena upon which it is brought to bear – not only in the field of research into bodies and organisms, but also in manifestations of violence, ecological disaster (→ II/33), or the control of displaced populations (→ Transnational Migration, I/44).

De Oto and Quintana (2010) accurately criticize the duplication of the colonial blindness in Agamben’s thought on the subject, because when he transforms the concentration camp into *the* contemporary paradigm, he forgets the biopolitical production of the colonial world with its plantations, forced migrations (→ Unfree Labor, I/19; Slavery, I/18), and other modalities of extermination and exploitation, rationalized by means of the biopolitical networks of thought and administration. But Agamben’s reading was questioned from the beginning and corrected by others who crafted a concept of biopolitics that responds precisely to the colonial context, such as Mbembe’s notion of necropolitics (2003). Although global processes are acknowledged, such as the formation of neoliberal governments or the expansion of an extractive capitalism (Extractivism, II/9), biopolitics no longer requires a European or U.S. referent to successfully operate as a concept in very different contexts.

Although the concept retains its conceptual integrity, it is increasingly assailed by the proliferation of its empirical uses given that the boundaries that Foucault could place around it, as well as those set down by his European followers, are no longer able to incorporate certain historical evidence or an empirical perimeter that would allow for the easy differentiation of what is and what is not biopolitical. Perhaps this is the price to be paid by the concept as a result of its sociohistorical displacement and contextual interpretations and thus, in Latin America, the concept modified its historical inscription to become a frontier term that visualizes the past as well as the tenuous, but fundamental, connection between the present and the future in Latin American societies. Hegemonic theorizations are inadequate in this move, which signals the beginning of new conceptual and methodological formulations.

Juan Cajigas-Rotundo (2007) further elaborates the notion of the biocoloniality of power in order to analyze the processes of appropriation and extraction of biodiversity in the Colombian Amazon (→ Nature, II/39). If modernity and coloniality form a “system characterised by ‘structural heterogeneity,’” its contemporary forms (read as Empire by the author) inaugurate a new relationship that “may be called bio-colonial” (Cajigas-Rotundo 2007, 176). The new type of biological exploitation, sustained by scientific networks and highly sophisticated institutional apparatuses, generates local and global forms of what Hardt and Negri (2000) understand as *biopower*: the power of the multitudes over biopolitical processes. The battle between Amazonian communities and transnational corporations (→ II/23) is ongoing and the notion of biocoloniality is based upon biopolitical arguments developed in different contexts, no longer necessarily European or Western, to conceptualize the local process and the global forces that impinge upon this area of Latin America. Hence, biopolitics does not correspond exclusively to the historical process of the colonization of vital processes and organisms, or the creation of controllable populations, but now includes the formation of new biological forms of domination and unprecedented forms of economic extraction or the exploitation of groups and populations.

The positive pole: biopolitics in the United States

The reception of Foucault’s work in U.S. academia, specifically the uses of his conceptual language or guiding methods, has been too vast and varied to summarize. There has been a shift in the application of his thought to specific problems according to the availability of his work in English, as well as the shift in the objects of study. In this specific context, Rabinow and Rose (2006) provide a further useful compass with which to navigate this wealth of approaches and usages when they argue that Foucault proposed a “bipolar diagram of power” in which one pole leans toward an anatomo-politics of the human body, which “seeks to maximize its forces and integrate it into efficient systems,” while the other focuses on “regulatory controls, a biopolitics of the population, birth, morbidity, mortality, longevity” (196) (→ Health, I/29). The authors seek to differentiate the Foucauldian concepts of biopower and biopolitics from the philosophical deployments of the terms found in the work of Giorgio Agamben and Antonio Negri. They argue that the expanded concepts of Negri and Agamben are “highly general” and totalizing and thus misleading and emptied “of their analytical force.” In their understanding, biopower “can describe everything but analyze nothing” – unlike Foucault, who was precise in identifying the historical and dispersed, though “more or less rationalized” phenomena which his concepts came to encompass.

Rabinow and Rose (2006) propose that it is the generality of the claims in the thought of Agamben and Negri that make them so attractive to academics in the United States, particularly in those attempts that seek to reflect critically upon the present. They argue

for a re-historization of Foucault's concepts because "biopower" is as precisely grounded as other Foucaultian concepts, and it is neither transhistorical nor metaphoric (199), so any attempt at deploying it in other contexts requires a re-elaboration. Thus in U.S. academia, emphasis seems to be placed on the technologies that pursue the maximization of life through biomedics; biotechnologies; stem cell research; the host of technologies; practices; truth discourses; forms of authority; and the relationship between corporate America, government, and science. According to Thomas Lemke, this is the most empirically oriented use of biopolitics (Lemke 2011b) to date. In contrast, those studies inclined to the critique of thanatopolitical interventions gravitate toward very specific situations – instances of designated states of exception – such as Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib (both zones significantly *not* on the U.S. mainland), detention centers for asylum seekers, or the classification and criminalization of entire populations of color driven by the logic of state racism that works directly and indirectly through non-state bodies, for-profit corporations, pressure groups, and regulatory bodies, as seen in the incarceration industry. The study of the "biopolitics of death" in a number of fields in the U.S. tends to be influenced by Agamben's concept, precisely because it contributes to an understanding of the unexpected "return of the concentration camp" within rights-based democratic states (Miller 2016, 76), which has severely challenged liberal assumptions. Indeed, Ruth Miller (2016) argues that the popularity of "biopolitics" in U.S. academia that spanned the period between the 1990s and early 2000s has waned in the late 2000s precisely because of this "death-focused" interpretation of biopolitics. Citing Rosi Braidotti, she concludes that "death is overrated" (77), an affirmation which suggests that Agamben leaves no possibility of resistance to the exercise of biopower given his conclusion that "the concentration camp, rather than the city, has become – and perhaps always has been – the preeminent space of democratic political engagement" (64).

Different interpretive strategies and epistemological conditions can be identified which have allowed for the proliferation and considerable centrality of the concept of biopolitics in U.S. academia. First, the gradual introduction of the concept in U.S. academia, now used in a wide variety of discussions in the humanities, social, and life sciences, is marked by the early work of two important U.S. academics: Paul Rabinow, who from the late 1970s worked closely with Foucault and played a vital role in the translation of his work into English, and Ann Laura Stoler, whose book *Race and the Education of Desire* (1995) is considered to be one of the earliest critical studies of Foucauldian thought focused on sexuality (→ Gender, I/9), race (→ I/39), and empire in the area of postcolonial history (Miller 2016, 65). Stoler's work looks to the past, so her interpretation of Foucault is focused on how the configuration of the European bourgeois is a process marked by race because European colonial ventures were the testing ground of modernist discourses on sexuality and race. She asserts "other cultural, political, or economic assertions cannot be charted in Europe alone" (Stoler 1995, 7).

Rabinow is more interested in what he defines as "the contemporary" (2008); his reading of the Foucauldian biopolitical is oriented to the study of "emergent cross-over areas" (1996, 74) between science, (bio)technology, nature (→ II/39), culture, law, politics, and economics. His preoccupation with the contemporary from a Foucauldian perspective was innovative and demarcated a possible field of inquiry which would make way for studies of how scientific knowledge about race, sexuality, reproduction, and disability is biopolitical. Rabinow's and Stoler's orientations, one that is forward-looking, the other a revision of the objects of the past, illustrated early on the wide historical scope of the concept and that it established two of the most fertile directions that the study of the biopolitical has taken. Both can be located as belonging to a more orthodox approach to Foucault's thought because

they worked before the publication of the 1979 Lectures as well as before scholarly trends became mainstreamed in the late 1990s, and they do not flatten Foucault's analyses into "a set of polemical, ideological, globalising generalities," as Colin Gordon has stated (Gordon and Donzelot 2008, 53).

Second, the uses of the concept have proliferated in the 2000s for many reasons, among which are the availability of the lectures in translation, disciplinary trends, and the popularization of governmentality studies initiated by Nikolas Rose and Colin Gordon, together with increased references to the concepts as used by Agamben and Negri, that brings "biopolitics" into play to discuss the 20th century and the more contemporary, global, transnational context of the 21st, respectively. "Biopolitics," like much of Foucault's vocabulary, acquires different emphases, echoes, and traces according to other terms with which it is clustered: Stoler is uninterested in governmentality, for example, whereas recently the biopolitical is often coupled with neoliberalism, which Foucault did not reflect upon extensively except in his lectures; in 2009, neoliberalism (→ II/16) and governmentality are brought together in a special issue of *Foucault Studies* (2009). "Biopower" and "biopolitics" are usually found together, since many of the current concerns such as fertility, race, or disability are harnessed to political objectives. Clearly, the concept may be decoupled from its original contextualization in Foucault's thought and recontextualized to study phenomena that he himself either did not contemplate or explore in a limited fashion. These redeployments enrich the concept without necessarily referring to its first use in Foucault, although they may bare the traces of its various trajectories and resonate with them.

Related to a capacity to be resignified by means of its displacement from its original context in Foucault's thought is the concept's potential to articulate a wide variety of disparate phenomena: the market, emerging, marginalized, and consolidated subjectivities and populations, corporalities and practices, their normalization and punishment, neoliberalism, sexuality, normativity, discursive formations, and epistemes, economics, institutional politics, and administrative measures, cultural artifacts, and scientific trends and propositions, industries, different modes of power, and its operations, affects, technologies, disjunctions and continuities, dispositifs in the past and the present and in widely different contexts and at different levels (micro and macro). The concept crosses disciplinary boundaries; allows for interdisciplinary research; and may be moved seamlessly between the theorizations of Negri, Agamben, and Foucault although they are not necessarily compatible, especially in specific terms of how power and governance work. This adaptability therefore allows for the concept to travel widely between different phenomena from the environment to food chains and the economics of debt. One may wonder whether any concept can survive this transit without a weakening of its analytical punch, derived from its historical specificity, or whether it is strengthened by its trajectories. In other words, there may not be a common language, but there is a shared mode of critique if "biopolitics" is identified as shorthand for a post-Foucauldian perspective. Even the early work of Stoler and Rabinow exemplifies this resilience and plasticity: their use of "biopolitics" is not nominative, but analytical because they have not dispensed with Foucault's detailed descriptive archaeological investigation. This is most obvious in Stoler's work because she explores the emergence of the conditions necessary for the consolidation of the bourgeois subject in the 19th century by returning to the origins of biopolitics in the 18th and early 19th centuries to show how the transformation of political techniques, the transformation of sovereign power, utilized both the discourse of sexuality and a politics of race in the "emergence of the 'biopolitical' state" (1995, 20). Rabinow is also intensely contextual because his work is ethnographic, although he displaces the concept to contemporary scenarios that give continuity to Foucauldian "bio-history" (Foucault 1978, 143) at the intersection of power and knowledge.

Convergences

Although the uses of the concept inevitably differ in Latin American and U.S. academia, there are some convergences. As stated earlier, the concept of biopolitics underwent a displacement in Foucault's thought, related to a host of other notions that he did not elaborate further or left unfinished. One of the themes addressed by Foucault in his lectures at the *Collège de France* is the State, which in his own thought constitutes an unraveled node of different approaches with contradictions. Although biopolitics is not the exclusive domain of state policies, the role of the State in Europe was central to its own configuration; however, the concept of governmentality, that is contemporaneous to that of biopolitics, denies the centrality of the State in thinking through these processes. The choice of terms is neither casual nor innocuous. Viewed from the perspective of the appropriations and uses of the concept in the U.S. and Latin America, the State is given a central role (→ Nation State, II/38). Whether inclined toward the *negative* or *positive* emphasis, the State emerges as the most important biopolitical actor. However, as in the example of Rabinow's work, U.S. academia also researches other institutions, especially the market and its ties to technological and scientific apparatuses, as well as the nexus between knowledge production, private profit, and population management or the military industrial complex (→ Military, II/37). In the case of Latin America, for argumental reasons and due to the differences between the industrial and knowledge structures from one region to another on the continent, the market is a minor actor.

The concept of biopolitics is not employed in isolation and, in accordance with the orientation chosen by authors, will be linked to an array of other terms, some of which are not necessarily Foucauldian. For example, those uses that work with Giorgio Agamben's thought (1998) will refer to his notion of *bare life*; others may prefer the thought of Hardt and Negri (2000) and will read biopower as the capacity of multitudes to act upon biopolitical processes. The combinations are many and will depend upon the issues addressed by – as well as the theoretical preferences of – the academics themselves. Thus, although biopolitics may be the initial and indeed fundamental concept, the web of concepts with which it will be associated is not guaranteed by its own initial formulations. This indicates a conceptual and empirical displacement in heterogeneous and diverse directions that occurs in both Latin American and U.S. academia, which, in the long run, may produce a radical modification of the concept itself.

A third point of convergence is the materiality of the processes that are dealt with by both academia. Regardless of the plurality of uses and the heterogeneity of the fields in which it is used, biopolitics is a concept that signals new material forms and expressions of power which have direct consequences upon the life and death of subjects and collectivities. Whether it is oriented to let die or let live, biopolitics is elaborated as a concept that intervenes in vital processes and the many directions these may take, so it does not simply describe them. In a fashion, the term is halfway between the materiality of its manifestations and the discursive formations that sustain it and which it produces. This occurs even when the materials which are being analyzed are textual, as in the fields of literary or cultural studies, for example, which explore corporealities' effect or certain relationships of power. Thus, textuality is not an impediment to the observation of the materiality of referents and their material effects.

A fourth point of convergence detected is the retroactive use of the concept. In other words, historical processes are interpreted and reinterpreted through the lens of a biopolitical perspective and the conceptual frameworks related to it. This is particularly evident in historical research, but it also manifests in the formulation of other central concepts in contemporary debates in the U.S. and Latin America. For example, to read race as a biopolitical formation modifies the coordinates of current discussions, but also recasts the understanding of previous

arguments and perspectives. The same may be said with respect to gender and other categories. This process can be described as the *biopolitization* of many concepts and phenomena, a shift that is currently under way, but which signals significant theoretical transformations.

Finally, these convergences must be read in the context of the unequal relations between U.S. and Latin American academia. The concept crossed the Atlantic in the 1980s and was amply developed in the U.S., a trend that later marked its use in Latin America. The hegemonic formulations of the concept in fields such as cultural studies, feminism and queer studies, work on race (→ I/s) and racialization, and science and technology, among many others, come from U.S. academia, particularly from the beginning of this century. Given this trajectory, it is possible to argue that biopolitics is already a post-Foucauldian concept and that these convergences will be intensified in the future.

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CONSUMERISM

Gustavo Blázquez

The noun consumerism is formed when the term “consume,” which indicates the action or the effect of making use of goods and spending energy, is coupled with the suffix-ism. The new word has somewhat different meanings in the European languages that are spoken in the Americas. In Spanish (*consumismo*) and in Portuguese (*consumismo*), the word has a strong negative connotation referring to the tendency to consume immoderate amounts of unnecessary things. The hyperbolic and superfluous character that it has by definition is the reason for the moral condemnation that it receives. In English, the word maintains this connotation. It describes the state of advanced industrial society in which huge quantities of goods are bought and sold. In French, *consumérisme* is a noun form referring to the movement of goods and services, which bestows on consumers an active role in society and in the economy.

In the ambivalent context of the production of canonical language, parts of the social sciences set out to disparage consumerism, which simultaneously creates meaning and stigmatizes it. To the extent that it challenged the theory of *homo economicus* as capable of rationally organizing consumption for the satisfaction of one’s own needs, consumerism became an expression of capitalist alienation and the commodification of spiritual goods (→ Capitalism, II/2). This type of rhetoric assumes an aristocratic position when distinguishing between rational consumers, those used for calculations and choices, and other considered excessive or common. The latter is associated with the masses.

The years following World War II saw the rise of the “Consumer’s Republic,” according to Lizbeth Cohen, who coined the term in 2003 to describe the transformation in North American society and the gradual identification of consumption as a civic responsibility. According to her analysis, home construction and associated goods such as furniture and cars, along with the politics that limit access to them by class (→ Social Inequality, II/20) and race (→ I/39), led to increasing segmentation of cities and to the growth of localism (→ Urbanization, I/45). The advertising industry took advantage of this fragmentation and before the possibility of market saturation could wreak havoc, it created its own divisions by lifestyle. During the 1960s, when marketing techniques were brought into the political sphere, this segmentation took on a new significance. As part of this process, the attribution of value increasingly depended on success in the market, resulting in what Cohen calls the “consumerization of the republic” (2003, 397).

As a preview of May 1968 in France, Guy Debord proposed the idea of the *Society of the Spectacle* to understand the new social order where interpersonal relations are mediated by images (1967). Later, and from a considerable political distance, Jean Baudrillard published *The System of Objects* in 1969 followed by *The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures* in 1970. To him, individuals no longer obtain an object, but become included in a global system where the sign and the product fuse. Massive consumption, more so than production, builds social relations and gives way to different lifestyles and the aestheticization of life.

The sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (1998), described a phenomenon of Modernity whereby a society of producers, guided by their work ethic, transforms into a society of consumers which adhere primarily to the “aesthetic of consumption.” Bauman uses the terms “solid” and “liquid” to refer to the former and the latter, respectively. As part of these changes which accompanied the rise and decline of the welfare state, the poor ceased to be the reserve army of labor and became instead consumers who had been pushed out of the market. Each excluded consumer then became the agent of his or her own misery as the state no longer took collective responsibility for them (→ Nation State, II/38). Within the neoliberal society (→ Neoliberalism, II/16), the poor slowly disappeared from the collective moral obligation of society as a whole, moving from “dangerous classes” to straight-up “enemies.” However, as Bauman proposes, “behavior classified as criminal” is not an obstacle to a “fully fledged and all-embracing consumerist society” but its “natural accompaniment and prerequisite” (80).

Various cultural and political movements (→ Social Movements, I/41) and subcultures (→ I/43) incorporate criticism of consumerism as part of their identity. The hippies, punk rockers, and Leftists in Latin America tend to share a criticism of consumerism, as well as, artistically speaking, the zombie iconography of George Romero, the hyperrealism of artists in the U.S., and the artistic movement known as Nueva Figuración or Neo-figurative in Latin America. The so-called American way of life is being questioned across different mediums. Degradation of the natural environment and plundering of natural resources have not been spared either (→ Extractivism, II/9). The very idea of nature (→ II/39) itself is remade: it is sacred; it is our Mother. Faced with the growing dependence on relationships mediated by products, a do-it-yourself ethos has emerged based on anarchist and libertarian principles. The violence that goes hand in hand with capitalist reproduction and the dependence on ever-increasing consumption that it entails, especially in the Third World, are likewise objects of criticism. Strangely enough, in the case of the Latin American Boom, the criticism itself became an object to be consumed.

After WWII and the atrocities associated with Auschwitz and Hiroshima, consumerism was one of the signs of changed times. The moral and scientific communities condemned it, but its appearance in the language in many ways showed that it was here to stay. In 1962, U.S. President John F. Kennedy laid out the four basic consumer rights, namely the right to safety, the right to be informed, the right to choose, and the right to be heard. The work of sociologist Talcott Parsons and the theory of Behaviorism had been dominant in academia in the U.S., but the study of business and management as sciences grew as well as the study of publicity and marketing. The first issue of the *Journal of Consumer Studies & Home Economics* appeared in 1977. It has since been renamed the *International Journal of Consumer Studies*. It focuses on research around the factors involved in consumer choice.

Toward a sociocultural theory of consumption

In the midst of the cultural shifts that took place in the 1960s and 1970s, the Social Sciences abandoned what Douglas and Isherwood referred to as the “veterinary prejudice that food is

what the poor want most” (1979, 69). Culture had been defined as something supplemental that only got attention once all the basic necessities had been covered. Critics questioned this assumption. The works of Clifford Geertz and Raymond Williams made culture a fundamental aspect of social life, albeit in different ways. Consumption, and in particular consumption of cultural things, was redefined as a meaningful practice in and of itself. People’s tastes turned out to be battlefields for political, aesthetic, and symbolic ideas. For consumption that was considered popular (→ I/37), massive, shameful, or even deviant, sociology found a reason and an associated political force, usually resistance or desire for an alternative.

To overcome the moral condemnation of consumerism, the Social Sciences sought to apply anthropological relativism and propose the basis of a sociocultural theory of consumption. This new and diverse paradigm abandoned a behaviorist–functionalist approach of the individual and their needs and at the same time proposed the existence of a type of rationality for the behavior. Now, not all consumerism would be “the bad kind,” just that which was immoderate or superfluous.

The construction of this theory began from the analytic transformation of consumption in the total social phenomenon from Mauss (1971, 159). According to this theory, consumption is capable of simultaneously expressing everything from religious institutions, laws, and morals, to politics, family economics (→ Family, I/26), and aesthetics. This new commitment brought challenges, such as the cultivation of an interdisciplinary perspective and the mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods. Comparatively, Néstor García Canclini (1995, 42) defined consumption as “the group of socio-cultural processes in which the appropriation and uses of the products are made” [translation by the author]. For his analysis, he proposed the combination of three different approaches. First, consumption should be considered as a moment of the cycle of social production and reproduction, when capital extends and replicates labor’s force. His study did not ignore the macrosocial rationality based on economics and the fetishism of products. Instead, symbolic goods are actually material ones as well. They are part of a market characterized by the value given to the pretense of originality, the instability of their success in the marketplace, and the need for permanent renewal. Other characteristics include the high cost of production of the prototype in relation to the copies and the protection such prototypes are afforded by the State (Castells 1989).

Second, this rationality needs to be recognized as being insufficient to explain consumption. Rather than robots driven by strategies designed by market leaders or manipulated by cultural industries, individuals actively order, classify, and decode messages (Adorno and Horkheimer 1969). When consumer practices were studied, other distinct rationalities appeared, or were placed there and supported by their differential and unequal relation in the discourse and logic of power.

In the case of Great Britain, the analysis of this “other rationality” is related to the emergence and formation of the Cultural Studies and the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham. The discovery of this practical rationality is observed in the first work based on text and messages as ideological structures that control reading positions. It also analyzes the decodification process and proposes distinct modalities of reading – dominant, negotiated, and optional (Hall 1980). In the following years, this tendency would be deepened to make way for an “ethnography of audiences” who are interested in the conditions for reception and shifts in meaning (Morley 1986).

Also in the context of British Anthropology, Mary Douglas sought to broaden the scope of the new discipline. Along with economist Baron Isherwood (1979), she analyzed consumption in the modern world. She proposed doing away with the idea of the irrationality of the consumer and the utility of the products theory from economics in order to concentrate

on the social uses of goods. Extending the notion of culture as an activity that has meaning for the consumer, the authors transformed products into a means for thinking. It is through their participation in the rituals of consumption that the subjects define who they are and their relationship to the rest of the social scale. The fundamental value of consumption, along with its capacity to satisfy needs, would be that it orders the world according to certain cosmologies, in other words, theories about the order of the social universe.

The works of French thinkers Micheal de Certeau, Pierre Bourdieu, Claude Grignon, and Jean Claude Passeron are also notable. It was de Certeau's exploration of everyday life which led him to challenge the idea of the subordination of consumption under the system of production, and understand consumption as its own, different kind of production (1984, 31). This final type of production would not forge its own texts, but instead create new ones starting with uses dependent on the strategies of those in power. These strategies guide and impose consumption parameters in relation to the legitimacy of the interpretation of professionals and intellectuals who are authorized by society (→ *Public Intellectuals*, III/18). In music, for example, genres which tend toward abstraction and afford a contemplative listening experience appear superior to those which have concrete goals, such as dance music (→ *Popular Music Flows*, III/16; *Dance*, III/7). In the face of the strategies which establish certain rules for consumption, the less powerful will try various tactics which could wear down the dominant interpretations and social structure on which they depend.

Upon consideration of these other rationalities, the studies show the symbolic and aesthetic dimension or third way of García Canclini's well-known analysis of studies of consumption. For example, Pierre Bourdieu (1979) analyzes how consumption constructs and communicates identity and social distinctions in societies where a democratic imagination dominates. Tastes determine which class a consumer falls into. The starting point, however, is the taste of the dominant class which is imposed on a massive scale.

For Bourdieu, the masses relate to the dominant culture and to the realm of production in the same way. They are systematically deprived of both the means of symbolic appropriation of the machines they serve, as well as the capacity to generate their own objectives. Consequently, popular consumption is structured as a function of legitimized taste, which is approved unquestioningly. It is given that people will feel inhibited from doing it; the imposition of artificial needs is the most subtle form of alienation.

Claude Grignon and Jean Claude Passeron (1989) criticized the so-called legitimizer position. Taken to the extreme, it gives way to a so-called miserabilism whereby the dominant culture can be found in popular culture only in a mutilated, diminished, impoverished, and partial form (→ *Popular*, I/37). The authors likewise warn of the dangers of naive cultural relativism and its shifts toward populism (→ II/43). With the goal of bridging the divide between these two positions, Grignon and Passeron propose the diversity of cultural effects that impose a legitimate order. The capacity of the populace to organize their lifestyle to match models does not necessarily emanate from the dominant culture and the heterogeneity of the popular cultures. In order to accomplish this, they divorce the binary nature of taste versus necessity which characterizes the theory of dominocentrism. This theory analyzes patterns of consumption of the less-dominant classes from the point of view of the dominant ones. In its place, they propose a "dominomorphism" which is capable of simultaneously recognizing the relations of domination and the options, directions, and positive qualities of the behavior of the classes which are dominated. As part of this reorientation, they replace the idea of capital with assets and postulate the necessary link between cultural analysis and ideological analysis. The former links the culture of each class with the social conditions and the feelings that the individuals of that class acquire. The latter is interested in the ways in which the social behavior functions in relation to social domination.

The various developments in theory which are outlined here redefined consumption and explained it according to the dynamic between limitations imposed by social stratification (→ Social Inequality, II/20) and the possibility of action or agency by the study's subjects. This group of theories developed in Europe found fertile ground in the Americas. They blossomed there beginning in the late 1970s and increased throughout the following years.

To the South

The reformulation of a sociocultural theory of consumption in Latin America has different, mingled beginnings. It deserves mention that the structuralist mode, with its emphasis on the ideological dimension of the message, fell into disuse toward the end of the 1960s and throughout the following decade. The work most representative of this paradigm is *How to Read Donald Duck*, by Ariel Dorfman and Armand Matellard. Academics in Latin America found that the book mixed structuralism from France and orthodox Marxism. The book, which was censored in the U.S., analyzes some of the Walt Disney characters which are hugely popular in the Global South. Furthermore, it called itself a “manual for decolonization” (→ Postcolonialism, I/38). It criticized North American imperialism and the ways in which it imposed patterns of consumption. Although the theoretical model the book proposes was overtaken by later ones, the attention it draws to the unequal relationship of power between the North and the Global South, and the cultural domination and consumerism associated with the American way of life remain valid (→ Foundational Discourses, III/8).

The way in which Modernity developed in Latin America raised questions which would prove important in the creation of studies of consumption in the region with an emphasis on the process of the appropriation of symbolic goods (→ Modernization, I/35). Social scientists who study Latin America are confronted with new theoretical and political challenges related to the strategic value of indigenous, folk, and popular cultures, as well as the formation of a mass culture (→ Indigeneity, I/31; Popular, I/37). Other elements which theorists must grapple with are the growing value of cultural exports such as handicrafts and telenovelas (→ Television, III/43), as well as the growth of music from the region in the global market and the Latin American Boom (→ Latino Media, III/33).

The production of a new academic field focused on consumption highlights the necessity for transnational unity among university professionals interested in the analysis of new cultural dynamics. Institutions such as the Council on Latin American Social Sciences, known by its Spanish initials as CLACSO, and the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences, or FLACSO, catalyzed the formation of a body of specialists who identify issues and design joint research projects.

Last but not least, it is worth mentioning that regional politics, revolutionary movements (→ Revolution, II/44), and bloody dictatorships (→ Authoritarianism, II/25) contributed to an outflow of intellectuals and scientists from the region. Their collaboration, while away from their home countries as well as after they returned, contributed to the growth of a sociocultural theory of consumption that is distinctly Latin American. The importance of culture in the processes of the recuperation of national democracy (→ II/32) and the creation of civil society (→ II/28), as well as policies aimed at media literacy contributed as well. Paulo Freire's thoughts about communication and freedom (→ I/27) as well as the recognition of the profound ignorance about the behavior of consumers contributed to this dynamic too.

This reorientation in Latin American academia during the 1980s is associated with the writings of Néstor García Canclini and others. Canclini, in books such as *Teoría y método en*

sociología del arte (1979), *Las culturas populares en el capitalismo* (1982), and *Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity* (1990), synthesized and expanded the European debate about analysis of consumption beyond its economic dimension. His interdisciplinary approach, strongly rooted in the Latin American political and cultural processes, consisted of ideas such as de-collecting, de-territorializing, paying attention to intersections (→ Intersectionality, I/32), nontraditional genders (→ Gender Identities, I/28), and oblique powers.

Another notable author is Jesús Martín Barbero, whose 1987 book *De los medios a las mediaciones* proposed a methodological strategy for the analysis of telenovelas starting from the study of the relationship between the place of production and the place of reception. Critical reception, or the ways in which people appropriate texts, and the quotidian behavior that structures the social use of communication became objects of study for the social sciences (→ Media Consumption, III/34).

Related to the new theoretical–epistemological and methodological concerns, empirical studies of the culture of consumption began as well as an analysis of the impact of the cultural policies of emerging Latin American democracies. At the beginning of the 1990s, the CLACSO, with the coordination of Néstor García Canclini, promoted five investigations about cultural consumption in Buenos Aires, Lima, Mexico City, Sao Paulo, and Santiago in Chile. The empirical studies and the academic discussions which accompanied them multiplied, at varying rates, in Latin American research centers and universities. In 1999, Guillermo Sunkel published *El consumo cultural en América Latina*, which was a comparative study of these new theoretical developments. An expanded second edition was published in 2006, which caused new research and the consolidation of the sociocultural theory of cultural consumption.

Following this paradigm, cultural consumption influences the values of use, change, and symbolism in relation to the growing autonomy of culture and the arts in Modernity. According to George Yúdice (2003), culture is transformed into a resource. Analysis of consumption also contributes to the design, implementation, evaluation, and critique of cultural policies. It adds to the fundamental understanding of social and political processes, the formation of subjectivities, the construction of collective identity, and the symbolic elaboration of difference and inequality. “Consumption is good for thinking,” maintains García Canclini (1995, 41–55) in *Consumidores y ciudadanos* where he reviews several of the theoretical and methodological topics of the Latin-American paradigm and proposes a rethinking of the relationship between consumption and access to rights (→ Human Rights, II/35). Neoliberalism (→ II/16) substitutes the notions of “people” and “popular culture” for “civil society” (→ II/28), which leads García Canclini to question citizenship’s (→ II/27) relation to consumption and more as a political strategy. Along these same lines, he identifies the redefinition of boundaries between public and private as well as between the state and the market, and the transformation of the citizen into the consumer who is interested in enjoying a particular quality of life. The focus on forms of domination and resistance through an examination of the political dimension identifies this as an important Latin American contribution to the conversation about consumerism.

The text makes its mark on the debate in another way as well, with its political–epistemological warning about the hegemony of the United States. Starting from an empirical analysis of the tastes in film and video of viewers in Mexico City, the author points out the growing Americanization or North Americanization of cultural consumption (Media Flows, III/35). The power of American companies accounts for this process (Cultural Industries, III/27), but not to be discounted is the rise of certain aesthetic and cultural features associated with the U.S.

The language of the text is moralistic about consumerism and perhaps some dimensions escaped the analytical mesh due to their being slightly embarrassing, such as pornography. With some exceptions, notably Tomás Moulian (1998), these studies rarely expound upon questions related to the consumption of things related to the body, physical pleasures, and sensual or sensorial experiences. Research from the U.S. does examine these topics.

To the North

Beginning in the 1970s with the arrival of the French Theory and of the Birmingham School in North American universities, questions could be raised regarding the functionalist theoretical models and the borders between disciplines which guided the Humanities and the Social Sciences. Associated with movements for recognition of civil rights for women and African Americans as well as other ethnic minorities and sexual identities (→ Social Movements, I/41), the field of Cultural Studies was formed. It was also connected with the very way in which academic institutions were administered. This varied and multifaceted field of interdisciplinary research proposed a renewal of the analysis of cultural consumption based on the line of inquiry brought on by Postmodernism (→ III/14) (Featherstone 2007). The focus of the analysis was on the products of mass culture. It furthered perspectives on excess and waste that had attracted the attention of earlier thinkers such as George Bataille and Mijail Bajtín.

The spread of conspicuous consumption raised challenges. Thorstein Veblen (1899) had described the exhibition of status at the end of the 19th century, but the U.S.-American analysis went further and looked at the experience of fascination, longing, and nostalgia which consumption offered. The enlightened sector of society judges its own consumption as rational when measured against the hyperbolic or excessive consumption of the masses. Despite this moral condemnation from a particular sector of society, consumerism is valued, dreamed, imagined, and carried out by a range of people. Those who self-identify as consumers are proud of it. Participation in certain markets, acquisition of particular goods, or even desires could account for the cosmopolitan and contemporary identities that some sought (→ Cosmopolitanism, III/5).

This research is likewise concerned with the relationship between consumption and identity, beginning with a theory of power from the works of Michel Foucault and Louis Althusser. The magazine *Public Culture*, founded in 1988, became one of the primary outlets for these ideas. In light of all these theories, Appadurai (1996) explored the notion of techniques of the body first elaborated by Marcel Mauss (1971, 337–357), to account for the problem of repetition and formation of habitus which consumption implies. Even the most hedonistic and anarchic consumption encourages repetition and the logic of this repetition creates regimes that are cyclic in nature and time. Time is money in contemporary society; yet, the hegemonic model of consumption is fashionable. Part of the function of fashion is that it produces the fleeting experience of “imagined nostalgia” for things that never were. Enjoyment, specifically enjoyment of things that are ephemeral in nature, appears in the tension between these fantasies and nostalgia. Today’s consumer is kept in line by the representation of the present as something that has already happened. Thus, consumerism has overtaken other forms of organization of consumption, such as the power to prohibit consumption. In tribal societies, for example, taboos structured consumption, and from antiquity, there were laws limiting excessive consumption. A whole new emotional economy has been created as part of the process associated with post-Fordist capitalism (→ Fordism, II/10).

The sociocultural theory of consumption has expanded upon a diverse array of topics. From the tendency of capitalism to produce dreamlike imagery or the increasing availability of identities to sex tourism and the pornography industry, it has all been studied. Moreover, the tastes for kitsch and camp aesthetic, interior design, plastic surgery, malls, and advertising have all been looked at as well (→ Visual Cultures, III/45). The sociocultural theory of consumption has even been brought to bear on the television series *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, which resulted in a whole new field of study, Buffy Studies. Consumptions linked to the production or reproduction of living things – human reproductive technology, seed-saving banks, transgenic animals, pet-care, the slow food philosophy, and even veganism – have all been looked at to study the consumerism aspect of consumption. Consumption has appeared as a way of organizing one's emotional life as well as the sensual and sensorial human experiences.

North American cultural studies have offered diverse ways of approaching the study of consumption, for example, the analysis of fandom. The seminal work of Henry Jenkins in the early 1990s recognized the emotional links connecting consumers with texts. Through their consumption, fans construct their own culture by appropriating, remixing, and poaching content from mass culture. Connecting with their favorite stars through autograph hunting and face-to-face encounters motivates the behavior of fans, as well as the pleasures of appropriation (through spoiling, fan fiction, and slash) as well as performance, through cosplay, filking, making fan videos, and collecting and making zines and blogs. In addition to showing the importance of agency and the interwoven effects of consumption, the fan studies show how, prior to the saturation of the market and the proliferation of standardized products, some consumers transformed themselves into “pro-sumers.”

Studies of the process of the creation of celebrities are another perspective from which to look at consumption. The fusion between actors and characters, such as that between Sarah Jessica Parker and the character Carrie Bradshaw in the TV series *Sex and the City*, as well as the mixing of acting and politics – think Ronald Reagan or Arnold Schwarzenegger – brings to the fore issues related to the more sensorial aspects of mimesis. In this context, it is interesting to wonder about the enjoyment of seeing low-quality nude photos of celebrities as well as the growth of celebrity magazines and the portrayal of criminals as celebrities, such as Pablo Escobar or Walter White from the TV series *Breaking Bad*. Suicide as a part of the culture of popular music, as well as new media forms are also changing our relationship to celebrity culture quite profoundly.

Pertaining to the United States and Europe, Beatriz Preciado proposes another perspective on the issue. Preciado characterizes the postindustrial transnational media regime, which grew during the 1970s, as drug-pornographic (2008). This new era is characterized by the production of large amounts of synthetic steroids and new synthetic psychotropic drugs and the spread of pornographic images around the globe. Bringing in other elements as well, one could look at the urban architecture of today's megacities (→ Urbanization, I/45), which teem with poor people alongside knots of highly concentrated capital that rely on the digital computer processing capabilities of the information superhighway. Biomolecular and semiotic-technical methods of government blend together in contemporary society (→ Biopolitics, I/22), giving way to new toxic-pornographic subjectivities. Capitalism exploits the orgasmic force, what Preciado (2008) refers to as the *potentia gaudendi*, or the capacity of every living thing to become excited.

This new spirit of capitalism even incorporates the Protestant ethic, enlarging it into what Preciado calls “the Weber-Hilton Principle” (2008, 189). Following the apparent surrender

to vice and idleness in figures such as Paris Hilton or the Kardashian sisters, there is no hidden rejection of capitalism or of the Puritan ideas of erotic power, but instead the complete transformation of their lives and sexuality into capitalism. This becomes their life's work, and because of devices which enable us to see them constantly, their digital images span the globe (→ Digital Culture, III/28). It would not, therefore, be hedonism nor achieving sensorial pleasure that guides consumption, but the management of the cycle of excitement and frustration. An endless cycle of desire and resistance results from frustrated satisfaction and the logic of masturbation. It consumes and destroys everything, even the natural environment (→ Nature, II/39). Consumption is dominated by a virtual, hallucinogenic aesthetic. Thanks to the instantaneous spread of information through social networks like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, intimate interior spaces are transformed into exterior ones (→ Social Media, III/41). The anonymity of the streets has evolved into an object for video surveillance.

In the context of North America, the study of consumption is interested in questions of legality and ethics. It analyzes the regulations and state controls on consumption and the recognition of new rights for consumers, such as the right to recourse or to redress, and the right to a physical environment that will enhance the quality of life. It also looks at the discussion about which ads are appropriate to be targeting children, as well as the representation in the media of women, homosexuals, minority ethnic groups, and those who identify as transsexual (→ Gender Identities, I/28). Other important areas for investigation are issues such as the systematic collection of identifying information about consumers, the formation of consumer associations, the rise of consumer activism, and the reduction of consumption or demarketing (Aaker and Day 1982).

More than a word

Consumerism is here to stay; it is a hallmark of contemporary society. It continues despite endless criticism and defense. Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood (1979, vii) pointed out the following paradox: "Overconsumption is more serious and more complicated than personal obesity, and moral indignation is not enough for understanding it." The explanations put forth by the social sciences became more complicated when the dominant behavioralist–functionalist and structuralist models were questioned during the 1950s and 1960s. Beginning with the recognition of agency on the part of those being studied and the performative dimension of culture, research efforts were oriented toward the formation of a sociocultural theory of consumption. Based on ideas developed in Europe and in different settings, the conversation about consumerism came to the Americas and in Latin America, the political dimension of cultural consumption and geopolitical inequality received more emphasis (→ Geopolitics, II/34; Social Inequality, II/20). Meanwhile, North American research deepened the cultural definition of consumerism and, beyond merely noting the moral condemnation of it, called attention to the emotional, sensual, legal, and ethical dimensions of consumerism.

As part of the inter-American dialogue, the blend of these perspectives offers a new possibility of investigating consumption under the conditions in which it currently exists. During a time of narco-capitalism, when cocaine and other prohibited substances strongly feed social life, consumption of narcotics, and especially the nature of consumption by narco-traffickers and assassins draw attention once again to excessive consumption, waste, and violence. Faced with the precarity of life and the diminished importance of work as a way for social advancement, coupled with the proliferation of objects of desire and restrictions of achieving them,

choosing your method of consumption – either feast or famine – is a privilege. Miracles attributed to Virgen Mary, Jesús Malverde, or San La Muerte, the macabre aesthetization of torture and death, the popularity of films showing graphic violence, or even actual murder acquire other meanings when analyzed in this context. Within this tension, violence has the capacity to become a tool of empowerment in some future dystopia (→ Utopias, III/23). Violence already has a symbolic value as it supplies goods differentially to different people. For example, an AK-47 manages to become an ornament or a Humvee from the battlefield becomes a rented Hummer for a teenager's birthday party or a wedding.

The study of consumption, both the politics and the desires that surround it, acquires a strategic value in the contemporary context. Today's society offers the apparent capacity to enrich and provide power to those who already have their hands on the levers while at the same time, threatening the existence of those who do not.

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24

EDUCATION

Stefan Peters and Adriana Serrudo

Education is a central issue in public discussion (not only) in the Americas. The shared concerns about education, however, tend to hide important context variety. At first sight, everyday school-life of a college student in a downtown Manhattan private school seems to have little to do with the routine of a kid of the same age attending an impoverished secondary school in rural Paraguay. However, this example is somehow misleading. On the one hand, abysmal differences of everyday school-life also exist within the countries of the Americas between privileged urban private schools and schools with a high number of socially underprivileged students. On the other hand, although there is no doubt that important variance exists, this is not to neglect convergences. For example, the expansion of access to education has been quite successful throughout the Americas. On average, today young people from Alaska to Patagonia show higher education attainment than their parents and grandparents. Regarding Latin America, Carlos Alberto Torres even called the 20th century the “century of education” (2008, 209).

Arguing in a similar way for the U.S. or Canada would certainly not be wrong. Still, a second look on education performance arrives at the conclusion of a rather weird success story. The improvement of education attainment is accompanied by continuing debates about educational crises both in Latin America and in the U.S. (Gentili 2009; Putnam 2016). This apparent contradiction is linked to a widespread perception that education is often understood as a magic bullet able to resolve all kinds of social and political problems. Education is not only presented as a key for combating poverty and inequality (→ Social Inequality, II/20), but also for sustaining economic growth and competitiveness through human capital formation. Furthermore, education is supposed to contribute to health improvements (→ Health, I/29), the reduction of crime and violence (→ Security II/45), successful nation-building (→ Nation State, II/38), and even to build a more profound democracy (→ II/32). There is a broad agreement between all kinds of actors including politicians from the right and the left, business, trade unions (→ Labor Representation, II/14), NGOs, social movements (→ I/41), indigenous communities (→ Indigeneity, I/31), international organizations, and general public opinion regarding the importance of education and the need for improvements in education. In a nutshell, this consensus is based on a clear and compelling argument that investment in education delivers development (→ II/6) success (Bokova 2015).

Still, behind this apparently tight consensus, there are fierce controversies regarding more concrete education policy issues like the role of education in society, the legitimate actors

involved in the education process, pedagogical orientations, or curriculum development. Furthermore, it is not even clear what is understood by education. While most people might think first and foremost of schools and universities, the animated debate on lifelong-learning (Jarvis 2009), but also the less well-known discussions on nonformal and informal learning (Overwien 2012) demonstrate that the scope of education reaches well beyond the walls of formal educational institutions. Broader definitions of education include, for example, learning in social movements, trade unions, or in indigenous community activities like the Andean *minga*.

Education in the history of the Americas

Education in the Americas did, of course, not start with the arrival of Columbus. Precolonial educational traditions include, for example, the institutionalized systems of formation of the ruling classes and the transmission and reproduction of knowledge. For example, Aztec *Calmécac*, *Tepochcalli* but also *Yachay Wasi*, *Aklla Wasi* among the Incas were part of precolonial educational efforts (Plaza Martínez 2013). Yet, the knowledge of the rich educational traditions prior to the so-called “Conquest of America” has been violently erased by the colonial powers (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7). Today, these experiences are nearly totally absent in discussions about education in the Americas.

During the colonial rule (→ I/5) in Latin America, the Spanish and Portuguese Crown concentrated their educational efforts on measures to assure the reproduction of the colonial administration. Furthermore, different religious orders were engaged in education. They combined alphabetization with proselytization, the fostering of Catholic beliefs, and the formation of priests and missionaries (→ Religion and Missionizing, I/17). The importance of religious education became apparent when the Portuguese and Spaniards decided to expel the Jesuits in the second half of the 18th century. Although the Crown tried to compensate for the losses due to an increase in the royal engagement in education, the exodus of the Jesuits meant a “de-capitalization of the colonial education system” (Caruso 2015, 21). Generally speaking, during the whole colonial period, education remained a rather exclusive issue. After independence (→ Independence Movements, I/10; Revolution, II/44), the new republics in Latin America, thus, inherited weak education systems with an urban, elite, white, and male bias (→ Gender, I/9; Ethnicity, I/25). The newly independent countries reproduced these general patterns by focusing their efforts on higher education for the local elites. Education continued to be a privilege of the few. However, not all remained unchanged in postindependence education. Secularization and the focus on rationalism, utilitarianism, and thoughts from the Enlightenment (→ I/8) by some liberal governments represented a clear rupture with the past and led to severe conflicts with the Church. Moreover, many of the newly founded republics passed education laws that stipulated free and universal compulsory primary education (Mexico 1867, Costa Rica 1869, Venezuela 1870, Uruguay 1877, Argentina 1884) or even codified the right to free primary education in their Constitutions (Peru 1828, Bolivia 1851, Colombia 1886). Having in mind that similar laws were passed in the United States between 1852 (Massachusetts) and 1918 (Mississippi), Latin America was certainly not a latecomer (Reimers 2002). However, the reality of education in the region remained far behind the legal claims.

Based on the aforementioned legal frameworks, Latin America’s modern school systems have been developed since the mid-19th century. They started from a shared orientation toward the French model, but with the passing of the decades and driven by political and social changes, the education systems gradually differentiated themselves. Despite the increasing

variation, the so-called “State-run centralized public education system” (SIPCE) persisted all over Latin America. The Latin American states saw education as a key issue to promote economic development (→ II/6) and as an important instrument to foster nation- and state building (→ I/16) (Soifer 2009). In fact, the majority of nations managed to articulate schools, colleges, and universities, valuing them as privileged spaces for the (re)production of public knowledge (Puiggrós 1999). The school became the fundamental place for teaching and studying about society: learning of collective values, norms, rituals, language, etc. Thus, the state assigned education the role of unifying the highly diverse societies.

However, education did not manage to penetrate the whole society. The most salient shortcoming of Latin America’s educational systems consisted in the immense gap between the legal framework and the educational reality. Despite important differences regarding enrollment and literacy rates, in general, the education systems discriminated against indigenous people, blacks, the rural population, the poor, and women. Although throughout the 20th-century Latin America and especially in the 1960s, a continuous expansion of access to education (Reimers 2002) was experienced, with the exception of gender (Bustillo 1993), the aforementioned axes of inequalities persisted. Latin American education has therefore never been the “great equalizer” (as Horace Mann famously claimed it would be in 1848), but rather contributed to the reproduction of the extreme social inequalities (→ II/20).

The need for a better educated workforce and/or the widespread unease with educational injustice motivated several Latin American governments to reform their educational systems. These efforts were reinforced by student–teacher movements’ demands for more and better education in representation of the large social strata that knocked on the doors of higher levels of the educational systems. This happened from the late 1960s and early 1970s, from the Mexican Tlatelolco to the Argentinean reform of 1973, and included reform experiences by democratic governments in countries such as Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil. These transformations also affected marginalized modalities such as adult education and indigenous education (Puiggrós 1999). During the Cold War, the U.S. government worried about the political impact of these progressive education reforms and tried to counter them, for example, with a program designed by Stanford University that aimed to use television classes for improving rural education in El Salvador (→ Television, III/43). However, the program frustrated rural teachers who saw their work downgraded. As a consequence, the program rather contributed to a radicalization of teachers and not the desired impact (Caruso 2015, 34).

In spite of this frustrated project, U.S. influence on education in Latin America increased clearly with the violent start of the neoliberal era in the region (→ Neoliberalism, II/16). After the coup d’état against president Salvador Allende’s democratic socialism in 1973 (→ Socialism, I/42), the brutal military dictatorship of General Pinochet transformed Chile into a neoliberal laboratory (→ Authoritarianism, II/25). Education policy of the dictatorship was roughly the antithesis to the reform projects under the former socialist government and marked the beginning of a wave of neoliberal educational reforms throughout the region. Although the concrete design of the neoliberal education package differed between the countries, in general the reform agenda consisted of the privatization (→ II/17) and decentralization of education, the introduction of international quality standards, continuous evaluation, and the strengthening of contents directly linked to increase the students’ employability (Torres 2008).

However, the results of neoliberal education policy were rather disappointing. The increase in enrollment rates slowed down. As a consequence, concerning access to education and compared to other regions like Asia, Latin America fell behind (Londoño 1996). Moreover, government spending cuts frustrated hopes for improving education quality due to

reduced teacher salaries and a lack of investment in school infrastructure. As a consequence, “also in Latin America the miracle of reaching a low-cost high-quality education did not occur” (Rivero 2000, 106). Furthermore, the neoliberal reforms intensified the fragmentation of the educational systems. Private education gained importance and due to decentralization, existing inequalities concerning the educational conditions between schools in different municipalities and provinces were accentuated.

In summary, neoliberal policies have not been able to resolve the crucial problems of Latin American education and even tended to further aggravate the reproduction of social inequalities within the region’s education systems. It is certainly no coincidence that at the end of the last century, socialist Cuba stood out as a positive regional outlier that managed to combine high learning outcomes with low inequalities (Carnoy 2007).

At the beginning of the 21st century, various left-of-center governments came into office in Latin America (Ellner 2014). The so-called “left turn” or “pink tide” (1999–2016) entailed major policy shifts in education. Several countries passed new education laws that were sanctioned in a context of revision and criticism of the neoliberal governments of previous decades, e.g. the Law on Education “Avelino Siñani – Elizardo Pérez” No. 070 (Bolivia 2010), the General Law of Education No. 20,370 (Chile 2009), or the Organic Law of Education (Venezuela 2009). These laws generally stipulate that education is a right of citizenship (→ II/27) and once again assigned the state a central role within the educational process. A nodal aspect of the laws is their emphasis in combining the right to education, the respect for cultural diversity, and recognition of the cultures of indigenous peoples and ethnic and gender minorities. Consequently, these laws refer to nondiscrimination; in some cases, such as Uruguay, they even placed certain emphasis on the transformation of discriminatory stereotypes based on age, race (→ I/39), ethnicity (→ I/25), or gender identities (→ I/28) (Saforcada and Vassiliades 2011).

Beyond the legal framework, education policy change led to a new expansion of access to education that improved the educational possibilities of socially disadvantaged groups. These reforms were accompanied by measures to expand adult education and prison education. Still, social inclusion was not restricted to issues of access to education or enrollment rates. The reform process also encompassed programs that aimed to close the digital gap. With Uruguay as a pioneer, several governments of the region introduced different variants of U.S.-based informatics professor Nicholas Negroponte’s “One Laptop per Child” program and thereby considerably improved the access to information as well as the digital knowledge of students and their families (→ Digital Culture, III/28). Furthermore, progressive education policy reform entailed curriculum reforms that aimed to introduce several transversal topics such as diversity, human rights (→ II/35), or violence prevention into the curricula.

Education and inequalities

Despite decades of reforms aiming to improve equity, students’ social background continues to be the key factor for educational success. In fact, Latin American educational systems work as machineries of reproduction of social inequalities. However, the reciprocal relationship between education and social inequalities is, of course, not a unique feature of Latin America. Rather, it can be considered as one of the best documented facts in international social sciences. In the U.S., the findings of decades of intense academic work on the relationship of education and social inequalities highlight once again the importance of the social background especially race (→ I/39) and class (→ Social Inequality, II/20) for educational achievement gaps. For several decades, large amounts of scholarly and political attention

have been paid to ethnic and racial inequalities. In spite of some improvement, inequalities between Blacks and Hispanics on the one hand and Whites on the other hand still remain very pronounced (Dworkin and López Turley 2014).

However, during the last decades, an important change occurred: as achievement gaps between children from high- and low-income families have increased during the decades of neoliberal reforms, today in the U.S., class is more important than race for explaining educational inequalities (Reardon 2011). Yet, class and race continue to be highly intertwined and thereby demonstrate the importance of approaches that make use of intersectionality analysis (→I/32) for explaining educational inequalities. However, generally speaking, the panorama for the U.S. again raises concerns about the growing reproduction of socioeconomic inequalities within the education system. Some authors already speak of a tendency toward resegregation of schools in the U.S. (Donnor and Dixson 2013; Putnam 2016).

At first sight, the situation for Latin America seems to contrast the recent increase in inequalities in the U.S. Since the beginning of the 21st century, almost all Latin American countries have shown a modest decrease in income inequality. Furthermore, this trend seems to be accompanied by a decrease in educational inequalities. In fact, various scholars even highlight the important contribution of education for declining income inequalities in the region (Lustig et al. 2013; Cornia 2014). The notion of a decline in educational inequalities is first and foremost explained by important progress in the expansion of access to education. This important improvement was achieved, thanks to increasing government spending on education, the introduction and amplification of Conditional-Cash Transfer Programs for poor families like the *Asignación Universal por Hijo* in Argentina, *Bolsa Família* in Brazil, the *Bono Juancito Pinto* in Bolivia, or the *Bono de Desarrollo Humano* in Ecuador (Papadopoulos and Velásquez Leyer 2016), free school meals, general poverty alleviation, and several education policy reforms aimed at preventing school dropout. As a consequence, Latin America experienced a new phase of education expansion (CEPALSTAT). This trend was especially pronounced at preprimary, secondary, and higher education and benefitted first and foremost lower-middle-class and poor students. Moreover, girls' education is a real success story in Latin America. Today, girls are better educated than their male peers in nearly all Latin American countries, although positive statistical results tend to hide insights from intersectionality analysis about the persistent disadvantages of poor girls from rural areas and/or black or indigenous communities.

The recent trends in Latin American education seem to contrast with the situation in the U.S. While in the U.S., both education and social inequalities are rising, in Latin America, education seems to be increasingly successful in equalizing the huge social inequalities. However, Latin American education's balance sheet is far less positive than it might appear when analyzing only statistical data. Actually, based on their everyday practice on the ground, hardly any teacher would confirm the enthusiastic conclusions based on scholarly regression analyses. First, the noteworthy progress in enrollment cannot hide that access to education is still insufficient. Large parts of the population still cannot put their codified right to education in practice. While gaps in enrollment rates between socially disadvantaged groups and the middle and upper classes have closed significantly for primary education, the same is not true for preprimary, secondary, and higher education. At these levels, inequalities due to class, ethnicity, place of residence (urban–rural disparities as well as inner-urban socio-spatial segregation) (→ Urbanization, I/45), age, and health remain starkly pronounced throughout the whole region (Trucco 2014). The persisting inequalities in education become particularly salient at the level of higher education, with important inequalities in enrollment rates between socioeconomic contexts. Especially in some Central

American countries, being poor equals a nearly insurmountable barrier for accessing higher education. However, generally speaking, access to higher education still remains rather exclusive (CEPALSTAT). This is also true for countries where very different kinds of affirmative action policies and/or higher education reforms were applied to increase the number of socially marginalized groups in the universities. And even in socialist Cuba, recent investigations stress setbacks in terms of equity in the access to higher education and a tendency toward a reproduction of professionals (Tejuca Martínez, Onil Gutiérrez Fernández, and Irina García Ojalvo 2015). Further progress toward more educational justice remains an urgent task all over Latin America.

However, the analysis of matriculation data represents a necessary but insufficient tool for assessing education inequalities. Enrollment data do not tell anything about real attendance, nor about learning outcomes or the social recognition of the credentials obtained. As a consequence, in addition to highlighting inequalities in access to different levels of education, it is mandatory to insist – second – in the quiet banal insight that guaranteeing access to education does not suffice to reduce inequalities. Rather, education quality represents another key factor for explaining persistent educational inequalities (Behrmann and Birdsall 1983; UNESCO 2004). Although today there is a widespread consensus on the importance of education quality, what is meant by education quality is by no means clear. Actually, a lot of different concepts coexist, turning the consensus on education quality into a highly controversial issue. Different definitions of education quality stress either equality, pertinence of education contents, formation of solidary citizens, or internationally standardized competences. Measuring education quality includes therefore highly normative decisions about what students should learn and how education should work.

In the political practice, an increasing number of Latin American countries adapt themselves to the arguably Eurocentric conception of education quality from OECD's PISA project. PISA is an international achievement test that compares narrowly defined learning outcomes in maths, science, and reading of fifteen-year-old secondary students (OECD 2016). A compelling argument in favor of PISA is surely the comparable database. In public debates, the PISA results are usually discussed in a homogenized way looking at the position of a country in the international ranking as well as progress or regression compared to earlier results. However, the problem is arguably not about education quality *per se*, but rather about the inequalities of education quality between different educational institutions and social classes within a country. A closer look at the PISA results not only shows that Latin American students' performance is far below the OECD average, test scores also highlight the huge inequalities of learning outcomes between middle- and upper-class students on the one hand and poor students on the other hand (Trucco 2014; OECD 2016).

This is in line with other studies which highlight that quality of education differs significantly among institutions. Huge inequalities in learning outcomes exist between urban and rural schools, between schools in different neighborhoods, or between private and public institutions, etc. Generally speaking, socially and geographically disadvantaged students attend schools that are incapable of providing high-quality instruction. This is both due to factors related to education policy (teacher training, class size, learning materials, etc.) and due to socioeconomic context factors that facilitate or hinder the provision of high-quality education. Consequently, it is not poor quality, but rather varying degrees of qualities within the educational systems that contribute to the (re-)production of inequalities in Latin America (Tenti Fanfani 2008; Peters 2013).

A third factor that has to be taken into account for measuring inequalities is the hierarchal fragmentation of education systems. This category focuses on the differences in the public

appreciation of educational credentials of formally equal status, e.g. public/private, vocational/general education, school location, and more generally the social composition of the student body (Peters 2013). Although no formal segmentation between different educational tracks exists in Latin America, the improved access to education of underprivileged social groups coincided with a process of successive fragmentation of the educational system due to a withdrawal especially of middle-class children into more exclusive and mostly private institutions. This expresses and reinforces the sharp inequalities between the social appreciation of prestigious, privileged, and privileging private schools in wealthy neighborhoods (Tiramonti and Ziegler 2008) and that of stigmatized and stigmatizing schools in deprived parts of the city, in the countryside, and/or in indigenous communities. As a consequence, even though higher levels of education have by and large lost their exclusivity, the relative social homogeneity of the students' social backgrounds in school has remained relatively untouched by this development. In fact, the growing hierarchical fragmentation of the education systems induces a process of homogenization of the social composition of the student body of individual institutions while simultaneously diversifying the social composition of student bodies of different institutions (Peters 2013).

Given the different dimensions of the relationship between education and social inequalities, in order to assess changes in educational inequalities, it is necessary to recognize the mutual interrelatedness of the three analytical categories access to education, quality of education, and hierarchical fragmentation of the education system. While isolated modifications of individual categories may generate highly necessary improvements, a reduction of social inequalities through them, however, cannot be expected. Rather, the relationship between education and social inequalities is affected not only by the possession of an education certificate (access to education) and the competences acquired in school (education quality) but also by the societal recognition of the respective qualification as verification of student's competence and/or socialization background (hierarchical fragmentation).

Based on this multidimensional approach, the balance sheet of the last years has been less positive than quantitative research suggests (Lustig et al. 2013; Cornia 2014). However, this is not to neglect important change. The configuration of educational inequalities has indeed undergone transformation. Still, instead of a reduction of education inequalities, what happened is rather a reconfiguration of these inequalities. While great efforts in expanding access to education allowed for a reduction of quantitative inequalities regarding access to education and enrollment rates, both inequalities in education quality and the hierarchical fragmentation of the education systems tend to stagnate or even to increase. This situation explains why education is simultaneously seen as a major driver of social development progress and a policy field in permanent crisis (→ II/4). Depending on what is looked at improvements can be found but also stagnation or even deterioration. However, the results of a multidimensional approach highlight that progress toward more educational justice remains a task ahead. Rather than being institutions of social integration, schools in Latin America tend to consolidate, reproduce, and sometimes even to further accentuate social inequalities.

Revolutionary education campaigns and social activism

As we have seen, social inequalities have been historically very pronounced in Latin America. Especially in the rural zones, social injustice cried out for change and motivated social movements (→ I/41), political activists, and revolutionary groups to struggle for social transformation. Education has always been a key issue within the agenda of revolutionary change (→ Revolution, II/44). The Mexican Revolution and José Vasconcelos' efforts as the

director of the Mexican Secretary of Public Instruction to bring education to all corners of the country represented somehow a model for upcoming progressive revolutionary politicians (Ocampo López 2005).

Despite their important political differences, the Guatemalan Revolution (1944–1954), the Bolivian Revolution (1952–1964), the Cuban Revolution (since 1959), and the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua (1979–1990) all also shared a common interest in improving education, especially for the rural poor. Revolutionary enthusiasm often motivated mostly young middle-class activists to engage in alphabetization and educational campaigns. The link between political activism and educational engagement was also stressed by critical thinkers like Paulo Freire, who developed in his famous work *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970) a framework for popular education (*educación popular*) that spread all over the region, inspired pedagogical discussions throughout the world, and continued to guide educational practices in many social movements like the Brazilian Landless Movement (MST), the international peasant movement *Via Campesina*, or the *Zapatistas* from Chiapas in Southern Mexico (Pinheiro Barbosa 2016) (→ Alter-Globalization, I/21).

Within the context of the much discussed “left turn” in Latin America, several progressive governments in the region put the social question back on the political agenda and sometimes even proclaimed revolutionary transformations (Ellner 2014) (→ Socialism, I/42). Once again, education was presented as a key instrument for improving social justice and promoting social transformation. In this sense, one of the most ambitious projects of educational change has surely been undertaken by the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela under President Hugo Chávez. While education has been an important issue since the first days after coming into office in 1999, the major educational transformations started in 2003. From this moment, the Bolivarian Revolution engaged in the construction of a massive system of adult education that contains all levels from alphabetization courses to higher education. These Educational Missions (*Misiones Educativas*) are embedded in a broader process of social policy change represented by the so-called Social Missions (*Misiones Sociales*) that aim to clear the social debt of the neoliberal years and simultaneously want to contribute to the self-organization and political empowerment of socially disadvantaged groups (→ Participation, II/41) (Maingon 2016). In this context, the Educational Missions improved access to education, integrated education with social and political activism, strengthened popular education à la Paulo Freire, and initiated a new educational enthusiasm that was especially palpable within underprivileged social groups. Moreover, based on the Cuban method “Yo sí puedo” (Yes, I can), the alphabetization campaign went beyond Venezuela and was exported and adapted to other countries governed by left-of-center governments like Bolivia, but also to Argentina and Uruguay (Canavire 2011).

Focusing on Venezuela, there is no doubt that the system of education missions successfully managed to incorporate large parts of the socially disadvantaged population. Supported by large numbers of Cuban educators, the *Misiones Educativas* managed to get to impoverished urban and rural places where the state formerly had often hardly been present. Here, the missions have given many elderly people the opportunity to learn, to write, or to complete primary education, whereas younger participants have studied for their high school degrees and have even been able to attend higher education. Although the massive participation seen during the first years decreased after 2007, in 2014–2015 still approximately 560,000 Venezuelans participated in the different *Misiones Educativas*, more than half of them were enrolled in the higher education programs of *Misión Sucre* (Bravo 2017). The missions therefore became a crucial part of the government’s efforts to increase access to education. In combination with important increase of students’ numbers in the formal system, this

encouraged the government to self-declare Venezuela as the world's biggest classroom (AVN 2011). However, learning outcomes are highly contested and differ starkly between local contexts (Peters 2013). But the major problem consists of the continued social devaluation of the *Misiones Educativas*. In a context of extreme political polarization, they are perceived especially within the middle and upper classes as a political project by the government to prop up its popularity and to spread the ideas of the Bolivarian Revolution. Drawing on Collins (1979), one can argue that their certificates have adopted the character of political credentials. They are not principally regarded as evidence of competence or qualifications but as testimonies of sympathizing with the current government and might even have a stigmatizing effect in the labor market (Peters 2013).

Intercultural education

The incorporation of the perspective of interculturality in Latin American education systems also gained dynamic during the last period. However, paradoxically the introduction of alternative educational modalities such as rural education or bilingual and intercultural education for indigenous peoples (→ I/11) had already begun to gain importance during the era of neoliberal education reform projects. These reforms were in line with efforts by international education forums to strengthen specific rights of these groups (Jomtien Conference 1990, UNESCO, UNICEF). Regarding indigenous groups, these reforms were part of broader paths taken by the American governments to consider these groups as an integral part of their nations.

This meant a major change. Historically both in North and Latin America, indigenous peoples _> have been cornered aside into reserves, reservations, colonies, farms, etc. This was a direct consequence of the civilizing ideology that aimed to achieve the incorporation and integration of the indigenous into the emerging national societies. In educational terms, in Latin America between the decades of the 1940s and the 1970s, this ideology implied a process known as “*castellanización*.” The indigenous groups were successively incorporated into the educational systems and at the same time suffered from the prohibition of the use of their own languages at school because of linguistic homogenization policies. Only from the 1970s onward has the negation of indigenous languages, traditions, and cultures been timidly modified (→ Indigeneity, I/31). With some contributions from popular education, indigenous languages were incorporated into primary education and founded the so-called “transitional bilingual education”. These reforms paved the way for a boost in intercultural education, although according to the ethnic composition of the population, the concrete reforms linked to the so-called intercultural education had different developments throughout the continent.

Moreover, the distinctive path of the North American variants of intercultural education should be taken into account. In North America, the proposals for the educational processes were developed under the notion of multiculturalism (→ I/36). In the United States, multicultural education is conceived under the umbrella of liberal democracy and seeks to respond to governance challenges and the social, political, and economic marginalization of families and individuals that are ethnically and culturally differentiated. In this view, multiculturalism depends on freedom and individual choice and is therefore opposed to any minority nationalism (López 2009, 182). Concerning education, this includes tendencies to consider vernacular maternal languages in some curricular instances and in certain periods of adaptation of migrant students in schools. Will Kymlicka (2002) is the best illustrator of this trend in North America and places it in perspective, identifying the limitations in its application to the case of black and indigenous populations both in Canada and the United States.

In Latin America, the situation is different. As a consequence of pressures from indigenous organizations, community leaders, committed academics, and multilateral organizations (World Bank, UN, among others) throughout the 1990s and especially during the beginning of the new millennium, most countries in the region incorporated interculturalism into their Ministries and/or Secretariats of Education. Nevertheless, these changes received important critiques. Especially salient seems to be the objection raised by indigenous organizations and leaders to what they called “interculturality from the state.” They postulate that the state’s proposals for intercultural education are functional to the system of domination by which Indigenous peoples continue to suffer from marginalization.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the relationship between indigenous peoples and nation-states has become even more complex. Indigenous movements are highly political and one cannot separate education from their struggles for self-determination. In countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador, indigenous leaders link interculturality with the notion of “living well” or “life for the common good” – *sumaq qamaña* in Aymara, *sumaq* or *allin kawsay* in Quechua – and assume an anticolonial view while postulating the need for a mental decolonization to which a reformed school should contribute (→ Postcolonialism, I/38) (López 2009). Thus, the “decolonization of education” seeks to critically discuss the traditional education paradigm and aims not only to empower indigenous populations, but also to dispute the common sense around the meanings and objectives of education as such. However, the decolonization of education is a relatively old issue in Latin American political and educational discourses. The topic had already been discussed in the 1960s and 1970s in connection to the languages and cultures of subaltern communities (López 2016). At the end of the 20th century, these notions were recuperated as articulations of dissatisfaction with the notions of development and progress as well as with the market logic of the neoliberal order. Therefore, the concept of “decolonization” cannot be detached from indigenous struggles for self-determination and claims for repositioning their ways of knowing, feeling, and being vis-a-vis the mainstream.

In Bolivia during the government of President Evo Morales, the Law Avelino Siñani (2010) was issued. It postulates educational decolonization as a goal and purpose. This includes, among other transformations, the teaching and learning of indigenous languages in all parts of the education system (→ State Transformation, II/21). This is in line with the notion of plurinationality of the state and therefore also of the education system. Furthermore, the law underlines the importance of community education in rural areas, the creation of Intercultural Universities, and what is known as intra- and intercultural education for and in the communities and native nations.

In the case of Ecuador, the most innovative proposals occurred within the framework of educational reforms that allowed for the founding of Intercultural Universities. These institutions design their own curriculum whose proposals do not need approbation from the Ministry but from the most important indigenous organization in the country, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE). The Amawtay Wasi Intercultural University represents the most well-known experience. However, there were several missteps in the last period of President Rafael Correa’s government (2007–2017) when it was decided to add the Intercultural University to the set of higher education institutions in the country and test its postgraduate proposals. In the context of increasing conflicts between the Correa administration and the CONAIE, the Intercultural University was cited for failing to comply with the requirements for postgraduate institutions requested by the Council for the Evaluation, Accreditation and Quality Assurance of Higher Education of Ecuador (CEAACES).

Despite these conflicts and setbacks, in general, the recently developed critical positions of interculturality all share that they seek to distance themselves from the instrumental uses of the concept as adopted by states and governments especially during the neoliberal era. They stress that the problem is not one of nomenclature or denomination but of meanings and significance. However, concerning the aforementioned epistemological ruptures regarding the sense of education, there continues to be a pronounced tendency toward a deep-seated social depreciation of intercultural educational approaches by vast parts of the population and especially by the middle and upper classes. Additionally, regarding access, permanence, and educational promotion and despite important progress during recent decades, fierce discrimination against indigenous peoples persists.

All over Latin America, educational attainments of the indigenous population continue to lag behind national averages. In general, the indigenous population exhibits above-average illiteracy rates. The largest gaps are observed in Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela with differences ranging from 17.7 to 20.1 percent. The highest levels of illiteracy can be found in Paraguay and Honduras, where almost one in three indigenous people declared that they cannot read. In contrast, Argentina (4 percent) and Uruguay (1.7 percent) have relatively low illiteracy rates among their indigenous population. Moreover, illiteracy is exacerbated among the indigenous language-speaking population and women exhibit higher illiteracy rates than men. Among the countries that report data on whether indigenous language is spoken, there is clear evidence that these groups suffer from particularly high levels of illiteracy ranging from almost one-fifth of the population aged fifteen and over in Costa Rica (18.3 percent) to just over two-fifths in Colombia (42.3 percent). Regarding the differences by sex, with the exception of Uruguay, in the remaining fourteen countries with information, the indigenous population not only has the highest illiteracy rates but also the population group where there is the greatest inequality between the sexes. Ecuador and Mexico stand out, where women's illiteracy surpasses that of men by almost 15 percent (OEI 2015).

Conclusion

Education in the Americas contains important divergences between the different regional, national, and local contexts. Additional to the apparent divergences, there are mutual influences between the Americas in terms of education. On the one hand, this includes migration both within Latin America and from Latin America to the U.S. and Canada (→ Transnational Migration, I/44). In fact, today Latina/o students constitute the biggest migrant community in the U.S. educational system (Dworkin and López Turley 2014). On the other hand, North America and especially the U.S. continue to have important influence on the design of education policies in Latin America. Furthermore, despite huge variations between the different contexts, there is also considerable convergence. This includes the successive increase in importance of intercultural and indigenous education throughout the Americas. Convergence also appears on a more general level. For example, education is generally seen as a well-suited tool to fix social problems.

However, the concrete results of decades of education policy reforms raise skepticism concerning the positive impact of education on social development. In fact, in the U.S., education is becoming increasingly segregated and in Latin America, even ambitious reform processes of progressive governments have not managed to break with the regional pattern of educational systems that tend to perpetuate social inequalities (→ II/20). Of course, the reason for education's rather poor social development outcome can only partly be found in the reform agendas themselves and their implementation. The social context must also

be taken into account. Arguably, extreme social inequalities as in Latin America or rising social disparities as in the U.S. conspire against education's potential to successfully attack social problems. Put differently, a sustainable fall of educational inequalities can only be achieved if social inequalities are reduced. Therefore, comprehensive changes in social policy are needed. From this perspective, the relevance of education for medium- and long-range improvement of living conditions and for reducing social inequalities becomes relativized but not negated. The fact that Uruguay as the country with the traditionally lowest social inequality values in Latin America nonetheless is characterized by comparatively high education inequalities elucidates that education policy matters (Peters 2013). However, for education to unfold its sociopolitical potential, it is necessary to reduce poverty and social inequalities outside educational institutions through alternative social policy instruments. This is true both for Latin America and the U.S.

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25

ETHNICITY

Christian Büschges

Ethnicity is both a scientific analytical category and a concept of everyday use. It identifies groups of human beings on account of their supposed common ancestry and cultural distinctiveness, and sets them apart from other people. Although ethnicity includes the notion of descent and, more often than not, phenotype, it does not share the biological determinism usually related to the concept of race (→ I/39) that denies the possibility of cultural change and social mobility. Nevertheless, the differentiation between both concepts is not always clear-cut and has changed over space and time. This holds true for both scientific discourse and colloquial language that are heavily intertwined.

Defining ethnicity

The term ethnicity stems back to the ancient Greek word *ethnos*, which was used to address foreign people situated outside the sphere of Hellenistic influence who were, therefore, considered culturally different. Although the term fell into disuse during early modern times, the social and political differentiation between different population groups, because of their supposed common ancestry and cultural distinctiveness, can be considered a common characteristic of premodern polities in Europe and, as a consequence of European conquest (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7), in the Americas (Büschges 2012). In contrast, with the rise of nationalism during the 19th century, cultural homogeneity became a key concept of state-building processes in Europe and beyond (→ Nation and State Building, I/16). In the Americas, debates on national identity faced the colonial heritage of ethnic differentiation and slavery (→ I/18), and within the ideological context of Positivism and Social Darwinism, racist discourses emerged during the second half of the 19th century. Meanwhile, ongoing waves of immigration from Europe and, increasingly, Asia provoked nativist responses and legal restrictions to immigration throughout the Americas (→ Migration, I/15).

From the last decades of the 19th century onward, the concept of ethnicity has taken shape in scientific and political discourses, due to the successful establishment of cultural anthropology and ethnology in the academic sphere (e.g. Franz Boas in the USA, Manuel Gamio in Mexico) (→ Indigeneity, I/31), and has increased political activism of immigrant groups facing discrimination. In the Americas, its first appearance as a category dates from the beginning of the 20th century among New York intellectuals engaging in the politics

of “cultural pluralism” (Hattam 2005). It was apparently the Jewish–American philosopher Horace Kallen, who used the term “ethnic” for the first time in 1906. As a child, Kallen had emigrated from Silesia in 1887 and joined the U.S. (and global) Zionist movement, and in 1919, he became a professor at the New School for Social Research in New York. While Zionism was seeking to define a historical Jewish identity within a modern industrializing society, Kallen and other representatives of cultural pluralism stressed the importance of distinct immigrant groups for the development of U.S.–American democracy (→ II/32), while rejecting the contemporary idea of assimilation expressed in the ideology of the “melting pot” (→ Hybridity, I/30). The birth of the modern (political) concept of ethnicity in the U.S. can therefore be related to collective identity construction following mass immigration during the second half of the 19th century. However, the ideology of cultural pluralism did not question the racial divide between black and white, because, in contrast to recent multiculturalism (→ I/36), early 20th-century cultural pluralism excluded the descendants of former slaves and the native population.

In Canada, public debates on immigration were only occasionally reflected in academic writing during the first half of the 20th century (Tepper 1994). Cultural pluralism was addressed for the first time in the book *Canadian Mosaic: The Making of a Northern Nation* by writer and publicist John M. Gibbons (1938), followed only in 1965 by John Porter’s sociological analysis *Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada*. Meanwhile, political and scientific attention to Canada’s indigenous peoples varied between silence and assimilation, and in the historical survey *The Canadians: 1867–1967* edited in 1967 by historian Robert C. Brown, references to “racial conflicts” were limited to the relationship between British and French Canadians.

In Latin America, immigration from Europe during the 19th and early 20th centuries also provoked discussions on cultural and national identities, particularly in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil. However, from the second decade of the 20th century onward, it was notably the rediscovery of the “Indian heritage” by the intellectual and political movements of *indigenismo* that incentivized debates on ethnic identity and diversity, particularly in Mexico and the Andean region (→ Memory Politics, I/34). In 1939, the *Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia* was founded in Mexico, and one year later, the *Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano* held in Pátzcuaro assembled representatives from nearly all American countries. Yet from its inception, indigenism was characterized by a contradiction between cultural relativist approaches to ethnicity and assimilatory state policies (Giraud and Furio 2012). These policies were aimed at integrating the socially marginalized contemporary indigenous population into modern society.

By the 1960s, with the civil rights movement and a new wave of immigration from Mexico and other parts of Latin America to the USA, ethnicity had become an established concept in the social sciences. The book *Beyond the Melting Pot* (1963) from sociologists Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, followed by more popular and politically orientated publications, like the *Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics* (1972) by philosopher, journalist, and diplomat Michel Novak, reflected the growing attention toward ethnically framed social identities and conflicts in both academia and politics (Sollors 1986, 20–21). In Canada, the political concept of multiculturalism (→ I/36) finally emerged from public debates on immigration and cultural pluralism during the 1970s, and the federal government of Pierre Elliott Trudeau sponsored research on the past and present of cultural difference and ethnic groups in Canada (Berry and Lapointe 1994). Throughout the Americas, the 1970s showed growing discomfort with assimilation theories and practices directed toward the so-called ethnic minorities and incentivized political commitment to and academic research on the

indigenous peoples of the continent (Wade 2010, 61–62). New indigenous organizations and international anthropological activism defended the indigenous demand for self-determination and collective rights (→ Human Rights, II/35), as expressed in the famous declaration *For the Liberation of Indians*, announced during an international anthropological conference in Barbados in 1971 (Dostal 1972).

While much of the early ethnological and ethnohistorical research shared the essentialist assumption that ethnic groups and identities are based on stable and objective criteria, the 1970s also brought a shift in the scientific perspective on ethnicity under the label of constructivism. Fredrik Barth's pioneering introduction to his book *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (1969) developed the argument that the specific ethnic identity attributed to a social group cannot be interpreted in terms of a fixed cultural essence based on descent (Barth 1998). In his view, ethnicity is a relational and situational category that is socially constructed in the context of encounters between different social groups. Thus, the ethnic identification of a person or group can change over time or even according to varying social contexts. In contrast, ethnic activists engaged in political debates on group rights often practice what Gayatri Spivak (1988) has called "strategic essentialism." Nevertheless, the boundaries between academic constructivism and political essentialism are not clear-cut, as some anthropologists stay in close contact with ethnic organizations, and ethnic activists have become familiar with academic discourse.

Facing the fluidity and strategic interests that ethnic identification entails, sociologist Rogers Brubaker has argued for a clear distinction between the scientific concept of ethnicity and the usages of ethnic semantics by social actors (Brubaker 2004). In highlighting the constructivist approach, Brubaker overtly denies the "existence" of ethnic groups beyond the scope of ethnically defined movements and organizations (→ Social Movements, I/41), that is, "groups, whose members develop a feeling of togetherness (we-feeling), and communicate and interact during a longer period of time in order to achieve a common goal" (Elwert 2003, 263). Viewed from this perspective, research on ethnicity should focus on the social construction and impact of ethnic categories, discourses, practices, and institutions (Brubaker 2004, 11).

The anthropological and historical research on ethnicity has focused traditionally on the so-called ethnic minorities. Recent whiteness studies (→ I/46) have expanded the perspective on identity constructions of the dominant sectors of (post-) colonial societies (Ignatiev 1995; Garner 2007). Following Pierre Bourdieu, ethnicity is just one concept of social representation among others (like nation, race (→ I/39), class, gender (→ Gender Identities, I/28), or age) that legitimizes (di-) visions of the social world and power relations in each society (Bourdieu 1985). Recent intersectionality studies (→ I/32) analyze the interdependencies between ethnicity and other categories of social differentiation (Céleri, Schwarz, and Wittger 2013).

The differentiation between the concepts of ethnicity and race in a scientific analysis is still debated and also varies according to national or regional academic communities. There has been a general international shift of attention in the social sciences from race to ethnicity from the 1970s onward. Most European and Latin American scholars today avoid using the term race as an analytical category, as a reaction to contemporary ("scientific") racism, and because of the inadequacy of explaining the social world with biological (genetical) theories and terms. In contrast, race remains an important analytical category in Anglo-American scholarship on the history and the contemporary societies of the Americas, pointing to the different ways and contexts of how race and ethnicity have been socially constructed in history (O'Toole 2015; Iceland 2017).

The colonial construction of ethnic boundaries

While the question about the usefulness of applying the concept of ethnicity to premodern non-European societies is still debated, it is widely accepted that the social and political practice of ethnic differentiation has been a constitutional element in the expansion of European colonialism since the end of the 15th century (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7), and gained further importance with the birth of modern nationalism at the end of the 18th century (→ Independence Movements, I/10).

The notion of cultural difference has been present among European settlers migrating to the Americas from the time of Columbus' first contact with local communities in the Caribbean in 1492. Columbus not only invented the term "indio," but he also created the enduring stereotypes (→ Indigeneity, I/31) of the Indian that would dominate both colonial and postcolonial discourses of social differentiation in the Americas over the following centuries: the noble savage and the barbarian. However, patterns of colonialism differed throughout the continent.

European migrants coming to live under the British rule in North America were generally seeking to create closed settler communities, at the expense of the indigenous population that were either forced to move or were killed in conflict (Berkin 2003). Miscegenation was of minor importance during the whole colonial period. Hence, when addressing the question of ethnicity in colonial North America, the cultural differences between immigrant groups regarding place of origin (English, Irish, German, Dutch, etc.) or faith (Anglicans, Calvinists, Quakers, Catholics, etc.) must be considered (→ Religious Beliefs, I/40).

During colonial times, the term "race" had already been used as a common identity marker in the British and French colonies, separating the heterogeneous European settlers from the native "Indian" population based on physical, cultural, and supposed moral attributes (→ Interethnic Relations, I/12) (Herzog 2011). Due to the limited degree of sexual and social contacts between European settlers and the native population in both British and French America, the slavery of people displaced from Africa produced the strongest social divide within colonial society. The presence of the English crown and church in North America was generally weak until the 18th century, and so were crown regulations concerning social life, although the British crown imposed legal limits to "mixed marriages" from the 17th century onward (→ Gender, I/9).

In contrast, the Spanish kings, with the help of royal officials and the clergy in the Americas, tried from the very beginning to organize colonial society by extensive legislation, restrictions on immigration being the first step. The initial system of spatial separation between Spanish settlers and native communities in the Americas was soon undermined by sexual contact and migration, and the Catholic Church favored "inter-ethnic" marriage over concubinage. Due to crown legislation and the notion of cultural superiority among the descendants of Spanish immigrants, a complex social classification system emerged over time, which is known in the literature as Spanish-American society of caste (*sociedad de castas*). Magnus Mörner has argued that this society "was created transferring to the New World the hierarchic, estate-based, corporative society of late medieval Castile and imposing that society upon a multiracial, colonial situation" (Mörner 1967, 54). The colonial categories of social classification and hierarchy reflect traditions from the Iberian Peninsula: the term caste, as well as race (*raza*), stems from biological language transferred already in late medieval Europe from animal species to human social groups. What is important to note is that both terms, caste and race, combine the notion of descent with cultural attributes and are the product of the melting of the religious concept of purity of blood (*limpieza de sangre*) with the

social concept of nobility of blood (*nobleza de sangre*) (Zúñiga 1999). In Spanish America, due to the religious and social obsession with purity, sexual relations between Spanish settlers, the native population, and African slaves remained an irritating phenomenon and carried social stigma throughout the colonial period. The new ethnic categories like *Mulatto* (deriving from – hybrid – mule) or *Mestizo* (meaning mixed-blood) still reflect the biological origin of colonial social categories (→ Hybridity, 1/30). Ironically, in Spanish America, the term “caste” was soon reserved for people of mixed ascendancy, who, faced by strong legal restrictions regarding social reputation and opportunities, struggled to fill ranks in the colonial bureaucracy or the church and exercise certain professions. Until the 18th century, the colonial hierarchy of caste society was composed of Spanish settlers at the top, groups of mixed ancestry in the middle, and the indigenous population and African slaves at the bottom.

The Portuguese colonial pattern of social differentiation widely followed the Spanish model, although with some delay and, like British America, concentrated until the 18th century on the Atlantic coast and its hinterland. For the same reason, social contact and miscegenation with the native population did not reach the same level as in Spanish America, and the institution of slavery remained much more important for social relations and hierarchy. However, manumission was much more frequent in the Portuguese (and Spanish) colonies, which was reflected in the constant rise of a sector of society categorized as mulattos, and who faced similar social discrimination as their Spanish-American counterparts (Russel-Wood 1982).

There has been much debate about the lasting impact of ethnic prejudice on social relations and hierarchy during the colonial area, especially regarding people of mixed ancestry. For colonial Spanish America, the relation between ethnicity (or race) and class has been discussed during the late 1970s and early 1980s in a controversial debate over intermarriage patterns in late colonial Mexico. Much of the dispute focused on statistical methods and interpretation of data taken from parish registers. Patricia Seed questioned in her conclusion of the debate the general evidence of statistical approaches to what she calls “the social dimension of race” (Seed 1982). This expression reflects the fact that official caste labels sometimes differed from context to context, even regarding the same person. It must also be kept in mind that the language of ethnicity (or race) is not so much a reflection of social life, but a part of it, because official colonial ethnic labels depended heavily on social reputation and as such were to some extent negotiable or susceptible to manipulation. A good example of this includes the efforts of the colonial Spanish administration to control tribute evasion by urban “Indians” in the city of Quito during the 1770s. Persons denying tribute payments by arguing they were “mestizos” could prove their status before court, which they achieved normally by presenting a wide array of social attributes like habits, clothing, occupation, etc., testified by witnesses, while the argument of skin color was largely absent or even rejected as an element of proof (Minchom 1994).

Although the impact of the official colonial caste categories on social relations and hierarchies in the Americas remained of crucial importance, ethnic categorization proved to be flexible enough to allow for social mobility, especially at the end of the colonial period, particularly in the Iberian colonies. While a change of legal ethnic status sometimes followed migration or economic success, there is evidence that within the lower ranks of society, ethnic boundaries were generally not as clear-cut as the official colonial discourse stipulated (Cope 1994; O’Toole 2012).

Postcolonial ethnicities

With the breakdown of colonial rule (→ 1/5) in the Americas during the late 18th and early 19th centuries, ethnic classification was challenged by the political ideas of popular

sovereignty and legal equality inherited from the Age of Enlightenment (→ I/8). In addition, the new political concepts of nation and nation-state further challenged colonial social and political divisions. However, the former colonial elites largely controlled the decolonizing process, and, therefore, social reform and political emancipation remained limited throughout the 19th century.

The founding fathers of several Latin American states appropriated the indigenous pre-colonial past to legitimize independence from Spain and the new political boundaries that cut through the former colonial empire (→ Memory Politics, I/34). The Inca and Aztec past in Peru and Mexico, or local indigenous chiefs resisting Spanish conquest like Mapuche leader Caupolicán in Chile, served as historical roots of an “invention of tradition” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) that has nurtured national discourse in the region up to the present (Guerra 1994).

Early attempts in the 1810s and 1820s to abolish colonial legal discrimination of African American slaves and the indigenous population were only short-lived. In the new Latin American nation-states, the indigenous population remained initially under a neocolonial system of “ethnic administration” (Guerrero 1990) controlled by local landowners, state officials, and clerics. Only during the 1850s and 1860s were special laws and obligations imposed on the indigenous population formally abolished, as was slavery, although Brazil and Cuba had to wait until the 1880s.

In the USA, slavery was abolished in 1863, but a new system of racial segregation between “blacks” and “whites” was established with the Jim Crow Laws during the 1880s (Lewis and Lewis 2009). In contrast to Latin America, where miscegenation (*mestizaje*) was seen as a means of overcoming ethnic diversity and paving the way to modernity, the legal adoption of the “one-drop rule” in many states of the USA during the early decades of the 20th century was aimed at suppressing any notion of miscegenation and social mobility, especially regarding the African American population.

Throughout the Americas, the 19th century saw the violent incorporation of the remaining independent indigenous communities into the nation-state (von Karstedt 2006). In the U.S., the expansion of the settler frontier to the West expelled the native population from their ancestral territories, which were replaced from the 1850s and 1860s onward by “Indian reservations” granting limited autonomy. Similarly, the Canadian Confederation, which was established in 1867, negotiated with the so-called First Nations of Canada the expansion of the settler frontier to the north and northwest by assigning new “Indian reserves” under the control of the federal government formally stipulated by the Indian Act of 1876. At the fringes of the former Spanish colonial empire, national governments conducted military campaigns from the 1860s to the 1880s against the remaining independent indigenous communities, for example, the Yaqui in northern Mexico or the Mapuche in southern Chile and Argentina. All of them were relocated and confined to small areas.

The politics of forced separation of social and political communities defined by ethnic or racial markers has undoubtedly been a tool of majoritarian “white” or “mestizo” society to impose and legitimize social superiority and political power. From the perspective of the people affected by these discourses and practices, alternatives to independence or asymmetrical integration were few. In the early years after the independence of the USA, claims from the Delaware to join the union leading an Indian federal state were refused (Haake 2007). In the former Spanish colonies, indigenous communities defended the colonial heritage of extraordinary taxes in exchange for limited self-government as a means to preserve access to land (→ II/15) and cultural traditions against liberal reforms imposed by national governments from the 1850s onward (Thurner 1997).

During the second half of the 19th century, ongoing waves of immigration from Europe to the Americas, incentivized by the national governments of the continent, fueled political debates about modernity and national identity. In both North and South America, immigration from Europe was seen generally as a means to bring progress to all corners of the nation-state (→ Development, II/6). The quest for modernity was accompanied by contemporary social theories of Positivism and Social Darwinism that fostered the spread of racist attitudes against both indigenous and African American people.

In the USA, the growing immigrant population from south and southeastern Europe, as well as Asia, at the end of the 19th century, produced a growing public consciousness of ethnic heterogeneity (Heinze 2003). While the idea of the melting pot had dominated immigration debates from the middle of the 19th century onward, nativist tendencies gained ground up until the turn of the century. They helped to shape a discourse of a white protestant Anglo-Saxon identity that provoked immigration control measures during the 1920s. A similar process emerged in Canada, including restrictions of migration directed against African Americans coming from the United States.

In Latin America, especially in Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, the immigration policies of the 19th century aimed at modernizing nations by “whitening” their populations (→ Modernization, I/36; Whiteness, I/46). Due to the limited degree of immigration compared to the USA, nativist reactions were less important in Latin America. However, Argentine romanticist writers of the early 20th century elevated the image of the rural gaucho and tango music to the center of national mythology (Bockelmann 2011), and some restrictions on immigration were imposed in Argentina and other countries after World War I.

Regarding the indigenous population, the early 20th century saw the rise of assimilationist state policies. In Canada, the Indian Act of 1876 had already reinforced the implementation of a compulsory residential school system for First Nation children that were often removed by force from their parents. In most Latin American countries, the idea of (biological and cultural) miscegenation, with the *mestizo* as its main representative, became the core of national ideology and state politics directed at nation-building, which included programs to expand the national education system to hitherto neglected rural areas (→ Education, I/24) (Miller 2004). The political and intellectual movement of indigenism promoted archeological and anthropological research on the great pre-Colombian civilizations, particularly of the Aztecs and Incas. At the same time, assimilation policies were directed at the contemporary indigenous population who were considered as oppressed and degenerated in both socioeconomic and cultural terms. Mexican intellectual and minister of education José Vasconcelos glorified the *mestizo* nation in his famous book *La raza cósmica* in 1925, while a first transnational conference of (nonindigenous) indigenist intellectuals met in 1940 in Mexico with the assistance of representatives from all American countries, except Canada, Haiti, and Paraguay.

In Brazil, the Vargas regime of the 1930s adopted the idea of “racial democracy,” based on sociologist Gilberto Freyre’s book *Casa-Grande & Senzala* (1933), which created the myth of Brazilian ethnic tolerance in opposition to racial segregation in the United States (Cottrol 2013, 143–172). In Canada, the 1960s brought a new political wave of Canadian Britishness (Champion 2010) and, in 1969, the Government of Pierre Trudeau announced a new Indian policy aimed at abolishing all remnants of a special Indian legislation in favor of expanding individual and universal rights to all citizens (→ Human Rights, II/35). However, the initiative encountered fierce opposition from indigenous authorities accusing the government of assimilating the “First Nations” to a “white” Canadian nation.

While Latin American indigenism remained largely confined to intellectual elites, the 1930s and 1940s also witnessed the first African American and indigenous organizations,

often emanating from leftist parties or labor unions (Becker 2011) (→ Socialism, I/42). In the United States, the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s opened the door to political activists and organizations emerging from subaltern social groups discriminated against by ethnic or racial discourse and legislation (Newman 2004). While the Civil Rights movement ended racial segregation policy, it also encouraged political activism among Mexican Americans and immigrants from other Latin American countries. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Chicano movement and the Raza Unida Party were the most prominent organizations fighting discrimination based on ethnic or racial prejudice (Rodríguez 2015). Both initially followed a strong nationalist course, disseminating the founding myth of Aztlán that located the origin of the former Aztec empire within the borders of the USA (→ Latinidad, I/33).

Several civil rights laws and affirmative action measures between 1964 and 1975 reflected a growing attention to ethnic and racial discrimination among state institutions and civil society. The federal government standardized ethnic and racial categories to ensure the effectiveness of affirmative action policy. Based on the *Statistical Policy Directive 15* issued in 1977, ethnic and racial terms were codified in the U.S. Census and have remained almost unmodified until today. *Directive 15* distinguished between four “races”: American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, black, and white. Hispanics or (from 1997 onward) Latinos were considered (like Jews) principally as (racial) whites but had supposedly a distinct (ethnic) culture (Hattam 2005).

In 1971, facing political activism of French-speaking Quebec as well as indigenous and immigrant organizations, Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau adopted the political concept of multiculturalism (→ I/36), recognizing the ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversities of the country, which should be defended and promoted by the state (Kymlicka 1998). In 1982, multiculturalism was finally included into the Canadian Constitution as a guiding principle of the state, and in 1988, it was codified in the Multiculturalism Act.

Also in Latin America, a new wave of indigenous and African American movements emerged from the end of the 1960s onward, challenging the concept of the culturally homogeneous *mestizo* nation and denouncing ongoing discrimination. While since the early 20th century social movements linked to left-wing political parties, labor unions, and peasant organizations had focused primarily on socioeconomic issues related to labor and land (→ Labor Representation, II/14), the 1970s saw the rise of ethnically framed demands advocating bilingual education, political representation, and self-determination within a pluri-ethnic state (Albó 2002).

The 1990s brought the heyday of indigenous movements throughout the Americas (Bengoa 2007). While national indigenous organizations, like the *Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador* or the Assembly of First Nations in Canada, negotiated political, socioeconomic, and cultural demands with the state, protest marches and national strikes revealed the difficulties in resolving the long-lasting legacy of ethnic discrimination. The indigenous uprising in Ecuador in 1990 and the Zapatista revolt in Chiapas (Mexico) in 1994, as well as the continent-wide protests against official festivities of the 500th anniversary of the “discovery” of the Americas in 1992 were important landmarks of rising transnational and global debates on indigenous rights and the role of ethnicity in reshaping the traditional nation-state. Most Latin American countries passed new state constitutions and legal reforms reflecting the new pluri-ethnic paradigm of state and nation during the 1990s, especially in Ecuador and Bolivia (Van Cott 2008). However, the recognition and implementation of collective rights of indigenous people are still much debated and frequently arouse conflicts (Oliveira 2009). A key element of traditional and recent ethnic politics, the establishment of

new or the transformation of already existing indigenous reservations (reserves, *resguardos*, etc.) into semiautonomous regions often collides with “national interests” defended by state agencies. This can be seen in recent conflicts over oil production in the Yasuni National Park in the Amazonian region of Ecuador, the oil pipeline crossing the Standing Rock Reservation in North Dakota (USA), or ongoing deforestation piercing the lives of indigenous people in the Brazilian rain forest.

Recent ethnicization of politics can also be observed outside reservations, and does not concern only people claiming an indigenous (or African American) identity, but also immigrant groups and their descendants. Latino candidates and voters have become important and will be more so in elections and state institutions of the USA, and the same holds true for Asian Americans. Bolivia’s current president Evo Morales is the most outstanding example of the social and political mobilization of different parts of the population that have been discriminated on the grounds of their supposed ethnic otherness and inferiority throughout the Americas.

Conclusion

With the turn of the millennium, the concept of a multicultural or pluri-ethnic state faces growing objection throughout the Americas. While traditional liberal critics continue to denounce the spread of social decomposition and conflict provoked by the emphasis on ethnic difference, ethnic activists deplore the inconsequence, inefficiency, or arbitrariness of constitutional and legal provisions. There is no doubt that ethnically defined social movements (→ I/41) and official multiculturalism policies (→ I/36) have considerably enhanced and strengthened social mobilization and political participation (→ II/41). However, poverty and underemployment still affect huge parts of the population that has historically been exposed to ethnic discrimination or racism, particularly in Latin America. Recent academic and political debates on post-ethnicity (Hollinger 2005) and interculturality (Walsh 2012) propose to dissociate the recognition of cultural diversity from the division of society in ethnically defined, bounded groups, considering the complexity, the relational and situational flexibility, and the long-term alterations of individual and collective identity claims and ascriptions.

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26

FAMILY

Cornelia Giebler

The term *family* consists of a variety of different social constructions and interactions. Family is understood as the domain of the private and of the intimate as much as it is a social institution that is embedded in government regulations that clarify how families are to be defined within the respective realms of social life: these rules determine affiliations, exclusions, marriage precepts and proscriptions, responsibility for biological and nonbiological children, and the elderly and partners, as well as sexual inclusions and exclusions, and their respective contractual determinations with consequences for caretaking responsibilities and public funding. A significant part of the debate about the family relies on demographic data that describe the size of families and provide information on fertility and mortality in societies through the construction of families as members of households (→ Biopolitics, I/22). These governmental constructions make the household a centerpiece of many empirical sociological analyses because of the publicly available data. In contrast, from a culturally anthropological perspective, family relationships – ranging from kinship to invented forms of kinship (in Latin America: *compadrazgo*) – are the centerpiece of the research on family. These cannot be captured with the instruments of empirical large-scale datasets, and instead require culturally and socially adapted research designs operating at the local and regional levels. Thus, blood kinship as a construction of family deemed to be universal in the 1960s and 1970s is here called into question as well as the current debates regarding family, where a sociopolitical field of contestation already exists with far-reaching consequences for community formation in the Americas.

Families in the Americas

In contemporary societies, traditional constructions of family, such as the family as the smallest unit of human cohabitation in society, compete with modern constructions of family that encompass other types of family that are outside the heteronormative and reproduction-based perspectives.

Based on the first perspective, families are considered to be a universally valid structure of order that, as kinship suggests, constitute a socially legitimated and acceptable type of affiliation and mutual dependence. Up until the 21st century, this perspective understood families as a supra-historical, supra-cultural institution that forms the “nucleus” of society.

Family thus plays a decisive role for the formation of community and society. In this way, older “Western-European” constructions of family, such as by Ferdinand Tönnies, have been applied to Anglo- and Latin American contemporary contexts. Tönnies distinguishes between communities based on blood kinship, neighborhoods, and friendship. The basis of all of these is what he called the mother-child relationship (Tönnies 2002). Generational relationships hereby play a decisive role in the traditional definition of family: family occurs namely where children are born and raised.

Another theme related to family pertains to the question of membership in households that is used as a measuring unit in demographics and socioeconomic statistics. However, the high proportion of single-person households, non-household family members, and the previous focus on male heads of household have led to inaccurate estimates when households were used to portray family size, or when population numbers were calculated based on heads of household as an implied measurement of “family”. This method of data collection has led to statements that have related family size to the stage of societal development (→ II/6). Extensive households were equated with large families and these were thought to belong to “underdeveloped” regions, such as Latin America in contrast to Anglo-America. Although household size in all American nations has shrunk, the illusion of the large family/extended family in Latin America remains as a point of differentiation to the Anglo-American small family.

In conservative political discourse, family is viewed as the “nucleus” of the nation from which the construction of societies and communities emerges. Connected to family is the assignment of responsibilities such as child-rearing/education; the (re-)production of life; and social, health-related, and care responsibilities. This nucleus construction is cultivated in the upper classes of America especially because economic power is exerted over “family” both in global economic contexts organized through family units, as well as in areas of local family power where prestige and economic influence relies on the family name. This characterization stands in conflict with critical feminist discourse in the Americas that deconstructs the intra-family perspective of “family” as a relationship based on potential violence and exploitation. Family is criticized here as the basis of patriarchy (→ Gender Identities, I/28). In a similar vein, the LGBTQ movement has criticized the heteronormative restriction of the concept of family.

From a contemporary perspective, family must be understood as a field of struggle in which critical discourse redefines the concept of family constantly. The global extraction of child-rearing from the family to state institutions; the global establishment of marriage rights and the right to raise children for gay and lesbian lifestyles; and the feminist attacks on the domestic gender division of labor and the related public transfers of unpaid labor are the most important aspects of the contemporary redefinition of family. Moreover, the impact of identity politics must be mentioned, which includes the criticism of western family forms and reliance on traditional family forms in indigenous societies, single-mother families of Afro-descent, and immigrant families, as well as the criticism of imagined western norms of being male and female and the debut of androgyny, transgender, and a new femininity and masculinity.

In socialist discourse, child-rearing is an early task for the state for reasons of equality and political education. In Cuba, and in contemporary revolutionary and reform states such as in Ecuador (→ State Transformation, II/21), there is comprehensive investment in education (→ I/24), particularly in early childhood institutional education based on *educación popular*. In this way, child-rearing and educational responsibilities that previously belonged to the family have been replaced or supplemented by state institutions.

Definitions and imaginaries of family have been relevant factors in the formation of the political and cultural fields in the Americas since the colonial period (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7). However, there is a wide divergence between the ideology of the family and the social reality of what can be called a family, which began during colonial times (→ Gender, I/9).

In many regions, precolonial lifestyle practices have survived interwoven with colonial and modern forms. Additionally, indigenous lifeworlds have become even more important since the 1990s. In addition, new forms of constructions of family ancestry may also be found. On the basis of precolonial Kichwa/Quechua history, lifeworlds of family membership and notions of family and sexuality have achieved a new, wider global dissemination over the past few years in the context of alternative discourses under the label of “Buen Vivir.” Concepts of family have been reactivated and newly formulated that view harmony between nature (→ II/39) and the reciprocity of the sexes as the centerpiece.

Since before colonization up until the current postcolonial period with its urban and rural lifestyles, family in the Americas is clearly diachronically different from a regional, class, ethnic-cultural (→ Ethnicity, I/25), and gender-specific (→ Gender Identities, I/28) perspective, but also simultaneously synchronal in many areas across the Americas characterized by its own specificities. In addition, globalizing rituals such as those honoring the deceased in Mexico on the “Day of the Dead” that have been mixed with “Halloween” in the U.S. exemplify how family membership is celebrated throughout the course of the year, as well as show the diffusion of single-person lifestyles and small families (→ Memorial Culture, I/14).

Constructions of family

From the perspective of international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), family continues to be perceived as the natural center of society, as stated in Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State” (→ Human Rights, II/35). Here, family is defined as a natural relationship for the international community and the right to a family is formulated as a human right.

However, this definition came into question precisely because of the ambiguity of the terminology. In the debate on family construction and its value for the UN, Adolfo Castañeda (2011) noted that the family is the central basis of society. Nonetheless, this then came to be questioned when a UN draft report in January 2016 stated that there is no definition of the family under international human rights law (Gennarini 2016). General definitions of the family have also come to be called into question in the critical literature. The Colombian newspaper *Desde Abajo*, published at the conclusion of a conference in March 2013, published an article with the title asking “Is family the nucleus of society?” which went on to develop a deconstruction of the concept of family.

The presentation of family as a fundamental program for society-building can predominantly be found in the Latin American and Anglo-American literatures on family in the 1990s until early 2000s. It is described as a place in which “the family conforms to a space of action in which it defines the most basic dimensions of human security: the processes of material reproduction and the social integration of people” (UNDP 1998, 192) [translation by the author]. Since the 1950s, Latin American literature has imagined the family to be a refuge of safety in which the building blocks for a later life are laid for its members and in particular the children, secured through the state by laws that understand the family as the

foundation of society that is worthy of protection in agreement with Catholic moral standards. State guarantees for family are made through legal constructs on marriage, i.e. the exclusion of persons not eligible to marry such as that of LGBTQ in many U.S. states. In the pre-Civil Rights period, for example, the prohibition of marriage between *Blacks* and *Whites* was state-regulated in contrast to marriages between *Whites* and Indigenous people – particularly in the U.S. (→ Interethnic Relations, I/12; Whiteness, I/46; Indigeneity, I/31).

A general legal practice is also to register children under their parents' names – usually the first name of the father whereby the patrilineal inheritance is established, anchored to an inheritance law that favors biological children, thereby making blood kinship the organizing principle of family. Formally, elective kinship is consistently considered to be inferior even when quasi-familial ties are established through adoption, new reproductive medical procedures, legally establishing non-blood relationships, or the existence of patchwork families. These nontraditional groupings have all become a part of social reality – predominantly among the middle class – in Anglo-America and Latin America, beyond the reach of the church and state regulation.

The fundamentally positive and seemingly universal line of reasoning regarding the natural family is found in Anglo-American as well as Latin American academic texts. However, the “white middle class nuclear family” is made the centerpiece of a positively connoted family construct and the father–mother–child relationship as the “nucleus” is the focal point of the construction and reproduction of society, particularly in public discourse through a mixture of expert knowledge and political pressure. Notwithstanding, if one considers the concrete social realities in different regions of the Americas, the different classes and strata, indigenous, agricultural, and urban zones, and also the different members of families as well as the internal structures of families, a completely different image emerges that has less to do with a coherent family unit than with family fragments that have to be studied. To mention are studies on low-income families, women and mothers, fathers, male and female youth and children, on the elderly, and the respective gainful employment and domestic work. Additional topics include intra-family division of labor (→ Gender and Work, II/11), domestic violence, child abuse in the family, and the outsourcing of child-rearing and education in private and public institutions from early childhood to adulthood that all allow for a very differentiated image of family in the Americas.

Family in precarious lifeworlds

The responsibilities assigned by conservatives to families are further differentiated in all current studies from the Americas. For Latin American families, two criteria can be ascertained that show problematic conditions for growing up and being socialized in a society: first, the large number of single female-headed households that are represented in all countries across Latin America, in almost one-third of families; and, second, the absence of fathers and the related asserted lack of opportunities for the next generation to identify with men that can lead to problematic socialization.

The discovery that an increasing number of young families are ideologically characterized as “irregular” and exist simultaneously as unstable, unmarried relationships is indicative of a parlance committed to a vision of the “perfect” family that does not correspond to the social reality in precarious living conditions. Such descriptions devalue non-normalized families with the assertion that they will never be able to guarantee what is imagined to be the normalized family, namely raising a child to fit into society. Even as an economic unit, they can neither provide the basis for a better life nor can they be the nucleus of society that

provides opportunities for future generations. Thus, throughout the Americas, certain forms of cohabitation continue to be denigrated. However, in Latin America, it is the semipublic form of the “second family” in the middle and upper classes, the “casa chica,” that continues to be practiced parallel to the widely accepted form of family.

Affected by war and refugee flight, El Salvador is an example that illustrates the processes associated with the creation of precarious lifeworlds and related family constellations. The decades-long violence beginning with wars occurring between 1920 and 1930, and dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s (→ Authoritarianism, II/25) causing around 60,000 deaths, as well as the related displacement of approximately one-third of the population in the 1980s into the U.S., Mexico, and neighboring countries (→ Transnational Migration, I/44), destroyed families.

Battle over definitions of marriage and the family

In the U.S., the so-called “complete” family – father, mother, and children – has increasingly become statistically less common. The concept of the model family of the 1950s that dominated into the end of the 20th century has been modified to include family groups that have the possibility of being both multicultural and diverse. Marriages are generally less common among people in the lower class compared to those in the upper class. This results in a notable paradox in the U.S. that namely “blue collar” families are experiencing an attack on their lifestyles regarding marriage and family and at the same time they have come to fear that the new diversity in ways of life will result in the dissolution of familial bases of financial security. As Arlie Hochschild (2009) formulates, “As an ideal at least, American marriage has survived a cultural war unmatched in the Western world.” A perspective of family tied to a traditional image based on the gender-based division of labor remained in the U.S. throughout the 1990s and in conservative segments of society. This conception of family continues to play a decisive role in the U.S. today and is reflected in legal definitions of family such as, for example, when immigrant children from the Southern Hemisphere of the Americas are to be returned to “family members” in the Global South that are defined as blood relatives.

Supranational family policies

In the international arena, the UN suggested definitions of family in 1994 that were adjusted to changing family relations. Following suggestions by Alva and Gunnar Myrdal at the conference in Cairo on population developments, the conference discussions pointed out that the traditional gender-based division with productive and reproductive roles within the family frequently does not reflect current realities and aspirations (Castañeda 2011).

At the end of 2016, the debate over the definition of the family finally came to a preliminary end by the UN when it officially incorporated homosexual couples into its definition of family. Nevertheless, the concept of family and related practices of the different funding policies for families remains a paradox in all American states. There are still many legally binding provisions dealing with human rights including the Universal Declaration that exclude the possibility of recognizing homosexual relationships in law and international politics.

LGBTQ families

In different countries and in some regions such as Mexico City, the opening of the definition of the family along long-established but nonetheless subaltern practices has led to homosexual families first being legally recognized as families, then as marriage-like relationships

in 2007, as marriages in 2009, and finally this being generalized across the entire country in 2016. In Argentina, marriage was introduced as a legal act in 1888, but divorce was not introduced until 1987. Homosexual relationships were recognized in 2003 in Buenos Aires (Jelin 2005). Columbia also included homosexual couples both in inheritance law and in pension and other transfer payments.

That same-sex relationships are not in line with the worldview of the Christian institutional religion that did not prevent them from being practiced in secret (→ Religious Beliefs, I/40). Marriage-like relationships have made their voices heard in all countries even if legalization has remained contested. It should also be noted that it has been documented in many different rural, indigenous regions, that homosexuality, as a culturally acceptable form of cohabitation, is common and accepted.

Childhood and children's movements

Today, childhood belongs in a category of its own. Through different processes of marginalization, children remain without parents, grow up with other members, and/or live on the street. In Latin America, social stratification is salient for life chances or lack thereof for children, street children, and child labor, as well as infant mortality, maternal mortality, and unequal educational opportunities (Giebelier 2013). In this context, children's movements – with the first being documented in Peru in the 1970s – are relevant factors influencing both national and international policies on children. International children's conferences convened by the UN, such as the 1999 conference in New York, point to the strong political self-organization of excluded groups and relatedly the increased organization of children.

Children's movements have organized to fight for the rights of working children on the street (→ Human Rights, II/35). In 1988, the first international meeting of working children in Latin America took place. For several years, new internationally networked children's organizations have formed that also advocate for their rights. Thus far, Bolivia is the only country in the Americas that bans child exploitation and that allows child labor – under certain conditions that do no harm to children – as a right codified into law. Childhoods are vastly different in the different regions of Latin America.

Child marriage and marriages between children are also being reported in many Latin American regions although the minimum age to marry, usually 16, is formally regulated. In most states in the U.S., child marriage is prohibited but almost every state allows for exclusions. The limited studies available show that child marriages most frequently occur in poor regions and in precarious lifeworlds.

Youth – family actors in the in-between

The youth concept that has long been used in a self-evident manner in Western discourses has also come to be viewed as too homogenizing due to the divergent experiential worlds of children. Duarte (2000) addressed the topic of the dissolution of the youth concept such that the different lifeworlds and experiences come together thereby causing the cohort notion of “youth” to collapse. This makes it necessary to talk about “youths.” Moreover, it has been argued that youths in indigenous contexts have to be treated as a separate category (Pérez Islas 2004) because the Western classification along the life course is fundamentally not applicable for indigenous societies.

Youth is also different in precarious urban zones where young people attach themselves to elective kin and create new, long-term “families” as members of youth gangs such as the

Mara 13 or Barrio 18 (Cruz and Portillo 1998). In all big cities across the Americas, from Los Angeles through San Salvador to Rio de Janeiro, “bandas” or “pandillas” consist primarily of young men who control whole sections of the city as “no go areas.” Their “new families” frequently sever contact to the old families, thereby constructing completely new affiliations and using violence both internally and externally. These developments coincide with a socialization of violence, the absence of men and fathers from families of origin, the precarious survival situations of mothers, and severe poverty, as ascertained by Salazar (2002) in his study of the development of violence in the barrios of Medellín in Colombia.

Postcolonial practices in families

The various processes of change experienced by families across the Americas are based on very different preconceptions, discursive locations, and historical developments of family or community relations of all kinds. The current negotiation battles over constructs of family and its practices are also related to the social movements (→ I/41) of the 1960s and 1970s. These helped to widen the horizons of the tightly corseted, blood kinship-based definition of family which had been based on classifications, ethnicization, and colonial practices, and whose basis in constructs of binary gender identities the women’s movement helped to dissolve.

In both Latin America and Anglo-America, postcolonial processes in the different classes and ethnic groups provided for different impacts in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres of the Americas. In cultures of Afro-descent, marriage prohibitions affected gender relation; in the white upper class, marriage, including compulsory forced marriages, dictated and transformed the model of heteronormative small families into a specific social class; in the southern states of the U.S. as well as in the white upper classes of Latin America, colonial practices continued and were widespread until the 1990s. This also includes the abuse of male family heads against “house servants” who were seen as a constituent of the household in feudal manors as well as a constituent for sexual demands. Whether these practices currently regarded as postcolonial will be extended into global care constructs is currently being discussed.

Race and family

With the Civil Rights and Black Power movement in the 1960s, a fight against racism and for comprehensive civil rights began that marked a new era based on the revocation of racial segregation and the abolition of marriage prohibitions between Blacks and Whites. In Latin America, communities of *Afrodescendientes* in Ecuador, Columbia, Brazil, and El Salvador as well as the *Garifunas* demanded their rights and began to defend themselves against widespread racism in Latin America (→ Race, I/39).

In the Afro-Latino communities, the family model of the White middle and upper classes has not yet emerged. The housewife model has not been an option. The need for women and mothers to earn money is a self-evident necessity. Within the national societies of Latin America, they remain located at the lower end of the social scale. Their living conditions and experiences contradict widespread conceptions such as those of Gilberto Freyre who exonerates Latin American countries of racism. Hordge-Freeman (2015), by contrast, explains that hierarchization is produced at all levels, intrafamilial as well as hegemonic; whenever families attempt to establish *Whiteness* (→ I/46) as a model of feminine beauty by straightening hair or noses, this is an adaptation of the hegemonic White model of beauty.

It should be noted that intrafamilial realities exist that correspond to racist stereotypes and result in adaptations to the hegemonic culture. Simultaneously, social movements such

as the “black is beautiful” movement practice radically other ideals that result in other perspectives and everyday practices in families which stand opposed to the expected adaptations as in the predominantly masculine Rastafari culture (→ Subcultures, I/43). Two sides of the same medallion – adaptation versus rebellion – show that Black, indigenous, and subaltern lifeworlds consistently work at removing legally, medially, and socio-politically dominant forms of family definitions.

New constructs of family through mobility

Forced migration, work-related mobility, flight and displacement due to the construction of dams and extractivism (→ II/9), centuries-long deforestation, and the cultivation of monocultures that have caused part of the structural population displacement in the Americas have contributed to structural migration across the continent. Families are forced to leave their country, are uprooted, or abandoned to their fate which usually leads them to the megalopolis of urban zones (→ Urbanization, I/45).

Through this mobility, new constructions of family have emerged such as the double or triple families in the respective countries, transnational families that maintain contact through new forms of social media (→ III/41), but also stories of family members who disappeared while on travel and who are sought for by their mothers are all practices of mobility that run through the Americas and are increasingly transatlantic. Thus, mothers of those who have disappeared in Mexico seek their children through the “caravanes de madres de migrantes desaparecidos” [“caravans of mothers of the missing migrants”]. The quantitative increase in migration since the beginning of the 1990s has seen continuously changing destinations and origins of the migration movements such as the new migration path from Venezuela to Columbia today that for centuries ran in the other direction, the repatriates from Spain to Ecuador since the European financial crisis of 2008, or the repatriation of members of the Pandillas from Los Angeles to El Salvador.

Critique of the family through new constructions of gender

The feminist discourse on gender provided new images of families which brought internal power structures into focus, especially in analyses of domestic violence and the gender-based division of labor. No longer were the stated facts of female housekeeping discussed from the point of view of deficiency – the absence of male caring, male models of child-rearing, etc., but rather precisely using this fact to view men and women separately (→ Gender and Work, II/11). This means that the increasing number of female heads of household is not interpreted as a potential danger but rather as a strength of women who take care of their children and themselves and often also the elderly generation despite precarious conditions (Zapata Galindo 2013). Thus, the number of female heads of household in Mexico is around 25 percent (INEGI Census 2005, 2010) and in El Salvador, women make up one-third of the heads of household: 589,000 female to 1,131,000 male in 2016.

Conclusion

The discourse on the family still represents a contested terrain in the different regions and laws of the Americas. Discourses that are attributed to the U.S. can also be found in Latin America, and child marriages that are scandalized in Latin America are also an integral part of U.S.-American social reality and laws. The ways in which the family has been expanded

in laws do not just affect the U.S. or Canada, but also Latin American urban centers, as well as countries in which marriages and family formation by homosexual couples have become possible or remain contested and a central societal theme.

In addition to transnational, national, and regional policies, there has also been a structural change in perspective that has occurred in research on the family including on the individual groups that make up the family, namely the elderly, men, women, LGBTQ, youth, and children (→ Gender Identities, I/28). In addition to the dominant social science research on the family in the 1970s, women's studies, men's studies, gender discourses, childhood studies, youth studies, and LGBTQ perspectives have later emerged that have distinguished themselves explicitly from more traditional research on the family. These main points include the exposure of intrafamilial violence and exploitation as something subjugating first women, and then children and the elderly; the thereby associated social movements (→ I/41); the empirical process of the dissolution of the imaginary "ideal" family built on economic cohesion and held together through love; finally, new models of family made possible through the increasingly widespread externalization of care.

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FREEDOM

Donovan Hernández

The concept of freedom is a fundamental part of the vocabulary of politics but it is one of the most difficult to define. Athenian democracy, for example, opposed the liberation of slaves and excluded women and children (→ Slavery, I/18). Under this form of government, even within the free cities, only men were considered citizens capable of using laws to govern themselves (→ Citizenship, II/27). In the Roman republic, freedom was for the boys. Modernity opposes the need for freedom (→ Modernism, III/14). The enlightened imagination relates it to the “state of nature” which precedes civil society (→ II/28). Diderot and D’Alembert’s *Encyclopédie* distinguishes three types of freedom: natural, civil, and political. The Enlightenment (→ I/8) thought of the “state of nature” as one’s self at birth, which is the antithesis of civilized man.

Yet, being in the state in which one is not subservient to anyone else can be identified as complete freedom, limited only by natural laws. In this “state of nature,” a man has no right to harm himself nor anyone else nor their property. Freedom is the right to control oneself, which all of us have. Freedom and natural law are related to the problem of government within natural and political rights. The entry in the *Encyclopédie* for Government reads,

The greatest good of the people is its liberty. Liberty is to the body of the state what health is to each individual; without health man cannot enjoy pleasure; without liberty the state of welfare is excluded from nations. A patriotic governor will therefore see that the right to defend and to maintain liberty is the most sacred of his duties.

(Diderot and D’Alembert 1967 [Orig. pub. 1757])

These ideas had an impact on political processes throughout 1789 and the Age of Revolutions (→ Revolution, II/44). Despite this, as Susan Buck-Morss (2009) maintains, the Enlightenment excluded areas under colonial rule (→ I/5) from these ideas.

If the independence of the thirteen colonies had fixed Federalism within the modern political ideology, the French Revolution placed the Republican form of government firmly in opposition to despotism. The slogan of the French Revolution “Liberty, Equality and Fraternity” would find different articulations within the modern political discourse. Immanuel Kant read the enthusiasm awakened by the French Revolution as a sign of moral progress. For him, freedom is a tenet of reason. Kantian ethics is an ethics of autonomy whose general

form is a categorical imperative: act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law. For Hegel, on the other hand, freedom is found in the concept of rights,

The territory of right is in general the spiritual, and its more definite place and origin is the will, which is free. Thus freedom constitutes the substance and essential character of the will, and the system of right is the kingdom of actualized freedom. It is the world of spirit, which is produced out of itself, and is a second nature.

(Hegel 2012, xxix [Orig. pub. 1820])

Freedom is a systematic way to achieve this idea within the States (→ Nation State, II/38).

Liberalism, for its part, tends to place freedom and equality opposite each other. Freedom is an inherent capacity of the individual which unravels through ventures and risks of commercial activity, while equality tends to be the responsibility of the State. It is achieved through actual commitments in the distribution of wealth. It was Karl Marx, among the European Socialists (→ Socialism, I/42), who made the bluntest criticism of Liberal political ideals by showing that neither equality nor freedom is sufficient to guarantee political freedom for people under the State's control. Here, the State is understood as an instrument of class struggle (→ II/3). Furthermore, in place of the republican ideal, the transition from socialism to communism requires collective appropriation of the means of production as well as the abolition of the State. For that, private property should be substituted by collective ownership of the means of production. For Marx, formal freedom and equality are bourgeois ideals supported by the individualism present in the Enlightenment's contractualism. This theory supposed that the individual was by nature a pre-social being, while socialism starts with the assumption that humans are social beings. On the other hand, the social justice criteria of "to each according to his need" or "from each according to his ability" show that Marxism supposes a philosophical difference between this "realm of necessity" full of subjugation and reproductive activities, and the "realm of freedom" in which each human is capable of developing his own ability without limitations or restrictions. Therefore, the classless society would be the realization of the realm of freedom, which would do away with the domination of man over man.

The most relevant definitions of freedom in the inter-American context are related to the most significant political events in the history of the Americas as well as developments in theory. In more than one case, these are intertwined with the historical and social events of the 20th century. The conceptual history and politics of freedom in the emancipatory processes of 19th-century America, as well as the important part of the political and academic debates that centers on whether or not the concept of liberation is tied to anticolonialism-like theories of the global South (→ Postcolonialism, I/38), can be demonstrated in the political movements as well as in the direction that the Latin American countries followed intermittently throughout the 20th century. In addition to theories of freedom and social movements (→ I/41) for civil rights which happened in North America, three different definitions of freedom that take into account the heterogeneity of meanings of the word play an important part to the related struggles for hegemony and the anti-hegemonic in their discourse (→ Alter-Globalization, I/21) as well as in defining neoliberalism (→ II/16) (freedom as a free market), indigenous movements on the subcontinent (freedom as autonomy) (→ Indigeneity, I/31), and the progressive governments of Latin America.

The context of the Americas

If freedom defined the 19th century, the 20th would be about liberation. The language of freedom as well as its philosophical, political, and legal antecedents are closely tied to the revolutionary rhetoric in Latin America (→ Revolution, II/44) as well as civil metropolitan movements and wars of liberation in Africa and Asia. They share a common enemy: neocolonial and authoritarian regimes of geopolitically dominant states (→ Authoritarianism, II/25; Geopolitics, II/34). This libertarian attitude, expressed in all areas of social life, from the conduct of the revolutionary postcolonial State to the problematic differences between new feminist ideas, was called the Great Liberation (1969) by Herbert Marcuse. This emancipatory transversality led sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein (1983) to define the movements of this period as anti-systemic struggles. Diving deeper into the dimensions of the principle political debates around liberation in the Americas, the struggle for civil rights can be found as well as the uses of the concept of freedom that is found among traditional academics and the most important 20th-century social movements (→ Participation, II/41; Human Rights, II/35).

Freedom and independence in the Americas in the 19th century

In the United States, the process during the Civil War (1861–1865) which abolished slavery (→ I/18) first and then issued the *Emancipation Proclamation* – two bastions of civil and political freedom – is tied directly to the struggle for civil rights which came much later. Figures like John Brown marked the way for the antislavery struggle to be seen as the duty of mass movement, which is to say, direct action, not governmental action. The antagonism between the North and the South obligated President Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863. The result was constant northward migration of slaves from the South, many of whom joined the Army upon arrival. With unification and a definitive end to slavery, a fundamental legal transformation had arrived, though would still take much time to become a change in the general political culture. At the time, it was a transformation in the aspects of segregation.

On the other hand, the beginning of the 20th century made clear that the revolutionary impulse lay in Latin America (→ Independence Movements, I/10). Former colonies and vice-royalties that received their independence in the 19th century approached hundred years of sovereignty, although in most cases, the inertia of Civil War and factional divisions undermined the formation of republican institutions (→ Nation and State Building, I/16). They were defenseless against foreign interference promoted by imperial powers from Europe and conservative regional groups. In this sense, Simón Bolívar's celebrated *Juramento del Monte Aventino* attributes the vanguard of human freedom to Europe, similar to Hegel. Bolívar delivered his oath on August 15, 1805, in which he maintained, in typical exalted oratory style, a unique story which put an unexpected twist to the accepted Eurocentric rhetoric. Bolívar had this to say,

Civilization, which has blown in from the East, has here shown all its facets, has demonstrated all its elements; but as for resolving the great problem of human freedom, it seems that the subject has been forgotten and that this mystery will become clear only in the New World.

[translation by the author] (1999, 17)

The idea of freedom as a civilizing agent moves from the East after having resolved the European forms of despotism to the Americas now setting out to break the chains of oppression of the people of America colonized by Spain. The Spanish-speaking parts of the Americas

become, in this manner of thinking, a crucial node in the advance of freedom in geopolitical terms. The concept of freedom plays an important role within the complex political architecture to the thinking of independence-seekers. If civil liberty ought to be defended by institutions within the Republic, the coalescence of the independence process – as Bolívar argued – would be looked upon favorably by assemblies of power-holders whose authority comes directly from each nation liberated from the yoke of Spanish rule. Finally, in his celebrated document, *Sentimientos de la nación* (*Thoughts of a Nation*), José María Morelos y Pavón writes, “America has given its reasons and justified the fact that it is free and independent from Spain and all other nations, governments or monarchies” [translation by the author] (1813). The speech constitutes a declaration of independence in and of itself. The meaning of freedom is related to emancipation from 19th-century European colonial powers without the republican powers having to resolve the inequality generated by the colonial power in the modern era.

Indigenous and Afro-Caribbean presence in the politics of freedom

The fact that the military and intellectual elite of Latin America self-identified as being of South American Spanish-speaking stock as opposed to European, an identity known as *criollo*, is not the only thing that matters when it comes to the meaning of freedom in the region. With repeated acts of resistance dating to the very beginning of colonial domination (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7), indigenous mobilization with revolutionary protagonists of African descent from the former colonies of the Caribbean has become an important reference point for analyzing the politics of freedom in the region. Mayan rebellions in the Yucatán Peninsula in the 19th century fought against the caste system. Although they were snuffed out, they showed the wide capacity of oppressed populations within the agave industry for action, which was portrayed in the novel *Canek* by Ermilo González Abreu.

On the other hand, as Luis Fernando Granados (2016) convincingly maintains in his important work *En el espejo haitiano* (*In the Haitian Mirror*), it would be impossible to understand the cycle of popular revolution that the wars for independence made in the 19th century without hearing echoes of the revolutionary struggle of Haitian slaves while gaining their independence (→ Revolution, II/44). Escaped slaves influenced the politics of Toussaint Louverture, and other Black Jacobins. Together, they achieved the universalist ideal that the Enlightenment (→ I/8) and the French Revolution failed to realize in their colonies when they abolished slavery. Most importantly, they brought freedom to their lands.

The legacy of this radical libertarian impulse nourished the peasants of the Gulf of Mexico in an insurge against the colonial regime’s system of castes that the *criollos* could not fully understand. The European caste system in the Ibero-America named different mixtures of lineage, for example, a person of indigenous American Indian and African or African-American descent was called *zambo* (→ Hybridity, I/30). Likewise, *mestizos* were people of indigenous American Indian and European descents, while the term *mulatto* was used for people of European and African or African-American heritage. Along similar lines, comparative literature specialists and those who focus on postcolonial studies such as David Kazanjian (2016) have shown what forms the liberated slaves of Virginia and insurgent Mayas of the Yucatán have contributed to the definition of freedom at the same time that great Socialist insurrections were taking place in Europe in 1848 (→ Atlantic, I/3). In conclusion, it would be impossible to understand the cycle of independence struggles in Latin America without establishing a tie with the emancipation process in the Caribbean.

Freedom and revolutionary politics in Latin American states

The unequal map of Latin American regionalism would take steps toward its current form when in 1910 the Mexican Revolution burst onto the scene. It gave rise to a state with a mixed constitution that included collective rights. Even before the revolution of October 1917, Latin America was on the world stage as a place of powerful emancipatory progress. It deserves mention that as it concerns land reform (the defense of which was taken up by the Southern Liberation Army), the Mexican Revolution proposed and achieved one of the most advanced plans of its time, including community land distribution (→ Land, II/15). That said however, what followed the revolution was a one-party regime known as the Revolutionary Institutional Party that Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa called “the perfect dictatorship.” At the end, the revolution fell victim to successive disputes between generals. Then, with a broad base of support from unions and peasants (→ Labor Representation, II/14), there was a subsequent peaceful secession of power from the hands of the armed groups, to those of the civilians. Socialism (→ I/42) undoubtedly played a role in the ideology of the leftists of the Mexican Revolution. Except for a brief period under Lázaro Cárdenas, however, it would not be a philosophical basis for the Mexican state. It would be the Russian Revolution of 1917, including the complex aftermath following Lenin’s death, which would fix emancipation in the imagination of oppressed people. It was responsible as well for the formation of Communist Parties in peripheral countries of the capitalist world system. International socialism became regional and made contact with colonial Africa and Asia as well as with the dependent economies of Latin America that chained ironfisted dictatorships in the region to the interests of capitalists in North America and Western Europe (→ Capitalism, II/2; Authoritarianism, II/25).

The Cuban Revolution of 1959 grew out of Marxist–Leninist currents as well as from the spirit of José Martí. It would make socialism a political option in the region. It is interesting to note that, following the example of the national liberation front in Algeria, which would win independence in 1962, the revolutionaries commanded by Fidel Castro would consider the fall of the Batista regime an act of liberation. From then on, the tactic known as *focalism* would be replicated in the metropolitan zones of various Latin American countries such as Uruguay, Mexico, Argentina, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru, and Bolivia, among others. Focalism often figured into the politics of the revolutionaries in Algeria who often chose cities as the site of encounters between the state and radical leftists. This is the case with the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional of the Tupamaros in Uruguay. They took their name from a pejorative nickname that the army used to refer to rebels who joined the independence forces in the Río de la Plata region. However, the Cuban model, nourished with the arguments of different Maoist and anarchist groups, was not applied with success in urban settings, with one notable exception – the rise to power of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional in Nicaragua in 1979. In countries such as Mexico, guerrilla groups were placated by the state, giving way to what is called “*guerra sucia*” (“dirty war”). For their part, already unstable nations such as Peru and Colombia ended up fragmented into a complex web of relationships between the militarization of politics (→ Military, II/37), paramilitary groups, guerrilla militias, and escalation of low-intensity warfare that has affected civil society throughout the region. Under successive military juntas in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, or Paraguay, for example, state-sponsored terrorism has worsened.

Chile’s path to socialism deserves to be mentioned separately. La Unión Popular, a broad coalition of Marxist-inspired parties in Chile, was victorious in 1970s presidential election and brought Salvador Allende to power. The Allende government’s program was progressive:

nationalization of the copper industry, agrarian reform, higher salaries for workers, etc. However, in the midst of an economic crisis (→II/4) and with a polarized society, the armed forces, headed by Pinochet, initiated a coup d'état on September 11, 1973 in what proved to be the end of Salvador Allende.

Freedom and civil rights

In the meantime, this transitional period reflected the difficulties that traditional imperialism had maintaining possession of colonies in Asia, particularly Vietnam. France's army was expelled and the entrance of the United States into the conflict showed a major geopolitical transformation which, ironically, would also be the most significant defeat of an armed power at the hands of guerrillas in the Third World. This animosity, just as the obvious imbalance of forces, awoke international solidarity from within Communist Parties and traditional Leftists. The libertarian spirit translated into student demonstrations, public discourse, and activity that politicized the era in new ways. Everything was in question. It was the same antiauthoritarian spirit which brought the civil rights struggle into cities in the United States (→ Social Movements, I/41). The economy of abundance was questioned in its own house. Yet, racism and segregation persisted.

The struggle for civil rights acquired a new form: from being reduced to groups that sought changes from within the legislative framework, it became a mass movement which tried forms of resistance and civil disobedience. With largely nonviolent strategies, activists challenged the day-to-day practices of segregationists. In the face of police violence, they resisted nonviolently. It is important that the demonstrations were supported by progressive North American unions (→ Labor Representation, II/14), as well as from a wide range of society. Of course, Martin Luther King, Jr. was emblematic in the movement for the eloquence of speeches such as the "I Have a Dream" speech in which African Americans are presented as part of the story of the United States (→ Foundational Discourses, III/3; African-descendant Literatures, III/2).

Some of the spirit that died with him would rise again in other ways. In a parallel fashion, the figure of Malcom X motivated a politics of self-defense which was taken up by the Black Panther party founded in 1966 and active until 1982. This overtly revolutionary group supported Black nationalist beliefs inspired by socialism. The Black Panthers proposed to communities of people of African descent that they exercise their American right to bear arms as a means of self-defense against police abuse in their neighborhoods (→ Security, II/45). Theirs was a ten-point revolutionary program that included specific demands which illustrated their definition of freedom. They wanted self-governance for communities of African Americans, full employment, and better housing, not to mention that they demanded that the American government keeps its promise of payment of forty acres and two mules as reparations for slavery. The Black Panther Party was the most well-known for its implementation of programs that solved specific problems within their own communities, such as free medical care (→ Health, I/29) and policies which provided more dignified living conditions. In the same way, its connection to Algerian liberation struggle and its support for the Cuban Revolution made the Black Panthers a benchmark of libertarian politics in the Americas.

This is by no means an exhaustive list of all the expressions of liberation, however. The constant student movements in Latin America deserve mention. The campus was not the only common factor between them. The constant mobilization of peasants, industrial workers, and social movements has counted on the tireless participation of students. Yet, even movements for reforms at the university have helped bring about larger-impact policies

off-campus, including questioning authoritarian and military power structures in the region. Without a doubt, 1968 was a year that included many of these expressions in political as well as cultural spheres. The indiscriminate killing of protesting students in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas de Tlatelolco in Mexico City made it clear that the bloodiest of authoritarians can rule with impunity even in supposed functioning democracies (→ Democracy, II/32). Despite this, student movements have regrouped all across Latin America and have demonstrated solidarity with other oppressed segments of society. On the other hand, the articulation of social demands through a Liberation Front may impact transversal practices of exclusion as has been the case with the exclusion of women from the field of politics and the attack against the autonomy over their own bodies (→ Intersectionality, I/32). An example of this is the creation of the Frente Nacional de Lucha por la Liberación y los Derechos de las Mujeres (National Front for Women's Rights and Freedom) in Mexico in 1979.

Theorizing freedom

Important theories about freedom have arisen from the world of academia. This can be seen in the works of authors such as John Rawls, Martha Nussbaum, and Seyla Benhabib, among others who have made important contributions to rethinking liberal principles and criteria from the perspective of social justice.

Rawl's work *Theory of Justice* (1971) was a precursor to the revision of classical Liberalism. The social contract, according to Rawls, is based on justice and impartiality and this work lays the foundation for this theory. Rawls proposes a deductive theory of society. For him, the basic structure of society provides for the principles of justice. Rawls proposes a veil of ignorance which prohibits participants in a social contract from taking advantage of one another. It would guarantee the equality of the rational actors based on criteria of justice. Rawls' original position is the starting point. Rawls' definition of freedom is the following: society is a cooperative enterprise of mutual benefit and justice should be understood from two principles. The first is that each person has equal rights to an extensive scheme of basic freedoms that are compatible with a similar scheme of freedoms for others. The second is that social and economic inequalities (→ II/20) will have to be shaped in such a way that they are reasonably expected to be advantageous to all and that they are linked to jobs and public offices accessible to everyone.

Rawls considered his theory of justice as a normative theory of the structure of society. Martha Nussbaum (2006), however, succeeds in linking a theory of justice with situations that Rawls did not consider, namely disability, the limits of nationality, and ethics related to nonhuman animals. These are the frontiers of justice. The revision of the normative limits of the abstract theories of justice allows Nussbaum to propose an approach from the "capacities" necessary and sufficient for social development. Seyla Benhabib (2002), on the other hand, suggests that freedom within a multicultural society is the ability of any individual to make use of discourse and introduce new topics of debate. The community of communication is not limited by a country's border but, as the theory of cosmopolitanism (→ III/5) holds, every person who will be affected or potentially affected by a political decision has the right to participate in the deliberative process through an exchange of ideas.

The critical theory of Nancy Fraser and Wendy Brown, both from the United States, is concerned with radicalizing democracy and approaches the political debate from there. Fraser (2003) maintains that the debate around justice and freedom are not limited to formal rights. Recognizing minorities is crucial within today's identity politics and as a result, the importance of the distribution of material resources has returned to the foreground as a

social justice issue. Thus, her appeal for “reformism without reform” seeks the consolidation of a distributive justice focused on material resources, not merely equal access to opportunities since participants in society start from unequal conditions for reasons of race (→ I/39), class, and gender (→ Gender Identities, I/28). By the same token, authors such as Wendy Brown (2015) describe the advance of neoliberalism (→ II/16) as a process of constant depoliticization of the public sphere. Consequently, political relations become less adversarial while the field of “best practices” from business management takes over. The neoliberal tendency to substitute politics for administration contributes to dismantling the exercise of political power and democratic thought. This imposition of the *homo economicus* over the *zoón politikón* corresponds, per Brown, to a resurgence of antidemocratic means of conducting the state and resolving conflict, which, in turn, strengthens the fantasy of sovereignty of a contained Nation-State. In this way, the margins of juridical exceptionality in international law expand in correlation with the ascent of liberal theories of economic development (→ II/6) as freedom, which constitutes an inauspicious perspective.

Theorizing freedom

In the context of social crisis (→ II/4) and authoritarianism (→ II/25), three theories of freedom that are distinctly Latin American come to the fore. First, the Dependency Theory; second, the Liberation Theology; and third, a Philosophy of Liberation.

The dependency theory emerged in the 1960s as a criticism of the approach to development by the ECLAC (Commission on Economics for Latin America and the Caribbean) (→ Development, II/6). Authors such as Theotonio Dos Santos, Ruy Mauro Marini, and Celso Furtado showed that the path to development conveniently omitted geopolitical inequality which in fact was the underlying cause of the underdevelopment in the first place. The theory of dependence begins with the recognition of the differential in power relations between the South and the North. The former exports raw materials and natural resources to the latter (→ Extractivism, II/9; Global Commodity Chains, II/12) which needs cheap labor as well as seeks to perpetuate the relationship (→ Geopolitics, II/34). Thus, the dependency theory reformulates the relationship of domination as the dependence of the periphery on the metropolis, a systemic and unequal dependence which produces precariousness. Relationships of domination go beyond merely economics – they are expressed as well in the cultural dimension.

Liberation theology, on the other hand, is an intellectual movement in which different libertarian tendencies combine with the efforts of the ecclesiastical community to understand the exploitation of the poor in the peripheries, using the Gospel as a starting point (→ Religious Beliefs, I/40). A 1968 conference in Medellín is widely considered as the beginning of the movement. Among its most conspicuous representatives are the Brazilians Leonardo Boff and Rubem Alves, Gustavo Gutiérrez Merino of Peru, and Ignacio Ellacuría, a priest who was assassinated in El Salvador by the military. It is worth mentioning that following the triumph of the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, leading members of the ecclesiastical community entered the revolutionary government – Ernesto Cardenal, Fernando Cardenal, and Miguel d’Escoto, all of whom espoused liberation theology. No struggle for emancipation is complete without a link to salvation as well.

The starting point, theologically speaking, is, of course, a desire for improvement for the poor, while the social sciences provide the understanding of society. The theological objective is considered to be the construction of the New Man but with an understanding of the spiritual and historical dimensions of poverty, not merely an understanding based on

theology. The supposed existence of the *social sin* is responsible for social injustice and the exploitation and oppression of the poor and maintains the structural inequalities of the capitalist organization of labor. In this way, liberation theology simultaneously links ideas from the dependency theory with elements of Paulo Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed. Undoubtedly, one of the inspirations of this rebellious approach from within the church was Martin Luther King Jr., a man of the cloth who catalyzed the Civil Rights struggle.

The philosophy of Latin American liberation and two of its main exponents should also be mentioned, Enrique Dussel and Horacio Cerutti. Cerutti's theory looks at freedom from a perspective inspired by Martí, which he calls *Our America*. It shows not only the structural inequalities in the epistemological structure of non-Anglo-Saxon America but also the diversity of experiences within the process of political and cultural liberation. For his part, Enrique Dussel (2014) was at first much closer to liberation theology, but later chose a method all his own. For him, if philosophy is thought of as a system of reality – from the pre-Socratics to Hegel – then there is an irreducible exterior to the terms of the system, following Emmanuel Levinas' way of thinking. This radical otherness is the pauper, the poor people of the global periphery in Latin America and the Third World who oppose the capitalist world order. Thus, though the dialectic understands reality as a concept, the analytic criticizes it from its most basic exterior form. As this argument goes, freedom can only come from the pauper, from those who scavenge the crumbs from the victors' parties. It interests them the most anyway, for it means freedom from the yoke of capitalism (→ II/2). Freedom is generally only thought of in political terms, but it has pedagogical, social, and erotic dimensions as well. It is this approach, in relation to Wallerstein's world systems theory and dependency theory, which will place the discussion specifically within South America's experience of decolonization (→ Postcolonialism, I/38). This is distinct from the North American experience expressed in postcolonial studies.

Final discussion

Undoubtedly, plenty of possible interpretations of the concept of freedom have not been dealt with in this review of the concept. Despite this, it is important to discuss some of the approaches that have transcended time and disciplines, and have had an impact on our understanding of the word *freedom*. Aside from the European approaches of the 18th century, the philosophical meanings of German idealism and the way in which classical Liberalism has understood this word have influenced the consolidation of the nascent Latin American republics during the independence period and the 19th century. The meanings of freedom were interpreted for emancipatory and certainly rebellious uses in revolutionary politics across the continent (→ Revolution, II/44). This has stirred a debate in its interpretations among academics in North and South America, including primarily those related to the theory of distributive justice and freedom as well as theories of dependence and Latin American liberation. However, it would be impossible to conclude without mentioning at least three events that have contributed decisively to contemporary definitions of freedom in the inter-American context: neoliberalism (→ II/16), indigenous mobilizations in the American subcontinent (→ Indigeneity, I/31), and the progressive governments in Latin America. It is impossible to argue that the meaning of freedom is the same in each of the cases cited. Clearly, that is not the case. Yet, the way in which each one of the phenomena articulates a sense of the word freedom shows clearly that its meaning is variable. Its definition depends on the hegemony involved in each discussion. Thus, there is no teleology of freedom, but heterogeneous strategies of appropriation and uses of the word.

Freedom within neoliberalism

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and Perestroika, the Socialist inspiration for liberatory ideas was submerged beneath the ocean of Liberal democracies. Although it remains constantly active in the periphery of the modern world, financial capitalism dominates the design of globalization. In this self-serving narrative, we have arrived at the so-called “end of history.” The ideological dispute has been settled, and the servitude of collectivism, according to Hayek, has been superseded by neoliberalism as the single model of governance. Thus, technocratic or information-based societies (→ Digital Culture, III/28) exist alongside the dismantling of the so-called welfare state in the name of a supposedly renewed spirit of freedom. The neoliberal project imposes itself as the hegemonic rationality of modernity.

Therefore, the concept of freedom in this realm of discourse is used to reinforce individualist and asocial modes which were at the margins of the contemporary meaning of this concept. According to Foucault (2008), classical Liberalism asks how to have less government. Making self-regulation of the market one of the pillars of Western governmentality, neoliberalism poses the inverse problem: how can you strengthen the State based on a market of free competition? The central concept has shifted; it is no longer about how to whittle the state down but about making it be the guarantor of the conditions of competition between individuals and companies.

In the world of economics and debt, in the realm of venture capitalism, freedom means to compete freely. This has made thinkers such as Alain Badiou (2000) declare that the concept of freedom is not feasible for contemporary emancipatory politics. It is true that neoliberalism is currently hegemonic in the discourse surrounding freedom, but it also contradicts its own hegemony with other approaches that fight for radical democracy capable of integrating social perspectives of redistribution and refoundation of the state (→ State Transformation, II/21). Other approaches seek to “democratize democracy,” which otherwise is strictly a project of Liberalism (→ Democracy, II/32).

Indigenous mobilization

The one-dimensional political debate within academia and in the public sphere is severely thinned and a cause for worry. But also, a vigorous effort encouraged by those in the conversation to build critical thinking in the face of the ravages caused by contemporary capitalism. It is important therefore not to forget that the concept of freedom resonates in the anti-colonial struggles of Latin American civil society. The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) recaptured this emancipatory legacy on January 1, 1994 and later made it policy via their Good Government Juntas and the Revolutionary Law of Women. It showed that freedom, far from being exhausted by the blindness of neoliberalism, can be a strong factor in mobilizing oppressed groups in the 21st century. It is noteworthy that during the last National Indigenous Congress in 2016 in San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, Mexico, representatives of indigenous groups from the United States met with their Mexican counterparts. New forms of solidarity are taking shape and establishing roots.

One of the most meaningful episodes within the search for freedom was the series of international alliances that gathered in Seattle in 1999 (→ Alter-Globalization, I/21). Protesters from many civil society movements, including union-members, met to protest the economic privatization policies which are the paradigm of dominant capitalist players in the globalization game (→ Privatization, II/17). Seattle had an inter-American dimension as well. Its spirit was directly related to the one that EZLN provoked. This event on U.S. soil

reactivated post-Marxist mobilization. It was significant for two reasons, the first of which is because it dealt with a post-Cold War international action in a world order dominated by neoliberalism's free market. Second, it made the necessity of joining environmental, labor, feminist, and postcolonial struggles explicit. The upshot from this is that the politics of class were put in relation with global warming (→ Climate Change, II/30), gender-based oppression (→ Gender Identities, I/28), and the exploitation of workers in the Third World. It was related to a very important impulse in the new rebellious and anti-systemic activity that would have been unthinkable with the specifically North American component of a strong tradition in civil struggle rooted in nonviolent civil disobedience. The time has come for a new internationalism (→ Cosmopolitanism, III/5).

As we have seen, a large part of the indigenous mobilization in Latin America coincides with the demand for autonomy. Yet, they have also been part of powerful democratic processes that promoted political candidates through broad mass movement, with the CONAIE in Ecuador and Evo Morales in Bolivia being two examples (→ Indigeneity, I/31).

The dead end of progressive governments in Latin America

In fact, after the fall of military dictatorships and years of pronounced efforts to advance toward more normal institutions, Latin America led the rise of an entire generation of Leftist governments that was deemed the "Pink Tide." Michelle Bachelet was elected in Chile in 2006, served until 2010, and was reelected for a second four-year term in 2014. Evo Morales, a union activist of Aymara descent, has been at the head of Bolivia since 2006. Lula da Silva headed Brazil in 2003 and 2010 and Rafael Correa was a leader in Ecuador between 2007 and 2010. Hugo Chávez led Venezuela between 1999 and 2013 and José Mujica headed Uruguay for five years starting in 2010. The Kirchner governments in Argentina were seen as a new boom in anti-neoliberal politics and the formation of a counter-hegemonic bloc.

Despite all of this, they did not live up to expectations. Progressive administrations were forced to maneuver with reactionaries and regional interest groups. The important signs of hope in the Latin American left have begun, if not to give in, at least to face processes of Neoconservatism that are changing the shape of the geopolitics of the region. Dilma Rousseff suffered a soft coup in Brazil in 2016; the rise of conservatives in Argentina and the consequent dismantling of the social welfare structure, the loss of the monopoly on violence in Mexico, and the instability in the peace process in Colombia should be noted. In the U.S. as well, Leftists are on the run, leaving the door open to political outsiders, or those with no experience in politics. Some of them even claim to be in some way or another "against" the system. Yet, they are reviving Draconian measures such as border walls and cutbacks in the public policies.

In this scenario, the meaning of freedom is being impacted by the State's type of business-centered administration, but it does not define freedom completely. Alternatives, resistance or counter-hegemony, also influence the possibilities to understand and capture new meanings of the word that has been so crucial to the vocabulary of politics. One thing is for sure, this tension promises a long life for the concept of freedom.

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28

GENDER IDENTITIES

Karina Bidaseca and Julia Roth

The term “gender” was originally used to describe grammatical categories. Gender as it is understood here – as a relation between differently situated humans and as a socially variable role – goes back to long debates in the context of feminist practices and studies. Feminism has a long history in the Americas, which has started long before the term came into use in the 1890s. Enslaved women in the Caribbean had been opposing their dehumanization, exploitation, and enslavement from the outset in the form of various practices (→ Slavery, I/18). All over the Americas – above all in the U.S., the Caribbean, Central America, and Brazil – numerous enslaved women also escaped and lived in hiding or as “cimarronas” in maroon societies. Early feminists struggled for the recognition of their legal equality after centuries of structural exclusion and subordination which was justified through defining women as naturally different and inferior from men and therefore reduced to particular social roles and engendered labor forms (→ Gender and Work, II/11) (Mies 1996). Soon after the French Revolution (1789), feminists like Olympe de Gouges (France 1791) and Mary Wollstonecraft (Great Britain 1792) highlighted the fact that the newly introduced “human rights” (→ II/35) were limited to white male citizens (→ Citizenship, II/27; Whiteness, II/46). Around the same time, the nonwhite freedom fighters from Saint-Domingue (today Haiti) reiterated the inconsistencies in ideals with regard to human rights and freedom (→ I/27) and the system of institutionalized enslavement. Half a century later, this idea would be repeated in Sojourner Truth’s speech at the Women’s Rights Convention in Akron, Ohio (USA 1851) where she used her experience as a black formerly enslaved woman to question feminism of that time by pointing the entanglement of class, racialization, and gender (→ Intersectionality, I/32). Colonized women – indigenous and enslaved Afro-descendant women as well as working-class women – were gendered differently based on naturalizing ascriptions.

In the 20th century, this very naturalization of gender roles came increasingly under scrutiny. At the beginning of the 20th century, socialist feminists like Clara Zetkin and Rosa Luxemburg insisted on the importance of other socioeconomic positions (→ Socialism, I/42). In his studies, African American sociologist and philosopher W.E.B. Du Bois (1903) elaborated on the interrelations between race, class, and nation. More than three-quarters of a century later, Black feminists in Cuba and Afro-descendant female authors would discuss the interrelations of racism and sexism in the black female edited journal *Minerva (Revista quincenal dedicada a la mujer de color)* published from November 1988 to July 1989.

One of the pioneers of anthropological studies addressing the topic in the social sciences is Margaret Mead. In her 1935 *Sex and temperament in three primitive societies in New Guinea: The Arapesh Mundugumor and Tchambuli (or Chambri)*, she questioned the strict natural correspondence between sex and temperament of an individual's behavior and claimed that sexual differences may vary according to specific circumstances or cultural contexts.

In *The Second Sex* (1949), existentialist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir coined the famous phrase that “one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman” which expresses an egalitarian conception of human beings, according to which sexual difference is culturally constructed and does not alter its radical equality of condition.

In the second half of the 20th century, the introduction of the category of “gender” enabled new interpretations of sex differences and of a female essence. John Money in *Hermaphroditism, gender and precocity in hyperadrenocorticism: Psychologic findings* (1955) observed the distinction between the medicalized “sex” and the psychological category “gender” to describe the behaviors associated with male and female identities of persons, and where they intervene with sociobiological factors. In the 1970s, Anglo-Saxon academic feminism started using the category *gender* in order to emphasize the differences between sociocultural constructions of gender roles and the biology of the sexes. In her 1975 essay “The Traffic in Women,” feminist scholar Gayle Rubin described the “sex/gender system” as a “set of arrangements” through which sex is translated into gender and which serves as a prototype of all social and economic relations. In this system, men exchange women among themselves on a continuum ranging from prostitution to marriage (Rubin 1975). In her 1986 article “Gender: a useful category for the story,” feminist historian Joan Scott proposed the distinction between gender as “a constitutive element of social relations” and “gender as a primary form of symbolic power relations” (2011, 65) which she saw expressed in four main elements: the available symbols that evoke multiple representations; regulatory concepts present in the interpretations of the symbols; institutions and social organizations of gender relations; and subjective identity.

Drawing on Michel Foucault's findings of the history of sexuality, Teresa de Lauretis in *Technologies of Gender. Essays in Theory, Film and Fiction* (1987) explained that gender is understood as the effect and development of a series of social technologies such as films, institutional discourses, epistemologies, and critical practices in everyday habits continuously and transversely creating representations and self-representations.

The continuous, everyday production of gender has been illustratively described as “doing gender”: gender is “done” through interaction with others on a daily basis (West and Zimmermann 1987). Doing-gender processes take place not only through individuals, but also through normalizing practices in society, such as laws or institutions like the family (→ I/26) or matrimony.

Gender and interlocking axes of oppression

In the 1970s and 1980s, feminist theorists and activists were also highlighting the overlapping influences between racism and sexism (→ Race, I/39). Contemporary Black feminism originates in the historical reality of African American and Afro-descendant women who have been resisting racist and sexist violence from early on. The *Manifesto das Mulheres Negras* (1975) in Brazil and the *Combahee River Collective Statement* (1981) in the USA both attested to the entangled forms of inequality and oppression (→ Social Inequality, I/20). The ways in which black and other non-hegemonic feminists addressed the multilevel exclusion of black women are illustratively expressed in titles like that of the Chicana feminist compilation *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color* (1981) edited by Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa,

Angela Davis' *Woman, Race and Class* (1981), or the volume *All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, But Some of US Are Brave* (Hull, Bell-Scott, and Smith 1982) (→ *Latinidad*, I/33). Chicana feminists like Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherrie Moraga spoke of the "Borderlands" of identities and experiences not considered normative according to the dominant regimes of knowledge and power, as historically constituted by colonialism, enslavement, patriarchy, and heteronormativity (→ *Borders*, III/3). They thereby claimed the recognition of more than two binary-opposed gender identities tied to heteronormative notions and strict social roles.

The term "women of color" – and "womanism" as their particular anti-racist form of feminism – identifies women of Asian, Latin American, Native American, and African descent, as the most important minority groups of color in the USA, as well as encompasses those who have participated in civil rights movements fighting the nationalist struggles with colonialism in the "Third World" (→ *Social Movements*, I/41). The concept of "intersectionality" (→ I/32) – as a frame to address the simultaneous articulation of different axes of inequality such as race (→ I/39), class, gender (→ I/9), and sexuality – is now a cornerstone of African American feminist critique, aesthetics, and politics. The term "intersectionality" itself, however, was not utilized until 1989, where the (U.S.) African American lawyer Kimberlé Crenshaw used it to address the disadvantages of being both black and female.

In Latin America, feminists do not use the term as often in comparison to European and U.S.-American theorists. *Interseccionalidad* or the notion of an *intersección* is not as common of a concept in Latin American feminist discourses. However, the notion of *interrelaciones* (interrelations) does exist and is being discussed and the number of academic publications utilizing the term and concept is increasing (see Vázquez Laba 2012; Viveros Vigoya and Gil 2014; Muñevar n.d.). The discussion of the categories of gender, sexuality, and race, and their interrelatedness has been discussed in the review *Debate Feminista* directed by Marta Lamas since 1983. However, the production of feminist knowledge in nonacademic contexts has mostly been ignored in hegemonic feminist theory.

During the 1990s, in line with postmodern perspectives of gender studies in U.S.-American academia, both sex and gender were conceptualized as discursive constructions equipped with renewed meanings through practices such as performance or surgery. At the same time, the notion of "sexual difference" integrated sexualities formerly considered as "deviant" from the binary heterosexual. In her emblematic book: *Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (1990), Judith Butler argued that gender identities are unstable and performances in process. Butler's thinking was influenced by the "New Gender Politics," which included transgender, transsexual, intersexual positions and their complex relationship with feminist and queer theories. In *Undoing Gender*, Butler (2008) called out the crisis of the concept of gender as a mere discursive differentiation of masculine and feminine, and as a devaluation of the symbolic status of "sexual difference" and called for "queering" as a process of reviewing hegemonic histories and documenting LGBT+ people in history.

Queer theory has become a central concept in gender studies and parts of feminist theory, particularly in the U.S. and Europe. Queer of Color and Queer Diaspora critics have rendered problematic the hegemonic notion of "queer" subjectivities and practices by pointing to the implicit *situatedness* of this position as white, "western," urban, and mostly middle-class (→ *Whiteness*, I/46; *Social Inequality*, II/20). These critics have highlighted the fact that conceptualizations of "queerness" are related to societies and forms of consumption (→ *Consumerism*, I/23) and theorizing that are not available – and often not desirable – for most queer subjectivities outside of these centers (see Alexander 1991; Muñoz 1999; Ferguson 2004). In Latin America, this critique has been expressed in the formulation of their own version of the concept: "cuír" (Vargas Cervantes 2016).

In *Biopolitics of Gender*, the Spanish feminist philosopher Beatriz Preciado criticized the neglect of the importance of the body in hegemonic notions of gender and redefines the notion of performativity as a complex circuit of bodies, technologies, and signs including techniques of biotechnology, film, cyberspace, etc. (→ *Biopolitics*, I/22).

Also crucial for the particular Latin American (and Mexican) context was Marcela Lagarde's reformulation of the concept of feminicide (as different from "femicide"). The concept gained visibility in the context of the women's movements of Latin America and other regions known as "Ni una menos!" / "Not one less" starting in 2015 to fight structural violence against and assassination of women (→ *Social Movements*, I/41).

Gender, sexuality, and race: colonialism and (post)colonialism

Recent de(s)colonial versions of feminism(s) have been based on the entanglements of gender and coloniality as coined by María Lugones (→ *Postcolonialism*, I/38). On the one hand, the conquest was related to gendered imaginations of the conquered spaces, thereby transferring the colonial hierarchy in Europe to the already established binary gender hierarchy (→ *Gender*, I/9). Projecting allegories of the female body onto colonial maps, European conquerors transferred gendered concepts to newly conquered spaces. In her groundbreaking study *Imperial Leather: Race, Class and Gender in the Colonial Contest* (1995), postcolonial critic Anne McClintock has identified Columbus' depiction of the earth as a woman's breast as a genre of "porno-tropics," evoking "a long tradition of male travel as an erotic of ravishment" (22). And postcolonial critic Gayatri Spivak has described the current global situation of postcoloniality as "the product of a violation" – and thus as historically marked by gendered violence and gendered power hierarchies.

While Gayle Rubin considered the sex/gender system as pertaining to a capitalist economy (→ *Capitalism*, II/2) but also constituting the very fabric of culture throughout human history, Jean Franco argued that particular forms of the "exchange" of colonized women – such as enslaved indigenous women given as a gift to the Spanish conquerors or being exchanged between Aztecs and Spanish men – were already part and parcel of the conquest (Franco 1999 [1992], 71) (→ *Interethnic Relations*, I/12). Bridging instead world-systems and decolonial analyses of the capitalist world-economy with feminist perspectives, María Lugones coined the term "modern/colonial gender system" to refer to the co-constituency of gender, modernity, and coloniality under capitalism that introduced a "new gender system" with numerous different gender positions for colonized and colonizing subjects and "gender" itself as a "colonial concept" that provided a form of organizing relations of production, property, cosmologies, and ways of knowing (Lugones 2007, 186). Rita Segato (2015) inscribes the conception of gender in the dual world of the logic of the "pre-intrusion world," where the grid of exclusive modernity challenges the community world, the protection of indigenous women before the kidnapping, and the privatization of the home. As part of the decolonial feminist debate, Rita Segato, Rosalva Aída Hernández, Yuderkis Espinosa, Claudia de Lima Costa, the Afro-Cubanas in Cuba, the community feminism of "Mujeres Creando" in Bolivia, Giuseppe Campuzano in Perú, and the performance language of Pedro Lemebel in Chile are fundamental in the gender debate in Latin America and are increasingly entering the academic field.

Colonial continuities/persistent engendered colonial inequalities: femicide and feminicidio

A specific dimension of discourse on gender and gender relations in the Americas is the extreme structural violence and homicide against women which goes back to a long history

of structurally gendered violence. The concept of “feminicidio” [in Spanish, different from *femicidio*] was developed by United States’ writer Carol Orlock in 1974, and first used in public by the feminist Diana Russell before the International Tribunal on Crimes against Women at Brussels (→ Human Rights, II/35). The term refers to a sex-based hate crime term, broadly defined as “the intentional killing of females (women or girls) because they are females,” though definitions vary depending on the cultural context. It is a political concept with high recognition in Latin America. It has been translated in Mexico by Lagarde (2006) as *feminicidio* to refer to “femicide violence” to define violent gender-based killings of women, aimed at challenging neutral words like “homicide” or “murder,” and extract them from the private sphere and individual pathology.

The Inter-American Court on Human Rights has not recognized “feminicidio” as systematic violence – as the case of “Campo Algodonero: Claudia Ivette González, Esmeralda Herrera Monreal and Laura Berenice Ramos Monárrez against the United Mexican State” has shown – but has opted for a more lenient state responsibility based on the created risk doctrine with the addition of due diligence prevention duty, an obligation reinforced by Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará (2011, 14). The decision recognized the existence of “a culture of discrimination against women” and is exhibited as an “emblematic precedent in Human Rights Inter-American System case-law development” (17). This was the first time the Inter-American Court on Human Rights looked into a case of structural, gender-based violence against women, i.e. the type of violence defined in Article 1 in CBDP. In its final ruling, the court stated that the three victims’ murders were “gender-based,” namely they are consistent with “feminicidio” and are part of a larger context of violence against women in Ciudad Juárez (1).

Rita Segato (2016) suggests the term “geno-femicide” [*femigenocidio*] for systematic and impersonal crimes on women (and feminized men) with the sole objective of destroying them because they are women. Instead, she suggests using the term *feminicidio* to describe all misogynistic crimes against women without personalizing or individualizing the motive of the perpetrator, or the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator. Some Latin American countries have already passed on corresponding legislation: Costa Rica introduced legislation on *feminicidio* in 2007 (*ley de penalización de la violencia contra las mujeres*), followed by the Decreto 22–2008 on *feminicidio* in Guatemala in 2008, and in Perú (*Ley no. 29819*) in 2013, while laws on *femicidio* have been introduced in Chile in 2010 and in Argentina in 2012. However, the legal terms concerning *feminicidio* are mostly blurry and remain unclear as to what *femicidio* includes or whether *feminicidio* is addressed as well, and investigation on scientific grounds and technical techniques in the handling of evidence are generally often still lacking when cases of *feminicidio* are investigated.

Final discussion. The maps of gender in feminist praxis

Colonization was no uniform process in the Americas, but it has always structurally marked gender identities, gender relations, gender hierarchies, and gendered inequalities in the Americas, particularly in populations classified as non-Western and thus nonhuman (indigenous and Afro-descendants). In ways that endure, the violence of the colonizing processes marked feminized bodies (and bodies gendered as “other”) (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7): structural sexual abuse and rape were recorded in the oral narratives of women (Bidaseca 2018). Intersectional approaches stemming from African American feminist activism and interventions, postcolonial and decolonial feminisms seek to address these “interlocking axes of oppression” (Combahee River collective 1981), like sexism, racism, coloniality, etc., in formerly colonized spaces and transnational contexts that produce persistent inequalities and

colonial gender positions until today as well as pursue ways to overcome these structures (→ Postcolonialism, I/38). Simultaneously, women throughout the Americas have been resisting their oppression, gender violence, and inequalities from the outset (see Federici 2004; Shepherd et al. 1995). Feminist interventions have contributed immensely to more equal rights, a greater awareness of gender violence and inequalities, as well as the diversification of possible gender norms, positions, roles, and identities. Still today, some of the most promising feminist theorizing and activism can be found in the Americas as the late movements such as “¡Ni una menos!” and the “Women’s Marches” indicate.

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29

HEALTH

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There is no universally accepted definition of health. The preamble of the Constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO) defined health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, not merely the absence of disease and infirmity.” This attempt to depart from previous definitions that focused on biomedical concepts and equated health to the absence of disease was perceived as innovative, but it was also heavily criticized for being idealistic, excessively broad, unmeasurable, and outside the control of the health sector. In fact, even today, most health indicators measure the presence of disease or biological risk factors for disease. Nevertheless, it is broadly accepted that health and well-being are dynamic processes that result from the interaction of the individual with their physical and social environments, and public health policies should not uniquely focus on restoring ill-health but also on improving the social and environmental conditions in which people live.

Key factors that affect people’s health include: genetics, income and social status, education (→ I/24), built environment, occupational and environmental exposures, social support systems, level of inequity (→ Social Inequality, II/20), personal behavior (nutrition and physical activity) and coping skills, culture, and access to health care services.

American context and socio-determinants of health

The American continent is highly urbanized (75 percent of the population resides in urban areas) and inequitable, across and within countries. The United States of America (USA) is the largest world economy, with a 2017 per capita income of US\$52,000, while at the other end of the spectrum, Haiti has a per capita income of about US\$800. Several Latin American countries have long been counted among the most inequitable in the world, but the USA and Canada were thought of as the land of opportunity. These broad tendencies have changed during the last decades. Many Latin American countries have significantly invested in decreasing socioeconomic inequities and improving the socio-determinants of health, while in the USA, income inequalities have sharply widened. Despite these changes, excluding Canada and Cuba, most countries remain highly inequitable. Canada’s Gini coefficient is in the low 30s; the Gini coefficients in most Latin American countries remain in the upper 40s and low 50s; and it is in the low 40s in the USA, Argentina, and Uruguay.

American governments have contrasting views of their role in fostering the highest attainable level of health for their citizens. While most Latin American countries and Canada have ratified international conventions that assign the responsibility for the progressive implementation of the right to health to the states (→ Human Rights, II/35), in the U.S., the attainment of health is largely a personal responsibility and access to health care is mediated by the rules of the market and the individuals' ability to pay, combined with a patchwork of entitlements and subsidized programs for the indigent, elderly, and the armed forces. Cuba stands out as a country committed to enhancing the health status of its population and across borders.

Health indicators

The average life expectancy is seventy-five years, ranging from sixty-three years in Haiti to 81.6 years in Canada. The infant mortality rate for the region is 18.6 per 1,000 live births (range: 4.2 in Cuba to 23.7 in the Dominican Republic). Canada has the lowest maternal mortality ratio at 7.3 per 100,000 live births followed by the USA at 26.4; Costa Rica has the lowest in Latin America at 29.3 deaths per 100,000 live births and the Dominican Republic the highest at 119 (PAHO 2009). Although most Latin American countries have made substantial progress at reducing inequalities in reproductive, maternal, and child health and nutrition, the inequities along socioeconomic strata, especially for the lowest income quintile persist (Restrepo-Méndez et al. 2015), with indigenous groups and those of Afro-American descent being at the bottom of the continuum. People in the lowest income deciles exhibit health indicators typical of a developing country (in terms of reproductive and child health, and the presence of infectious and parasitic diseases). All socioeconomic strata are also suffering from chronic diseases and other health problems that are exacerbated by rapid urbanization (→ I/45), environmental contamination (→ Environmental Justice, II/8), and detrimental changes in nutrition and lifestyle.

Violence is being recognized as a major health problem, with twenty-two countries having above the average rate of homicides per 100,000 persons in the world, and only six below average, including Chile, Cuba, Canada, Costa Rica, USA, and Suriname. Researchers and health analysts have often noted the need for the region to focus more attention on environmental and occupational health issues, injuries, and traffic accidents, and other socio-determinants of health.

The health care systems and their financing mechanisms

Access to health care is considered a right in most Latin American countries (Cubillos et al. 2012). Chile was the first to have a National Health System in the mid-1950s; Cuba developed its comprehensive health care system after the 1959 revolution, and the Medical Care Act was approved in Canada in 1966.

In all other countries, except the USA, the health care systems aim at providing universal coverage but have developed in a segmented fashion. Residents with jobs in the formal economy are covered by social security systems financed through contributions from the employer and the employee, and are often subsidized by the government. In some countries, like Argentina and Mexico, each sector of the economy has a separate social security fund (for example, one for public employees, another for the employees of the gas and oil industry, etc.). The indigent and those in the informal economy receive services through a public network of government-financed clinics and hospitals (→ Informality, II/13). The most affluent groups can

buy supplementary health insurance in the private sector, but it is not a popular option, covering only about 5 percent of the population, the exception being Chile that at the turn of the century had about 25 percent of the population privately insured. The quality of care varies widely, and the best services tend to be offered in the public hospitals located in major municipalities.

In the mid-1970s, Costa Rica consolidated all governmental health services under the *Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social* (CCSS), and the government committed to cover the premiums for the indigent and unemployed. The CCSS covers a broad array of services, including transplants, and all pharmaceuticals included in its comprehensive and needs-based formulary. To this date, it is the most equitable and efficient health care system in Latin America, and the services tend to be of very good quality. Chile was the first country to undergo a neoliberal health reform at the beginning of the 1970s (→ Neoliberalism, II/16), under Pinochet's dictatorship (→ Authoritarianism, II/25). Since then, and despite the efforts of democratically elected governments, access to health care in Chile has remained fragmented along socio-economic levels, with the young and affluent receiving health care through private insurance companies, known as the *Instituciones de Salud Previsional* (ISAPREs), which are the equivalent of Health Maintenance Organizations in the USA, and the rest through different programs managed and partially financed by the government. In Brazil, after the demise of the dictatorship in 1985, the joint effort of the new government and thriving social movements (→ I/41) resulted in the integration of all governmental and not-for-profit health providers under a Unified System of Care (the SUS) in 1988. The SUS offers universal coverage and it is free to everyone, including the pharmaceuticals dispensed in public pharmacies. Brazil's response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic during the late 1990s relied on local production of antiretrovirals. In building strong networks among health care providers, civil society (→ II/28), and public laboratories and governmental institutions, Brazil received worldwide recognition. More recently, Cuban health professionals have been deployed in Brazil to serve disperse rural areas, which tend to be underserved.

The health care system in the USA is based on people's ability to pay. U.S. residents, often through the employer, purchase a private insurance policy; and the cost and type of policy determine the services to be covered. Choosing among the multiple available policies is no easy task and it is often done by the employer. Private providers and hospital chains tend to locate in lucrative urban centers to the detriment of the rural and poor urban areas. A fact that is often overlooked is that about half of the health care expenditures are public, through a combination of prepaid entitlements (Medicare for the disabled and the elderly), and tax-based (→ Taxation, II/22) systems for the indigent (Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program or CHIP) and the armed forces. Despite being the country with the highest per capita health expenditure in the world, in 2010, 18.4 percent of the population remained uninsured. The Presidency of Barack Obama embarked on a major effort to increase health care coverage and reduce waste in the health sector. After a protracted and difficult negotiation, The Affordable Health Care Act (known as ACA or Obamacare) was signed in March 2010, and it has been credited with reducing the number of uninsured to about 10.9 percent of the population by 2016. Despite its accomplishments, President Trump and the Republican majority of the USA Congress are threatening to repeal Obamacare, and although to this date (January 2018) they have failed to do so, they are choking its financing. The future of the health care system in the USA remains uncertain. In the meantime, people continue to enroll in Obamacare, health professionals and insurance companies are becoming impatient and resent the uncertainty with the future of the program, and the uninsured, if poor, can be treated in Federally Qualified Health Centers at significantly more affordable prices than in the private sector; however, their access to specialty and hospital care is severely limited.

Similarly, about half of health expenditures in Latin America are private. Long waiting times, lack of clinical supplies and pharmaceuticals, and gross inefficiencies in the public sector have led people to use a wide range of privately provided ambulatory services. Out-of-pocket payments represent the highest percentage of health care financing for most countries in the hemisphere (PAHO 2012), with the notable exceptions of Cuba and Canada.

Total health care expenditures also vary widely in the region, in absolute and relative terms. In the 2010s, the USA is spending over US\$8,000 per capita, Canada about US\$4,500, and around US\$1,000 in Latin America, representing about 17 percent, 11 percent, and 6–8 percent of the countries' GDP, respectively.

The 1980s and the role of international institutions

The economic crisis of the 1980s (→ Crisis, II/4) resulted in many Latin American governments having to rely on external financing to pay the external debt and maintain basic public services. In exchange for bailing them out, the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund imposed fiscal and policy conditions, affording the WB and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) the opportunity to shape health policies in the region and de facto replacing the technical role and influence of the Pan American Health Organization. In 1987, the WB recommended the expansion of private financing for health (World Bank 1987), and in its Development Report of 1993 *Investing in Health* laid out the neoliberal health reform. According to the Report, the role of governments should be limited to regulating the sector and financing the services for the indigent and uninsured; the private sector should increase its role in financing and delivering health services. The services covered by each private health plan would depend on the premiums and the conditions determined by the plan administrators, and the indigent and uninsured would have access to a basic package of services, to be determined using cost-effectiveness studies and the governments' ability to pay.

This neoliberal health reform was subsequently promoted by the WB and IDB throughout the region, and was poorly received by most governments, unions, and professional associations for being a radical departure from their historical and constitutional commitment to universal health care access, not being evidence-based, being poorly aligned with their infrastructure and human resources, and with the countries' existing legal, technical, and managerial capacities. Health experts have criticized the neoliberal health reform for not being evidence-based, serving the interest of private providers and health insurance companies, many of them foreign owned. The neoliberal reform has also been criticized for transforming the structure of health care systems aimed at equal and universal access into segmented systems where access depends on affordability, as in the USA.

The neoliberal health reforms

Although the USA health care system is the most expensive in the world, by a large margin, and its underperformance in terms of equity, efficiency, and quality has been documented and is widely acknowledged, the global tendency is to expand the USA health care model to the rest of the world. In the Americas, the vehicles for its expansion have been the loans provided by bilateral and multilateral donors, and the Trade Agreements under the influence of global health corporations (→ Transnational Corporations, II/23). Cuba and to a certain extent Canada have escaped these international pressures.

While during the 1990s, the implementation of the neoliberal reform faced fierce opposition in Bolivia, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, or lukewarm in the Dominican Republic,

especially through the mobilization of unions and professional associations (→ Labor Representation, II/14), it would be incorrect to say that the neoliberal health reform was imposed in Chile, Colombia, or Mexico. As mentioned, the Chilean reform was led by General Pinochet. In the case of Colombia, Juan Luis Londoño, a Harvard graduate with a PhD in Economics, who in 1993 was the Minister of Health and the Deputy Chief of the National Planning Department, asked the WB to help him implement the neoliberal reform in Colombia. Similarly, Julio Frenk, a Mexican physician with a PhD in medical care organization and sociology from the University of Michigan, collaborated with the WB when he was at the Mexican Health Foundation in the mid-1990s and was able to implement the health reform in Mexico in 2004, when he became the Minister of Health. Londoño and Frenk (1997) wrote a seminal article explaining the neoliberal reform. These two Latin American leaders were able to exert considerable influence in the region through their work as consultants and as employees of the WB, the IDB, Frenk's position as the executive director of evidence and information for policy at WHO, and their roles in the editorial boards of major journals, as well as their strong linkages with other international institutions and foundations. Although the Chilean, Colombian, and Mexican reforms follow the same neoliberal principles, they are all slightly different.

The first country to engage in a neoliberal reform in Latin America was Chile in the early 1970s, when general Pinochet requested the assistance of neoliberal Chicago economists to undo the reforms that had been promoted by Allende's socialist government. The Chilean reform consisted in allowing employers and employees to purchase a health care coverage in the private sector (ISAPREs) instead of contributing to the national health system. Only those without existing health problems and high salaries were able to afford the private premiums; therefore, the government remained responsible for more than three-fourths of the population but lost a significant portion of its funding. The Chilean experience has been well-documented and some of its major flaws (the fragmentation of the Chilean Health system along socioeconomic strata) were addressed, albeit with little success.

The Colombian neoliberal health reform was the second Latin American country to fully embrace the neoliberal model. The architects of the Colombian reform tried to address the wide inequities caused by the Chilean reform by establishing cross-subsidies from the premiums paid to the privately financed system (contributory system) to the public network (subsidized system). With time, the packages of services offered to those enrolled in the contributory and in the subsidized regimens were supposed to be equalized. Twenty years later, despite large financial investments in the sector, the system remains highly inequitable and inefficient. At present, it is bankrupt. Recent governments, both in Chile and Colombia, have invested large amounts of time and resources trying to regulate private providers and improve equity in the provision of care, with very limited success.

Analysis of the Colombian reform documented that public health services deteriorated, including vector control and immunization programs: in part because the attention of the policy makers and health sector managers was focused on structuring and managing of the reformed medical care system; and in part because the decentralized entities did not have the expertise to operate the population-based services that traditionally had been designed, and if not implemented at least managed, by the central authorities. Thus, the subsequent Mexican health reform set a specific budget and resources for public health activities, again with limited success because the Mexican reform took place in a decentralized context, and not all decentralized states shared the interests and complied with the orientations of the federal government.

The implementation of the Mexican health reform has been convoluted and has only affected the services provided by the Ministry of Health, meaning those services for the uninsured. The unions and leaders of the powerful social security institutes opposed all efforts to decentralize and privatize the provision of services they had already prepaid. However, they could not stall the privatization (→ II/17) of their pension plans, and their power and influence have been severely weakened. In addition, the government approved and implemented fiscal reforms that resulted in increasing the budget of the Ministry of Health while defunding the social security institutes, paving the way toward privatizing medical care for those with ability to purchase insurance.

The Mexican health reform has been touted as highly successful in high-impact journals and media channels, but most authors are close collaborators of the main architects of the reform. The few independent assessments agree that, as in the case of Colombia, more people carry an insurance card and feel entitled to services but assert that the efficiency of the system has suffered, the already high administrative costs have skyrocketed, and improvements in the quality of the services have not been independently evaluated (Yepes et al. 2010). The question to be answered is if the enormous increment in health care expenditures can be justified by the increase in the access to services of questionable quality. Moreover, each state has implemented the reform differently. It is important to determine how much of the additional funding is allocated to administrative costs and evaluate if the reformed model is the best path toward achieving equitable and efficient universal coverage (Homedes and Ugalde 2009).

The trade agreements include provisions that further seal the neoliberal health reform model. The General Agreement on Trade and Services opens the door for the establishment of insurance companies and health care businesses across borders (Sanchez Torres and Kiss 2012). Those are crucial steps in the privatization of health services because, as mentioned earlier, most countries of the region did not have a private health sector able to manage and implement the services that the public sector would cease to provide. Some researchers have described how private insurers and providers from the USA and Europe have been penetrating the Latin American countries (Iriart et al. 2001).

Access to pharmaceuticals

People have great faith in pharmaceutical remedies. Self-medication with traditional medicines or with pharmaceuticals is very common, but less frequent in the USA, Canada, and Cuba where pharmacies are heavily regulated. While responsible self-medication does not pose any significant health threats, many Latin Americans rely on the advice of pharmacy clerks, who often are not required and do not have any pharmaceutical training, but unaware customers follow their recommendations and waste their limited resources in inappropriate treatments that might have detrimental effects.

Except in the USA and Canada, patients can avail themselves of needed pharmaceuticals in the public pharmacies located within the public health centers and hospitals. However, the comprehensiveness of the public formularies varies widely, and while in Costa Rica it is very broad, in other countries it is limited to a few hundred products. Most medicines, when available, are dispensed for free but there are frequent stock-outs, and as a result, about 70 percent of the pharmaceutical expenditure is out of pocket. During the 1980s and 1990s, several countries established user fees and co-payments and the proceeds were used to buy necessary supplies and pharmaceuticals.

Except for Cuba, Latin American patients and patient associations, presumably supported by the pharmaceutical industry, have used the Constitutional right to health that has been embraced by most countries to sue governments and gain access to very expensive pharmaceuticals that are not included in the formularies of the public sector. In most cases, the judges have ruled in favor of the patients, regardless of the therapeutic value of the medicine requested, resulting in a few patients consuming a sizeable proportion of the pharmaceutical budget at the expense of many who suffer from other, often less costly, ailments.

More recently, a few Latin American countries have overlooked the establishment of physician's offices in pharmacies or next to them. This model is attractive to many because the cost of the medical services is very low, a few dollars, there is no waiting time, and people tend to leave the premises with several medicines on hand. Its impact on the appropriate use of medicines deserves to be studied. It has been reported that the physicians operating in these pharmacies must prescribe several medicines per visit, regardless of need, therefore contributing to overmedicalization, waste of limited resources, and iatrogenia.

In an increasing number of Latin American countries, chain pharmacies are replacing the traditional individually owned pharmacies. Pharmacy chains are often located in high-income neighborhoods and downtown areas, creating an access problem for the millions who live in the sprawling low-income barrios, callampas, and favelas (→ Urbanization, I/45). The ongoing consolidation of pharmacy chains results in oligopolies, large international corporations with presence in several countries, and price collusion. For example, three chains control the market in Chile, and it is difficult to foresee if the fines imposed for price fixing will have an impact on their behavior. To counterbalance the behavior of Chilean pharmacies, the mayors of an increasing number of municipalities are establishing public pharmacies, where they can sell medicines at affordable prices.

The Canadian health care system does not cover the cost of pharmaceuticals. Residents in some Canadian provinces can purchase insurance to cover the cost of pharmaceuticals, and recently the government of Ontario has promised free medicines for all residents under twenty-five years of age.

Pharmaceutical prices, in absolute terms, are the highest in the USA than anywhere else in the world. The government of the USA is forbidden by law from regulating pharmaceutical prices, except when used by the army and its veterans. As a result, the industries establish the prices they want. The government subsidizes the price for pharmaceuticals for the indigent. Residents covered by private insurance or Medicare (the insurance for the elderly) have to cover the cost of co-payments and deductibles. These deductibles and co-payments are established by the insurance companies and pharmaceutical benefit managers, through secretive and convoluted negotiations, that include rebates and bonuses. As a result, nobody knows the actual price of prescription pharmaceuticals, and people with the same health problem could be paying drastically different amounts. The need to control the skyrocketing prices is broadly recognized, but the government, which has been captured by large campaign contributions, is reluctant to adopt any policy that might constraint the margin of benefits of the health industry.

Obtaining health services across borders

The Cuban government's commitment to enhancing health expands beyond its borders. Cuba plays a key role in the health of the region by: (1) lending physicians to other countries with limited resources, or to work in certain geographical areas where local health professionals are unwilling to serve (rural areas and poor urban neighborhoods); and (2) providing

specialized care to residents from other countries, which some have labeled medical tourism (Huish and Kirk 2007). These services are offered at government's expense if patients are indigent or for a reasonable price if they can pay.

Except in the case of Chile, Canada, USA, and maybe Colombia, the public sector does not know the unitary price of the services it provides, and health establishments are not equipped to bill for services. As a result, foreigners might be able to freely use public facilities, especially those who reside close to the international borders (→ *Borderlands*, II/26). Brazil provides free services to residents from its neighboring countries, Bolivia and Paraguay, through the SUS. The flow of patients is fluid between Canada and the USA. It has been reported that some USA border patients who do not have access to needed services relocate to Canada to take advantage of their universal health system, which is free at the point of service, except for pharmaceuticals. Some Canadians travel to the USA to avoid waiting lines or for services not covered by the public system. It is well-documented that U.S. residents travel to Mexico and Canada to obtain cheaper medicines and health services.

The most contentious international border is the U.S.–Mexico border, which houses about twelve million people, most of them of Mexican origin, in thirteen pairs of sister cities. Residents on the southern border of the USA tend to be poorer than the average and about 20–30 percent of them are uninsured. It has been documented that about one in four or five U.S. residents crosses the border every year to receive health care in Mexico. Most of them visit private providers and pay out of pocket, but a few use public facilities and even the Social Security infrastructure. Mexican residents travel to the USA to deliver babies and to access specialized care. Most of these patients are affluent and either have health insurance coverage or pay out of pocket; the few that are not able to pay have to wait until their condition becomes urgent to be admitted through a hospital emergency room. Contrary to what is often portrayed in the media, the amount of free care provided to ineligible residents from Mexico or other countries is negligent. In fact, researchers have documented that Mexico is a safety net for the USA poor and uninsured, not the other way around. More recently, private entrepreneurs are building infrastructure in Northern Mexico and in a few major Mexican cities to attract USA medical tourists.

Discussion

Even though access to health care has been a recognized objective of all health systems in the Americas, except in the USA, the neoliberal health reforms and trade agreements are facilitating the transformation of all health systems toward a model that enables the establishment of private insurance companies and private health care providers (→ *Neoliberalism*, II/16, *Privatization*, II/17). In addition to Cuba, some countries, including Costa Rica and Canada, have been able to wade through the tendency and have maintained a strong public sector. El Salvador, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela are striving to strengthen the presence of their public health sector. Chile has made strides to improve equity by increasing the number of services that have to be offered to all Chileans; and Mexico, Peru, and the Dominican Republic appear to be deepening their neoliberal health reform. The new Argentinian government espouses strong neoliberal tendencies. While it has discontinued a very successful program that delivered free medicines to 5,000 public pharmacies, the additional changes that it might introduce in the health care delivery system are not yet known.

Although most Latin American countries aim at providing universal coverage, the fluctuations in the economy might interfere with their intentions. The role that pharmacies are playing in fostering health and the appropriate use of medicines deserves to be further

studied. Similarly, Latin American countries that have embraced the Constitutional Right to Health will have to seek strategies to fulfill citizens' rights to health allocating the limited public resources in an equitable manner (→ Citizenship, II/27; Human Rights, II/35).

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HYBRIDITY, MESTIZAJE, CRÉOLITÉ

Afef Benessaïeh

Defining cultural identity is a perilous task. Social theorist Stuart Hall equates it with representations, or the way people express some common understandings about who they are and how they are distinct from others – the concept of culture viewed anthropologically as a people’s distinct “way of life” (Hall 1997, 2). Already a most difficult concept, cultural identity opacifies with further layers when used in social contexts marked by heightened diversity and mixedness: the boundaries between “who they are” and “their distinctiveness from others” becoming quite delicate to draw. In this, “New World societies” richly illustrate the dynamics and contradictions to such contexts, while their literary and scientific production about cultural identity is abundant and long-established. Indeed, in the Americas and the Caribbean at large, words for expressing diversity and mixedness proliferate in nuance and number: called hybridity in the Anglophone Caribbean, *mestizaje*, fusion, or transculturation in Spanish and Portuguese postcolonial locations, or *créolité* and creolization in most Francophone Antilles, all terms unequivocally asserting a sense of cultural singularity formed through diversity.

For the newcomer to the region, the terms hybridity, *mestizaje*, and *créolité* are more or less equivalent notions. Yet, on daily grounds, these terms are instead often questioned, opposed, and at times resisted by the very people they seek to name or define. The literatures hosting them do not usually speak to one another, as they spend most of their time in sophisticated internal debates about the soundness of calling mixedness in such or other ways, bringing greater confusion to the nonspecialist. Hence, what follows through this entry is an attempt to clarify, distinguish, and critically historicize each of these concepts in the realm of Inter-American and Caribbean studies. Such comparative genealogy of concepts will allow contextualizing the current state of scholar and literary reflections about the continuing resilience of mixedness for understanding cultural identities in the Americas at large – with a particular emphasis on Caribbean perspectives, where all three concepts are of daily common use. The following starts with discussing the more general notion of hybridity, which helps positioning that of *mestizaje*, grounded in post-independent Latin American contexts, while paving the way for problematizing the more geographically limited concept of *créolité*.

Hybridity: living in an interstitial space?

Since a few decades now, Literary, Cultural, and Postcolonial studies alike have largely adopted the notion of hybridity to express a sense of cultural identity that is not viewed as fixed, bounded, and neatly othered (→ Postcolonialism, I/38). Authoritatively cited in this literature, the work of Edward Said on *Orientalism* (published in 1978) as the ways in which the Middle East has come to be represented as a distant, dangerous yet sensual place filled with irrational people, did not exactly deal with hybridity – the term not being mentioned even once in Said's original work. However, it opened a productive background for critically appraising the many ways in which people from non-Western locations are culturally labeled in an otherness largely imagined, with the procedure being politically useful for legitimating colonial or imperialist endeavors.

This is where scholars such as Homi Bhabha, Stuart Hall, or Paul Gilroy have thereafter fruitfully proposed to define hybridity as a key concept adequately capturing cultures and cultural identity. Furthering Said's steps, Bhabha, for instance, offered to problematize colonial representation by questioning the very idea that the colonized is different. Such difference is produced as a "sign of authority" (1994, 114); it is indeed the colonizer who names and defines it, because doing so reaffirms its own cultural identity predominance. Neat cultural differentiation is hence a strategy for furthering colonial authority; for Bhabha, culture is the battlefield to be reinvested. He thus proposes to locate culture and cultural identity in a moving *interstitial space* or *third-space*. Hybridity is thus the "sign of the productivity of colonial power, its shifting forces and fixities; it is the name for the strategic reversal of the process of domination through disavowal." (112) In this sense for Bhabha hybridity is the "production of discriminatory identities that secure the 'pure' and original identity of authority" (112) (→ Colonial Rule, I/5).

By claiming blurriness or resisting stereotypical attributions of alleged otherness (his as well as the colonizer's), the hybrid subject redefines itself in a space of action allowing for more fluid figures, including partial, ambivalent, identifications to the colonizer's own sense of cultural identity. In sum, in Bhabha's view, there can be no sharp differentiation between cultures, "neither 'one' nor 'other'" he claims (127), proposing instead to consider a grayish third-space where cultural identities are to be understood as entangled, and where subjects are deemed fully capable to stand for defining themselves.

The Americas have experienced particular kinds of colonialism involving the enslavement of at least twelve million Africans taken from countless locations (→ Slavery, I/18), and the creation of plantation-based, intensely color-segregated, coercive societies (→ Colonial Economies, I/4). In explicit reference to cultural identities in the Americas and in diasporic locations, the work of Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy (both of Caribbean background) stands out for its strong influence on a large scholarship dealing with the term of hybridity. In numerous pieces of writing, Hall stresses, for instance, the particularity of the Caribbean as a place foundationally infused with a diversity which has translated over time as the mixed and multiple identities' positioning often associated with the notion of hybridity.

None of the people who now occupy the islands – black, brown, white, African, European, American, Spanish, French, East Indian, Chinese, Portuguese, Jew, Dutch – originally 'belonged' there. It is the space where the creolisations and assimilations and syncretisms were negotiated.

(1994, 234)

Such lack of a common place or founding myth over origins (→ Foundational Discourses, III/8) other than in a shared memory of dislocation and violence into white patrons' hands

led these societies to build cultural identities through their inner diversity, and cultural identities which have been made of continuous adaptations, confrontations, and changes.

Echoing Hall's views, Paul Gilroy (1993) has similarly questioned ideas about Black cultural identities throughout the Americas as sharing some "ethnic essence" (→ Ethnicity, I/25) or forming a joint totality of their own. He speaks instead of the "Black Atlantic" as a vast transnational "culture area" connecting the Americas to Africa, yet an area marked by rupture, dispersal, and a cultural mutability fused with an "inescapable hybridity" that was literally born within the slave ships (quoting the work of historian Markus Rediker, Gilroy 1993, xi) (→ Atlantic, I/3). By this, Gilroy essentially meant to disagree with "Afrocentrist" views persistently attempting to claim for the inner difference of black Americans, and the retention of core African traditions or ways of living in the Americas (a thesis established by a leading anthropologist Melville Herskovits since the 1940s). For Gilroy, such views are unlikely to hold, given the "instability and mutability of identities which are always unfinished, always being made" (1993, xi). The *Black Atlantic* is essentially in that sense a literary pamphlet against the discourses of racial and cultural purist authenticities.

Hall and Gilroy add to Bhabha's reflections on hybridity a location-specific positioning. While for the latter this is a notion of global significance, whereas all cultural identities can be viewed as hybrid, for the former, the case can be further specified. They suggest that Afro-Caribbeans and Afro-Americans (in the continental sense) are particularly concerned with it. Although debated by some, while consensually considered by many, the slaves from which these populations originate were drifted from many places in the African continent, and they never formed a homogeneous group sharing a common language, belief, or way of life (slave ships and plantations heightened diversity; see the work by Mintz and Price 1992). Hence, since the very start of their forced passage within slave ships, their dispersal in plantations pitting together human lots individually rooted out from their respective native place of provenience, African slaves and their descendants have been drawn to invent ways of relating to one another, and construct a world of shared meanings from pieces.

Discussing the notion of hybridity in an Inter-American perspective must, of course, include reference to Latin American cultural theorist Néstor García Canclini. In *Culturas Híbridas* (1989, followed by *La Globalización Imaginada* in 1999), Canclini importantly questions the location of Latin America in the globalizing world. For him, this is a region that is simultaneously modern and vividly lacking modernization (→ I/35), where traditions, folklores, and religiously inspired crafts constantly combine with the utmost industrial and technology-driven, in a baroque mixture fusing together multiple referents from indigenist, colonial, catholic, and hypermodern sources (→ Indigeneity, I/31; Religious Beliefs, I/40). Latin America, in that sense, lives in several entangled temporalities at the same time. This is where Canclini argues for the use of the notions of hybridity and hybridization processes as particularly fit terms for understanding the Americas as a "complex articulation of modernities and traditions," and a "heterogeneous continent formed with countries each experiencing multiple development logics" [translation by the author] (1989, 23) (→ Development, II/6). Canclini centrally suggests to substitute the terms of syncretism and mestizaje (popular in the literature) with hybridity,

I prefer the latter because it designates diverse intercultural mixtures, not only racial ones like 'mestizaje', and because it allows including modern forms of hybridization in better ways than 'syncretism', a formula almost always referring to religious fusions or traditional symbolic movements.

[translation by the author] (1989, 14–15)

Here, Canclini importantly contributes to thinking hybridity in tangible, everyday life terms, through a particular emphasis on “mass culture,” and while using narratives from common people conversations, with current popular cultural productions to express the ways in which Latin American imaginaries are entangled in mixed temporalities.

Although by now it is firmly established in academia, the notion of hybridity is the target of numerous critiques, among which are by Neil Lazarus, Benita Parry, Jonathan Friedman, Arif Dirlik, or Ella Shohat. In particular, Jan N. Pieterse offers a magisterial synthesis of such “anti-hybridity backlash” (2001). He states three core arguments worth signaling. The first points to the idea that while the notion seeks to come to terms with viewing the social and cultural world in binary perspectives, it paradoxically fails to its own project. Indeed, one may have difficulty understanding hybridity without contrasting it to its opposite, the notion of purity. Critiques have therefore argued that since the latter barely exists, hence the former becomes insignificant, for all social and cultural facts are indeed hybrid, and which renders the notion too vague to be of any utility. A second line of counterarguments raises the idea that the notion of hybridity has rapidly established itself as a new elitist hegemonic discourse prevailing in First-World Anglo-Saxon universities, and which prioritizes individual agency over (unresolved) structural issues of power inequalities and cleavages. And a third attack on hybridity, coming from anti-Cosmopolitan scholarship (exemplified with the work of sociologist Anthony D. Smith on the persistence of ethno-nationalisms and local rootedness, see Smith 2009) (→ Cosmopolitanism, III/5), claims to the *naïveté* of viewing the world under hybrid-prone eyes. For all three lines of critiques, hybridity is argued trivial, and an often depoliticized celebration of multiculturalism (→ I/36) under neoliberal times (→ Neoliberalism, II/16). Yet, and beyond those critiques, perhaps the strongest argument against the utility of such notion is a much simpler one: outside of academia or arts and literature conversations, people rarely spontaneously name themselves “hybrids” other than ironically, the term remaining for most technically associated with animal, vegetal, and industrial man-made experiments.

Mestizaje: renaming reality with words of one’s own

Indeed, in Latin America and the Caribbean at large, the notion of hybridity is rarely used among people and scholars alike, unless they refer to the work of some of the leading academics in cultural studies as previously seen. In lieu, “mestizaje” – which can be generally translated as ethnic and more largely cultural “mixedness” between European, Indigenous, and African stocks in the hemispheric context – is much more in use, and it has been the case for quite some time.

Until rather recently, miscegenation tended to be viewed in the Latin America of the 18th to late 19th centuries as a degenerative problem which was willingly dealt with through the implementation of “whitening” policies (*blanqueamiento*) (→ Whiteness, I/46), via state-led selective immigration and legal policies sanctioning interracial relations (→ Migration, I/15; Interethnic relations, I/12). In that era, scientific racism and social Darwinism provided the international intellectual and political contexts (→ Race, I/39), where mixed races, particularly among non-European populations, were generally held as the least desirable types. In the following, *A Journey in Brazil* by Harvard zoologist Louis Agassiz in its 9th edition in 1879 – a clear indication of the book’s scholarly success in its time – illustrates well some of the prevailing theories of the era. Describing Brazilian society, Agassiz writes about “a class of men in which pure type fades away as completely as do all the good qualities, physical and moral, of the primitive races, engendering a mongrel crowd as repulsive as the mongrel dogs” (Agassiz and Agassiz 1879, 298).

The aforementioned excerpt, stridently contrasting notions of “purity,” and “good qualities” to those of “mongrelness,” “repulsion,” and “primitiveness,” illustrates some of the premises of scientific racism, which came to be highly influential in Europe and beyond throughout the 19th century and up to the World War II, where it suited most evidently fascist perspectives on white superiority. It expresses a view that was used to argue for the classification of human races into (darker) inferior and (lighter) superior ones, echoing the extremely influential literary writings of the French diplomat Arthur de Gobineau on the matter (in *Essay on the Inequality of Human Races*, originally published in 1851–1853). Gobineau’s main thesis was that interracial mixings have weakened the white Aryan race and brought Europe to its knees. In short, and for all European ills, mixedness was to blame. He writes, “In all its branches, humanity experiences a *secret repulsion* for any crossings,” or better, speaking about interethnic mixtures as providing a “frightening spectacle of *ethnic anarchy*” (1967, 62 and 158, my translation from French and added emphasis).

As illustrated with the writings of Agassiz or Gobineau (both have lived in Southern America), scientific racism allowed and pseudo-scientifically justified the expression of highly negative discourses about racial and cultural diversities. However, in Latin America, and in spite of the popularity of these views among light-skinned ruling elites, these perspectives did not at all fit the overwhelming reality of its population, in its large majority mixed and darker-skinned.

This is where several leading intellectuals, artists, and scholars from the hemisphere have proposed major shifts in perspective. Starting around the second half of the 19th century with a major peak throughout the 1910s–1920s, ideas about viewing the Americas as a singular place, fundamentally mixed, have progressively made their way and resonated in influence. In particular, the work and legacy of Mexican anthropologist Manuel Gamio, with Brazilian social essayist Gilberto Freyre, are important to mention. With them, scientific racism and racial classifications along evolutionary lines were largely discredited. Instead, the idea of mestizaje gained an unprecedented popular legitimacy and state approval throughout the Americas. Interestingly enough, both Freyre and Gamio were trained under Franz Boas’ mentoring, at the very first anthropology department established in the United States at the beginning of the 20th century. From Boas, they both retained a similar understanding of the “culture concept” as having little to do with evolutionary logics or racial attributes. Indeed, with and after Boas, anthropology began viewing human cultures as context-specific and highly dynamic “complex wholes” to be understood on their own terms (and not along some universal scale ranging from the primitive to the modern, as others influentially argued). In addition, Boas actively resisted the idea that racial purity was existent, or even desirable, a perspective which contributed to shifting the gaze toward the plural and mixed people constituting most of the Americas and the Caribbean. In the 1920s indeed, a major rupture with scientific racism was thus ignited with Boasianism in the United States, with his many mentorees spreading their own work across the Americas (Boas 1915; 1928; Benessaieh 2016).

Manuel Gamio (1883–1960) is particularly renowned as one influential anthropologist who raised indigenism to the rank of official policy (→ Indigeneity, I/31), in an era of strong postrevolutionary nationalism celebrating Mexican population’s heterogeneity. He importantly contributed to the greater use of the notion of mestizaje as the uniting symbol of Latin American nations. Indigenism was about simultaneously highlighting indigenous past splendors as national profound identity, and seeking active state interventions for bringing actual indigenous people to a modernizing country. It was a singular perspective that was used to formally oppose racism while in reality favoring the assimilation of indigenous people to the nation. Raising his voice against belittling the indigenous, Gamio writes in *Forjando Patria*, “The Indian has the same aptitudes for progress as the white, he is neither inferior nor superior”

(1916, 39). But for him, there was no question of any rights to difference or recognition; as long as they remained geographically, linguistically, and culturally isolated, the country would stay divided between a majority of indigenous “backward civilization” and a European-descending minority allegedly forming an “advanced and efficient civilization” (Gamio quoted by Brading 1988, 84), a division preventing the country from moving toward its mestizo future.

Gamio defined mestizaje as a modernizing, state-led, cultural fusion between people of European and indigenous ancestries – although significant, most African, or Asian presence in Mexico was little acknowledged by then. Reacting against the idea of “artificial, hybrid, undesirable juxtaposition,” a formula exemplifying how the notion of hybridity was generally understood in the continent by then, he describes mestizaje in the following terms as “Indians gradually adopting new manifestations of culture by appropriating them to their own nature and necessities... Fusion takes place with the wise interaction that comes with spontaneous evolution” (1916, 159). Here, Gamio suggests the need for indigenous people to integrate the values and practices of the (European-descending) population, which would lead them to fully blend (and dissolve) into the larger national fusion, claiming mixedness as a new emblematic “race” for the Americas at large.

Yet, Gamio was not alone in what would soon be called a generational *mestizofilia* wave or a rising fervor for celebrating mixedness and valorizing anew the indigenous roots of the nation; he was just one among its most academically established voices. He was in fact part of a larger movement fueled by state officials and intellectuals such as Andrés Molina Enriquez (1885–1940) and José Vasconcelos (1882–1959), viewed with great interest by sociologist and U.S. commissioner of Indian affairs John Collier (1884–1968), while becoming rather dramatically echoed by leading artists in the Mexican muralist movement of the 1920s, such as Diego Riveira (1886–1957), José Clemente Orozco (1883–1949), or David Alfaro Siqueiros (1896–1974) (→ Muralism, III/37). For many, mestizofilia portrayed the country nation-building process following revolutionary years (→ Nation and State Building, I/16), with a new willing distancing from the European aesthetics still mostly preferred by ruling elites – the critical literature about mestizofilia abounds, but excellent overviews are provided by Martínez-Echazabal (1998) and Wade (2005), with Giraudo and Furio (2012) providing a sharp account of indigenismo’s Inter-American spread, including in the U.S.

In Southern America, leading intellectuals belonging to the same generation as Gamio and others, such as Oswald de Andrade (1890–1954), Arthur Ramos (1903–1949), and Gilberto Freyre (1900–1987) expressed alike views in their distancing from European standards. Freyre, in particular, counts among the most influential social essayist and government official to have durably asserted the legacy of Africans to Brazilian cultural identity. As he wrote in what is regarded as a leading manifesto on the social history of Brazil in *Casa Grande e Senzala* published in 1933 (translated as *The Masters and the Slaves*, 1946), as well as in *New World in the Tropics* (originally published in English under the title *Brazil: An Interpretation*, in 1945), racial prejudice in his home country was not as pervasive as he observed it to be in the Southern, segregated, United States. To the contrary, Freyre went arguing for the distinctiveness of Brazil’s profoundly mixed identity, “the formation of Brazil went forward without the colonizer being concerned with racial unity or racial purity” (1946, 40). For him, and because of its own only “semi-European” ancestry drafting from Phoenician, Celt, Goths, Gaul, Moorish, Roman, Jew, and Teutonic sources, the Portuguese had a superior sense of adaptation (over less adaptable Anglo-Saxons or “turbulent” Spaniards in the rest of the continent, his own terms), and he had as a result a “singular predisposition to the hybrid” while contemplating “that a brown people may be superior to a white people” (1959, 4, 56). Mestizaje, and not purity, was what exalted Freyre for Brazil.

Casa Grande, and by extension, Freyre's entire work, can be read as a celebration of the New World. Against scientific racism, Freyre viewed rather favorably ethnic mixing as a transformative dynamic through which mestizo offspring ameliorated their best parental attributes and aptitudes. He considered race not as any given attribute, but as adaptive, changeable features where the Brazilian mestizo (especially of African ancestry) was seen as an even better type emerging "more adaptable to tropical climate," "vigorous and ductile mestizo population," constituting altogether the "finest expressions of vigor and physical beauty" (1946, 18, 45, and 66). In Freyre's views, the New World offered in sum a radical alternative to European standards on culture and race, made of a fully assumed heterogeneity and mixedness and where the darker was newly argued as beautiful and superior.

As discussed earlier, mestizaje has many meanings for many people. From one perspective, it can be viewed as a well-intended strategy for redefining cultural identities, in their now assumed mixedness, and in terms fitting much better to Latin American realities. From other perspectives, it also suggests more contradictory ends, where official discourses celebrative of (lightening) mixedness were in fact invisibilizing large (darker) sectors of the society, which continued to remain mostly under-recognized. Gamio, for instance, was not exactly favorable to valorizing indigeneity (or even africanity) in the national cultural fusion he was writing about. Freyre, for his part, was largely criticized for suggesting that slavery in Brazil was more benign than elsewhere in the Americas, and for becoming one of the leading theorists of "racial democracy" – which claimed for the mere symbolic recognition of Blacks without acting much for their socioeconomic condition. Thus, for "Decolonial" scholars (such as Aníbal Quijano, Enrique Dussel, or Walter Dignolo) (→ Postcolonialism, I/38), the state-approved ideology of mestizaje was only another way of keeping power in the hands of the white creole elite. Hence and instead of reversing modes of domination founded on the belief of white European racial superiority, mestizaje mostly meant an "internal colonialism," or the continuation of racial domination under other names: the mestizo being a mix of white with any other shade of racial type, while the black, the indigenous, and the generally nonwhite continued to be viewed as underdog classes to the former.

Yet, overall, and beyond the differing political charges of mestizaje for elites and larger populations in the Americas, it is difficult to be critical of the fact that the term originally served the main purpose of disqualifying dominant, contemptuous, views which ranked populations from inferior to superior races based on their skin color. Indeed, such an intellectual project was about *renaming a reality with words of one's own*. And it was about affirming strongly, unequivocally, the singularity of Latin American cultural identities by highlighting their most fundamental heterogeneity. And that was an enormous step toward breaking with European standards and influence in the hemisphere. In the end, and if still undecided, one can consider the considerable discursive rupture between viewing the darker, mixed race as "a mongrel crowd as repulsive as the mongrel dogs" (Agassiz and Agassiz 1879, 298) or as the "finest expressions of vigor and physical beauty" (Freyre 1946, 66). Between the two rather opposed perspectives, and beyond most critiques one could possibly raise, a world of significant meanings now exists, and it arguably owes something to the "invention" of mestizaje.

Créolité: narrating people's daily lives and experiences

A third key concept sketching mixedness in the Americas, and more particularly in the post-plantationary societies of the West Indies, is *Créolité*. The term "Creole" (*Criollo* in Spanish) is generally used in the hemisphere as an equivalent for "born locally," and it applies

to people, clothing, food, spices, plants and animals, music, and ways of daily life in general. In Latin America, the *Criollo* primarily designates (nonindigenous) light-skinned locals, established in the continent for some generations (the term is in some places commonly used as synonymous to “mestizo,” i.e. local, but without any reference to the notion of *mestizaje* discussed earlier). In the Caribbean, differently, Creole has come to mean something else over time – it is first and foremost a language originally forged in the slave-based plantations (with its many linguistic variations from one island to the other), and it does not only mean native or locally born, but more importantly, ethnoculturally mixed (from European, Indian, Chinese, Javanese, Lebanese, or “Syrian” sources) with a visible African heritage. And in the Caribbean, all three terms analyzed in this entry are in daily use, by street vendors to TV headliners and intellectuals alike; hybridity in the Anglophone islands, *mestizaje* and its French translations (*métissage*, *métis*) in the Francophone and Hispanophone Caribbean, with Creole (and *criollo*) are used everywhere throughout the region. Yet and beyond most ethnic connotation, Creole is generally understood as a spirit or a way of life, and something or someone *typically Caribbean*.

This is where an influential generation of writers, artists, and intellectuals from the French Antilles have been proposed in the late 1980s to define anew their cultural identity as *Créolité* (Creoleness). The neologism willingly resonated with popular representations about being from the region, yet added to it an assertive agenda rehabilitating the use of Creole for writing and speaking in the public sphere, and valorizing anew a shared identity rooted in multiple, entangled cultural and ethnic sources, which was born in slave ships, developed in sugarcane fields and plantations, and started to ripen through the mixing with Asian and Levantine newcomers after slavery abolition (mostly between 1822 and 1886 in the region) (→ Plantation Literature, III/15).

Éloge de la créolité (*In Praise of Creoleness*, 1993, originally published in 1989) by Martinican linguist Jean Bernabé with writers Patrick Chamoiseau and Raphaël Confiant counts among the leading manifestos spearheaded by a quite larger literary and intellectual movement. The first opening line of the text defines *Créolité* in the following terms: “Neither Europeans, nor Africans, nor Asians, we proclaim ourselves Creoles” (1993, 75). The formula was simple and quite resonant, Creoleness was “the very foundation of our being” (1993, 87), and similar to Latin American *mestizofilia*, the target was to get rid of European standards for redefining one’s cultural identity. Africanness too was at gunpoint, as asserting Creoleness as the distinctive trait for Martinicans, and the slave plantation-based societies in the Caribbean (within the postcolonial world at large), became about refusing to privilege any ethnic origins above others, and again, claiming instead a deep mixedness of experiences and representations.

The Creolists established distance from the literary movement on “Negritude,” which previously aimed to rehabilitate African heritage, influentially impersonated since the 1960s with the writings of the poet, essayist, and leading political figure Aimé Césaire (with Léopold Senghor in Senegal, and up to a point, Franz Fanon, also from Martinique). *Créolité*, in sum, was ambitiously presenting itself as the current synthesis for Caribbean cultural identity, absorbing most literary movements having previously aimed for the same.

A violent and paradoxical therapy, Negritude replaced the illusion of Europe by an African illusion ... It was a necessary dialectical movement, an indispensable development. But it remains a great challenge to step out of it in order to finally build a new temporary synthesis on the open path of history, our history.

(Bernabé, Chamoiseau and Confiant 1993, 82)

Hence and beyond Negritude, which for Creolists tended to cultivate an essentialist and past-oriented perspective attached to tracking the legacy of Africa in the Americas, only substituting one intellectualized “exterior” standard with another, the Creolist argued for an “interior vision” rooted in the Caribbean’s own history and lived experience (1993, 87–88).

The Creolists fundamentally proposed to redefine plantation-based societies from the region as a highly pluralistic space of cultural relations, confrontations, and adaptations, which resulted through time with the forming of a new identity scheme made of all its ethnic and cultural components, a “mixed culture called Creole” (1993, 93).

Yet, Creoleness was not only about defining mixedness in discursive terms; Bernabé, Chamoiseau, and Confiant as well proposed an active agenda made of two central lines: one was about promoting the use of Creole as a legitimate language, in the public sphere, in the academia (a creole certification opened at Antilles University, Martinique, in 2000), and in published writings (poetry, novels, popular and children’s tales, etc.); the other was about creating a new literature genre, integrating creole oral traditions, legends, and tales in its definitely popular orientation, while depicting the daily life and personal stories of common people in rural and newly urbanizing settings alike. Thus, they proposed, “The Creole literature we are elaborating takes it as a principle that there is nothing petty, poor, useless, vulgar, or unworthy of a literary project in our world” (1993, 100), or further, “[we want] To explore our American Indian, Indian, Chinese, and Levantine origins, and find their poundings in our heartbeats” (1993, 100–101).

Needless to say, the Creolists were not alone in the reflection of naming or defining Caribbean cultural identity. In particular, the work of writer, poet, and philosopher Édouard Glissant (1928–2011) prefigured and offered a formidable alternative to them. Glissant counted among the pioneering theorists proposing creolization as a fundamental process for understanding Caribbean identities formation, as a living laboratory of the globalizing world. He as well distanced himself from the Negritude movement, which he viewed as a need among intellectuals “to refer to a common stump in order to find unity (equilibrium) beyond dispersal” [translation by the author] (1997, 37). In *Le Discours Antillais*, he defines creolization in the following often-cited terms, positively contrasting “rhizomatic” identities (or composite and co-adaptive) to “single-rooted” identities (unique and predatory):

Creolization is to put in contact several cultures or at least several elements of distinct cultures, in a place of the world, resulting in a new, totally unpredictable configuration, in relation to the sum or the mere synthesis of these elements.

[translation by the author] (1997, 37)

Glissant’s definition largely inspired Creolists, who specified it further as a process possibly resulting in a given state of being (or identity). However, Glissant never really joined the Creolists; he mostly considered that the concept of Creoleness tended to freeze the open-ending process of creolization, which was too lively, too disordered, and unforeseeable to result in anything worth defining on more stable bases.

While very influential in (mostly francophone) local and international academic and literary scenes alike, the Creolists were and still are the target of many critiques. Two important lines of objections worth careful mentioning are: one relating to Creoleness as a new folklorism, the other raising its apparent lack of notable political results. Indeed, on the one hand, Creolists were suspected of speaking to an international audience while having little connection to the real experience of the locals, which are said to have little to care about renaming under different terms their assumedly mixed cultural identities (*métissé* is the term most used in everyday life).

The Creolists were largely criticized for overemphasizing Martinican and Caribbean specificity, traditions, and idioms, which was viewed as another call for remaining caught in past splendors while mostly promoting (for foreign eyes) folkloric views about what in reality is a more indefinable cultural identity (see the critiques by Giraud 1997; Amselle 2011). Hence, and in line with Glissant, creolization (and not Creoleness) remains better understood as an open, unfinished, at times conflictual process of continuing mixedness, and not as any given identity. On the other hand, some have also raised the fact that the “Creoleness movement” (as it is called) never resulted in a clear political project for people’s lives and prospects for future, starting with real (or even simply greater) independence from France. Creoleness also did not limit daily and structural racism in Martinican society, in which lighter mixed and whites alike (such as the “Békés,” a tiny ethno-class directly descending from plantation owners) are said to continue to hold the greater fortunes and political influences. It is hence said to have been mostly constituted for merely aesthetic, culturalist discourse, without much political impact. In addition, Aimé Césaire, mayor of the island capital for more than fifty years (1956–2011) and an immense, almost sacred figure in Martinique and beyond, never explicitly joined or even backed the Creolists, which perhaps complicated further the reception of *Éloge de la créolité*, and reducing its influence to rather small cultural and academic circles (→ Political Communication, II/42). In the end, Creoleness mostly equated for many the invisibilization of the memory of slavery and African heritages, which both remain more than necessary to deepen and politically assert (→ Silencing, III/19). This second general line of critique is particularly well suggested by Guadeloupean writer Maryse Condé in her many novels and published interviews, and has mostly risen throughout the author’s fieldwork interviews in the literary and cultural scene. In the daily scene, métissage and its various declinations, instead of Creoleness which is held as evident and in no need of being named, seem to encounter much greater reception.

As a general result, and while Creoleness has raised itself as one of the most established literary and intellectual movement in Martinican institutions (and the French ex-colonies in the Caribbean and Pacific), authors and scholars from younger generations are generally cautious with keeping distance. And while acknowledging the importance of the movement, they mostly opt out for defining themselves “post-creolists,” more concerned with the urgencies of urban daily life at the margins than with more general discourses about cultural identity, and outside of what for them seems to have become a dominant, and perhaps politically inoffensive, discourse.

Beyond most critiques raised against Creoleness, one cannot ignore the fact that the movement has eventually lived up to its own expectations. From one end, its main tenants have all been consistently awarded major local and international literary prizes for their novels, which minimally testify for their success in convincing the public with considering popular culture and lives as themes of sound relevance (Goncourt Prize for Chamoiseau’s *Texaco* in 1992; twice prized Casa de la Americas for Confiant in 1993 and 2016; among other numerous prizes). From another end, they as well seem to have coincided their central project, laying in the rehabilitation of the use of creole as a legitimate language (→ I/13) in the public sphere, with a favorable political era newly allowing for young and older people to be no longer ashamed to speak creole (as it previously used to be the case). Hence, Creoleness possibly reached its own goals of questioning colonial standards in people’s mind, with positioning anew language and cultural mixedness as central and worthwhile.

Concluding remarks: resisting to be named

This chapter offered an attempt to clarify, distinguish, and critically historicize the concepts of hybridity, mestizaje, and créolité, in the realm of Inter-American and Caribbean studies. This

comparative genealogy of concepts placed a particular emphasis on the Caribbean, a region being often under-examined or of marginal importance to a number of Inter-Americanists. Yet, and because of its central location in the slave and semi-forced trade of people sent anew to continental Americas (→ Slavery, I/18; Unfree Labor, I/19; Migration, I/15), the region remains a foundational place for understanding the diversity and mixedness qualifying for most of the hemisphere. To paraphrase Mintz and Price (1992), this is a location where people made and remade a new world of shared significance from pieces and dispersal, and in the making, reconstructed themselves. In the Caribbean indeed, intermixture can difficultly be argued as elite-driven, ideological, or mere cosmopolitan delusion (→ Cosmopolitanism, III/5). It is the daily life and memory of many, and one that was at first often forced more than chosen. In that location thus, mixedness seems an almost inescapable condition. Which perhaps helps to explain why the region is so productively engaged in scientific and cultural endeavors with defining, questioning, and resisting mixedness under all possible existing terms.

Stemming from the previous pages, two core lines need to be singled out. First, all the three concepts discussed here have raised similar critiques about their alleged depoliticization, celebrative common perspective, or for smoothing down in seemingly harmonious figures what for some remain deeply divided, racialized, societies (→ Race I/39; Social Inequality, II/20). Power inequalities are in these views too prevalent for vanishing away under mixedness-prone lenses, which overemphasize lived agency while trivializing persistent structural imbalances. The hybrid, the mestizo, and the creole are argued as similarly lightened subjects obfuscating the indigenous and black (not to speak of the even more invisible Asian or Tamoul), and whose heritages remain to be more fully highlighted. Second, all three concepts are said by many to probably make sense for some theory purposes, while on the field check of “reality,” people rarely call themselves under those names. Historically speaking, and in everyday common talks, the mestizo (métis in French) and even the criollo (créole in French) were generally used to name light-skinned locals (and native plants, animals, or crafts), not at all the mixed and browner nationals. Consequently, in Latin America and the Caribbean at large, and out of cultural and academic circles, the use of these terms is often echoed with persisting reluctance.

With this in mind, concepts and theories are indeed stylized simplifications of much complicated realities. They can always be questioned for what they are not or what they do not seek to explain. This can be endless, useless, conversation, but theories can be assessed as well for what they stand for. In this last perspective, one cannot disregard the fact that the concepts discussed in the previous pages serve the main purpose of naming what is perhaps unnamable, or not to be named, for most. That is, the complexity, the heterogeneity, and the intermingling of many cultural identities which cannot be bagged under a single or definitive label. Hence, people’s resistance to being named is not necessarily a dismissal of mixedness as a fit notion, but perhaps only a paradoxical necessity to slip through any given category, and, as Glissant once suggested, claim again, and again, opacity over transparency. Thus, the never perfectly defined theories about the mixed and the diverse were and still are part of an open-ended cosmopolitan agenda about overturning exclusionary ethnic politics (→ Ethnicity, I/25), fundamentally questioning other much more strident discourses which chronically voice out the contrary.

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31

INDIGENEITY

Olaf Kaltmeier

Although rarely used by indigenous movements themselves, *indigeneity* has become a prominent concept in academic discussions on the indigenous question since the 2000s. As a social categorization, indigeneity presupposes a commonality among different indigenous peoples (→ I/11) worldwide, often defined in contrast to other identitarian groups (→ Ethnicity, I/25). Within the American context, the catchall category “indio” – an invention of the Spanish colonizers thought to have arrived in India – does not initially say anything about the signified, as it sums up a variety of different nations, peoples, and communities. The following historical fact illustrates the problem: in 1491, there were no Indians in the Americas; in 1492, there were between 60 and 110 million (Bonfil Batalla 1972). At the end of the 19th century, the indigenous population declined about 60–80 percent due to direct and indirect impacts of colonization (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7). Since the mid-1970s, there has been a growing debate to frame this forceful decline of population as genocide, particularly in the United States.

Nevertheless, indigenous people are still an important demographic factor, although difficult to measure. The most established procedure is based on auto-identification, which also depends upon political conjunctures of racism and recognition (→ Race, I/39). In the Andean region and in Central America, about 40 percent of the population is classified as indigenous. In Latin America, in general terms, a 10 percent indigenous population is estimated. In the U.S., it is about 1 percent and in Canada about 4 percent. Since the early 18th century, the colonial classification of indigenous belonging in the U.S. was in the blood quantum laws, which were actualized in the 1934 *Indian Reorganization Act*, and today are related to DNA tests.

Looking at the semantic field of indigeneity, we can state that the adjective “indigenous” can be derived from the Latin term “indigenus” which means “native, born in a country,” which comes from “indi,” an old derivative of “in,” and “gen,” the root of “gigno” (“give birth to”). Indigeneity has added the suffix “ity,” which denotes a certain state, property, or quality of the adjective “indigenous.” This conception as a “state of being” evokes a wide range of discursive practices to define criteria for the assumed ontological quality of indigenous, with definitions such as language (→ I/13), traditions, religion (→ Religious Beliefs, I/40), and special way of life, among others.

In contrast to this essentializing conception, indigeneity is understood as an ongoing process and a relational category (de la Cadena and Starn 2007; Gerharz, Uddin, and Chakkarath 2017). This includes both self-identification by different indigenous people, as well as identifications by others, such as colonizers, settlers, the church, the state (→ Nation-State, II/38), and with high amount of symbolic capital, scholars. The relational construction itself is embedded in struggles about recognition and redistribution. Therefore, indigeneity is related intrinsically to history, as concepts such as indigenous, native, aboriginal, and first nations, refer to priority in time and place. This is reflected in the terms “Native American” and “First Nation,” used by the U.S. and Canada.

“Indian” is thus a multiethnic category that allows a broad range of self-ascriptions and ascriptions by others. The term has also been appropriated by the indigenous people themselves, and in different conjunctures has been reframed and subverted to challenge the established power systems. Indigenous peoples in the Americas usually express their ethnic identity in emic terms, or they make use of concepts such as nations, nationalities, and peoples. These concepts are applied to overcome discriminating and limiting concepts such as “ethnic minorities,” and they allow strategic references to international law (ILO-convention No. 169).

Indigenism

In colonial times, the problem of how to deal with the indigenous population in the conquered territories was solved by the Spanish crown. The solution was the establishment of a segregated political system of two republics, one for the white conquerors and one for the conquered indigenous population (Thurner 1997) (→ Colonial Rule, I/5). After independence (→ Independence Movements, I/10), this system of the two republics was replaced with a unified notion of the nation, as one republic (→ Nation and State Building, I/16), that was formally based on ideas of republican citizenship (→ II/27). However, this new notion excluded the indigenous population from political participation (→ II/41). In other parts of the Americas, such as in the Western U.S. and the Southern Cone, indigenous peoples like the Lakota and the Mapuche have undergone a remarkable process of ethnogenesis (Boccaro 1998). These peoples were neither conquered by the colonial powers nor subjected to the violent processes of internal colonialism by the republican state. However, in the last third of the 19th century, a new conjuncture of colonization began in both North and South America. In the U.S., it was imposed under the banner of “Manifest Destiny” and in Chile, under the euphemistic label of the “Pacification of the Araucanía.” The last extended autonomous territories of indigenous peoples in the Americas were conquered and integrated into the nation-states. Only smaller indigenous groups, mainly hunter-gatherers in the Amazon basin, remained intact and had no cultural contact with modern-expansionist forces.

In the early postcolonial republican state of the 19th century, the indigenous population was generally denied citizenship rights, and instead was submitted to politics of extinction. Until the beginning of the 20th century, channels of political mediation barely existed, so indigenous peoples were doomed to a “subaltern voicelessness” (Kaltmeier 2019) (→ Silencing, III/19). This situation changed with the rise of *indigenismo*, a political and cultural movement of nonindigenous intellectuals and state agencies, that developed social and cultural policies toward the indigenous peoples. In Mexico, it was during the Mexican Revolution, which lasted from 1910 to 1920, that indigenist politics in the field of education began (→ Revolution, II/44). A further increase in the dynamics of indigenist politics could be seen in the 1920s, in the context of the political stabilization after the Revolution. The

institutions established in this period aimed at the assimilation, hispanization, and nationalization of the indigenous population through education (Brading 1988). In other Latin America regions, such as Brazil and Peru, there was also a new conjuncture in the foundation of indigenist institutions during the 1910s and 1920s.

A dynamic new Inter-American turn began in the 1920s, with the previously mentioned programs of assimilation through education in Mexico, and a significant change in the indigenous policy of the United States. Previously, after the military defeat of the last indigenous tribes in the Great Plains and the Southwestern United States, and the Plains Cree in Canada, the U.S. government (Dawes Severalty Act of 1887ff) as well as Canada (e.g. Indian Acts of 1839–1876) pursued a strict reservation policy. Within this framework, vast lands were made available to white settlers (→ Land, II/15), and the indigenous population that had survived the genocidal consequences of hunger, disease, and military defeat were concentrated on reservations administrated in the U.S. by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). In the 1920s, criticism of the reservation policy arose due to the disastrous social and economic circumstances found there. In 1928, the *Meriam Report* criticized the assimilation policy and proposed a limited recognition of the rights of Native Americans. Many of the findings of this report are reflected in the *Howard-Wheeler Act* of 1934, more commonly known as the *Indian New Deal*, empowered by John Collier. Provisions of the act recognized the value of culture and heritage, and for the first time returned land to tribes rather than taking it away. This period ended at the end of the 1940s, when the *Hoover Commission Report* of 1949 recommended a policy of the assimilation of native peoples into mainstream society. This led to the so-called Indian Termination Policies, enforced by the federal government in the 1950s (Castile 2004; Blanchette 2010).

In 1931, Collier and Mexican anthropologist Manuel Gamio discussed the necessity of the establishment of an Inter-American organization (→ Pan-Americanism, II/40). Meanwhile, Bolivian Franz Tamayo, founder of the indigenous education project of Warisata, and Mexican educator Moisés Sáenz advocated for an Inter-American indigenist institution. (→ Education, I/24) These efforts culminated in the foundation of the Inter-American Indigenist Institute (III) at the Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano of 1940, in Pátzcuaro, Mexico. In 1942, the III was inaugurated as an independent international organization with its seat in Mexico City, and Gamio became its director, a position he held until 1960 (Giraud and Lewis 2012).

Most Latin American governments were skeptical about the III, because their own hegemonic projects of nation-building (→ Nation and State Building, I/16) were based on 19th-century notions of whitening (→ Whiteness, I/46; Biopolitics, I/22), and the exclusion of the indigenous population. Yet, despite the resistance of traditional elites, most countries of the Americas set up national indigenous institutes, following the agreements of the Pátzcuaro Congress, although with different degrees of institutionalization. The hemispheric circulation of indigenist ideas was facilitated by the establishment of journals such as *América Indígena* and *Boletín Indigenista* (later renamed *Anuario Indigenista*), both edited by the III. In the first numbers of *América Indígena*, statements by indigenous leaders such as D'Arcy McNickle from the Salish nation in the U.S., and Canadian Jasper Hill from the Lenni Lenape nation, were printed. However, their authorship was not mentioned directly. Besides this limited participation, the underlying politics of representation in the field of indigenismo was highly problematic, because mainly nonindigenous experts were designing programs for indigenous people. This led to many of the programs to be aimed at assimilation. In 1953, the III was integrated into the OAS (Organization of American States) and in 2009 – after a significant loss of importance since the 1970s – it was closed.

While indigenism in Mexico – especially after the end of the government of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940) – turned out to be a program of assimilation and acculturation, in some Andean countries, the indigenous question has been related strongly to socialism (→ I/42) and questions of social inequality (→ II/20) and class struggle (→ II/3) since the 1920s. The emergence of socialist and communist movements at the beginning of the 20th century in many Latin American countries opened up new possibilities to form interethnic alliances that articulated important claims of the rural indigenous population (→ Interethnic Relations, I/12). In contrast to our contemporary understanding of indigeneity, which is mainly based on ethnic identification (→ Ethnicity, I/25), indigenous collective identity in the Andes at that time was based on an articulation of ethnic and class-based elements, which permitted access to the political field. Particularly in the Andes, indigenous peasant movements had the organizational capacity to carry out nationwide agenda-setting, and to foster the process of construction of collective identities. In Ecuador – which in 1943 became one of the first countries to create a national indigenist institute – interethnic relations with socialist and communist movements shaped indigenous organization processes. This was best expressed in the foundation of the *Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios* (FEI, Ecuadorian Federation of Indios) in 1944. The FEI became the main platform for the demands of highland Indians in Ecuador until the 1970s, and its actions mainly took place within the legal framework of working rights and the denunciation of mistreatment. Peruvian Marxist José Carlos Mariátegui was a key thinker to articulate Marxism and indigeneity, providing the intellectual background for several peasant movements (Becker 2008; Kaltmeier 2019).

In Bolivia, indigenous-peasant sectors of society gained access to the political field via trade union-based corporatism (→ Labor Representation, II/14), which found its highest expression after the Bolivian Revolution in 1952. The indigenous-peasant population benefited from the revolution (→ II/44) in several ways, such as class-based citizenship rights and recognition as peasants (→ Citizenship, II/27), restitution of land (→ II/15), and the installation of health and education system (→ Health, I/29; Education, I/24). Nevertheless, the overall aim of mestization left only a very restricted place for indigenous positioning (Ari 2014). In Guatemala, indigenist politics were first influenced by biological and racist discourses (→ Race, I/39).

Thus, indigenism can be understood as a foundational conjuncture in the field of indigeneity, where mainly nonindigenous intellectuals raise the question of indigenous participation in society, and create practices and institutions of intervention on a national and transnational scale. Indigenism empowered cultural anthropology as new state-sponsored sciences for the intervention in indigenous communities. It also placed the indigenous in the center of the imagined national community, aiming for a profound process of assimilation in the name of *mestizaje* (→ Hybridity, I/30). While indigenous people were excluded from full citizenship in terms of political participation (→ II/41), including the right to vote, indigenism has created a contradictory field of intervention with development projects in areas such as health, agriculture, and education (→ Development, II/6). Despite its assimilationist undertone, it has challenged conceptions of the nation based on whitening. It has also established a field of practice and intervention that put the indigenous question on the political agenda of postcolonial nation-states, and on the broader agenda of pan-American and even transnational institutions (→ Pan-Americanism, II/40). The latter is revealed in the pilot development program for indigenous peasants, the *Misión Andina*, designed by the International Labor Organization (Breuer 2017). The establishment of indigenismo as a dispositive to control indigenous populations was without doubt a governmental reaction toward the growing politicization of the indigenous question, especially in regard to socialist organizational processes. However, it also opened the door for new counter-governmental practices.

Indigeneity in movement

Social anthropologists, as well as indigenous leaders, criticized the politics of assimilation and traditional indigenismo at the end of the 1960s through the 1970s as ethnocide, which is best expressed in the first declaration of Barbados *For the Liberation of the Indian* in 1971. At the same time, indigenous peoples themselves gained voice. The *Manifiesto de Tiwanaku* in 1973 was the cornerstone in a new dynamic of decolonization, and put autonomy in the center of the political organization process (→ Postcolonialism, I/38). It was made by the Katarista movement that was formed at the end of the 1960s by young urban Aymaras, whose parents had migrated from the rural areas to El Alto, La Paz, in Bolivia. In the center of the cultural politics of the Katarista was the appropriation of the symbolic figure of Tupac Katari, who, together with Tupac Amaru II in Peru, was the main leader of the indigenous uprising in the 1780s.

In the U.S. in the 1960s, indigenous identity politics reached a climax in the context of Afro-American and Chicano Civil Rights Movements (→ Social Movements, I/41). The formation of a “red power” movement culminated in the foundation of the American Indian Movement (AIM) in 1968. Through spectacular protests such as the occupations of Alcatraz in 1968, and Wounded Knee in 1973, as well as the Trail of Broken Treaties in 1972, the AIM gained worldwide attention (Deloria 1985; Dunbar-Ortiz 2014). The question of land return and reparation is still an open issue: in 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the Black Hills were taken illegally by the federal government. The Lakota refused to take the reparation offered by the court because they wanted their land back. The reparation sum remains in an interest-bearing account, which in 2015 amounted to over \$1.2 billion. In cultural terms, the formation of this Pan-Indian movement also led to a proliferation of homogenized indigenous markers, such as dress codes for the indigenous people of the Great Plains, which were often not related to local indigenous heritages in other regions.

Also in the 1960s, the lowland indigenous peoples of the Amazon basin formed social movements with reference to ethnic identity. In Ecuador, the ethnic-indigenous mobilization cycle has its roots in the Amazonian lowlands, with the foundation of the Indian Asociación Shuar in 1962, supported by the Catholic Church. In 1980, a group of indigenous organizations were founded in the Amazonian lowlands, which combined to become the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENIAE). In 1986, the main regional indigenous organizations of the sierra, costa, and lowlands created a nationwide umbrella organization, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), which shaped indigenous mobilizations and demands for recognition and redistribution over the next several decades. While most indigenous movement organizations are related to the nation-states the indigenous peoples live in, there are also some transnational regional organizations, such as the *Cordinación Indígena de la Cuenca Amazónica* (COICA), founded in 1984, that rallies lowland indigenous peoples of the Amazon basin (CONAIE 1989).

A prominent Inter-American conflictive hotspot of indigenous rights in the 1980s was the Miskito Coast, where the self-determination for indigenous people clashed with the Sandinista Revolution, and its attempt to establish a socialist system against the interest of the ruling elite and the United States. While many indigenous social movements in the Americas have been related to left-wing movements, at the Miskito Coast indigenous leaders were denouncing human rights abuses by the socialist government (→ Human Rights, II/35), and even received support from the CIA to organize a counter-insurgency. The Miskito question generated fierce debate. AIM-intellectuals like Russell Means and Ward

Churchill supported the Miskito, while others backed the Sandinista government. At the Miskito Coast in 1987, the Sandinista government established one of the first regions of indigenous autonomy in the Americas.

Instead of redistributive politics, a deepening of citizenship, and the recognition of ethnic and class-based rights, the 1970s and 1980s were characterized by a wave of anti-communist authoritarian regimes, which limited the room for maneuvering the social movements through repression (→ Authoritarianism, II/25). The class-based cycle of mobilization (→ Class Struggle, II/3) and the fight for the redistribution of economic resources ended, and a new conjuncture of neoliberal politics began (→ Neoliberalism, II/16). In this period, indigenous movements managed to establish themselves as the most important contestatory force in the Americas, especially in Latin America. In countries such as Chile and Guatemala, indigenous actors were engaged in the fight against dictatorship, genocide, and civil war (Postero and Zamosc 2004). These actors gained an international reputation, which was best expressed in the person of quiché-Maya Rigoberta Menchú, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992. Her autobiography *My Name is Rigoberta Menchú and this is how my Conscience was Born* (1982) written by the anthropologist Elisabeth Burgos initiated a controversial debate on authenticity and indigenous collective forms of life-writing (→ III/11).

The indigenous uprising in Ecuador in 1990, and the hemispheric indigenous protest movement of 1992 surrounding the quincentenary of the European conquest of Latin America by Christopher Columbus (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7), marked a turning point in the field of indigeneity (Bengoa 2000). It also initiated a new politicization of the indigenous question in Latin America. In 1994, the EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional) in Chiapas began its guerilla activities to dismantle neoliberal politics and political corruption in Mexico. They began their activities on the symbolical date of the beginning of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Mexico, Canada, and the U.S., on January 1, 1994 (→ Regional Integration, II/18). This new visibility of the indigenous, the introduction of ethnic symbols and semantics into public spaces, and the reinvention of ethnic identities have shaped the political culture of Latin American countries since the 1990s (→ Memory Politics, I/34). They also put into question the principles of vision and division of a social world based on coloniality (→ Postcolonialism, I/38). The high degree of organization, from the local communities over regional alliances to the nationwide umbrella organizations, is one of the most important factors in explaining the strength of the movement.

In regard to all of the mobilization processes in the Americas since the 1970s, there are certain similarities between them. The main actors of these new Indianist mobilization processes were young Indians that passed through the modern education system and dominated the codes of conduct of the modern-occidental society, as well as the norms of the indigenous communities. These “organic intellectuals” used indigenous identity in order to improve their position and that of their group (→ Public Intellectuals, III/18). As mediators between the two worlds, they were essential in order for indigenous concerns to be “heard” and “understood” in the mestizo-society.

Despite being formally recognized as citizens, and since the 1970s having the right to vote, indigenous people were de facto excluded from real political and cultural participation and representation. Indigenous movements put the questions of indigenous citizenship, cultural recognition (→ Multiculturalism, I/36), and socioeconomic redistribution, especially in regard to land (→ II/15), on the political agenda with mobilizations and protests. These dynamics transformed the field of indigeneity profoundly, as the agency of indigenous peoples led to a conjuncture of decolonization that put the nonindigenous cultural and political

(mis)representations of nonindigenous actors into crisis (→ Visual Cultures, III/45, Indigenous Media Production, III/30).

Furthermore, indigenous peoples also intervened directly in the political field. In the midst of the 1990s, political parties emerged from the indigenous social movements that were particularly successful in the local arena, where they won elections in several municipalities. They also gained influence on a national arena in political parties and movements (Van Cott 2005). In Colombia, a country with a small indigenous population, two indigenous managed to establish themselves in the party system, namely parties the *Movimiento de Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia* (AICO) and the *Alianza Social Indígena* (ASI). In Ecuador, the CONAIE founded the left-wing political movement *Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement – New Country* in 1995, and managed to install three indigenous ministers in 2002. In Bolivia in 2005, the coca-trade unionist and Aymara, Evo Morales, was elected as the first indigenous president in the region, advocating for a profound process of decolonization. The Mexican Zapotec Benito Juárez 1806–1872 was the first indigenous president in the Americas.

Neo-indigenismo

All this does not imply, however, that multiculturalism (→ I/36) in the Americas should be considered a smooth success story in terms of increasing the inclusion of formerly excluded “minorities,” or promoting a broader understanding of cultural rights and respect for cultural differences. These politics of recognition by the state took place in the heydays of neoliberal politics, which deepened the socioeconomic disparities in the region (→ State Transformation II/21). Noteworthy is that the indigenous demands for cultural recognition were fulfilled in part, while the claims for social justice and the redistribution of wealth were ignored.

Critical scholars conceptualized this articulation of political recognition and neoliberal politics as “neo-indigenismo,” which in Foucauldian terms is characterized by a governmentality based on the self-government of indigenous peoples (Hale 2005). In the context of a new generation of structural adjustment programs in the 1990s in Bolivia, the project of political decentralization with its cornerstone, the *Ley de Participación Popular*, became the interface where reform-oriented sectors of the indigenous movements met with neoliberal technocrats. In Ecuador, the World Bank executed a pilot project for indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants (PRODEPINE) in cooperation with the state and CONAIE, the main indigenous organization.

Throughout Latin America, new neo-indigenist state institutions were founded which replaced the traditional indigenist instances of mediation. Here, we have to mention the CONADI in Chile and CODENPE in Ecuador. In Mexico, the *Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas* even replaced the famous *Instituto Nacional Indigenista*, the most important bastion of traditional indigenismo. Meanwhile in Peru, the *Instituto Indigenista Peruano*, which was founded in 1946, was dissolved under the authoritarian government of Alberto Fujimori. Mostly, these current institutions do not have the degree of a ministry, they are subordinate to the president, and they put “etno-desarrollo” in the center of their activities (→ Development, II/6). They can be understood as an expression of neo-indigenism, as a rebirth of indigenist politics in a context of neoliberal hegemony, and indigenous self-organization.

Neo-indigenism employs the same logic of developmentalism and state-control inherent in indigenism, with the crucial difference being that now indigenous actors themselves are in charge to execute these programs. Issues of socioeconomic redistribution, especially in terms

of land, are not addressed in neo-indigenism. In the midst of the 2000s, the emergence of left-wing governments, which in the Andean region are articulated with indigenous movements, changed this scenario and inaugurated the end of neoliberalism. Particularly in Bolivia under the government of Evo Morales, the new constitution was inspired by ideas of decolonization and put the concept of *Buen Vivir*, derived from indigenous cosmovisions, in the center of the nation's development. The legal and political basis for indigenous rights has expanded all over the region. However, once established, this does not mean that their ideas have been applied. Procedural methods for the execution of the laws must be found, as well as ways to actually live in the formally established autonomy.

Transnational indigeneity

Since the midst of the 1990s, the debate on indigeneity has been related to the emergence of a transnational conjuncture of the indigenous question. To reach out for supranational political institutions, indigenous movements began to organize beyond the nation-states. In the 1970s, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples and the International Indian Treaty Council were accredited as international representatives of indigenous peoples by the United Nations, and were included in the nongovernmental organization (NGO) roster (Kemner 2013). The internationalization of indigenous demands has been spurred on by new alliances through the rising ecological and human rights movements in the Western Hemisphere (→ Human Rights, II/35), some of which campaign for indigenous peoples (e.g. IWGIA, Cultural Survival, Survival International, Society for Threatened Peoples).

The global demands of the ecological movement, such as sustainable development, were articulated with local actions by indigenous peoples, portrayed as “keepers of our earth” (→ Environmental Justice, II/8). Facing the political pressure of indigenous movements and their allies, especially NGOs, an international conjuncture began that finds its expression in the United Nations Year for Indigenous Peoples in 1993, the UN Decade for Indigenous Peoples (1995–2004 and 2005–2014), in international norms and conventions (ILO Convention 169 in 1989, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007) as well as in supranational fora like the UN-Working Group on Indigenous Populations (1982–2006), and the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (since 2002). These global networks have given shape to a new transnational identification of indigeneity.

Beyond these international fora, indigenous peoples also managed to promote emic dynamics of hemispheric entanglement. In 1990, they organized the first hemispheric congress of the indigenous peoples of the Americas. Here, they established the geopolitical imaginary of *abya yala*, a concept taken from the Kuna-people of Panama, to name the Americas and create a territorial reference. In the following conferences, a growing political self-confidence was observable. In the hemispheric conference of 2006 in La Paz, which took place in the context of the election of Evo Morales, the politics of recognition were rejected and substituted by the lemma “From Resistance to Power.” The great “intergalactic” meetings organized by the Zapatistas in Mexico also prove the ability of indigenous peoples to address nonethnic topics, and to mobilize an international civil society (→ II/28). Therefore, it was among the first social movements to engage in a media revolution, relying on the new possibilities of the network society (→ Digital Culture, III/28; Alter-Globalization I/21).

As fresh and innovative political actors with a high degree of credibility, indigenous movements could win the support of urban mestizo intellectuals of the middle class. Furthermore, they were seen as “ecological natives,” and thus as “natural” preservers of the

environment, a topic that won importance after the Rio-conference for sustainability and development in 1992 (Ulloa 2004) (→ Nature, II/39). Only in a few cases did indigenous political movements limit themselves to function as pressure groups for indigenous peoples. Generally, they were not single issue movements that represented a single group. In the Andean region in particular, indigenous political movements became the spokespersons for general, multiethnic, subaltern demands, addressing questions of economic politics, neo-imperialism, democratization, social rights, racism, and ecological justice.

In the U.S. and Canada, policies of Affirmative Action and state-run multiculturalism (→ I/36) opened windows of opportunities for American Indian participation in media (→ Indigenous Media Production, III/30), cultural production (→ Indigenous Literatures III/10), and academics. Meanwhile, in Latin American countries, recognition was the central topic of the political agenda. The political outcome of this new cycle of indigenous mobilization was overwhelming. In the 1990s, there were several constitutional changes that recognized the specific cultural rights of indigenous peoples. Furthermore, ILO convention 169, which recognized cultural rights and limited autonomy for indigenous peoples, was signed by nearly all Latin American governments (→ Nation State, II/38). In total, fifteen of the twenty-two countries who have ratified the convention are from South or Central America: Mexico (1990), Colombia and Bolivia (1991), Costa Rica and Paraguay (1993), Peru (1994), Honduras (1995), Guatemala (1996), Ecuador (1998), Argentina (2000), Brazil and Venezuela (2002), Chile (2008), and Nicaragua (2010). It has not been ratified by the United States nor by Canada.

While indigenism in the 1940s created an Inter-American field of practice, in the 1990s, the indigenous question was globalized. Indigenous people not only from the Americas but also from other regions of the Global South have identified common demands, especially in regard to the politics of recognition of the nation-states they are located in. These commonalities have led to the formation of a common Pan-Indian movement that has found support in international fora. It is in this context where the idea of indigeneity emerged as an academic concept. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007 is probably the most important expression of this latest transnational conjuncture in the field of indigeneity. This was shown by the fact that 143 countries voted in favor of the declaration, while the settler colonies Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States were the only countries which voted against it. By 2016, all four opposing countries had turned their vote and endorsed the declaration.

Futures of indigeneity

Political cultures in the Americas today cannot be imagined without the participation of indigenous peoples. Throughout the region, we can observe far-reaching institutional and constitutional politics of recognition, which put into question the postcolonial conjuncture of exclusion of the indigenous populations that dominated the political cultures in the Western Hemisphere from the 19th until the end of the 20th centuries. After twenty-five years of massive indigenous mobilizations (if we take the protests in 1992, five hundred years after Columbus' arrival, as a point of reference), it seems necessary to draw a balance about the political outcome and the perspectives of the protests. This balance seems even more necessary if we consider that the global conjuncture of indigeneity reached its peak with the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In actuality, several groups, such as the UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples, have been dissolved, and the two UN decades for indigenous peoples ended in 2014.

This transnational dynamic is mirrored by growing internal fragmentations of indigenous peoples due to migration (→ Transnational Migration, I/44), urbanization (→ I/45), and social mobility. In this sense, how to deal with urban indigenous peoples and dynamics of hybridization (→ Hybridity, I/30), especially from the second generation onward, will be a key question in indigeneity. Furthermore, it seems that it is difficult to construct Pan-Indian movements, as there is a growing tendency of indigenous communities to focus instead on local projects, such as community organization or local museums. Meanwhile, broader networks, which are increasingly organized through virtual communities, are more situational and contentious.

The established ethnic territories are also endangered, due to a region-wide conjuncture of an economic model based on the exploitation of natural resources (→ Extractivism, II/9). Indigenous peoples are highly affected by the accelerated accumulation process, facing the exploitation of natural resources (oil, wood, minerals, water), as they live in areas that have not yet been included in the process of capitalist accumulation (→ Capitalism, II/2; Environmental Justice, II/8). The (neo-)extractivist development regime goes hand in hand with large infrastructural projects, such as highways, that open the door for unplanned colonization processes of landless peasants (→ Modernization, I/35). This is especially the case for Amazonian indigenous communities, such as the recent example of the power plant at the upper Xingu on the Rio Tapajos in Brazil, while the highland communities are historically integrated into the commercial cycles. These highland communities today are threatened by new mining projects, such as the Wirikuta's fight in Mexico against Canadian mining companies, and the control of water reserves.

In this field, conflicts arise independent from the governments' political orientations. Bolivia faces the TIPNIS conflict on a highway passing through a national park and indigenous territories, while Ecuador has to deal with the ITT conflict on mining. In 2009, Peru experienced its most violent confrontation since the end of the civil war, when indigenous protests against petroleum exploitation and a free trade agreement with the U.S. broke out, and led to a confrontation with military forces. Taking into account the overwhelming pressure of the economic model based on extractivism, it seems that indigenous communities are increasingly involved in struggles to defend their basic rights, their commons (→ II/31), and their livelihood. The discussion around concepts like Buen Vivir, that emerged in the Andes and is now being taken up by indigenous peoples from Mexico to Canada, reveals the high importance of defining alternative economic models.

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INTERSECTIONALITY

Julia Roth

The paradigm of intersectionality serves to describe and analyze the ways in which socially constructed categories of differences interact to create social hierarchy. An intersectional approach is based on the notion that axes of social stratification like race (→ I/39), class, and gender (→ Gender Identities, I/28) cannot be conceptualized in isolation from one another, but must be considered through their interdependencies. An intersectional framing focuses on how discrete forms of discrimination are shaped by one another and aims to give credit to the entanglements of different axes of stratification such as race, class, and gender (or racism, class prejudice, and sexism or homophobia, respectively) and asks how various axes of stratification mutually construct one another and articulate simultaneously (→ Social Inequality, II/20). Exclusion and oppression or discrimination, but also privilege, are viewed as always previously marked by numerous interlocking factors. The research field or common object of intersectionality is hence relations of power, domination, and normatization which reproduce social structures, practices, and identities based on a power-sensitive perspective. An intersectional perspective serves as a theoretical–methodological framing and an epistemic sensitization.

Genealogy of the concept

Going back to the demands and theoretical productions by feminists, activists of color, and feminist activists from the so-called Global South, intersectionality has recently become a widespread concept in feminist and gender studies in Europe and the United States, ultimately in the social sciences in general. The idea of multiple and interrelated scales or levels of oppression is not new, but dates back to a long tradition of feminist activist intervention. For instance, Brah and Phoenix (2004), Zapata Galindo (2013), Viveros Vigoya (2013), and Brah (2013) remind us that black feminists and anti-slavery movements already by the 18th and 19th centuries and probably before then claimed the recognition of their racist discrimination.

For example, soon after the French Revolution (1789), the freedom fighters who built the first independent Latin American state in Saint-Domingue (today Haiti) pointed out the contradiction between ideas of human rights (→ II/35) and freedom (→ I/27) and the system of institutionalized enslavement (→ Slavery, I/18). Around the same time, feminists like Olympe de Gouges (France 1791) and Mary Wollstonecraft (Great Britain 1792) highlighted

the fact that the newly introduced “human rights” were limited to white male citizens (→ Citizenship, II/27). At the Women’s Rights Convention in Akron, Ohio (USA 1851), Sojourner Truth in her speech “Ain’t I a Woman?” questioned the universality of white bourgeois feminism by pointing out her experience as a black and formerly enslaved woman. In her statement, Truth anticipated the problematic of differences *between* women, as well as the entanglement of class, racialization, and gender.

At the beginning of the 20th century, socialist feminists like Clara Zetkin and Rosa Luxemburg criticized bourgeois feminists for ignoring other socioeconomic positions. In the U.S., African American philosopher W.E.B. Du Bois elaborated on the interrelations between race, class, and nation (→ Nation State, II/38), when he stated “to be a poor man is hard, but to be a poor race in a land of dollars is the bottom of hardships” (DuBois 1903, 16). The links between race, ethnicity (→ I/25), and class have been addressed since the 1930s, when researchers on social relations in Brazil started to problematize the interdependencies of race and class oppressions (Costa 2011).

More than a century after Truth, the “Manifesto das Mulheres Negras” (1975) in Brazil and the “Combahee River Collective Statement” (1979) in the USA provided decisive interventions into dominant feminist representations, pointing to the entangled and interdependent character of different forms of oppression. Angela Davis (1981) referred to the interrelated hierarchies of women, race, and class in a book with the same name. Chicana feminists like Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherrie Moraga spoke of the “Borderlands” of identities and experiences not considered normative according to the dominant regimes of knowledge and power (→ Borders, III/3), as historically constituted by colonialism and enslavement (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7; Colonial Rule, I/5). Non-hegemonic feminists like Patricia Hill Collins, bell hooks, Audre Lorde, June Jordan, Norma Alarcón, Chela Sandoval, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Sylvia Wynter, María Lugones, and many more have followed a similar agenda, who early on insisted and elaborated on entangled dimensions of oppression and inequality (Roth 2004).

Argentine American feminist critic María Lugones (2005) insists on the colonial dimension of gender in itself, as certain Western patriarchal gender norms and relations have been rendered universal and hegemonic through Occidentalist discourse without paying credit to other paradigms. Likewise, Cuban-born Jamaican American Sylvia Wynter (2003) rejects the category “gender” for the (formerly) enslaved and black women, as their dehumanization also excluded them being “gendered” in a comparable way to white women. In 2011, Zapatista women’s representative *comandanta* Esther’s speech at the Congreso de la Unión in Mexico City underscored her double oppression as an indigenous woman in Chiapas, Mexico, by pointing out “soy indígena y soy mujer” (I am indigenous and I am a woman) (→ Indigeneity, I/31).

Black feminism and Kimberlé Crenshaw’s juridical origin of the term

The term “intersectionality” was coined by the U.S.-African American lawyer Kimberlé Crenshaw for a concrete juridical context in 1989, in which the combined disadvantage of being both black and female was at the center of legal dispute. In her 1989 article, Crenshaw applied the metaphor of the intersection of different forms of discrimination for the concrete juridical case of black female employees at the car company General Motors (GM) in order to create concrete juridical categories to address discrimination at multiple and varying levels. GM had hired no black women until 1964. In turn, the black women hired after 1970 lost their jobs after the court rejected the plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim (GM did hire

women, although all of them were white), as well as the plaintiff's race discrimination claim (GM did hire blacks, but all of them were male).

The multilevel exclusion of black women had been addressed by black feminists for a long time, expressed in resistance to slavery and interventions and white feminist contexts produced a decade earlier, most illustratively expressed in titles like that of the Chicana feminist compilation *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color* (1981) edited by Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa, Angela Davis' *Woman, Race and Class* (1981), or the volume *All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, But Some of US Are Brave* (1982). The concept of intersectionality has by now been transferred to different places and signifies different things in different contexts, and thus needs to be critically contextualized for the concrete situations, locations, and constellations it is applied to.

Limitations and possibilities of the concept

The concept of intersectionality is often criticized for its indecision regarding what is 'intersecting': categories, identities, experiences, or relations of domination? It remains unclear whether it provides a theory, analytical strategy, or methodology (Davis 2008, 68). Another obstacle of intersectionality when applied to concrete contexts taking various categories into account is the question of the choice of the categories or axes of stratification that are considered relevant. Asymmetrical access to knowledge production and circulation (language or visible publications), historical, geographical, political, and cultural factors might come into play here, since knowledge production is "situated" and therefore "particular."

Moreover, there is a need for more intersectional theorizing for analyses on a translocational scale, taking into account the situation of particular differences in various spaces and locations. That is, that "race" might articulate and relate to other differences very differently in Brazil and Colombia than in the U.S., the UK, Kenya, Japan, or Germany. The same holds true for gender relations or concepts of sexuality. Against this backdrop, as intersectionality has become a highly established term in various academic fields, it seems necessary to find a way of contextualizing and decolonizing the discourse on intersectionality for researching interdependent inequalities in Latin America (→ Postcolonialism, I/38), rather than doing away with the concept as "Eurocentric" from the beginning. The circulation of intersectionality knowledge is also marked by intersectional and transnational inequalities: existing theorizations on intersectionality predominantly stem from U.S.-American and European academic contexts and elaborate on the respective hegemonic conceptualizations of gender and racial inequalities, which thereby tend to be treated as universal. It is thus all the more important to understand intersectionality as a locally positioned, context-specific tool.

Research dedicated to an intersectional understanding must therefore reflect its own positionality and "situatedness" within the dynamics of global knowledge circulation in a stratified world (Anthias 2008). A perspective that goes beyond the "Anglo-Saxon/Latinist cultural dichotomy" (Shohat and Stam 2012, xv) is hence highly desirable. This means, for instance, taking the different meanings, concepts, and workings of "race" (and racialization and racism, respectively) in different places and contexts in the Americas into account (Brah and Phoenix 2004; Wade et al. 2009; Rubiera Castillo and Martiatu Terry 2011; Zurbano 2012; Viveros Vigoaya 2013).

An intersectionality approach offers a critical lens which brings into view aspects that remain invisible when researched alongside one-dimensional or additive paradigms. An intersectional sensitization helps to avoid one-dimensional analyses of, for example, "class," without justifying this choice, being aware of the inherent multifaceted character of this

category. A woman might belong to the richest sector in her home country, but to the poorest ones when she migrates to another country. In order to fulfill its original function as a critical and political tool, the deeply Euro and U.S.-centric concept needs to be de-linked from certain traps of re-inscribing a North–South dichotomy of knowledge production and distribution, and re-linked to endeavors for building alliances based on solidarity. Furthermore, an intersectional frame in current inter- and transnational contexts requires taking the “Where, When and How” of its subject(s) into account (Haschemi Yekani et al. 2008). Put differently, class oppression (or privilege) means something different in Caracas than in Berlin; it means something different for women and men, white women and black women, a rich and educated heterosexual black woman or a poor black woman, a poor homosexual woman or a rich homosexual woman, or a homosexual man. Just like it is not the same if one is discriminated against because one is positioned as a “woman” or because one is positioned as a “black lesbian,” neither is it if one is positioned as an undocumented female care worker within transnational migration regimes or female recipient/client of care work (→ Transnational Migration, I/44; Gender and Work II/11). It also means something different to be born poor in Mali or Haiti than in the United States, and in possession of the respective passport as far as educational opportunities and social mobility are concerned. At different locations, different axes of stratification might mean different things, and, in transnational contexts, where separate regimes or perceptions might combine or clash. Escobar, respectively, argues for a “Politics of Place” (2007, 199) and a notion of “place-based practices of identity, nature, and economy” (2007, 199) as an epistemic perspective that “can be occupied by many subjects,” and de Sousa Santos pleads for moving from a “monoculture of knowledge” toward what he terms an “ecology of knowledge” (Dalea and Robertson 2004, 158), while Haschemi Yekani et al. (2008) underscore the “productive instability” an intersectional perspectivization might provide. Hence, the temporal and spatial (and/or cultural, and/or geopolitical) context is of utmost importance for an intersectional analysis, particularly also when applying it to the Americas. Yuval-Davis, respectively, emphasizes that an intersectional perspective always needs to be context-specific and aware of the concrete historical situation in which it is applied and which defines the relevance of the varying social divisions for each context. She also warns of a depoliticizing reduction of the concept to “identity categories.” To avoid such a reduction, an understanding of intersectionalities as inequalities would be helpful (see Roth 2013; Yuval-Davis 2013, 160).

Intersectionalities in the Americas

Both researchers and activists in Latin America are engaged in the interrelations of different axes of stratification and inequalities, mostly class and race. However, feminists who put gender relations at center stage seldom use the terminology of intersectionality produced predominantly by European and U.S.-American theorists. *Interseccionalidad* or the notion of an *intersección* is not as common as a concept in Latin American feminist discourses, even though the phenomenon of interlocking axes of oppression is often addressed in broader and more inclusive and practical ways than in the “Western”/ “Northern” academic circles. However, the notion of *interrelaciones* (interrelations) does exist and is being discussed. Recently, there are also a growing number of predominantly academic publications utilizing the term and concept (see e.g. Gil Hernández 2008; Viveros Vigoya and Gil 2014; Muñevar n.d.). Nevertheless, feminist knowledge produced in contexts other than academic ones and those using other languages and terminologies than those common in this field have largely been blinded out in hegemonic “Western”/ “Northern” feminist theory, which has focused

on the analysis and theorization of intersecting axes of stratification (on the depoliticization of intersectionality, see Gutiérrez-Rodríguez et.al. 2008).

Most importantly, to make an intersectionality approach productive for the Americas, one must take the diverse contexts into account, as well as avoid the North/South and subjects/objects of knowledge divide. Not coincidentally, many Latin American feminists contradict the intersectional paradigm, as they claim that the concept does not provide anything new for them: their specific experiences have long forced them to deal with various simultaneous and intersecting forms of oppression on a very practical level.

In her study *El Gran Caribe: Umbral de la geopolítica mundial* (2010), Ana Esther Ceceña draws an illuminating genealogy of the geostrategic position of the Caribbean and the related colonial entanglements of domination, impunity, and violence the region has been objected to by various imperial powers from the European Conquest until today. British scholar Peter Wade analyzes specific Latin American contexts and discourses and their internal differentiations, taking into account the often neglected dimension of sexuality implicit in the related processes of racialization (Wade 2000, 2003). Wade considers sexual and racial categories as closely related, mutually constitutive domains. He traces how racial hierarchy shapes sexuality and how patriarchal and racial dominations relate to each other differently in distinct localities, considering *mestizaje* as a colonial practice (→ Hybridity I/30), which produced racially intermediate *mestizos* through sexual interactions. Moreover, in response to Anne McClintock's work (cf. McClintock, Mufti, and Shohat 1998), he claims that these hierarchies' interrelatedness and the power structures involved are rooted in colonial history (Wade 2009, 25). Mara Viveros Vigoya (2002) and Andrew Canessa (2008) examine the interrelations between race and masculinities in Colombia and Bolivia, respectively, while Gil Hernández (2008) focuses on the interrelations between racism, homophobia, and sexism. Martina Sproll (2013) elaborates on the stratified access to employment in the banking sector in Brazil, where the visible, secured, and well-paid jobs are occupied by whites, whereas the precarious, insecure, and invisible jobs in the call centers, etc., are increasingly occupied by nonwhite and queer employees, thus cementing intersectional inequalities.

Cuban feminist discourses currently focus predominantly on neglected racist structures (Rubiera Castillo and Martiatu Terry 2011), while a number of Mexican feminist thinkers have recently reemphasized the necessity to bind discourses to the stronger social inequalities of gender inequality, with a special focus on the situation of indigenous women (Espinosa Damián 2011). For instance, Cuban sociologist Yulexis Almeida Junco, in her contribution to the 2011 volume on Afro-Cuban women *Afrocubanas. Historia, pensamiento y prácticas culturales* (Rubiera Castillo and Martiatu Terry 2011), admonishes the neglect of racial stratifications in a postrevolutionary Cuban society overwhelmed by eradicating class antagonisms, since Cuban society has from the outset been characterized by a class stratification that corresponded with racial affiliation (Junco 2011, 137). Cuba's hegemonic self-narration as a classless society, however, blinded out the continuing racial hierarchizations. The universally guaranteed social rights in all spheres of society created "the illusion of a problem already solved," as Junco observes. However, the opening of the access to education (→ I/24) and employment of all sectors without distinctions in race and class "allowed changing old racist conceptions, which led to the invisibilization of the topic of racism as an interest focus in the social sciences in Cuba" (Junco 2011, 141, translation by the author). Junco emphasizes the decisive impact of the macrolevel – geopolitics (→ II/34), colonial legacies such as structural racism or the transnational slave trade – on the respective inequalities at the microlevel – such as income inequalities or everyday racism, especially in a historically transnational space like the Caribbean. On the transnational scale, these inequalities are re-invoked in the recent

growth of tourism which is almost the sole sector of access to device. While white Cubans are likely to be employed in tourism, Afro-Cubans have remained largely excluded from this sector, where jobs are advertised for employees with “decent looks” (meaning: white). Moreover, due to the power and property structures from before the Cuban Revolution, white Cubans count more likely on owning nice houses to rent out to tourists and receive remittances from family members living abroad, than Afro-descendant Cubans. Cubans of African descent from the lower social strata of Cuban society are therefore in greater numbers illegally involved in a variety of “businesses” with tourists, ranging from selling souvenirs and tourist services to prostitution and so-called “romance tourism.” Furthermore, Cuban thinker and activist María Ileana Faguaga Iglesias observes that today, the aspirations of Afro-Cuban women who could obtain high school and university degrees are more often taken advantage of than their white counterparts. They face racial problems, as expressed in the unequal distribution of and access to convertible currency, as they are affected by both anti-Black racial discrimination and gender and class discrimination. (Faguaga Iglesias 2011, 156–157). Junco’s study shows how recently increased inequalities, such as access to private teachers to prepare for entry exams, lead to the disadvantage of Afro-descendant students in the education sector (on race in Cuba, see also Zurbano 2012 and 2018).

Mexican feminist critic Gabriela Espinosa Damián (2011) argues that Mexican – and, most likely, many Latin American – feminists (→ *Latinidad*, I/33) have had to address the multiple scales of exclusion due to their specific “limited citizenship” for a long time – and hence might contribute valuable experiences and theorizations in a transnational debate on intersectionality and possible ways of overcoming the persisting methodological or epistemic Occidentalism (Roth 2013). Espinosa Damián claims that the tensions and fractions between positions, such as the feminist struggle or the class struggle (→ II/3), gender struggle or indigenous struggle, have to be rethought of in the light of their (Mexican) realities – where feminism did not emerge in postindustrial societies, like in Europe and the U.S. – where political, economic, and social rights are accessible for the majorities, allowing feminism to concentrate on gender claims. In Mexico, in turn, she argues that “starting in 1910 until today, these rights are neither fully achieved nor exercised. Restricted or incomplete citizenship is a national reality, and the feminist movements cannot detain from the conjunction of social problems” (Espinosa Damián 2011, 18, own translation). Numerous current Mexican feminist studies address inequalities and tensions between differently positioned women and the entanglements of different axes of difference (see e.g. Belausteguigoitia 2009) and/or attempt collaborations between established feminists in the academy and political activists from diverse social spheres, from radical queer thinkers to Zapatista feminists (Suárez Návaz and Hernández 2008; Espinosa Miñoso 2009, 2011; Mendoza 2010; Rosendo Hidalgo, Dircio Chautla, and Sánchez Nestor 2010). However, representatives of indigenous feminist and other social movements (→ I/41) outside the academy have especially emphasized institutionalized feminism’s lack of intersectional thinking as related to the social realities of other disenfranchised groups, such as those dedicated to a radical feminist agenda (see e.g. Curiel 2008).

Espinosa brings up the discourse on the necessity of “decolonizing feminism” (Mohanty 2003; Lugones 2005, 2010) – referring to those strands and locations of feminist discourse, which have become canonical and hegemonic. In a similar vein, one might ask whether the “decolonization of intersectionality” is not also a strong necessity in order to avoid further knowledge asymmetries and methodological nationalism(s)/Occidentalism(s). From a Hemispheric perspective, one could consider their politics as taking the notion of intersectionality out of the ivory tower and back to its practical and radical political roots.

One such example of practical application of an intersectional frame in a transnational perspective is the international network project MISEAL (Measure for Social Inclusion and Equity in Institutions of Higher Education in Latin America), dedicated to social inequalities at Latin American universities (→ Education, I/24). MISEAL focuses on the intersectionality of gender, poverty, and race, aiming at finding measures to reduce the related unequal treatment and marginalization of discriminated groups and facilitate access to universities. The project has produced an archive of bibliographies on intersectionality in Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Germany, Mexico, and Spain, which provides a valuable source for researching intersectionality in the Americas based on context-specific theorizing and is a first step in the attempt to overcome the domination of English-language publications and the hegemony of U.S. and Eurocentric theorizing (see MISEAL Archive, Muñevar, n.d.).

Outlook

An intersectionality perspectivization can be useful to historically contextualize and analyze interdependent axes of inequalities and processes of colonization as engendering, e.g. in colonial contexts and examining interrelated regimes of stratification, especially on a transnational level in relation to migration.

With regard to the manifold contexts in the Americas in particular, it makes sense to speak of “intersectionalities” in plural form. One might even reconsider whether to use the term at all, or at least critically contextualize its application. The specific context marked by historical and ongoing inequalities and asymmetries further requires a radical rethinking of what counts as knowledge. It is necessary to open up the discourse toward types of knowledge produced with the same aim, but from different locations and positions, such as by theorizations by queer of color diaspora scholars and marginalized feminist thinkers. Overcoming the exclusivity of concepts like intersectionality requires acknowledging it and including other voices to open up theorizing to previously unfamiliar forms and politics of knowledge, taking into account the fact that feminist and anti-racist scholars and activists from other locations are often not familiar with these theorizations and the respective Anglo/Euro-American dominated canon of English-language texts. Intersectionality can function as a hegemony or power-sensible tool when understood in accordance to the explicitly political paradigm of African American, *Indígena*, and Chicana feminisms and feminist thinking (→ Latinidad, I/33), Critical Race and Critical Whiteness approaches (→ Whiteness, I/46), and queer of color diaspora interventions that originally produced the discourse. By using this intersectionality lens, it is thus important to link the analysis of multiple and intersecting forms of oppression that become visible with/to considerations of how to overcome these inequalities (→ Social Inequality, II/20).

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33

LATINIDAD

Luz Angélica Kirschner

Latinidad, a keyword in the growing field of Latino/a Studies, is both a complex and contradictory strategic practice historically “constituted through the homogenizing effects of racism” (Beltrán 2010, 7) encountered by Latin Americans, Latinas/os (also called Hispanics) in the United States, and other people of color in the Americas. Thus, *latinidad*, on the one hand, stands for a hemispheric standardizing and othering process whereby indefinite “Latin American national-origin groups are understood as sharing a sense of collective identity and cultural consciousness” (4) very much in conflict with those from the United States and Canada. On the other hand, the concept has been viewed as “a productive response” (7) to relentless racialization of oppressed groups throughout the Americas. Traditionally, *latinidad* has provided diverse populaces in the Western Hemisphere “with a shared history of racial struggle and a powerful sense of linked fate” (7) that sometimes has induced a collaborative disposition for collective politics on the basis of issues concerning conquest and colonization (→ I/7), chattel slavery (→ I/18), labor exploitation, political subordination, cultural struggle, immigration (→ Transnational Migration, I/44), color and race (→ I/39), sexuality and gender (→ I/9), religion (→ Religious Beliefs, I/40), class, and language (→ I/13).

Dynamics and debates on *latinidad*

Though highly contested and never agreed upon among Latin Americans, the possibility of a transnational and translocal *latinidad* is “a debate that Latin American intellectuals have waged since the nineteenth century” (Caminero-Santangelo 2007, 19) as a consequence of national struggles of independence from Spain (→ Independence Movements, I/10) and as an expression of Latin American resistance and solidarity to the domination of the United States in the region. Despite the instability and profound stratification of Latin American identities ever since the formation of colonial societies in the continent (→ Colonial Rule, I/5), historically, the idea of “an indivisible Latin America,” which for the purpose of this entry includes Brazil and the Spanish-speaking Caribbean, “has been useful in Latin America’s dealing with foreigners” (19). Perhaps the most recent manifestation of unified *latinidad* is the debated Latin American shift to the left at the beginning of the 21st century, also known as the “Pink Tide” that accelerated regional integration (Chodor 2015, 2) and arose prospects of the region’s combined socialist challenge (→ Socialism, I/42) to the global ambitions and

TINA (There Is No Alternative) principle of the European and U.S.-American neoliberal capitalist project since the 1980s (→ Neoliberalism, II/16). Though by no means a homogeneous, regular, or uniform phenomenon, some have interpreted the “Pink Tide,” whose ebbing has become even more evident by conservative backlashes in various countries, as an assertive attempt of the region to reinvent its imaginary in the face of the crisis of the neoliberal order in Latin America (→ Crisis, II/4). From the perspective of the United States, historically empire building agreements such as, for instance, the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, which mainly aimed at preventing Spain from reasserting its power over its former colonies, and the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary, which conferred the United States the power to become the policing authority of the hemisphere and intervene in Latin American nations, expediently construed Latin America as a unified body too with the aim to ostensibly shelter “the independent nations of the Western Hemisphere” (Caminero-Santangelo 2007, 18) from European intervention (→ Pan-Americanism, II/40). At least since the 1920s, the United States appropriated the homogenizing term “*Latin*” (Laó-Montes 2001a, 5) to refer to stereotypical ethnic characters on Hollywood films (read: Latin lovers and Latina spitfires) with only occasional distinctions made by national origin or particular migration histories.

Since the late 1970s in the United States, *latinidad* has been institutionally associated with a unified U.S. Latina/o identity straightforwardly linked to a Latin American heritage that in some fundamental way binds together various disparate groups such as, for instance, Chicanos/as, Puerto Ricans, Cuban Americans, Mexican Americans, Dominican Americans, and more recently Brazilian Americans. As of 2016, Latinas/os constitute the largest and second-fastest growing minority in the United States with the result that, on the one hand, the public discourse on immigration supports the dissemination of what Leo R. Chavez calls “The Latino Threat Narrative” (2008, 2). This saga of illegal and unassimilable *latinidad* festooned with ideas about the impending Latina/o takeover of the U.S. Southwest affects immigrants from Latin America in general and U.S.-born citizens of Latin American background alike and effectively promotes the indiscriminate perception of *latinidad* as the opposite to mainstream Anglo-American culture and everything that damages the nation’s legitimate society and identity. On the other hand, the generic “Latinos” (Dávila 2008, 7) sanctioned by some sectors of academia, mainstream media, journalists, and the consumer market are increasingly viewed by corporate leaders and governments on both sides of the Rio Grande “as the most politically and economically rewarding group” and celebrated as “the answer” to racial problems in the United States (1) (→ Latino Media, III/33; Cultural Industries, III/27). Officially, U.S. Latinas/os were homogenized as an ethnic group through the label “Hispanic” by the U.S. Census Bureau’s Office of Management and Budget in 1977 (Oboler 2006, 9) (→ Ethnicity, I/25). The history of the emergence of U.S. *latinidad*, however, would not be complete without remembering the use of the term “*hispano*” as a sign of solidarity “among working-class immigrants of Hispanic Caribbean and Spanish descent” at the turn of the 20th century in New York City (Laó-Montes 2001a, 5), a city that had been a stronghold for Latin American politics since the last decades of the 19th century. This genealogy also includes the “situationally operative” use that Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans, the two oldest Latina/o subgroups, made of “Latinism”/ “Hispanismo” during the 1970s out of their conviction that group unity was required for their sociopolitical and cultural advancement in response to racialized urban political spaces in Chicago (Padilla 1985, 141).

Prior to this decade, Mexican American civic middle-class elites and organizations such as the Sons of America, the American G.I. Forum, the Pan American Progressive Association, or the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) sought socioeconomic advancement of Mexican Americans through a liberal agenda that emphasized optimistic

individual assimilation and the loud proclamation of loyalty to the United States. Groups rights based on race and ethnicity, however, were conspicuously absent from their agenda. The awareness that assimilationist politics had not diminished racial discrimination that perpetuated the denial of their protection and full rights as citizens (→ Citizenship, II/27; Participation, II/41), and the silencing (→ III/19) of the history of Mexican-origin people in the United States led the Chicana/o movement organizations in the late 1960s to celebrate militant communal advancement and the critique of U.S.-American individualism by focusing on racial pride and cultural difference (→ Social Movements, I/41). Puerto Ricans boasted a long history of political radicalism preceding WWII. Mainly based in New York, leftist nationalism dominated the Puerto Rican politics in the struggle for independence and against Spanish colonialism. Radicalism declined after WWII, and akin to Mexican Americans, Puerto Rican moderate and middle-class elites during the 1950s and early 1960s opted for assimilationist politics. Radical activism returned in the 1960s and 1970s and with it militant movements that advanced cultural pride, action, and “decolonization” (Beltrán 2010, 27) (→ Postcolonialism, I/38). The desire of these two groups to create a homogeneous community of resistance, however, often propagated an essentialist understanding of cultural identity that failed to acknowledge the internal racial and cultural diversities of the group. “La familia de la Raza” (the Chicana/o Movement), for instance, habitually sought to achieve the power of unity and sociopolitical enfranchisement through a form of “political familism” (43) that left little room for dissent. Regrettably, Cristina Beltrán reveals, the struggles of Chicana and Puerto Rican feminist activists, who challenged the traditional gender roles of the groups and were therefore branded as illegitimate members of the community or accused of being sources of discord and fragmentation, remain powerful reminders of how “the politics of group unity” (55) and the common good of *latinidad* have restricted the political options of Latina feminist and queer activists.

The glaring blindness, if not symptomatic failure, of these militant groups to grasp the racial and sociocultural diversities of their constituencies needs to be linked to the heterosexual ideology of unifying *mestizaje* which, since the 19th century in Puerto Rico and other Latin American nations, contributed to the construction of racialized understandings of the self while generating national and racial discourses that aimed to create unified, independent nations (→ Hybridity, I/30; Nation and State Building, I/16). Though by no means homogeneous since every nation generated an idiosyncratic and ever-changing version of the unifying ideology, the ideology of *mestizaje* promoted the national homogeneity that *hispanidad* (Faber 2005) or *latinidad* (Mignolo 2005, 57–60) had not achieved but which was mandatory for the consolidation of the nation by ostensibly making “racial categories unimportant” and turning “the majority of the population into *mestizos*, sharing a common national culture and identity” (Wade 2009, 157). And yet, national discourses of racial harmony in Latin America (read: “We Are All ‘Latinoamericanos’”) (Bonilla-Silva 2010, 183), which affect differently indigenous and African heritages, have consistently celebrated the preeminence of the white (European), Hispanic experience to the detriment of the racialized indigenous and African ones that are systematically marginalized while the discourses sustain myths of racial democracies (→ Democracy, II/32; Indigeneity, I/31). Color-blind *mestizaje* significantly continues to affect the racialized way Latin Americans and Latinos/as relate to racial and sociocultural differences in the American hemisphere to this day.

There are a wide array of complexities of race relations in individual Latin American nations or the Spanish-speaking Caribbean islands and their distinct celebrations of whiteness (→ I/46), Hispanic heritage, and Catholicism. Suffice to mention Ileana M. Rodríguez-Silva’s important research on Puerto Rico’s persistent troubles with non-whiteness and the

country's concomitant denial of racialized domination. Rodríguez-Silva, for instance, reveals how in order to silence politicized blackness and respond to cultural Americanization, intellectual and political elites not only recurred to the *jíbaro* (the Puerto Rican highland peasant) trope (190) but also to the unifying cultural construct of the "*raza iberoamericana*" (187). In 1912, the notion *raza iberoamericana* simultaneously enabled nationalist Creole intellectuals on the island to culturally position themselves closer to the Latin American republics and Spain, to disassociate themselves from the imperial United States, but also to dilute the nation's blackness, and to distant itself from the "black Caribbean neighbours with whom they ... shared a history of slavery, sugar and coffee economies, plantation work, colonial rule, and direct US intervention" (188) (→ Colonial Economies, I/4; Colonial Rule, I/5).

At the same time, it is crucial to underline that historically, Mexican Americans who have embraced Chicana/o identities have had an antagonistic relationship with the panethnic term "Hispanic." Considering the group's predilection of "indigenous over Spanish colonial roots with regards to Mexican culture," some view the term as an imposed "colonist" moniker that stresses the Spanish heritage and brings to mind the annihilation of indigenous and black peoples in the Americas (Caminero-Santangelo 2015, 16). The appellation "Latino" has similarly been questioned for its etymology which foregrounds "Latin" cultures over others in the light that, Walter Mignolo elaborates, "'Latin' America was the name adopted to identify the restoration of European Meridional, Catholic, and Latin 'civilization' in South America and, simultaneously, to reproduce absences (Indians and Afros) that had already begun during the colonial period" (2005, 57–58). And yet, it should be recognized that the exaltation of indigeneity (→ I/31) as a means to critique colonial racialized domination in the American hemisphere does not destabilize national *mestizaje* narratives as radically as blackness does as showcased, for instance, by the ethnic tensions between some Mexican Americans, Chicanas/os, and Indigenous peoples in New Mexico and Arizona; the exclusion of Indigenous peoples characteristic of Mexican *mestizaje* (Kirschner 2012, 18–19); or the Peruvian case of Inca "whiteness." In Peru, indeed, a country until very recently virtually absent in studies of slavery or blackness in the Americas, "the Inca" (Greene 2012, 283) is central to discourses of power, identity, civilization, and citizenship (→ II/27) and thus to the marginalization of other histories and forms of ethnic difference such as Afro-Peruvians, native Amazonians, diverse Andean people, and Asian Peruvians.

Currently, the internal decolonial critique of a growing number of Latin American and Latina/o scholars underscores that *latinidad* has never been uncomplicated and emphasizes the need to engage with the concept's "own ideological construction and sustenance" (Aparicio and Chávez-Silverman 1997, 16) to problematize racism, ethnocentrism, classism, religious intolerance, and sexism inherent not only in mainstream Anglo culture but also in traditional Latin American and Latina/o cultures. At a historical juncture when in the United States the Latin American identity ideology *mestizaje* is advanced as the ultimate panethnic notion that equitably recognizes "the mixed racial, social, linguistic, national, cultural, and ethnic legacies inherent to Latino/a cultures and identities" (Pérez-Torres 2015, 25), these scholars propose that the complications of an allegedly cohesive *latinidad* or an unambiguous Latina/o identity have to be linked to the unresolved debates about a unified Latin American *mestizo* identity since deeply ingrained ideologies of race, gender, religion, sexuality, and *limpieza de sangre* (purity of blood), which largely can be traced back to the Iberian Peninsula before and around the time of the conquest, still linger and continue to impact the formation of Latin American and Latina/o identities as well as the way *latinidad* is lived and experienced (Kirschner 2012, 3–4). As already shown, this is not the first time that *mestizaje* has been celebrated as the all-embracing, democratic identity *par excellence*. In the postindependence

Latin American context, self-congratulatory white *criollo* elites and modern think tanks promoted *mestizaje* while leaving uncontested abject socioeconomic inequality and colonial racial hierarchies that legitimized relations of exclusion, domination, and exploitation imposed by the conquest (→ Social Inequality, II/20).

Present-day celebrations of *mestizaje* too often disavow that this dogma of collective *latinidad* hides practices of “whitening” (read: synonyms of Western European progress) that traditionally have privileged Christian Europeaness over Indigenous or African peoples, religions, cultures, and traditions all along likewise marginalizing Arab, Asian, Hindu, Jewish, other non-Christian, non-Western European ethnicities, and civilizations which are also unquestionably constitutive of Latin Americans’ and Latinas/os’ racial, religious, and cultural heritages. Despite slowly changing, in Latin America, processes of deprecation inherent to *mestizaje* continue to result in the little appreciation of the sociocultural contributions of Latin Americans with Middle Eastern, Eastern European, Asian, or non-Catholic heritages (Lesser and Rein 2008, 23), while in the United States, monolithic and essentializing understandings of, for example, Latin America and/or *latinidad* seem to preclude the possibility that Arabs (whether Christian, Jewish, or Muslim), Buddhists, or Jews (whether Arab, Ashkenazi, Mizrahi, or Sephardic) can be Latin Americans or Latinos/as or that Latin Americans and/or Latinas/os can be more than just Catholics or Christians (→ Religious Beliefs, I/40). Moreover, Arlene Dávila acknowledges that celebratory appeals to a common *latinidad*, transnational *latinidad*, or notions of *mestizaje* whether from Latinas/os and non-Latinas/os do not protect black and indigenous Latinas/os “from racial discrimination” (2008, 9). Silvio Torres-Saillant similarly articulates how the limited critical engagement with the histories of the Latin American and Caribbean regions, which should include the critical study of the evolutions of the ideology of *mestizaje* in specific contexts, is responsible for divisive intra-Latina/o racism and ethnocentrism detected in the United States (2003, 126–127).

It is thus not surprising that U.S. corporate mass-media representation of *latinidad* has the proclivity to reassure the Caucasian ideal of normative “whiteness” (→ I/46) which by default, for instance, is not Arab, Asian, Black, Jewish, Hindu, Indigenous, and, for that matter, does not speak Creole, Quechua, Aymara, Garífuna, Guaraní, Hindi, Ladino, Lucumi, Papiamentu, Arabic, Chinese, Russian, Haitian Creole, Japanese, Korean, Sranan Tongo, Yiddish among many others tongues. This glaring diversity would belie notions of a shared Latina/o-Hispanic linguistic heritage and common culture (→ Language, I/13). From this perspective, in the present neoliberal context, instances that allegedly celebrate generic “Latinos” “in all their many colors and nationalities” (Ulibarri 2015, 156), but not necessarily differentiate their many genders, sexualities, legal statuses, religious affiliations, phenotypes, disabilities, immigration experiences, languages, pigmentation of their skin, levels of education, heritages, or length of residence in the United States are better understood as market commodification through the community’s difference which while relying on stereotypes of ethnicity and race “advertise and sell ‘Latino’ as a type of brand name” (2015, 156) (→ Consumerism, I/23). At this juncture, it is equally relevant to remember that quintessential Latin American *mestizaje* discourse that has engaged hemispheric relations South and North has largely overlooked Canada as a nation relevant to the theorization of *mestizo/a* identities in the Americas. Scholars such as Rachel Adams, Albert Braz, Sarah Phillips Casteel, and Winfried Siemerling have called attention to the continental exclusion of Canada from discourses on slavery, Black diaspora, racial hybridity, borderlands, and *mestizaje*. Only recently have discourses of *latinidad* begun to connect with Latino/a Canadians. Though not as numerous as in the USA, the dialogue with a Latino/a group that largely

arrived in Canada between the 1960s and the 1990s as a consequence of political unrest and economic decline in Latin American nations offers the unique opportunity to examine from comparative perspectives how Latina/o minorities “are constructed and transformed in different host societies” (Armory 2015, 20).

Similarly, as immigration studies in the United States become increasingly aware of Brazilian communities, Latina/o scholars have called attention to the ambiguous position, if not absence, of Brazilians but also Portuguese and Spaniards within the discourse of *latinidad*. The marginal position of Brazil, Portugal, and Portuguese within *latinidad* has to be understood in the context of hegemonic intellectual traditions originating in Latin America where differences in the colonial history of the discovery, conquest, political independence, language, and national development of Spanish and Portuguese America have been too often perceived as insurmountable barriers that preclude commonalities between Spanish and Portuguese Latin(a/o) America (Kirschner 2018). Alike Chicanos/as, Brazilian U.S. Americans have problematized the official umbrella term “Hispanic,” which, unlike the epithet Latina/o, precludes “the possibility of affirming Brazilian identity” in the U.S. (Braga 2007, 231).

Despite the absence of Spain and Spanish Americans from mainstream discourses of U.S. *latinidad*, a number of Latina writers emphasize their Jewish-Spanish (Sephardic) roots as integral to Latino/a communities, while Muslim Latino/as revive the silenced heritage of Muslim Spain to find a voice and affirm their belonging to *latinidad*. Studies of *latinidad* correspondingly will need to consider the growing number of Latin Americans who display their appreciation of “their Morisco or Sephardi *converso* lineage” (Shohat and Stam 2014, 123). In the meantime, sectors of Latino/a scholars talk about plural *latinidad(es)* as they strive to acknowledge meaningful differences as well as meaningful similarities among Latin American and Latino/a societies, communities, and sociocultural expressions. These intellectuals endeavor to expand their knowledge of Latin(o/a) American identities in the Americas without ranking humanity or reinforcing color lines.

Conclusion and outlook

It is true that historically the idea of *latinidad* was advanced by imperial France and became a Eurocentric ideology for the colonization of being in the Americas (→ America, I/x; Foundational Discourses, III/x). It is also true that in the United States, there is a growing neoconservative strand of “Latino politics” (Laó-Montes 2001b, 135), mostly visible in the Republican Party, that disseminates Hispanic neoliberal ideals, bold nationalism, and anti-immigrant sentiments that affect peoples at home and abroad. However, as Walter Mignolo accurately acknowledges, sectors of Latin American and Latina/o scholars have turned *latinidad* into a decolonial project (2005, 64). For instance, inspired by the groundbreaking work of Kimberlé Crenshaw and her concept known as intersectionality (→ I/32), Latin(o/a) American scholars flesh out and disentangle the politics of color-blind racism as they explore the way, e.g. race, gender, ethnicity, religion, class, sexuality, and ethnicity intersect to determine inclusion or exclusion from *latinidad*, *mestizaje*, and any other of their cognates, such as *antropofagia*, *syncretism*, and *transculturation*. Furthermore, the intersectional perspective allows for analyzing the incredible power of these concepts to silence (→ Silencing, III/19), to erase whole cultural traditions and human voices in their pursuit of “whiteness” and cultural homogeneity. At the same time, Latinas/os in the United States embrace the advantages and acknowledge the political power wielded through the strategic adoption of panethnic *latinidad* in the public arena at a national level while multifarious social movements (→ I/41)

and subgroups such as Chicanas/os, Puerto Ricans, Argentines, Colombians, Dominicans, Peruvians, Venezuelans, and others push for their own specific agendas determined by their particular trajectories and circumstances in California, Florida, New York, Illinois, New Mexico, Texas, Arizona, and Connecticut. While Latinas/os redefine conceptualizations of postnational, transnational, dual, and “‘regional’ forms of citizenship” (Rocco 2006, 320), immigrant rights groups from the United States and Latin America, that understand immigration as more than a national problem, share experiences and engage in practices of hemispheric citizenship (→ II/27) as they concentrate on “more immediate solutions to problems of immigrants and workers in the Americas” (Luis-Brown 2008, 241). The recognition of the sheer linguistic, religious, ethnic, phenotypical, and cultural diversities of *latinidad* as well as the ever-growing internal critique of white-supremacist intellectual paradigms that traditionally have plagued the concept reveals *latinidad*’s potential for meaningful coalition building in the collective struggle for hemispheric but also global justice and human rights (→ II/35). In this sense, *latinidad* could become a space for greater cross-cultural understanding that challenges us to think about social transformation, political mobilization, and mutual understanding in non-reductionist ways.

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MEMORY POLITICS

Ludmila da Silva Catela and Michael Stewart Foley

Memory processes, the construction of testimonials on trauma, the association of victims united by state violence: all of these have emerged, in large part, from the domestic space and refuge from external danger. They are born as immediate means for processing inexplicable suffering as well as incomprehensible and extreme situations, such as the disappearance of people, torture, mass murder, clandestine kidnapping, child abduction, exile, terrorist attacks, and ethnic cleansing. However, what is particular to these memory acts is their position in the public space as political problems that cease being private in order to reshape forms of coexistence for the common good, such as demonstrations consisting of “citizens demanding their right to participate in the construction of political memory and the image of the past under public consideration” [translation by the author] (Vinyes 2009, 43, 2011). These demands may take the form of silence (→ Silencing, III/19), forgetting, or, at times, commemorations of past traumas. In this way, society establishes a set of “interventions by public actors with the goal of producing and imposing common memories for a given society, favoring the monopolization of the instruments for public action (official commemorations, academic history programs, laws, memorials, pantheons, etc.)” [translation by the author] (Michel 2010a, 2010b, 17) (→ Memorial Culture, I/14).

Consequently, memory politics can be considered as actions carried out in the public sphere by *entrepreneurs of memory* (Jelin 2002; Pollak 2006) who implement, plan, disseminate, and promote relations between the past and the present, between the generation of memory communities and the resolution of conflicts through the construction of spaces and the participation in “struggles” to define what is remembered, silenced, and forgotten in the face of the effects of political violence (Montaño and Crenzel 2015). These mediators may participate in state institutions, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and may range from human rights associations to art collectives (Montaño 2011; Lifschitz 2014). This also includes memory agents who act as mediators through their professional practices: historians, journalists, lawyers, filmmakers, artists, etc. (Pérotin-Dumon 2007; Vecchioli 2013; Alfaro 2016) (→ Public Intellectuals, III/18).

In general, the concept of memory politics comprehends both actions by social collectives and policies embedded in the state (→ Nation State, II/38) for denouncing crimes against humanity and for providing instruments for victim compensation. On one level, direct political practices are created for increasing visibility in the public space associated with rituals

and commemorations of significant dates. These include creative actions framed by the use of symbols, such as the white scarves of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, photographs of the dead held aloft by the mothers of the disappeared in Chile, the butterflies in the collective memory of the Dominican Republic, the murals of Guatemala, and the embroidered words “Peace, Memory and Justice” in Mexico. Examples of rituals include silent marches, demonstrations by families of the disappeared, the *escraches* in Argentina and the *funas* in Chile, the commemorative flowers of September 11 for the attacks on the Twin Towers in the USA, and the anniversary marches for *coups d'états* all over Latin America. On another level, the policies carried out by the state are instituted in all forms and stages at which planning is implemented, ranging from programs of compensation and reparations for victims to educational policies (→ Education, I/24), as well as involving the promotion and creation of places, sites, and museums dedicated to memory. Dates have also been established on nations’ calendars specifically for the purpose of remembering situations of violence and warning future generations about the path to such tragedies with the idea of *nunca más* [Never Again] (Herrera and Bedoya 2016).

Memory politics in the Central and South American context

Memory politics, in the South and Central American context, comprise a series of actions developed over time through demands by different groups and activists for recognition and accountability of state violence.

The construction of a dominant memory can be considered as the first step in memory politics defining what must be remembered – as well as what is silenced and forgotten – which constitutes a hegemonic memory or “the rhetoric of markers” (Piper 2009). This selection embraces a variety of themes and debates. For instance, in Colombia, there are identifiable instances where memory construction is generated with respect to the definition of the idea of *victim*. In Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, views have been constructed in relation to the notion of the *disappeared*. Processes that led to different definitions in the category of torture in Brazil can also be seen, as well as the visibility acquired by local indigenous memories in the face of repression in Guatemala, Peru, and Bolivia (→ Indigeneity, I/31), who are so often rendered invisible and silenced in other countries of Latin America. These ideas suggest a process of selection and dismissal, which generate battles over memory which arise from beneath the surface in response to more hegemonic and dominant definitions.

Setting commemoration dates is another action that comprises memory politics. Dates are established in sequences that correspond to local, national, and international events and memories in which diverse rituals are performed that continually give visibility to demands and commemorations regarding victims of political violence. Every country has resolved the defining of their respective memory calendars in a unique way. The calendars revolve around the dates of military coups, as in the case of March 24 in Argentina, which has been declared a national holiday as the Day of Remembrance for Truth and Justice. In contrast, in Brazil, despite efforts to establish April 1 as a moment of remembrance, it has not been accepted by Brazilian citizenry (→ Civil Society, II/28). September 11, in Chile, is also remarkable as a day of remembrance that divides the society between those who support and those who repudiate the nation’s past of terrorist state violence. Notwithstanding, dates of celebration may be defined according to other events, for example, in Paraguay, where November 3 is a popular day of celebration for the dictator Stroessner’s birthday, and in Peru, where the state established December 10 as the Day of National Reconciliation, which was rejected by the citizenry (Jelin 2002; Garretón et al. 2011).

Another action attributed to memory politics is the creation of public institutions and sites of memory. One of the most visible signs of memory politics has been the creation and management of memory institutions by the state and civil society organizations: museums, archives, and cultural centers. Examples of such institutions are the “Archives of Terror” at the Paraguayan Documentation Center (1993), the National Memory Archives in Argentina (2003), the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Chile (2009), and the Place of Memory, Tolerance and Social Inclusion in Peru (2015). In national spaces, archives and museums present new narratives of the recent past, establish alternative temporalities, and propose diverse significations for state violence (Da Silva Catela and Jelin 2002). In contrast, a social victory not to be overlooked has been the resignification of locations where political violence was perpetrated (prisons, clandestine detention centers, and police stations) (→ Security, II/45), and sites of memory whose main feature is the observance *in situ* of the characteristics of state terrorism on the different national, regional, and local levels (Da Silva Catela 2014). The variety of spaces and places of memory in the Americas constitutes a milestone that has altered city landscapes (→ Urbanization, I/45) and generated new avenues for the transmission of memory and conceptualizations of the recent past.

The installation of memory markers is also important for commemoration through its institutionalization of historical recollection like memorials, topographies, and maps capable of guaranteeing transmission to successive generations that have been managed from various perspectives and with diverse supports, invaded the public space with wide-ranging permanent and temporary actions, and are mainly generated by civil society activities (Jelin and Langland 2003). These include experiences such as the Memorial for Detained-Disappeared People and those Executed for Political Reasons in Chile, the Remembrance Park in Buenos Aires, the Eye That Cries Memorial in Peru, and the Memorial to the Disappeared in Uruguay. More ephemeral expressions should also be included in this symbolic marker system, such as graffiti, murals, and stencils whose main feature is the use of urban space for conveying meaning (→ Visual Cultures, III/45; Muralism, III/37). Examples include the Memory Tiles in Argentina, the anonymous tombs of the disappeared in Colombia bearing marks instead of names, and the Highway of Historic Memory in Honduras.

Reparations and symbolic restitution depict another act of memory politics which includes pleas for forgiveness by state and public figures and have constituted formal approaches (through administrative acts) and less formal approaches (through political acts) for generating symbolic reparations for the suffering of families and victims (→ Family, I/26). Such actions may be addressed to the entire community of the nation or to specific groups as exemplified in each of the following official please for pardon: in Chile, during the presentation of the *Report by the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission* (1991), when President Patricio Aylwin asked for forgiveness from the families of those affected by violence; in Peru, when President Alejandro Toledo acknowledged the victims of the armed conflict (2003); Argentine President Néstor Kirchner’s act of removing the portraits of repressors displayed at the Military College (2003); the public hearings on the Amnesty Caravans in Brazil (2009), which initiated the first act of asking for forgiveness from the persecuted and tortured villagers during the repression of guerrillas in Araguaia; and the request for pardon by the Colombian State from the victims of the Palace of Justice (2013). The preceding are all symbolic acts of reparation and restitution for crimes committed by the state at different historic moments in Latin America (Garretón et al. 2011).

The production of educational materials is also to be included in the actions associated with memory politics (→ Education, I/24). During the transition to democracy (→ II/32; Authoritarianism, II/25), it was necessary for countries of Latin America to generate educational

materials establishing systems for understanding their respective violent pasts and human rights violations (→ Human Rights, II/35). Every country instituted different educational policies regarding memory, which were included in school curricula either on a mandatory or an optional basis. A few examples were Bolivia's *National Plan of Action for Human Rights*, 2009–2013, incorporating the issue of forced disappearances into school programs; the *Young People and Memory Program* of the Provincial Commission on Memory for the Province of Buenos Aires; and the pedagogical program of the Presidency of the Republic of Colombia, *Peace is a note*. These and other initiatives share at their core the discussion of controversial subjects in the classroom where consideration is given not only to historical data but also to the impact of intranational experiences of violence in Latin American countries.

These are all ephemeral actions that generate new territories of memory; monuments that are erected in cities as markers against forgetting; and archives that contain documentary evidence of state violence, manuals, scholastic events, pleas for forgiveness, new commemorative dates on calendars, and numerous actions intended to convey what should *never again* take place for the citizens of a nation. They are efforts to promote the rejection of political violence as a form of regulating social relations and clandestine actions by the state to repress, torture, disappear, and murder. All memory politics involve a two-way relationship between the actions of a civil society struggling to give visibility to its memories and the formalized actions of the state. It is a relationship that revolves around what a nation should remember regarding historical facts and events of political and social violence in order to build an active, dynamic, and inclusive present.

Memory politics in the North American context

Unlike in Central and South America, memory politics in the United States has not often centered around traumatic experiences resulting from state violence, even though the state has been responsible for carrying out or allowing trauma-inducing violence at various points in the nation's history. Rather, political battles over the national memory have been more likely to be fought over differing views of the nation's history, and have more likely been contested over the establishment or removal of historical monuments, the content of museum exhibitions and school curricula, or the representations of history made in documentary films (→ Cinema, III/25). In particular, most battles over national memory in the United States have been fought over issues of race (→ I/39) or war, and sometimes both.

Despite wiping out indigenous peoples (→ I/11), enslaving millions of Africans and their descendants (→ Slavery, I/18), tolerating a form of racial apartheid for nearly a century after slavery's end, and imprisoning 120,000 Japanese-Americans during World War II, the United States has never held any form of truth and reconciliation process. Although the identity of the modern U.S. is tied in many ways to a late 20th-century embrace of multiculturalism (→ I/36), little effort has been made at a national level to formally address these actions that many would call crimes against humanity. One exception is the 1988 passage of the Civil Liberties Act to pay reparations to Japanese-Americans held in wartime "internment" camps during World War II and their descendants. At the time that President Ronald Reagan signed the law into effect, he acknowledged, on behalf of the American government, that the imprisonment of Japanese-Americans during the war had been the product of "racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a failure of political leadership." Still, it took decades of campaigning on the part of the Japanese-American community to get this acknowledgment because most Americans, both within government and without, would have preferred to forget this ugly chapter in the nation's history (Maki et al. 1999).

In fact, calls for reparations have usually been greeted with expressions of the impracticality of calculating and distributing reparations coupled with a clear desire on the part of the people's representatives to look to the future rather than to the past. On no issue has this been more contentious and more obvious than in calls for reparations for the descendants of African slaves. The call for reparations has been presented both as a repayment of a moral debt – to acknowledge the fundamental evil of a government-sanctioned institution of inhumanity – as well as payment for the literal theft of black-owned property and the deliberate exclusion of blacks from housing markets all over the country (Coates 2014) (→ Urbanization, I/45). Dating to the 1970s, serious calls for reparations were articulated by scholars, only to be largely ignored. In 1972, Yale Law professor Boris Bittker wrote *The Case for Black Reparations*; in 2000, civil rights activist Randall Robinson published *The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks*; and in 2014, Ta-Nehisi Coates used his prominence as a celebrated journalist to make the case for reparations once more. And yet, at this writing, House Bill 40, which simply calls for the “study” of reparations, has yet to be brought to the floor of Congress for discussion.

In the decades since the Vietnam War, memory politics has taken on greater importance, particularly in debates over the ways that war has been memorialized in monuments, museum exhibitions, and documentary films. In fact, debates over the way that the American war in Vietnam is remembered have been some of the nation's most contested. By 1980, presidential candidate Ronald Reagan referred to the war as a “noble cause,” and pledged never to send Americans to war “with one arm tied behind their backs”; in the way, critics said the government had mobilized troops during the Vietnam War (→ Military, II/37). When a citizen commission chose Yale architecture student Maya Lin's spare, sober design for a Vietnam War Memorial on the Mall in Washington, D.C., it provoked fierce disagreement and debate. Some veterans regarded the black marble memorial, inscribed with the names of more than 58,000 Americans killed in Vietnam, as overly negative, evoking the shame of a nation. Feeling pressure from the growing protestations, the government art commission fashioned a compromise which allowed the placement of a more traditional sculpture (of three soldiers) near the Lin memorial (Reston 2017). Still, as Marita Sturken (1997) has shown, the wall's emphasis on the victims and veterans has led to a discussion of honor and sacrifice even though the memorial stands as a condemnation of war.

The building of the Vietnam War Memorial on the National Mall prompted, in some ways, debates about how Americans remember earlier wars. Veterans' organizations were quick to point out that no substantial memorial had been dedicated to veterans of either the Korean War or World War II. As the 1990s dawned, with fiftieth-anniversary commemorations marking events of World War II, the United States saw some of its fiercest battles over how war is remembered.

Perhaps the most intense controversy over memorializing World War II came in response to a proposed exhibit at the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum. In 1994, as the exhibition came together around the refurbished Enola Gay, the plane from which the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, veterans' groups organized protests and lobbied Congress to demand changes. While Museum curators sought to use the Enola Gay and the fiftieth anniversary as an opportunity not only to commemorate the end of the war, but to contemplate the dawn of the nuclear age (including the damage the bombs did to Japan), veterans and their supporters thought that the exhibition emphasizes only that the bomb had won the war and saved the lives of countless others who would have died in continued hostilities. For more than a year, the controversy raged, with professional historians rushing to defend the Smithsonian's independence and citizen groups accusing it

of caving in to “political correctness.” In the end, over the objections of professional historians and the director of the museum, who resigned in protest, the public and Congress imposed enough pressure that a compromise exhibition was launched. As the historian Edward Linenthal noted, the problem for history museums seemed to be the tension between the “commemorative voice” and the “historical voice” (Linenthal and Englehardt 1996).

This tension between history and commemoration has, in many ways, defined memory politics since the 1990s. In 1994, for example, Lynne Cheney, the former head of the National Endowment for the Humanities, criticized the work of a national commission set up (at her direction) to create national history standards. The standards were intended to be used by teachers in public schools all over the country, but Cheney found them to be burdened by “political correctness,” lacking sufficient “celebratory” tone, or a “tone of affirmation” (1994) (→ Multiculturalism, I/36). Later in the decade, by some estimates, the Japanese–American Memorial to Patriotism during World War II was criticized for offsetting the celebration of Japanese–American veterans of the war with the acknowledgment of injustice at the imprisonment of 120,000 Japanese–Americans without due process. Historian Stephen Ambrose wrote that “we ought to redress the wrongs with apologies, congressional resolutions, exhibits in museums, passages in history textbooks – but not with monuments” (1999).

By the time the National World War II Memorial was dedicated – in the middle of the National Mall, between the Lincoln and Washington Memorials – in 2004, with more than \$180 million in private donations, the commemoration camp seemed to have won. Unlike the memorials to veterans of the Vietnam and Korean Wars, or the memorial to Japanese–Americans, the neoclassical styling (some critics suggested it looked like fascist monuments) of the World War II Memorial is uncompromising in celebrating the service and sacrifice of the sixteen million men who fought in that war. It is the culmination of a memorial-building boom that, according to Kristin Hass, revives post-Vietnam War nationalism by “enabling and encouraging an unfettered celebration of military service” (2013, 74). The shame and agony of the Vietnam War is not forgotten, but it has been effectively put in its place by the triumphalism of the World War II Memorial.

And yet, in the years since the World War II Memorial was built, the politics surrounding the memory of slavery, segregation, and especially the civil rights movement (→ Social Movements, I/41) has produced a counter-narrative, as well as controversy, particularly as memory of the black experience has intersected with questions of how the American Civil War should be commemorated. Thus, even as monuments to 20th century war veterans turned away from an honest reckoning with the costs and horrors of war, civil rights memorials shifted the national conversation on the Civil War toward reckoning with the shame of the Confederacy’s defense of slavery.

Dating to the 1980s, when public television documentaries such as “Eyes on the Prize” and “Eyes on the Prize II” celebrated the courage of civil rights activists who risked their lives confronting the structures of racial segregation (→ Television, III/43), Congress established a national holiday marking the birthdate of civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. and modern-day activists turned their efforts toward the establishment of a number of civil rights museums. The National Civil Rights Museum opened in Memphis in 1991, followed by other civil rights museums in Birmingham (1992), Montgomery (2000), Greensboro (2010), Atlanta (2014), and Jackson (2017). Furthermore, state legislatures approved the installation of historic markers, noting important events in the civil rights struggle, all over the South. Not all Americans agreed with this turn in commemorating the movement; a roadside marker, noting the place where young Emmett Till’s body was found, has been repeatedly damaged by racists in recent years.

In recent years, the strength of this national narrative of celebrating the civil rights movement has combined with the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement to start a new conversation about the appropriateness of honoring major figures of the Confederacy. Critics saw the long-standing presence of Confederate monuments in cities all over the South in the same way that they saw the flying of the Confederate flag over some state houses: as a denial of the South's loss in the Civil War, as a defiant clinging to a Southern heritage that unapologetically included slavery, and as an encouragement to racists responsible for recent mass shootings of African-Americans. Very quickly, in a matter of months, Confederate monuments came down in many cities, most notably in New Orleans, where the statues will be moved to museums but will no longer dominate the public landscape.

This movement to confront the ugliness of the U.S. American past stands in contrast to how Americans have remembered moments of national trauma in the wake of terrorist attacks. As Marita Sturken has shown, in the case of the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building and in the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, the national response has been defined by consumerism (→ I/23), an "investment," Sturken says, "in American innocence." A "kitsch comfort culture," including World Trade Center snow globes and New York Fire Department teddy bears, turns visitors to these memorials into consumers and tourists. Deeper engagement with the social, political, and economic contexts of these events is elided in favor of simple kitsch consumer items portraying American innocence (Sturken 2007).

In this way, the public in the United States is complicit in accommodating the states dominant narratives of innocence and triumph. There have been exceptions – including the recognition of crimes against Japanese-Americans during World War II and the removal of Confederate monuments – but citizen calls for full accountability of state violence in South American countries vastly surpass any such calls in the United States.

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35

MODERNIZATION

Frederik Schulze

Modernization as a theory emerged after World War II in the context of the Cold War and was most influential in the 1960s. It was the climax, and in a certain way, also an ephemeral endpoint of developmental thinking (→ Development, II/6). Modernization theory, mostly promoted by U.S.-American economists, argued that the West, and especially the U.S., had undergone a modernization process from traditional to modern societies, shaped by nation-states (→ II/38), democracies (→ II/32), capitalism (→ II/2), industrialization, high growth, technological progress, and a good standard of living. This theory considered most non-Western and also Latin American societies as traditional, but promised that every society could become modern and reach the living standard of the West. Modernization theory was a Western counter-theory to Marxism–Leninism and resulted in aid programs that aimed to modernize the so-called Third World in order to align it to the West. Modernization was discussed and implemented in Latin America, too, with diverging success.

Modernization is related to the terms “modernity”/ “modern,” which designate the goal of modernization. “Development” is often used synonymously, but refers to a more general and less theorized process of economic growth. “Progress” has a similar meaning, but represents the prewar thinking. Understanding modernization as a historical process, it correlates with westernization and, these days, globalization. Therefore, modernization has faith in progress and is Eurocentric, since it asserts that Western history should be a model for the non-Western world. With that, it connects colonial epistemology to other non-Western societies by blaming them for being traditional and backward. For the U.S., Latin America is figured as the negative, underdeveloped other.

Progress orientation before World War II

Narratives of progress had already shaped the political thinking in the Americas in the 19th century (Ekbladh 2010, 14–39). In the U.S., the ideas of individualism, human rights (→ II/35), and political liberalism, crucial for the declaration of independence from 1776 (→ Independence Movements, I/10), and, with the increasing European immigration (→ Migration, I/15), the perception of a civilizing mission for the subcontinent gained ground. This ideology, known as Manifest Destiny, valued technological progress, infrastructure, and industrialization. It included racism and led to the extrusion and extinction of indigenous

peoples (→ I/11) and to the opening-up of the country through the advancing frontier to the West.

Also in Latin America, ideas of progress were virulent. After the independence in early 19th century, the political elites, often of European descent, wished to Europeanize their countries by adopting Western racist discourses and aspiring after technological inventions from Europe (→ Race, I/39). This “oligarchic modernity” was shaped by the economic and social conditions of the colonial era (→ Colonial Rule, I/5; Colonial Economies, I/4), for instance, by slavery (→ I/18) or the export of primary goods (→ Extractivism, II/9). The elites aspired for economic expansion and rejected the cultural heritage of the colonial era (Larraín 2000, 70–91). In mid-19th-century Argentina, politicians such as Juan Bautista Alberdi or Domingo Faustino Sarmiento championed European immigration, and in the 1870s and 1880s, indigenous peoples were eliminated during the so-called Conquest of the Desert in Patagonia. In Brazil, some intellectuals even aimed to “whiten up” their country and erase its African heritage by European immigrants (→ Whiteness, I/46). French thinker Auguste Comte and his idea of Positivism propagated technological progress and helped to theorize the enthusiasm for progress in Brazil and other countries. The European orientation was prevalent on the whole continent where a contrast emerged between the countryside and growing cities in which a new middle class enjoyed a Western lifestyle (→ Urbanization, I/45). Great Britain was a reference for technology, and as Latin America’s most important trade partners and creditors, Britons built railroads and electrified cities. France figured as the cultural model and proclaimed the *latinité*, offering Latin American countries a place in Western culture.

Already in 1823, U.S. President James Monroe had declared the Western Hemisphere as under the U.S.-American sphere of influence, but only by the end of the century, did the U.S. slowly replace the European influence in Latin America (→ Pan-Americanism, II/40). After World War I, the U.S. became its main trade partner and started to intervene politically (→ Interventionism, II/36). From around 1870, U.S.-American press, travel writing (→ III/22), and political debates portrayed Latin America as backward and held climatic and racist reasons accountable (→ Political Communication, II/42). Those discourses were often shaped by ignorance (Park 1995). Also in academics, for instance, in Latin American Studies, founded in the 1920s, a negative perception of Latin America prevailed (Berger 1995). After the victory in the Spanish-American War in 1898, the U.S. finally became a regional power, especially in the Caribbean. The United States condemned Spanish colonialism and stylized themselves as the replicator of democracy and progress, but always representing their own economic interests (Krenn 1990). In the south, mixed feelings about the northern neighbor arose. Intellectuals such as Cuban José Martí or Venezuelan César Zumeta criticized the imperialist ambitions of the U.S. Moreover, in his influential book *Ariel*, Uruguayan José Enrique Rodó acknowledged the economic success of North America, but rejected the imitation of U.S.-American culture, which he called empty (Rodó 1988 [1900]).

Modernization theory in the Americas during the global Cold War

The term “modernization” had already emerged in the 19th century, but it was not until 1900 that it was used to refer to the future (Gumbrecht 1978, 120–121). In the 1930s, modernization was developed further into a U.S.-American concept with which liberalism could be argued against fascism and communism (Ekbladh 2010, 3–4). After World War II, *development* (→ II/6) was the predominant term for the moment and a strategic “weapon in the ideological combat that was the Cold War” (Westad 2007; Rist 2008 [1988]; Ekbladh

2010, 3; Latham 2011). The U.S. propagated their economic and social model with the global aspiration of a world power, not least to gain influence in the so-called Third World. This was particularly true as the Soviet Union entered the stage as an opponent in seeking world domination, promoting an alternative model of society. In his inaugural address from 1949, President Truman formulated for the first time the claim on leading the world through growth to “prosperity and peace,” by “making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (Truman 1949).

When economists and social scientists such as Talcott Parsons and Paul Rosenstein-Rodan started to research underdevelopment, modernization theory emerged as a metatheory on the development in the late 1950s. The theory described an ideal path of modernization and suggested solutions for underdevelopment (Gilman 2004; Ekbladh 2010). Modernization theory used the dichotomy of modern and traditional societies and assumed a linear development of humanity encompassing economy, society, and politics. Since the theory defined Western modernity as desirable for all humanity and imagined the U.S. to be at the top of human development, its arguments were Eurocentric and universalistic (Latham 2000, 4, 37). The goal was to modernize underdeveloped countries by self-sustaining economic growth.

Nils Gilman (2004) has shown that networks at Harvard Department of Social Relations and at MIT’s Center for International Studies were crucial for this theory formation. Influential proponents were Walt Whitman Rostow, Daniel Lerner, Lucian Pye, Gabriel Almond, James Coleman, Alexander Gerschenkron, Albert O. Hirschman, Alex Inkeles, and David H. Smith. Modernization theory was the product of an interdisciplinary environment and influenced a wide range of disciplines from sociology to history.

Walt Whitman Rostow, Professor for Economic History at MIT, published the most important contribution to modernization theory in 1960: *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. He outlined an alternative concept to Marxian dialectic that understood modernization as a social, political, economic, and cultural development process into modernity. He argued that first Great Britain had experienced this process and then Western Europe and the U.S. Furthermore, Rostow defined five stages of modernization: “the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption” (Rostow 1960, 4). While, in his view, traditional societies could produce only on a limited basis and possess only “pre-Newtonian science and technology,” takeoff had been shaped by constant growth and maturity by a diversification of technology and production. The last phase corresponded to the United States, i.e. a welfare state, offering security (→ II/45) and consumerism (→ I/23) to as many people as possible. In contrast, Rostow depicted the development of the USSR as deficient. Colleagues of his like Daniel Lerner analyzed partial aspects of modernization, for instance, “secularization, urbanization, industrialization, popular participation” (→ Participation, II/41), and its meaning for the individual as “a state of mind – expectation of progress, propensity of growth, readiness to adapt oneself to change” (Lerner 1964, VI).

Rostow located Latin America mostly in the takeoff phase (naming explicitly Brazil and Venezuela) and underlined that Argentina and Mexico had completed takeoff (1960, 127). U.S.-American theoreticians of modernization blamed, in a pejorative and superficial manner, cultural reasons for the lack of development in Latin America and called for extensive changes based on the U.S.-American model (Park 1995, 202–203, 216). Those thoughts were not limited to Latin America, since modernization became a term for describing the present situation of the so-called Third World in general (Gumbrecht 1978, 129).

Economic development was a crucial topic in Latin American debates, too. Many economists and politicians accepted the idea that Latin America had to industrialize and modernize, but developed other solutions than scientists from the U.S. The most important impact came from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) which was founded in 1948 as a UN agency and counted the participation of economists such as Argentinean Raúl Prebisch and Brazilian Celso Furtado (Larraín 2000, 121–122; Latham 2000, 72–73). The long-standing director, Prebisch, addressed unequal trading conditions and demanded Import Substituting Industrialization (ISI). His earlier *The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems* (1950) also contained parallels to modernization theory and characterized industrialization as a means “of obtaining a share of the benefits of technical progress and of progressively raising the standard of living of the masses” (Prebisch 1950, 2).

Modernization as aid: the Alliance for Progress and efforts to modernize Latin America

Ideas of progress often implied political efforts to achieve economic and social change. Already during the New Deal, the U.S. had implemented modernizing programs of which the regional development agency Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was the best-known and served as a model for development abroad (Ekbladh 2010, 40–76; Patel 2016). After World War II, the United States started to provide aid to Europe, which was rebuilt by the Marshall Plan, and to decolonized countries. New institutions such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), dominated by the U.S., were supposed to promote this policy financially.

Under Truman, aid for Latin America played just a minimal role (Park 1995, 171–172). In the 1950s, only Guatemala and Bolivia received some aid in order to protect American economic interests (Siekmeier 1999). The Organization of American States (OAS) proposed a stronger engagement of the U.S. in development assistance, but had little success. A more important impulse was the Operation Pan-America, put forward by Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek in 1958. Kubitschek requested that the U.S. should provide investment capital to create growth (Latham 2000, 77–78; Ioris 2014, 62–74). Anti-American riots during Vice President Nixon’s trip to Latin America the same year also made clear that the U.S. government had to make an effort in the region if it wanted to better its reputation (McPherson 2003, 9–37). One immediate result was the foundation of the Inter-American Development Bank in 1959. In September 1960, the OAS referred consensually to Kubitschek’s proposal in its Act of Bogotá (Taffet 2007, 13–19).

Also U.S.-American theoreticians of modernization perceived modernization as a basis for policy, because they thought that modernization could be induced and accelerated. Rostow and Max Millikan argued in 1957 that science should be useful for the state and strengthen the U.S.-American position in the Cold War (Latham 2000, 4, 7). Therefore, many proponents of modernization theory worked as policy consultants. Under President Kennedy, the influence of social scientists was “extensive” (Latham 2000, 57). Rostow worked as the chairman of the U.S. Department of State’s policy planning council and under Johnson as the National Security Advisor. Lincoln Gordon and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. from Harvard University were consultants for Latin American affairs.

From the late 1950s onward, modernization theory triggered large U.S.-led aid programs. Michael Latham has even named modernization an ideology that had dominated U.S.-American foreign policy (Latham 2000). In 1961, Kennedy founded the United States

Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Peace Corps which sent volunteers to aid programs worldwide. Even the United Nations declared the 1960s a development decade.

Influenced by Latin American inquiries, modernization theory, and the Cuban Revolution in 1959 (→ Revolution, II/44), which brought the Cold War to the Western Hemisphere, Kennedy initiated a huge aid program for Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, on March 13, 1961 (Schlesinger Jr. 1965, 186–205, 759–793; Park 1995, 204–229; Latham 2000, 69–108; Taffet 2007). In his speech before Latin American diplomats, he proposed a ten-year plan to increase economic growth, the standard of living, “democratic progress,” and “social change” (Kennedy 1961, 201–203). He also suggested a common market, addressed the problem of primary commodity prices, promised scientific exchange, technical assistance, a program against famine, and asked for a land and tax reform. Kennedy underlined his admiration for the theoreticians of modernization by trusting the “genius of our scientists” and made clear that this “revolution of the Americas” was designed to contain the “tyranny” on Cuba (Kennedy 1961, 199, 203). Siekmeier (1999), however, has pointed to the fact that the U.S. were driven not so much by fear of communism, but of economic nationalism that could pose a risk to their own economic interests in the region.

Kennedy suggested an OAS-meeting to work up the Alliance which took place in August 1961 in Punta del Este, Uruguay. The summit adopted a Charter which was drafted among others by Rostow, Richard Goodwin, and Schlesinger Jr. and referred explicitly to Kubitschek’s Operation Pan-America and the Act of Bogotá. In fact, there was substantial exchange between U.S.-American and Latin American economists like Prebisch, who endorsed the Alliance, or Furtado (Taffet 2007, 31). The Charter was heavily influenced by modernization theory and called for “economic progress and broader social justice,” “sustained growth” of at least 2.5 percent per year, “a more equitable distribution of national income,” “industrialization,” and “guaranteeing the system of representative democracy” (Pan American Union and Agency for International Development 1961, 3–4, 38). Furthermore, the signatories committed themselves to a land and tax reform (→ Taxation, II/22; Land, II/15), to efforts to improve education (→ I/24) and health care (→ Health, I/29), and to national development plans.

Cuba, represented at the meeting by Ernesto Guevara, was the only Latin American country that rejected the Charter. During the summit, Guevara criticized the U.S.-forced isolation of Cuba and the empty phrases of the Charter. Guevara underlined that the Alliance was “a solution within the framework of economic imperialism” and “will be a failure” (Guevara 2006 [1961], 77).

Guevara’s skepticism turned out to be true. The U.S. government provided one billion US\$ as emergency aid and promised twenty billion US\$ in credits. To receive these credits, the countries were supposed to apply for development projects at the Agency for International Development. The U.S. also provided experts and sent Peace Corps participants to Latin America to propagate a positive image of America.

Infrastructure, education, and sanitation were the main funding areas, but the aid had very different resonance and success. Chile, Brazil, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic received almost 60 percent of all funding due to political interests of the U.S., which wanted to strengthen their position through aid (→ Geopolitics, II/34). According to Taffet (2007), the U.S. administration tried unsuccessfully to prevent the election of Salvador Allende in Chile by granting aid. In Brazil, the military regime benefited from U.S. aid, and in the Dominican Republic, the Alliance was used to valorize U.S. military interventions (→ Interventionism, II/36).

The Alliance failed quickly, not only because of the contradiction between alleged altruism and political interests, but also due to organizational deficiencies, the blockade of the release of funds by U.S. Congress, and resistance by national elites against social change. Some modernizers also blamed high population growth in Latin America (Latham 2000, 104; Taffet 2007, 38–48). The continent fell short of the targeted growth rates, and even its foreign trade declined. The Alliance laid the foundations for the debt crisis of the continent (Kofas 2002, 15). As early as in 1962, an expert group with Rostow and Goodwin tried fruitlessly to resolve these problems. Under Johnson, the Alliance was reoriented to U.S.–American economic interests so that democratization efforts lost their relevance. The Alliance slowly faded away after 1966 (Taffet 2007, 47–64).

Criticism of the Alliance came promptly. In 1967, Chilean President Eduardo Frei Montalva complained that the Alliance had not caused any structural reforms or democratization, but excluded civil society (Frei Montalva 1967). Indeed, positive examples such as democratic Venezuela (Miller 2016) could not hide that the U.S. only backed democracies if political interests were at stake (Lowenthal 1991). Additionally, an important pillar of the Alliance for Progress was military aid against leftist guerrillas (→ Military, II/37). Such programs “helped to modernize repression” and backed authoritarian regimes (Kuzmarov 2012, 16, 208–213) (→ Authoritarianism, II/25). The U.S. was also involved in the overthrow of leftist democratic governments, supporting the 1964–coup in Brazil or intervening militarily in the Dominican Republic in 1965. The aid programs had often negative effects for democracies like Bolivia, too, where aid met the modernization efforts of the military and finally facilitated the coup of 1964 (Field Jr. 2014). In El Salvador, the successful Alliance–promoted education reform led to a political polarization between centralistic elites and the leftist opposition, and finally to civil war (Lindo–Fuentes and Ching 2012).

The Nixon administration put an end to the Alliance and to modernization theory as a political guideline. Nixon acknowledged in a speech in 1969 “the illusion that we alone could remake continents.” “Conscious of our wealth and technology ..., we have sometimes imagined that we knew what was best for everyone else and that we could and should make it happen. Well, experience has taught us better.” He announced a policy of respect and cooperation (Nixon 1969). However, in the 1970s, the Commission on United States–Latin American Relations (1975) still criticized the inappropriate and paternalistic foreign policy of the U.S.

Levinson and Onís (1970, X) started the critical scientific assessment of the Alliance for Progress and outlined that “the United States does not possess a fool proof blueprint for modern development in Latin America.” Recent historiography agreed that the Alliance had been too ambitious, paternalistic, badly organized, and distorted by U.S.–American economic interests. Furthermore, proponents of modernization had not been able to critically reflect and adopt their assumptions (Latham 2000, 71). Historians have criticized the Alliance as a “putative failure” (Park 1995, 204) and pointed to its “hubris” (Scott 1998, 342) and “imperialistic character” (Kuzmarov 2012, 209). Hal Brands (2010, 57) has resumed that “the course of the Alliance gave the lie to the central premise of modernization theory.”

Multiple modernizations? Adaptations and critique in Latin America

In contrast to the unambiguous evaluation of U.S.–American modernization efforts, historiography offers diverging answers to the questions if Latin America underwent a process of modernization in the 20th century or not. Also beyond the Alliance for Progress, many

Latin American governments were eager to modernize and change their countries technologically, economically, socially, and culturally. In the 1960s and 1970s, military dictatorships adopted the modernization paradigm and attempted, through planning authorities and foreign loans, to improve infrastructure and to industrialize. The euphoria for some short-term growth performances such as in Brazil in the early 1970s soon gave way to disillusion, since Latin American countries accumulated huge debts, had to deal with growing social inequality (→II/20) and environmental destruction (→ Environmental Justice, II/8), and had democratic participation limited by authoritarian regimes (→ Authoritarianism, II/25). Modernization efforts often discriminated against indigenous and rural populations, downplayed the role of women in local communities, and can be perceived as internal colonialism.

Three historiographical schools have emerged to interpret those processes. First, mostly U.S.-American scientists, still influenced by modernization theory, have asked why Latin American modernization has failed and why constant growth did not happen. Those scientists were interested in why certain aspects of modernization took place, such as urbanization (→ I/45), and others not, and they mainly blamed internal reasons or export dependency for the failure (Bernhard 1979; Bulmer-Thomas 1995; Haber 1997).

A second interpretation originated in the early 1970s in Latin America: the dependency theory. This idea contributed to the deterioration of modernization theory and the Alliance for Progress. Inspired by Marxism, dependency theory was a reaction to authoritarian regimes and failed development efforts. Sociologists such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto argued that the modernization of Latin America following the U.S. model was impossible since the historic starting conditions of both regions had been completely different. Regarding the *dependentistas*, Latin America was part of the capitalist world system and dependent on the centers of the West to provide primary goods and buy processed goods (Kahl 1976; Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Cardoso, Marcuzzo, and Sotelo 2014) (→ Postcolonialism, I/38). This critical perspective was further developed by Postcolonial and Post-Developmental Studies and has been recently defended by a group of Latin American social scientists, among them Walter Mignolo, Arturo Escobar, and Aníbal Quijano, who argue, under the slogan “modernidad/colonialidad,” that colonialism is always an integral part of modernity (Escobar 1995; Moraña, Dussel and Jáuregui 2008). Also civil society (→ II/28) and NGOs have criticized modernization and valued alternative life models. The concept of Buen Vivir has become especially influential. Developed by Andean indigenous groups, it values the well-being of the whole community and sustainable forms of development (→ Indigeneity, I/31).

A third historiographical approach, which shapes current research, points to the heterogeneous and contradictory modernization processes in Latin America and to the agency of Latin American actors in these processes. Latin American countries were not simply victims of U.S.-American development policies, but contributed self-confidently to them and used them to their own goals, for instance, in the Alliance for Progress (Taffet 2007; Lindo-Fuentes and Ching 2012; Field Jr. 2014) or during U.S.-American modernization efforts in the Puerto Rican school system 1898–1952 (Moral 2013). Governments in countries like Mexico, Venezuela, or Brazil were interested in modernization even before the Alliance for Progress. In Brazil, President Kubitschek demanded not just U.S. aid, but also implemented his own program to boost the industrialization of the country, full of belief in progress. The best-known result was the new capital Brasília (Ioris 2014). The Brazilian modernization overwhelmed even U.S.-modernizer Schlesinger Jr. who, during a trip to Brazil, was shocked by “the impersonal and sinister streets of Brasília, that terrifying preview of a collectivist future” (Schlesinger Jr. 1965, 179). Venezuelan elites, on the other hand, chose

a distinct path to modernization in which the state, rich in petroleum, acted as the main investor (Coronil 1997).

The specific Latin America modernization, different to Western developments, has many facets such as the Argentinean capital Buenos Aires, one of the most modern cities of the early 20th century, and trajectories of countries like Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil shaped by consolidated statehood (→ Nation State, II/38), economic growth, industrialization, social changes, civil society, and increasing life standards (Henderson 2001; Moreno-Brid and Ros 2009; Aarão Reis 2014, 23–29). But successes often were contrasted by social problems. A good example of this is the very fast urbanization in Latin America which created social inequality (Almandoz 2015, 87–109).

Latin America's ambivalent social and economic dynamics influenced the perception of the U.S. and the formation of cultural identities. Jorge Larraín (2000, 207) has argued that the tension between modernization and rejection of modernization is “the major feature of Latin American culture,” as shown in the formation of indigenous movements (→ Indigeneity, I/31). Similarly, Stephan Scheutzger and Peter Fleer (2009, 23–37) have underlined the dialectic of Latin American modernity between homogenization and cultural differentiation. Culture was often influenced by modernization, for instance, by the emergence of television and Western consumerism (→ I/23). The cultural influence of the U.S. did not result in North-Americanization, but was a process of perception shaped by enthusiasm and rejection by different social groups, resulting in pluralization and renationalization of culture (Rinke 2004). Anti-Americanism was one facet of this process (McPherson 2003). At the same time, external influences helped to create new cultural forms such as Brazilian cinema or Bossa Nova which were constitutive parts of cultural modernization (Tota 2009).

As a theory, modernization was crucial for the political and economic thinking of the Cold War. The solutions it offered did not fit to the social and cultural diversities of Latin America, but involved violence and harmed those who were perceived as traditional, such as indigenous or Afro-American groups. It established power relations between North and Latin America and between Latin American elites and other social groups. As a process, modernization was not the success story that modernizers had in mind, but was shaped by contradictions between ambition and reality, economic growth and social inequality, as well as diverse social and economic changes. Albeit a failed theory, it experiences a revival nowadays. Several Latin American governments, also leftist ones, set out for modernizing policies and are counting on neo-extractivism (→ Extractivism, II/9) and huge infrastructure projects.

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MULTICULTURALISM

Eduardo Restrepo

Multiculturalism is a word with meanings that often vary between countries or authors. Whatever it may mean in the U.S. today, it is likely to be quite different from its sense in Colombia, Canada, or France. For authors drawing from a liberal philosophical tradition, multiculturalism has connotations that imply recognition of rights around cultural, racial, or sexual diversity, while for others who are anchored in theoretical communitarian positions, what is at stake in multiculturalism is a substantial transformation of society as a whole.

Despite these differences, multiculturalism has usually been understood as a series of policies deployed by states (→ Nation State, II/38) to confront cultural differences in their territories. Although in a sense these policies are an important dimension of multiculturalism, it can also be usefully understood as a particular kind of governmentality. In order to do so, an analytical distinction between multicultural situations and forms of multiculturalism must be introduced that enables us to consider the existence of three styles of multiculturalism: ethnic multiculturalism, racial multiculturalism, and national multiculturalism. In Latin America, ethnic multiculturalism has been the dominant version (→ Ethnicity, I/25), while racial multiculturalism has had a stronger tradition in the United States (→ Race, I/39), and national multiculturalism which focuses on the figure of the immigrant has been central in European countries.

Analytical distinctions

According to Stuart Hall (2000), it is relevant to make a distinction between multicultural situations and multiculturalism. Multicultural situations refer to the fact that any social formation is culturally heterogeneous (→ Hybridity, I/30). There is no society, however small and isolated, without certain degrees of internal cultural difference and heterogeneity. This cultural difference and heterogeneity is obvious in industrial and postmodern social formations. Therefore, multicultural situations are a historical fact that characterizes any social formation. No social formation is culturally homogeneous; all social formations are more or less culturally heterogeneous. Now what appears as difference and cultural heterogeneity in a particular context is not outside of the cultural frameworks of meaning and experience. Thus, to a great extent, they are culturally produced.

In contrast, multiculturalism refers to policies produced in a given social formation to address cultural difference and heterogeneity. For example, multiculturalism involves the legal measures that are taken by a state in order to recognize its cultural diversity, but also the measures to address racial inequalities or to integrate immigrant populations or not (→ Transnational Migration, I/44), when these racialized or immigrant measures are framed as cultural differences. But beyond these policies, multiculturalism also involves a number of political assumptions and values about what difference is and how to deal with it. Multiculturalism does not operate just by making preexisting differences visible, but in many ways produces them through practices and discourses that performatively constitute the social and political realities. In this way, multiculturalism is a set of politics and assumptions around which emerges culturally framed difference.

If multiculturalism is understood as these policies and assumptions, then historically there is not a single multiculturalism but several (and sometimes contradictory) multiculturalisms. Liberal multiculturalisms take for granted the individual-citizen as the atom that constitutes the political body (→ Citizenship, II/27), as well as the distinction between public and private, within the liberal philosophy of universalism that views humans as freely choosing agents (Kymlicka 1995). Neoliberal multiculturalism implies a recognition of cultural differences within the framework of the structural adjustments that operate from the premises of the free market (Hale 2006) (→ Neoliberalism, II/16). In contrast, corporate or radical multiculturalisms assume certain collective entities, defined as peoples or nations, as their unit of political analysis and practice to redefine the very foundations and assumptions of what is the political community and the state (→ State Transformation, II/21). Therefore, these multiculturalisms challenge the notions of nation and state as Western cultural constructs that are not culturally neutral (Kincheloe and Steinberg 1997; Walsh 2014).

For its part, conservative multiculturalism would seek to incorporate cultural difference into the established social order through its dissolution or its negation on behalf of an ideal cultural homogeneity of the nation. As can be seen, these multiculturalisms differ in the political-ideological frameworks in which they operate. These analytical distinctions between dissimilar policies and assumptions allow us to problematize the necessary equivalences between multiculturalism and neoliberalism, to name an example.

Scopes of multiculturalism

In addition to this classification of multiculturalisms depending on their political-ideological differences, multiculturalisms could be identified by the types of populations that constitute their specific government practices. Following Foucault's governmentality (1978), diverse multiculturalisms might be understood as a historically specific art of government based on expert knowledge, which produce given populations as culturally differentiated inside the frame of a postcolonial state to be administrated on behalf of their ethnic, racial, or national particularities (→ Postcolonialism, I/38; Biopolitics, I/22). The diverse assemblies in which prevails the production of these cultural differences as mainly ethnic, racial, or national result in three different styles of multiculturalism: ethnic multiculturalism, racial multiculturalism, and national multiculturalism.

Of course, these are not the only existing styles of multiculturalism, although they are the most visible in the Latin American, the United States, and Western European contexts, respectively. Although they rarely are presented purely, it is important to be able to analyze their specificities when in a suitable theoretical position to understand the different empirical and concrete amalgams in which they are manifested.

From a methodological perspective, both historical and ethnographical approaches are required to study these different styles of multiculturalism. On the one hand, as suggested by Inda (2005), historical research of governmentality involves three closely related levels. (1) *Rationalities*, the multiplicity of statements from expert knowledge that within a certain regime of truth make possible the production of objects, subject positions, concepts, and tactics that justify the deployment of certain regulations for the established populations. (2) *Technologies*, the ways of doing that are articulated as an attempted response to the problems constituted by those rationalities. (3) *Subjectivities*, which emerged and are deployed in the interplay of the aforementioned rationalities and technologies. As a kind of governmentality, multiculturalisms require to be studied historically taking into consideration their specific entanglement of rationalities, technologies, and subjectivities.

On the other hand, Murray Li (2007) proposes that governmentality must be examined ethnographically taking into account: (1) *Designs*, that is, the ideas, programs, and conceptualizations that allow the conception of something as an emergent problem to be addressed by a governmental practice. (2) *Practices*, understood as the set of actions mobilized for those designs. (3) *Effects*, or the diverse and heterogeneous transformations to specific people and places derived from the particular ways in which those practices have been deployed, assumed, and contested. Ethnographically, thus, multiculturalisms as governability must be approached in the concrete overlaps of designs, practices, and effects.

In order to understand a particular style of multiculturalism, then, one must be able to trace in a specific social formation the historical interplays of its rationalities, technologies, and subjectivities as well as the inscriptions of its designs, practices, and effects. Therefore, it is not enough to identify the legal initiatives and disputes on behalf of a population produced as a cultural difference, nor is it sufficient to reduce it to the study of the political mobilizations of subaltern sectors marked by this difference (→ Social Movements, I/41).

Ethnic multiculturalism

Since multiculturalism can revolve around multiple cultural differences, it is analytically relevant to refer to ethnic multiculturalism as one that operates within a particular anchorage: the ethnic other of the nation. Indigenous communities are often produced as the ethnic other of the nation (→ Indigenous Peoples, I/11; Indigeneity, I/31), although not only these communities but also others groups that could be placed in this location.

In any given national formation, not every sector of the population can occupy the position of the ethnic other, but only those already historically marked as radical others could embody this position. The ethnic other is a particular subject position in a system of differences built on the basis of a historical formation of otherness (Ramos 1998; Rita Laura 2007; Briones 2008, 2015). Traditional indigenous groups are the most usual referents of this position, although in some contexts, blacks communities may also be used.

This style of multiculturalism was legally expressed around a radical cultural difference, following a narrative of demands for recognition of cultural diversity within the nation. Hence, the legal subjects are referred to in state entities as ethnic groups or ethnic minorities. The ethnic other of the nation shaped by this form of multiculturalism has had as a paradigm a certain imaginary of an Indianness marked by traditionalism, authenticity, and communality that is located in certain geographical areas (rural, jungles, and mountains) and temporalities (not modern and non-Western) (Ulloa 2005; Bocarejo 2016). It is precisely these arrangements of ethnic multiculturalism that have enabled connections with environmentalist subjects, producing what Cárdenas (2012) has called green multiculturalism

(→ Environmental Justice, II/8; Nature, II/39). As already indicated, this style of multiculturalism is operating predominantly in Latin America.

Racial multiculturalism

In contrast with ethnic multiculturalism, in racial multiculturalism, the ontological difference that articulates this governmentality is the racial subaltern of the nation. Rather than the ethnic other of the nation, with racial multiculturalism governmentality involves a racial order and racialized populations. These distinctions need to be clarified in order to understand the specificities of racial multiculturalism and its contrasts with ethnic multiculturalism.

Race (→ I/39) implies a particular system of difference in which the interplay of the language of blood (assumed biological inheritance) and appearance (corporeal visibilities) constitutes sets of naturalized equivalences of given populations with certain behaviors, intellectual abilities, and moral positions (Wade 2015). Race does not necessarily appeal to an ontological exteriority of Modernity or Occident, although sometimes it does. Race is not just an attribute to frame the (inferiorized) others, but it is also a category to describe (the celebrated) selves.

Historically, race emerged with colonial domination (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7; Colonial Rule, I/5). However, in postcolonial realms, it can also operate as a style of multiculturalism (→ Postcolonialism, I/38). The difference between them lies in the way in which racial difference operates: under colonial domination, race is openly mobilized as ideological justification to the naturalized hierarchy of the colonial order, while as style of multiculturalism, race appears as an ontological difference to govern racialized populations that belongs to the nation on behalf of justice and equality in the frame of postcolonial states. Racial multiculturalism as governmentality includes state policies regarding certain populations which are conceived as part of the nation on behalf of their racialized difference (→ Race, I/39). Therefore, racial multiculturalism partially overlaps with affirmative actions designed to reverse racial inequities.

Racism must be differentiated from racial multiculturalism. Although both assume race as the naturalized diacritic and principle of social intelligibility, there is a huge difference between racism as an open apparatus of oppression and racial multiculturalism as an art of governing others and selves in order to supposedly achieve justice and equality. So, it is very important to examine this racial multiculturalism not only by what it enunciates about itself, but from the historical and ethnographical perspectives described.

Racial multiculturalism is mostly found in the United States, although not exclusively. Australia and South Africa are two other countries in which this style of multiculturalism can be found. The racial grid of social and political intelligibilities has been a characteristic and a peculiar feature of the historical common sense of the United States, as well as Australia and South Africa. Therefore, multiculturalism here has been predominantly articulated racially rather than ethnically.

National multiculturalism

The specificity of national multiculturalism lies in the policies and political assumptions deployed to govern those populations that are produced as national exteriorities (→ Nation and State Building, I/16). In this style of multiculturalism, these populations are not the others of the nation as in ethnic multiculturalism, but they embody an ontological difference articulated as visible expressions of other countries that publicly disrupt the national self. Immigrants, particularly the so-called illegal ones, are the targets of this national multiculturalism.

This style of multiculturalism is mostly found in the countries of the global north, although it is also present in some countries of the global south. In contrast with racial multiculturalism, in national multiculturalism, the cultural difference is embodied by the figure of the immigrant who does not belong (“yet”) to the nation (→ Transnational Migration, 1/44). Surely, this figure of the immigrant is often racialized and targeted for the most bitter practices of racism. Nevertheless, in national multiculturalism, these populations are first and foremost symbolically articulated as aliens. This ontological gap, this constitutive alienation from the nation self, is what is at stake with this style of multiculturalism. There is a substantial difference with racial multiculturalism, which involves racialized populations, as they are not exteriorities of the nation.

Actually, an important part of this style of multiculturalism refers to the meaning and means of incorporating this exteriority to the national self (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdaul 2008). In Western Europe, this style of multiculturalism appears under the name of interculturality. In the United States, national multiculturalism has coexisted with racial multiculturalism.

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37

POPULAR

Pablo Alabarces

In social sciences and humanities, “popular” is inevitably linked with a certain dimension of the subaltern – or better yet, the subalternized. Always used as an adjective, “popular” is qualified by its absences: the dominant, the official, the cult, and the highbrow. It is from this point that the noun “the popular” has been built. This meaning, created from centuries of use in our languages – and treatment in our disciplines – operates in two spaces: one space is in the political debate, where the matter of “the people” and its role in democratic societies is central. The other space is in the cultural debate, where the main concept is “popular culture” and its related category “mass culture” (many times confused and overlapped with “popular culture”). By looking at both the meanings and agendas related to this area, the knowledge and resultant worries associated with the term can be analyzed with the understanding that the debate on popular culture is also linked to one about democracy (→ II/32).

Differences

In Latin America, to speak of *cultura popular* has almost always been (definitely, from the 1980s until today) about speaking of *something more*: to speak of practices and representations that are, or could be, outside of mass media; outside of the simple reference to mass culture; and understood as the multiple modes in which symbolic goods are produced, circulated, and consumed with the mediation of the – especially electronic – cultural industries (→ III/27; Media Consumption, III/34). On the contrary, Laura Grindstaff’s text (2008) includes a productive map of the field of North American research on *Popular Culture*, where it is impossible to find any reference to practices or phenomena outside of mass communication – including new technologies of circulation, and consumption of images and text (→ Media Flows, III/35). Possibly, the only area in which these perspectives can be found is in the production of the Popular Culture Association, founded in 1970 by Ray Browne and traditionally linked to both folk and populist positions.

The reasons for this difference – a mode that is broadly popular versus a mode that is simultaneously broad and restricted to mass culture – are extensive and complicated. Briefly, some of the differences can be located in traditions of reading as well as the particular characteristics of the Latin American societies and cultures that gave rise to distinct processes and categories. Among these differences, the following four are the most important:

Ruralisms

Long into the 20th century, the rural population was more important in Latin America than in the Anglo-Saxon world. Following Peter Burke's unparalleled study (1978), the importance of the rural was critical to the construction of the very category of *popular culture*. This continued to be true in much of Latin America and continues to be true today, albeit with the now indisputable presence of mass media.

Indigenisms

The significant presence of indigenous peoples (→ I/11) – a central characteristic of the subcontinent – has always required special treatment of its cultural configurations with respect to Anglo-Saxon traditions. With the exception of countries with high levels of European immigration (→ Migration, I/15), subjected to the harshest whitening, Europeanizing, and de-indigenizing practices (→ Whiteness, I/47) – Argentina and Uruguay among them – the indigenous presence was crucial to debates on the question of the popular: it would be impossible to construct its conceptual field without taking into account the everyday presence of indigenous customs, traditions, memories, and even languages (→ Indigeneity, I/31).

Among these differences, one might note the question of African-American populations, but their presence in Latin American popular culture debates is distinct from earlier forms, and at the same time, closer to the Anglo-Saxon debate. Although there was discussion in earlier periods – especially in the Fernando Ortiz's key text, *Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar* (1940), a foundational work in the cultural theory of the subcontinent, the reappearance of debates over the relationship between Afro-American cultures and popular culture is contemporaneous with its treatment in both Britain and North America.

Politicizations

In contrast with the British and North American landscape, the question of popular culture in the subcontinent is tightly linked to its enactment in political debates. From the beginning of the 20th century, it first appeared with anarchism and later with specific Marxisms, including those signaled diacritically as *American* – the work of José Carlos Mariátegui is key to these (→ Socialism, I/42). Certainly, until the end of the 20th century, the question of the popular was indivisible from its relationship to political debates that reached their climax in the 1960s, after the Cuban Revolution (→ Revolution, II/44). Debating popular culture is always something more than the mere description of mass culture as a space of alienation, although it may be this as well.

Populisms

By now, an entire library has been written on Latin American populisms (→ Populism, II/43) and it will not be summarized here. However, it should be pointed out that the presence of populisms in Latin America in the 20th century was critical to the question of popular culture. Populisms find their favorite textual expressions in mass culture; there is no successful populism without radio (→ III/40), mass press, and, later, television (→ III/43). Nevertheless, they inevitably require an excess that happens outside of mass culture (→ Political Communication, II/42): in traditionalist and folkloric recovery projects, at the site of street mobilization, in the state's celebratory rituals that belong to mass culture, as well

as in protests and carnivalesque riots that exceed it, or in the field of languages and popular customs where populist discourse captures and exhibits, as the horizon of possibility, its own practice and “ideology.”

A point of departure

The first paragraphs proposed an initial state of the art of popular culture studies beginning in the 1980s. This choice is not arbitrary. It is a response to the field of study itself, which in the moment of its creation, however, took on features rooted in earlier debates on popular culture – be they *gauchesco*, Mariátegui, or Gramsci. The 1980s produced an explosion of discussion on the topic along with key texts shaping the field of study. The fact that this decade is contemporaneous with Latin America’s democratic transitions is key to the intense, renewed preoccupation with the question of the popular (→ Democracy, II/32; State Transformation, II/21).

This scene can be categorized by four texts: the first, and last to be published, is *Comunicación y Culturas Populares en Latinoamérica* (CLACSO-FELAFACS 1987). The volume compiles work presented during a conference of the same name organized four years earlier (in 1983, at the exact moment of transition) by CLACSO (Latin American Council of Social Sciences) in Buenos Aires, which was an intersection of various critical vectors. First, Jesús Martín Barbero and Néstor García Canclini took the lead in the organization, coordination, and editing of the volume. They were clearly presented, as Bourdieu would say, as guiding intellectuals of the field and topic (→ Public Intellectuals, III/18). Second is the presence of CLACSO, an organization that played a crucial role across the continent in the support and protection of intellectuals exiled for political reasons. And finally, the presence of FELAFACS (Latin American Federation of Faculties of Social Communication) as a coeditor indicated the new role for departments of communication which, displacing sociology and anthropology, would go on to dominate these debates (→ Media Flows, III/35).

The culmination of these perspectives was the celebrated 1987 book, copublished by FELAFACS and Gustavo Gili in Barcelona, *De los medios a las mediaciones* (*Communication, Culture and Hegemony*), by the Spanish-Colombian, Jesús Martín Barbero. Parts of the book had already been published as articles as early as 1982; its publication as a book confirmed an intellectual trajectory that had already placed him, as noted earlier, right at the center of the field of research. Each of these texts makes clear the now familiar notion that *popular culture* is something more, an excess that escapes the network of mass media. The book titles themselves imply as much: communication or mass media *and* popular culture, mass media *and* mediation.

This insight was emphasized by two other key texts of the period: *Culturas Populares en el Capitalismo* [edited as *Transforming Modernity: Popular Culture in Mexico*] by Néstor García Canclini was published by Nueva Imagen in Mexico in 1982 and reissued in 2002 by Grijalbo, with a prologue to the new edition. Both contrary to and in agreement with the argumentation outlined here, the mass media barely appears in Canclini’s book. The focus is on handicrafts produced by indigenous peoples and peasants in contemporary Mexico. García Canclini is able to perfectly formulate *popular culture* as merely that excess described here from an anthropological perspective, simultaneously shaped by Gramsci and Pierre Bourdieu: the popular is the mode in which the subaltern understand, elaborate, and transform the world from their particular way of life.

And finally, outside of the Spanish-speaking mainstream but introducing the intense Brazilian debate, Marilena Chauí’s book *Conformismo e Resistência. Aspectos da cultura popular*

no Brasil [Conformism and Resistance. Aspects of Popular Culture in Brazil], published by Brasiliense in São Paulo in 1985. Chauí defines popular culture as culture made *by* the people rather than *for* the people, and consequently, her study traces the ways in which the Brazilian popular classes – especially the working class – engage in practices resistant to the hegemonic classes and against their repressive strategies.

The dominant preoccupation during this time period was with democracy in the wake of dictatorship (→ Authoritarianism, II/25). It was impossible to think about democracy without thinking about the common people and their “culture,” and the organization of a conference concerning popular culture in Buenos Aires in 1983 is only proof of this preoccupation.

Martín Barbero’s 1987 text makes this argument at length. One might read the book as a perfect summary of old traditions and new readings: popular culture’s populist foundation forged by Peronist intellectuals like Aníbal Ford, Jorge Rivera, and Eduardo Romano; the decisive influence of Gramscian perspectives; the new insights provided by British Cultural Studies and related fields – Richard Hoggart and Stuart Hall, and also Raymond Williams and E.P. Thompson; the definitive discovery of Pierre Bourdieu and Mikhail Bakhtin; Carlo Ginzburg’s novel work. This new library forms the foundation on which Martín Barbero constructs his famous triangle: from popular culture to mass culture/ from mass culture to popular culture/ popular uses of mass culture. The triangle proposes a reading that shifts constantly between mass culture and popular culture in an endless game of appropriation, re-signification, depoliticization, and the use of one by the other (→ Media Participation, III/36).

At the same time, it seems that the Barberian material poses some risks. Martín-Barbero set forth his argument along two lines that lend themselves to conservative readings. The first was militantly anti-Adorno: it made the “Adorno-Horkheimer branch” of the Frankfurt School responsible for all evils of Latin American cultural criticism. Adornian Frankfurtism was held responsible for elitist negation of popular culture and given a hegemonic position in cultural criticism that was far from proven. The argument seemed to be based on an extended elitist common sense rather than theoretical or intellectual positions that no important author at the time seemed to have proposed. Against Adornian Frankfurtism, Martín Barbero proposed a total recuperation of Benjamin, conceived of as the bold anti-Adorno reading “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” as a sort of proclamation of the popular experience of consumption of mass culture (→ Media Consumption, III/34). The second line of argumentation was anti-Marxism, paradoxically organized around four great Marxists: Benjamin, Gramsci, Raymond Williams, and Edward P. Thompson.

Another remarkable aspect of the period is the emergence and consolidation of perspectives on the popular public reception of mass communication; this announced a shift to an interest in consumerism (→ II/25) that would dominate the 1990s. The active reception of mass culture had been first proposed by the Argentine populists who posited it in order to understand the relationship between the popular classes and the Peronist state propaganda, but also because of the reasons for which Peronism had survived as a hegemonic nucleus in the popular experience despite eighteen years of bans, banishment, and exclusion from mass media (especially Ford, Rivera, and Romano 1985). These proposals, formulated as intuitions rather than empirical conclusions, were enriched by the Birmingham School – especially Stuart Hall’s foundational “Encoding/decoding” (1980) – and became dominant during the long 1980s. The weight of the “active reception” in popular culture studies in USA was also decisive. From the 1980s, British Cultural Studies were expanded through the U.S.-American academy, especially from two key facts: discovery of the work of Michel de Certeau, who taught in California at the beginning of the decade, and the dissemination of the work of Stuart Hall, who gave a seminal seminar in Illinois in 1983.

The neoliberal turn

In 1988, Renato Ortiz published *A moderna tradição brasileira. Cultura Brasileira e Indústria Cultural* [The Modern Brazilian Tradition. Brazilian Culture and Cultural Industry] which introduced two novelties into the landscape described. The first was the use of the formula of traditional modernity that spoke of a new preoccupation with the relationship between the traditional and the modern during a time in which an intense debate over postmodernity was unfolding. The final chapter, entitled “An International-Popular Culture?” points toward the second novelty and the end of the decade’s other major topic: globalization and its relationship to old and new concerns with the nation-state (→ II/38).

Ortiz’s work might be characterized as a transition toward the great book that constitutes “the neoliberal turn” of Latin American cultural studies by García Canclini: *Culturas Híbridas. Estrategias para entrar y salir de la Modernidad* [Hybrid Cultures. Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity], published in 1990 (→ Neoliberalism, II/16). The book led to a paradoxical turn that caused the closure of the discussion on this topic.

This closure was catalyzed when García Canclini explicitly asserted the impossibility of continuing to speak of “high culture,” “traditional culture,” “popular culture,” or “mass culture” in the wake of transformations produced by postmodernity and globalization. What remained was hybridity and hybridization (→ Hybridity, I/30), as much a state of being as a process in which all previously categorized goods mixed and presented themselves in a new guise. Of course, this is a simplification of a complicated, powerful, intelligent, and often contradictory text, but in general terms, and for the purposes of this argument, no one in the field of Latin American studies could return to the study of popular culture after *Culturas Híbridas*.

Antifundamentalist panic is one of the excuses invoked by García Canclini in the 2001 preface to the new edition of *Culturas híbridas*: “it is possible that the polemic against folk purism and traditionalism has led me to give priority to the prosperous and innovative cases of hybridization” (19). Here occurs the first problem: García Canclini chose his adversaries badly. He fought ghosts. On the one hand, he fought a populism in retreat – or better put, a populism displaced by a neoconservatism wearing neo-populist clothing and speaking a neo-populist language; on the other hand, he fought a fundamentalism of which only vague and distant traces remained in Latin America. Nevertheless, he did not realize that the year in which *Culturas Híbridas* started its brilliant career was the beginning of the neoliberal decade for which strategies such as those of hybridity were perfectly functional. The struggle against fundamentalism – useless and already won – was waged in neoliberal garb.

Likewise, García Canclini assigned novelty to a condition that had always existed: the transactions and negotiations that all cultural and social actors carry out from the moment any society is structured as a hierarchy of classes (→ Social Inequality, II/20) in order to dominate by means of coercion (where coercion also demands negotiation), or create hegemonies by means of infinitely produced consensuses, but also to resist, accommodate, suffer, or thrive in the interstices. Class struggle (→ II/3) was always more complicated than a simple struggle between classes: classes also rest, negotiate, forget the struggle, and later take it up again. Mass culture and modernity only add complexity and new scenarios; they don’t change the basic terms of the exchange. The phenomena of interculturality – also as old as the exploratory impulse and the conquest of societies (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7) – that imperialisms brought to light were not new either. They had led more than three generations of Latin American intellectuals to think about them, analyze them, and debate them along the lines of *mestizaje*, fusion, transculturation, creolization, and syncretism (→ Hybridity, I/30). These concepts do not lack explanatory power, although the analysis

and debate demonstrate limitations or specificities. The category hybridization was proposed as “a term of translation,” but in the very same movement, was revealed as a fetish.

To demand a choice between populist and fundamentalist points of view is to suggest a false decision that involves – as do all intellectual operations – political assumptions. The end of *Culturas híbridas*, “how to be radical without being fundamentalist,” is exemplary in this regard. There was never such radical possibility that dissipated in the face of antifundamentalist fears; there was a new fundamentalism – that of the market and civil society (→ II/28), the two traps of a triumphant neoliberalism. As Beasley-Murray has pointed out, all that was left was a civil society based in the market and allied with the State to protect some cultural specificity, and a cultural and consumerist regression to a civil society that holds out “the hope of reform by returning a sense of rationality and agency to subaltern subjects” (Beasley-Murray 2010, 121), a depoliticizing and acculturative operation. In this model, subaltern resistance was definitively expelled and transformed into performance or ritual: “the only options that remain for the dominated are negotiation or obedience” (78).

In García Canclini’s perspective, the old paradigm of “active reception” of mass media definitively transforms into the consumption of mass culture and other market goods (→ Media Consumption, III/34), which should be understood at the same time as a creator of citizenship (→ II/27). Although the word *neoliberal* almost never appears in these texts, its success across the continent in dictating the organization of societies and their cultures was the organizing principle of these new essays. This reached its climax in *Consumidores y ciudadanos* [Consumers and Citizens] (García Canclini 1995), where, as Gareth Williams claims, “the ultimate purpose ... is simply to recognize that the novelty of postmodern hybridity is essentially that of the market and mass consumption” (2002, 126). Confronted with this, Williams asserts, “it is no longer possible to think about such ideals as citizenship and democracy (indeed, politics itself) in the absence of reflection on misery, and on its relation to the truth regimes of the neoliberal geo-economic state and marketplace” (135). All of that was missing. What dominated the argument, on the contrary, was a brand of citizenship created by consumption that replaced any other symbolic or experiential affiliation: social classes were transformed into *imaginary communities of consumers*.

Of course, this was combined with other elements. On the one hand, cultural consumption based on the autonomy of the receptor heralded since the late mid-1980s became essential in the 1990s, transforming the activities of every reader/consumer into heartfelt creative practices. This was indisputable. However, it was new and different to understand these practices as unavoidably challenging and contestatory, intensifying the interpretations proposed by Michel de Certeau (1996) with a new neoliberal meaning: de Certeau’s users transform into free actors under the auspices of a semiotic market. In the American academy, the work of John Fiske (1989) is probably the major example of this tendency. In an exemplary way, all through his work during the whole decade, there is a combination of the American appropriation of the British Cultural Studies with the hypothesis of de Certeau, allowing the formulation of *semiotic democracy* as a key category of analysis. The possibility of thinking the popular is reduced to looking for – and finding, obviously – the resistance gestures of the dominated in the practices of the audiences (where the dominated could be women, black people, or young people, but never working class).

The neo-post-popular decade (and a half)

At the turn of the century, the great Argentine crisis of 2001–2002 and Chávez’s rise to power in Venezuela in 1998 marked the moment of crisis in the neoliberal model in Latin

America (→ Crisis, II/4). The crisis presented a scenario in which the agendas of the 1980s could reappear, because the necessity of democratizing was again being discussed, although this democratization was not post-dictatorial, but rather post-neoliberal. The end of neoliberalism meant that, once again, a democratizing agenda for wealth, culture, and power must be laid out. This scenario made the reappearance of old problems and categories possible, among them are the debates over popular cultures. In this context, two major trends on the contemporary map could be described: the first being influential in the U.S.–American academy; the second, in the Latin American field.

Some of this was forecast by Jean Franco in 1997 in an article published in the magazine, *Nueva Sociedad* (at the time published in Venezuela), in a special issue specifically dedicated to thinking about the then evanescent question of the popular. Amidst of the reign of hybrids and deterritorialization, when the popular had been displaced by the idea of citizenship or civil society, Franco affirmed that “the popular” did not correspond with any stable group, but rather with a general problem of representation in neoliberal societies (→ Participation, II/41; Labor Representation, II/14). For this reason, she proposed that the continuity of topics such as resistance and the limits of hegemony should be explored through Spivak’s category of the subaltern (1988). This proposal had already appeared, at the same time, as the agenda of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group, founded in 1993 and dissolved in 2001, although its circulation was limited to the field of Latin Americanism in the North American academy. In addition to Spivak’s work, Franco found inspiration in the original constitution of the Indian Subaltern Studies Group, led from the early 1980s by Ranajit Guha. In the broader field of Latin American Studies, Subaltern Studies would be recovered at the turn of the 21st century and linked to post- and decolonial debates (→ Postcolonialism, I/38). By contrast, in the North American academy, the discussion appears to have closed, especially since the appearance of the work of Williams (2002) and Beasley-Murray (2010).

However, a certain persistence of the debate can still be seen in the recent interventions of John Beverley (2011), one of the central figures working from this perspective. Although there are some provocative proposals, especially those elaborated in Beverley’s classic text (2004 [1999]), the possibilities for discussion of popular culture seem relatively exhausted. The central problem is that the discussion of the popular avoids, almost intentionally, the problem of mass culture, beyond which the reflection about the popular becomes a pure abstraction. That is how the “subaltern” category is transformed into a mere fetish, a limit to the hegemonic not linked to practices, goods, nor to concrete languages that might allow an analysis.

A second tendency can be dated to the North American–Brazilian anthropologist, Claudia Fonseca. Her book, *Familia, fofoca e honra. Etnografia de relações de gênero e violência em grupos populares* [Family, Gossip and Honor. An Ethnography of the Relationships Gender and Violence in Popular Groups], an ethnography on working-class *gaúchas* families, was published in 2000 in Porto Alegre. This line of inquiry leads Fonseca to conclude the book by wondering what happened to the study of the popular culture. She asserts that, “Today, the ‘popular’ is decidedly not on the agenda. Academic interests followed other paths. The term no longer appears in books, theses and research projects” (Fonseca 2000, 108). Yet, it seems that what was fundamentally in crisis were the words with which the popular was spoken about and if the critique of these notions is warranted. Fonseca wondered if perhaps this would mean the disappearance of the object that these categories describe. That which is assumed to be a simple discussion of nomenclature is actually a central political–theoretical debate. Does this mean that as long as these concepts fail to adequately describe reality, the object disappears?

Starting from these reconsiderations, there are a great number of new perspectives on popular practices and representations, especially from an anthropological and sociological viewpoint. They all focus on that “something more” beyond media studies and mass culture studies, in the field of religion, customs, and political practice, as well as dance (→ III/7) and popular music (→ Popular Music Flows, III/16). In the latter especially, music has become a key space in the cultural consumption of the popular classes, where hybrid tendencies combine with the permanency of old class borders – for example in the case of Latin American cumbia (Alabarces and Silba 2014).

Unlike popular music studies, studies of the mass culture have tended to abandon the question of differences “inscribed in the social hierarchy,” as Fonseca puts it, and have taken refuge in the seduction of the cultural gourmet or the curatorial me (the idea that each person is a curator of her cultural experience – an idea that appeared phantasmically in Canclini’s work in the 1990s), as proposed by Laura Grindstaff (2008). The same thing can be said about the category of cultural omnivorism, explored since the 1990s as an alternative to Bourdieu’s distinction. At the same time however, this tendency toward individualization in the face of a great quantity of stimuli and enormous possibilities coincides with, as Grindstaff maintains, the convergence and growing monopolization of mass culture and the continuity of a great cultural division: either those who, due to their educational or economic strata can practice personal curatorial or those who, with less education and fewer resources by contrast, remain bound to limited and homogenized forms of culture determined by huge media conglomerations and their websites. The allure of new North American television series – especially those produced by HBO and Netflix – is a good example of this (→ Television, III/43; Digital Culture, III/28): in Latin America, they continue to involve forms of consumption from which popular publics, in the old class sense of the expression, are systematically excluded.

In the last few years then, a resurgence of the category and its old problems has been seen and hopefully continues to be seen. The popular world is recuperating its visibility in academic circles in Latin America: but the same cannot be said about the U.S.-American academy. This is the result of new research that avoids that which Fonseca denounced, the cliché of poverty studies that obscures more than it elucidates, and insists on placing the popular world in a place of passivity ready to be rescued by some compensatory policy. Rather, this new research looks to recuperate the complexity of this world: its daily life, its sexuality, its territorial, social and political organizations, its novel relationship to work and its absence, to school, and to violence, rigorously avoiding stereotypes that tell a tale of the naturalized structuring of quotidian popular violence. This connects to their forms of consumption or symbolic production and all that is insistently called *popular culture*.

Certainly, this reappearance should be thought of in terms of national-popular narratives: the remarked upon “turn to the left” of the majority of Latin American societies; the so-called pink tide which might be critiqued as the new hegemony of the new populism (→ II/43). Progressive, but populist – populist, but progressive. In this context, the reappearance of these themes could be as much the product of a democratizing and emancipatory impetus as simple concessions to a national-popular mode. It is noteworthy that some of the works that subscribe to this move to recuperate the popular limit themselves to taking responsibility for lists of objectives, but persist in an orthodox neo-Canclinism that questions conflict and subalternization as organizing features, or proposes to dissolve the notion of resistance instead, reinforcing the “capacidad de agenciamiento” [the capacity for agency], a horrible but popular translation of Giddens’s “agency.” In this way, populism falls into its old customs: celebrating an autonomous production in the popular sense that cannot overcome its subaltern condition because the populist project neither provides for it nor permits it.

It is unclear if these are now to be considered post-neoliberal times, but it can be wagered that this is not the case. However, these neo-post-populist times might be declared when new discussions of popular culture flower and are disseminated across the subcontinent. It is highly probable that this flagrant reappearance can be explained by this context, and consequently inscribed into the legitimacy of old and new perspectives of the popular as the subject of a kind of re-democratization process – not now as part of the dictatorial process, but through neoliberal processes themselves. Popular culture should be explored in a research program with the old, permanent horizon that has allowed for the creation and foundation of this field of studies: out of concern for the radical democratization of our societies, the most promising position is, paraphrasing Stuart Hall (1984), to continue to give a damn.

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POSTCOLONIALISM AND DECOLONIALITY

Mario Rufer

Ideas such as “postcolonial criticism,” “postcolonial studies,” “coloniality,” and the “decolonial turn” all share concerns and issues closely related to the Americas. This text confronts the binary concepts of postcolonialism and decoloniality focusing on various convergences, intersections, and conflicts raised by the two concepts, offering an overview by examining four selected topics of inter-American relevance: (1) *Genealogies of the debate*, clarifying the genesis of the discussion regarding the two concepts; (2) *The Colonial*, intended to explain the precise notion of “the colonial” in postcolonialism and decoloniality, from an inter-American perspective; (3) *Modernity and its alternatives*, where the problem of the connection between colony (→ Colonial Rule, I/5), modernity (→ Modernization, I/35), nation-state (→ II/38), and capitalism (→ II/2) is considered from both perspectives; (4) *The subjects: race and difference*, where concepts of difference production, inequity, and racialized exclusion are considered within these two general frameworks (→ Social Inequality, II/20; Race, I/39).

The text has been structured according to a selection of relevant works that permit mapping a conceptual and epistemological discussion. In this sense, it is not intended as an explanation of historical and political processes or a synthesis of localized processes of decolonization processes. Rather, the intention is to critically read a field of analysis that considers the processes of the global south in light of a particular critique of various views on modernity, capital, politics, and identity.

Genealogies of the debate

The focus of postcolonial studies has been on analyzing the lasting consequences of the processes of colonialization (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7) – anchored in the late modernity of European empires, societies, and former metropolitan societies of the global south – and the production of knowledge, disciplines, and subjectivities. Postcolonial criticism reads the modern episteme based on the imperial legacy, identified with authors of Anglo-Saxon origins who have had an immense impact on the debate in the United States. In turn, the perspective of de(coloniality) contributes to a temporal and conceptual revision of the idea of modernity but based on a genealogy of Latin American debates with Marxist and dissident backdrops.

What is known today as “postcolonial criticism” arises from a heterogeneous interweaving of texts that share certain premises: (a) the importance of considering “post” in postcolonial as a critical form of reading the present, not as a concise period of history nor as a sign of achievement; (b) the relevance of understanding that this critical view must take into account the ways in which societies that were densely settled colonies (India, Kenya, and South Africa) have been constructed and whose colonial experiences have shaped national modernities in terms of difference, exclusion, and racism; (c) the need to consider the various forms of imperial violence as constituent of the modern experience as a whole: postcolonial societies are also formerly metropolitan societies, with their specific differences but also with aspects of diaspora, exile, a spirit of guardianship, and the self-perception of being a “center.”

There is a general consensus that postcolonial criticism fundamentally draws upon the humanities (literary criticism and critical discursive studies) more than social science, for various reasons. First, because of the imperial epistemic division between authorized discourses and subalternized discourses. Second, because of the strength of the “cultural” construction of capitalism as a global experience whose otherness was “created” by a theoretical subject conceived as a center (Europa) (Hall 1992). Third, because of the partitioning of knowledge and disciplines, this creation gives rise to: the ideological prevalence of one subject of all histories, Western (Chakrabarty 2000: 27–45), and another “different” subject, conceived as that which adapts the theory of the center to its needs (Latin America, Asia, and Africa). The three elements together enable the contemporary persistence of hierarchies in terms of race (→ I/39), class, gender (→ I/9), and caste (→ Ethnicity, I/25), metamorphosed into discourses of citizenship (→ II/27), equality, and rights (→ Human Rights, II/35).

Subsequently, the idea of representation, with dissonant aspects, became one of the fundamental concepts of intellectuals who, in Robert Young’s words, compose the “sacred trinity” of postcolonial studies entrenched in the United States: Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, and Homi Bhabha.

For Said, a Palestinian literary critic, the idea of representation is relevant insofar as it enables considering discursive formations on and from geo-cultural spaces. In his celebrated book, *Orientalism* (1978), he proposes that it is not possible to understand European imperialism of the 19th and 20th centuries (nor contemporary North American imperialism) exclusively in terms of coercion or the logics of capital subsumption. The persistence of the order imposed by the empires has to do with the consolidation of a form of discursively representing (barbarizing and exoticizing) the Orient (Asia and the Middle East, in this case) – given the relative stability of that representation – and with the installation of a habitus of internalization for these discourses by dominators and dominated alike.

Said’s book provides an early understanding of how, through a static and homogenizing image of the Orient, Europe constructed its idea of the Center, at a time when artistic and scientific discourses were establishing a universalist type of humanism and had already delimited its spheres of influence. Both discourses, in areas such as literature, painting, and anthropology, played their parts in propagating orientalism. Furthermore, this thesis enabled Said to shift focus toward the United States during the Cold War and to explain how and why the creation of area studies in North American universities was crucial in the perpetuation of orientalism for the construction of the United States as a new imperial satellite power. The strategy of area studies was to change the pedagogical emphasis from the old form of orientalism (of a more aesthetic bent) toward the one that was more focused on describing the difficulties that an “Arab or Muslim mind” would experience contending with universals such as law, rights, the modern state, and democracy (→ II/32) (1978, 39–40). In any case, the idea of representation (literary, pictorial, and disciplinary) does not indicate a different or

secondary act regarding the “real” referent; rather, it constitutes – and is constituted by – the “Orient” as object. Thus, the Foucaultian idea of discourse follows as the critical point for broadening the material concept of representation and reinforcing the thesis that Western and Oriental “are not there,” but are “discursive” realities that persist and mutate as such (hence, they are not entelechies or ontologies).

In the work of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, born in Calcutta and a professor at Columbia University, the idea of representation articulates the critical sensitivity of postcolonial work. Engaged in a philosophical conversation that reflects her distance from the views of the poststructuralists Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, Spivak exposes the contradictions of the European (logocentric) left in her celebrated essay, *Can the Subaltern Speak?* (1988). In this discussion, Spivak bemoans the fact that European poststructuralist theory has been absorbed in the United States and the Global South as disdain for the notions of ideology and representation (because according to poststructuralism, “the workers would no longer have to be represented, now they can represent themselves” – in a clear allusion to the beginning of Marx’s *The Eighteenth Brumaire*). Spivak proposes that to think of an autonomy of representation (as if ideological effect or manipulation did not exist), and ignores three fundamental aspects for an analysis of the present: the international division of work (→ Global Commodity Chains, II/12), the difference of gender (→ Gender and Work, II/11), and the geopolitics of knowledge imposed by the empire (→ Geopolitics, II/34). Only an intellectual with a certain Eurocentric blindness could think, according to Spivak, that to speak of “the worker” is to consider the experience of a white male worker who is French and literate, or the experience of a Mexican Quichean woman who is an illiterate worker in a maquiladora. For that matter, for Spivak, the notion of representation continues to be central in the two ways pointed out by Marx: *Vertreten* (to speak for, act for or in place of the other) and *Darstellung* (to make present again the absent referent through a sign). The latter, for Spivak, has been overlooked by poststructuralist criticism. So, for this author, who says, “The subaltern cannot speak,” we cannot overlook that she not only appeals to representation as it is understood in the arena of political theory (the representative who speaks/acts for the represented), but in the field of discourse as producer and reproducer of ideology: the signs that stabilize, fragment, and essentialize visions of subalternity in codified and authorized languages (comparative literature, history, and anthropology), and visions that subalterns do not control (→ Language I/13). This does not happen with hegemonic sectors whose representation (*Darstellung*) is not only more prolific but more controlled, codified, and regulated by themselves.

Homi Bhabha, a literary critic born in Bombay and professor at Harvard University, presents views that run against the grain of Lacanian psychoanalysis, the figure of Louis Althusser, Bakhtin’s theory of discourse, and Frantz Fanon’s critique on identity. Bhabha’s key work, which has become a classic, is a compilation of essays entitled, *The Location of Culture* (1994), in which he considers the ideas of hybridity (→ I/30), mimicry, and ambivalence as possibilities for responding to the function of stereotypes that created and disseminated the colonial situation. A central element in the reception of Bhabha’s work in Latin America, especially in the humanities with the translation into Spanish by César Aira in Buenos Aires (2002), is his particular reading of the instability of stereotypes. The subaltern’s mimetic and deviant use of the image imposed on them by the colonial discourse (the packaged other, the black, and the Indian) is also imposed as an indication of provincialism and the questionable and contingent authority of any representational form, aspects that affect the construction of subjectivities not only of the colonized but also the colonizer.

For some authors (Ahmad 1993; Dirlik 1997), excessive centrality in discursive practices, as well as the incapacity of postcolonial authors to reflect upon their privileges as intellectuals in hegemonic sectors of their own countries of origin and, therefore, as immigrants to the United States where all three have propagated their theories, has resulted in the appropriation of postcolonialism for depoliticizing purposes. Dirlik (1997) seriously questions the possibility that it was in the North American academic environment that the idea of “post-colonial criticism” found its support, and moreover in departments of cultural studies and comparative literature (something that can be counterargued because of the fact that canonic spaces of philosophy and classical political theory were closed to this type of conversation). On the other hand, it is also questioned whether it was during the Reagan and Thatcher administrations when these discourses gained popularity (Ahmad 1993, 192–193), becoming functional for the hegemonic ideology because terms such as domination, exploitation, and materiality had given way to categories such as fragmentation, hybridity, and negotiation. The authors themselves have counterargued that it was precisely that political moment which demanded non-totalizing ideas to give efficacy to social analysis through the prism of the colonial event, and that the basic task of postcolonialism was to demonstrate the degree to which the categories of social and political theory were unproductive if they excluded the colonial experience as the generator of theory.

The idea of postcolonialism had a paradoxical effect with respect to its inter-American circulation, use, and reception. On the one hand, its premises circulate in the United States with a strong influence on a stage where the colonizers appear to be in the European past and the colonized are in the distant peripheries. However, the “postcolonial records” have not necessarily been used to consider the United States’ own situation as the generator of devastating (territorial, satellite, and cultural) imperialisms and, in particular, over its own native U.S. populations. For some reason, North American universities did not take responsibility for considering the United States itself as a postcolonial “case” deserving study for this record (Mignolo 1995a). This is paradoxical if we take into account that Spivak is a critic of the field of comparative literature for being a discipline that can promote colonizing practices from the United States, Said criticized North America as a disseminator of neo-imperialist stereotypes, and Bhabha has been a key exponent of demonstrating how recent diasporas of colonial subjects of the former metropolis and, moreover, in the United States reconfigure the map of citizenship, identity, and subjective experiences of culture.

In turn, the postcolonial record has had a tortuous reception in Latin America. On the one hand, it is striking that this knowledge criticizing the geopolitics of knowledge and power with which representations of otherness have been imposed by the imperial centers of power reached the South having first been authorized in the North. The work of the three abovementioned authors arrived as predigested texts, authorized, and celebrated in the universities of the United States, like the work of other writers such as Dipesh Chakrabarty, Partha Chatterjee, and Achille Mbembe. These works are translated and circulated in Latin America as if the new center of imperial power was now empowered to authorize exactly what criticism of imperialism is legitimate and viable for our times (Rivera Cusicanqui 2010, 53–76). Nonetheless, there are recent local texts (De Oto 2003; Bidaseca 2011) that have appropriated a South–South theme connecting the critical perspectives of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean and that establish the foundations for an epistemology with a critical bent.

The ideas of coloniality and decoloniality entrenched in Latin American thinking may be analyzed in counterpoint (at times in convergence, at times in conflict) with the perspectives of postcolonial theory that we have just reviewed with Anglo-Saxon roots. With more in

common with the issues addressed by the social sciences and a rereading of the legacy known as “dependency theory” and “philosophy of liberation,” the critique of coloniality is based on a divergent vision of modernity as process (→ Development, II/6). The author of this categorization is the Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano, who, in a critical conversation with the Braudelian sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein over the course of several decades from the end of the 1960s to the 1990s, constructs the idea that modernity and the conquest and colonization (→ I/7) of America are co-constitutive (2016, 777–831). Quijano adds the word “colonial” to Wallerstein’s world systems theory, which proposes that the original accumulation of wealth was made possible by the fact of the conquest of America. Similarly, for the Peruvian sociologist, the conquest was not a consequence of Europe’s self-perception as the center of the Western world, nor was it the preface to a “modernity” that was to arrive with the Enlightenment (→ I/8), the invention of the nation-state (→ II/38), the bourgeois revolutions (→ Revolution, II/44), or the imperialism of the 19th and 20th centuries. For Quijano, modernity, capital, and Latin America emerged simultaneously, and it would be erroneous to consider the colonial experience and the invention of modernity as different processes. In this respect, studies in the coloniality of power criticize postcolonial studies for the centrality they grant to the second modernity and its imperial ways, engendering differentiation and otherness (principally during the 18th and 19th centuries and British and French imperialisms).

The concept of the coloniality of power views the “discovery” (*descubrimiento*) of America (which Enrique Dussel refers to as the “cover-up,” or *encubrimiento*) as having determined the scale, imagination, and language of the modern European world (Dussel 1992). In turn, for Quijano, it is in that moment that the idea of race (→ I/39) emerged to accompany the systematic processes of colonial extractivism (→ II/9). For this author, race is not a conceptual artifice of the second modernity but rather a product of the conquest of America (Quijano 2016, 285–290).

The Argentine philosopher Enrique Dussel, residing in Mexico since the end of the 1970s and a key representative of the philosophy of the liberation – which derives from a critical reading of the theology of liberation in vogue during the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America – is a cornerstone of this movement, having proposed an alternative perspective on the subject. In agreement with Quijano on the co-constitution of modernity and coloniality, Dussel argues that it was because of the experience of constituting a “New” world versus an “Old” world – that is, the idea of a world constituted by a temporal differential – that Europe consolidated the horizon of a nascent modernity (→ America, I/2). For Dussel, it is the subject as discoverer, conqueror, the *ego conquiro* of that Iberian modernity, which can only be understood on the basis of an America as constitutive otherness that facilitates the *ego cogito* of the enlightened second modernity and was principally French, German, and English (→ Enlightenment, I/8) (Dussel 1992, 66–67).

In the first decade of the 21st century, a movement emerged that recovered the ideas of Quijano and Dussel, among others, and was positioned epistemologically and politically as a “modernity/coloniality” group, forging a unique theoretical line known as the “decolonial turn” (Castro-Gómez and Grosfoguel 2007). The “modernity/coloniality” group is associated with figures such as Walter Dignolo, Ramón Grosfoguel, Arturo Escobar, and Catherine Walsh, among others, who invited Quijano and Dussel to engage in a more systematic dialogue in order to put together an epistemic and political program based on this rereading of America during the emergence of modernity/capitalism. Here, it is important to mention certain points: first, for thinkers like Walter Dignolo – initially associated with semiotics in colonial studies – this rereading of modernity should lead to a program of epistemic

disobedience that proposes a genealogy of epistemological opposition to coloniality, that is, to note that the endogenous American response to the colonial plundering is a project of decolonization that began right from the beginning of the colonial period in the Peruvian Viceroyalty and New Spain (Mignolo 2007, 26–27). In this way, he suggests a “decolonial turn” that goes beyond the cultural turn, one that is both discursive and postcolonial, a turn that permits reverting the reading of history, legitimizing local knowledge that has been subjected by the project of modernity, and considering the “energy of discontent” that the oppressive logic of the colony left behind. A turn that permits reverting what Nelson Maldonado Torres (2004) calls “the oblivion of coloniality” in contemporary social theory and philosophy of a Eurocentric bent.

Based on these premises, the critique that the decolonial turn levels on postcolonial studies emphasizes three elements: first, the postcolonial studies do not consider Latin America as the point of origin of modernity, as the “dark side” of coloniality; second, the insistence of postcolonial authors on continuing to be tied to the European poststructuralist canon and to figures like Foucault, Derrida, and Lacan; and, third, its excessive theorization of discursivity as understood from Eurocentric positions.

Critiques of the “decolonial” vision are also productive. On the one hand, there are those who argue that the same contradiction regarding the geopolitics of knowledge that runs through postcolonial studies is applicable to the decolonial turn because it is from very specific academic institutions in the United States where Quijano and Dussel’s concepts were reorganized. These concepts gained no value in the codifying machine of the North and then began to be read more organically in their own contexts of origin (Rivera Cusicanqui 2010, 57–58). Other authors such as Ramón Grosfoguel and Nelson Maldonado (in Castro-Gómez and Grosfoguel 2007) argue that the decolonial turn has allure in the United States because of the connection that exists there between the Latin American immigrant presence, the Chicano reflection (→ *Latinidad*, I/33), the racialized experience of the U.S. nation inherited from its dual history of slavery (→ I/18) and disappearance of the indigenous peoples (→ I/11), and the power of a relationship between social activism and academia (→ *Social Movements*, I/41). This explains why it is in “ethnic studies” and “Chicano studies” that the decolonial reflection most strongly took hold. For his part, Santiago Castro-Gómez (2005, 42) specifies that there is a postcolonial theorization that is uniquely Latin American, disperse but potent, that did not originate with Quijano and Dussel’s work but is also found in early Mexican authors such as Edmundo O’Gorman (*The Invention of America*, 1958) and Pablo González Casanova in his categorization of “internal colonialism” (*The Sociology of Exploitation*, 1980), or Brazilians such as Darcy Ribeiro (*The Indigenous and Civilization*, 1970), whose reception was eclipsed and should be revisited.

On the other hand, some authors see a fraught paradox in the type of analysis addressed by the project of modernity/coloniality: the danger that a re-enchantment with atavism, with indigenous or community authenticity, and with an illusion of return will tend to obscure the very premises of historical and structural heterogeneities by demanding a “record of difference” which is, in turn, incessantly required by the logic of capital (Dube 2007; Rivera 2010).

The colonial

One convergent thesis in both conceptual genealogies is that “the colonial” is part of the global present. Dissimilar authors such as Edward Said, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Aníbal Quijano, and Walter Mignolo propose that it is necessary to understand the continuities of the colonial in the present. The “colony” is not seen simply as a period, a social organization,

or a temporal sequence translated to the biographical experience of the subjects. It is also a heterarchical discursive formation whose duration extends beyond the apparent dichotomy between “colonial state” and “independent republics.” The “period of independences” – with its notorious variables in Latin America in the 19th century or those of Asia and Africa in the 20th century (→ Independence Movements, I/10) – did not in any way mean an end to the colonial project.

In turn, it is a recurring error to understand the prefix “post” in postcolonial criticism as a “triumph” over the imperial–colonial orders. The post in postcolonial should be understood as an “operation undergoing correction” (Hall 2010) that permits analysis of the persistent elements rooted in the imperial order (camouflaged, ambivalent, or naturalized) in the constitution of the contemporary global world: in the permanence and remaking of hierarchies, exclusions, racisms, and plundering whose origin is modern/colonial. Here, it is necessary to make two exceptions. On the one hand, the way to understand this colonial persistence is different for every genealogy (postcolonial/coloniality), and, on the other hand, the manner of conceiving of the alternatives regarding how to contend with this permanence will also vary greatly.

It is Quijano who establishes the foundations for the Latin American debate with the idea of coloniality. For Quijano, there is a substantial difference between *colonialism* (whether political, economic, or territorial regimes), of a coercive and exploitative nature as social organization, and *coloniality*, which is the empowerment of certain colonial structures with the attachment of the classification and *racial differentiation* of the populations. For Quijano, the formation of independent Latin American nations indicates the continuation of the colony not as mimicry but as a form of reorganizing its components in republican systems that need to guarantee the formation of patterns of difference *that pass over the logic of citizenship and class*. Thus, the creole elites, for Quijano (and in conversation with Pablo González Casanova’s idea of “internal colonialism”), are responsible for constructing a hierarchical racialized system through specific national syntaxes. Thus, mestizo, creole, gaucho, indigenous, and campesino all form part of a Latin American variety whose history can only be understood vis-à-vis the places conceded by the hegemonic narration of the nation in every case (→ Indigeneity, I/31). Therefore, Quijano speaks of the coloniality of *power*. Colonialism is not always racist, the Peruvian sociologist would say, whereas coloniality, by definition, is racist.

Walter Mignolo (*The Darker Side of Renaissance*, 1995b) and Rita Segato (*The Nation and Its Others*, 2007) fully agree with this view. On the one hand, from the start Mignolo decried the inadequacy of the cartographic territorial demarcation – the constitution of the “Western hemisphere” in the 18th century (→ America, I/2) and the American “national mapping” of the 19th century – with the jumbled histories of the peoples and native ethnicities. However, it is the creole elites who are ambivalently inscribed in these discourses. They are described as “part of the Western hemisphere” and yet as “different” with respect to the West. On the other hand, Segato specifies how the elites strategically create identifying forms, perceiving themselves as *mestizas* vis-à-vis an external bloc of metropolitan imperial power, but white (→ Whiteness, I/46) vis-à-vis the systematic strategies of plunder of their “other internals” (and how these strategies crucially vary among the countries of Mexico, Peru, Brazil, and Argentina, precisely because of the differential position of these “others” in the narratives of the nation). The *racialized* grounds for this ambivalence are what constitutes the coloniality of the Latin American situation.

For the postcolonial perspective, the concern is of an epistemic nature. For an author such as Dipesh Chakrabarty, the conceptual node has to do with recognizing the way in which, epistemologically, a “hyperreal” Europe – to which the United States also belongs as a

generating power – continues to function as “theoretical subject” of all histories (Chakrabarty 2000, 30–33). The ideas of temporality, as destiny, and of subject, as citizen engagement, continue to be trapped in Eurocentric narratives. The idea of the modern subject (as subject of language (→ I/13), politics, and the law) always seems to have a point of origin: *first in the West and then in the Rest*. Chakrabarty maintains that this does not respond to the description of a historical process but to the invention of a “politics of historicism” that will leave postcolonial societies with the promise of fulfillment but always one step behind: not in the denial of democracy, justice, and full citizenship, but always in a “not yet” (Chakrabarty 2000, 33–54). In turn, he indicates that this has a certain appeal and repetition in the United States as the reorganizer of the imperial map and new center of post-1945 world power.

In a similar tone and in clear counterpoint to “history from below” and to the English left, Partha Chatterjee (1986) critiques the “derivative model” that authors such as Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson proposed for the historical explanation of the emergence of national organization as imagined community, first in the West and then “conceded” to its peripheries.

With respect to their inter-American perspectives, in the United States, their reception was linked to a historiographic renovation, whereas in Latin America, translations of their works soon appeared produced by the Andean Oral History Group in Bolivia which contributed to a more organic discussion of the idea of subalternity along certain lines of Latin American history, anthropology, and sociology, specifically in Andean academic circles in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Argentina (Rivera Cusicanqui and Barragán 1997).

Modernity and its alternatives

The concept of modernity and its legacy is perhaps the clearest point of divergence between postcolonial perspectives and coloniality (→ Modernization, I/35; Modernism; III/14). For the postcolonial perspective, even with their multiple differences, the authors converge on one particular point; Precisely, because the colonial–imperial process of the emergence of modernity is historical and global, it is also irreversible. An attempt to scrutinize an “outside” to modernity in absolute terms is inert (and, overall, dangerous in ethical and political terms) because this would imply returning to consideration of ahistorical binaries that modernity itself imposed (us/them, scientists/magicians, mythical/historical figures), which are now reinvented in a kind of recovery of difference as redemption for the peoples, cultures, and perspectives that inhabit “the margins” of modern movements.

Authors such as Chakrabarty are emphatic on this point, and universals “are inadequate but at the same time indispensable” for thinking ourselves in the contemporary world (Chakrabarty 2000, 18–19). The ideas of State, Law, Justice, and Democracy are undoubtedly inadequate in their attempt at universality due to the violence that this pretension entails, but to dispense with them is historically inadmissible and fallacious. In every case, it is necessary to “provincialize” these universals, to revise and dismantle their violent processes of authority and authorization, to study the peculiar “translations” to local experiences (and not the restitution of atavistic “traditions”), and to analyze how even in discourses of resistance and opposition, there is the vocabulary of modernity, and the deferred “signature” of its writing.

For authors like Chatterjee and Chakrabarty, it is also evident that the postcolonial experience is constitutive of the Hyperreal Europe because these universals are shaped in close dialogue with and in contrast to lived and imagined experiences in the colonies. This point is politically relevant in diasporic moments of exile, war, and asylum of a clear neo-imperial nature where the ideas of liberty and justice reveal, at the same time, their spurious origins and irreplaceable pertinence.

Gayatri Spivak, from a Derridean deconstructionist perspective, proposes stripping the strategies of authorization and codification of their value of modern discourses, without losing sight of the fact that this means “problematically living what we have been obliged to live” (Spivak 1988). Said, in a humanistic critique, considers that the fact of being human, even with the concentration of power, is inalienable (Said 1978). Working in an aporia between what is inalienable and at the same time destructible is the key task for historical sensitivity in postcolonial criticism.

Fanon’s struggle to conserve the enlightened idea of the human – even when he knew that European imperialism had reduced this idea to the figure of the white colonizing man – is now itself part of the global inheritance of all postcolonial thinkers.

(Chakrabarty 2000, 5)

In the case of the Latin American decolonial turn, the relationship with modernity, its legacy, and its resistance is more ambivalent from the authorial perspective. Enrique Dussel tautens this relationship by proposing the concept of “transmodernity” as a key for approaching Latin American libertarian projects. For Dussel, the “other face of modernity” was the devaluation of cosmologies and cultural forms considered inert, barbaric, ahistorical, Mayan forms, Bantu forms, etc. Their otherness is maintained “with respect to European modernity itself, with which they have cohabitated and have learned to respond in their own ways to its challenges.” However, he believes that these cultures are in a “full-fledged process of rebirth” (Dussel 2008, 18). Beyond this point, authors such as Dussel, Mignolo, and Grosfoguel enter into clear conflict with the critical theory of Frankfurtian roots, arguing that the latter did not take into account that the totalizing experience of modernity needed to produce an outside, a “dark side.” For Dussel, Western modernity disdained that which was not useful for its civilizing project and thus generated a constitutive externality that today, at the hands of the oppressed who came to learn both codes – the modern and that which was excluded from history as progress and development (→ II/6) – can propose a “beyond” to modernity whose matrix of plunder and extractivism (→ II/9), according to this author, is gradually being exhausted (Dussel 2016). This perspective is taken up by Catherine Walsh, among others, as a pedagogical and epistemic project, conceiving of interculturality not as a “blending” of components but as a challenge to incorporate and legitimize practices and knowledge that has been excluded *ex profeso* (Walsh 2005) (→ Multiculturalism, I/36).

For thinkers like Mignolo, if the energy of discontent produced the first decolonial projects of Latin American origin, these “were also, ultimately, constitutive of modernity” (2007, 26). Mignolo makes use of the concept of “colonial difference” as the modern–imperial formula that produced and rewrote the coloniality of power by hierarchically organizing not only the subjects but their epistemes. For this author, rebellion and disobedience against imposed colonial difference are simultaneous to the emergence of modernity but have become invisible (→ Silencing, III/19). For this reason, what is key is an epistemic disobedience that recovers the other historical record, that reexamines the canon with which we are obliged to think, and that dismantles the “frontier mentality” (→ Borders, III/3). There are some early exponents of this position such as Waman Poma de Ayala (and his *The First New Chronicle and Good Government*, written for Philip III in 1616) and Ottobah Cuogano (a freed slave originally from Ghana in the 18th century and devout Christian who was able to write his memoirs) who represent the beginning of “other” thought, traceable through contemporary examples such as Rigoberto Menchú in Guatemala (→ Life Writing, III/11).

Edgardo Lander (2007) plays a central role along these lines by proposing the idea of *coloniality of knowledge*, specifying the epistemological problem of maintaining a Western view of a sovereign observer toward a naturalized, inert object that diverts the conception of nature and human reciprocity pertaining to indigenous societies (based on the idea that nature as we know it in opposition to culture was nonexistent in these societies) (→ Nature, II/39). From Colombia, Santiago Castro-Gómez would refer to this imposition of rational observer as “the hubris of point zero”: a governing point of observation that generates all points of view but over which one can have no point of view. This is the strongest colonial fallacy of the Western theory of knowledge (Castro-Gómez 2005). Perhaps it is in the current works by *Sumak Kawsay* and *Suma Qamaña* (translated as “good living” and “live well,” respectively, in Quechua), referring to the ancestral cosmivision of life in codependence with nature, divergent from the pressures of accumulation and extractivism of capital, where the ideas of the decolonial turn take form in concrete political proposals and specific state and government action and conceptions of nationhood (Quijano 2016, 847–859). Ecuador transitioned from national plans of development to a National Plan for Good Living in 2009, for a society oriented toward bio-knowledge and with a change of paradigm with respect to developmentalism (→ Modernization, I/35). The case of Bolivia is also remarkable as it has inscribed good living into its plurinational project. Some authors suggest that as a political project, the Bolivian case demonstrates how the idea of good living has shifted from a model associated with recognition of multiple cultures, languages, and legal systems, to the one that is more radical and perceives decolonizing power in self-management, self-government, and autonomy. In this sense, good living as a decolonial project clearly has an indigenous perspective (→ Indigeneity, I/31) and proposes itself as an alternative to capitalism, modernity, and development (Schavelzon 2015). On this point, Silvia Rivera (2010) takes a critical look and observes that the State appropriation of these proposals, as in the case of Bolivia, already indicates its aporia, its entrance into modernity, and the danger of its distortion and depoliticized branding.

In terms of synthesis, for Walter Dignolo, “the decolonial turn is an aperture, freedom of thought, a way of life (other-economies, other-political theories), and the *cleaning* of the coloniality of being and knowledge; the *release* from enchantment with the rhetoric of modernity, from the imperial imaginary articulated in the rhetoric of democracy” (Dignolo 2007, 8, my emphasis). The distance from the postcolonial perspective on this point seems clearer to those for whom neither cleaning nor release is possible but rather a “problematic living” that is open to historical difference.

For a better understanding of the analytic tensions between the critique of coloniality and postcolonial criticism, it is relevant to return to the analyses of Anibal Quijano and Dipesh Chakrabarty regarding the relation between capital, difference, and history. For Quijano – who follows the Peruvian essayist José Carlos Mariátegui’s critique of the means of production in Latin America at the beginning of the 20th century – the key characteristic of Latin American modernity is the composition of a *historical and structural heterogeneity* (Quijano 2016, 285–329). One thing that Marxism failed to understand, according to Quijano, is that precapitalist forms of production (servitude and slavery) and noncapitalist forms (the moral economy, community reciprocity, and non-secular modes of conceiving of production) had functioned simultaneously until the present with the expansion of capitalist relations of productions. For this reason, citizenship and racialization exist without apparent conflict in contemporary Latin American colonial modernity. For Quijano, it is precisely the loss of counter-modern projects like those of Tupac Amaru, the empowering emulation of colonial-imperial forms of differentiation by brainwashed republican creole elites, and the

invisibilization of the unrestrained forms of reciprocity and communality (→ Commons, II/31) that have threatened the liberating endogenous projects. It is by reconsidering these projects that a seed for a new history may be found to dismantle the model of coloniality in America.

For Chakrabarty, the first premise is similar: although there are ways of life that enter into a relationship with capital, they will never be completely devoured by it. In an analysis of certain texts by Marx, Chakrabarty specifies what is known as *History 1* and *History 2* of Capital (2000, 47–70). The first is composed of the known narratives on the transition to capitalism as history and sociology of the invariant modes of how “free” labor is a necessary condition for the reproduction of capital. However, for the Indian historian, it is crucial to understand other forms of social relations that, although they may have a relation to capital (as antecedent or in parallel form), they do not necessarily lead to its reproduction, which would be History 2. The two coexist but this coexistence renders irrelevant the question of whether there is an “inside” or an “outside” of capital (as proposed by certain proponents of the decolonial turn), or whether we have fallen into a global society that is completely subsumed by capitalism.

These questions are inadmissible for postcolonial thought because they emulate the blindness of two modern premises: the teleological reading which proposes that these two logics “still have not” been devoured by capital (but open the door so they might be); and the binary reading which proposes that the logics of History 2 (community and reciprocity) represent an externality *per se* of capital (but this same premise voids historicity itself). For Chakrabarty (and this is the central difference with respect to Quijano), the relation between capital and difference is “ineffable” – “the difference is not something external to capital. Nor is it something subsumed by it. It coexists in intimate and plural relations with capital, connections that span opposition and neutrality” (Chakrabarty 2000, 66). This characteristic – and not the axiology of an “other” project – is that which lays the cement, according to this postcolonial critic, for historical difference as an open process, “without guarantees.”

The subjects: race and difference

According to Quijano, “in world capitalism the questions of work, race and gender are three central instances with respect to which the conflictive relations of exploitation/domination are organized” (2016, 316). Of these three, according to the author, race (→ I/39) is the key invention of coloniality and the conquest of America; it is the most efficient instrument of domination of the last 500 years. The biopolitical racism of the 19th century represented the scientific perfection of a technology of domination, but the origin of this formalization of capitalist production on the basis of biologized anatomical hierarchies can be found in the European expansion over America (later extended to the other imperial formations). Race was thus a crucial instrument for modern capitalism but it would have been disdained by Marxism because of its inability to work with the colonial phenomena. So, the imposition of the categorization “social class” (→ Social Inequality, II/20) was incomplete for Latin America because it does not capture the efficacy of racial hierarchy in exploitation, extractive energy, and division of labor. Moreover, it does not capture the persistence of this categorization as the generator of differentiations, exclusions, the hierarchization of bodies, and awareness of current conditions (778–785) (→ Biopolitics, I/22). It is the persistence of racism in the production of hierarchies that voids in America any totalization of the liberal experience under the monikers republic, democracy, or nation. In this production of differentiated subjectivities, coloniality clearly appears as protected continuities of productive

synecdoches that were able to replace – under the guise of powerful political fictions – castes with *mestizajes*, racialization with *inequities*, and differentiation with *acknowledgments*.

The Argentine anthropologist Rita Segato (2010) follows Quijano and formulates one of the most powerful concepts of the critique of Latin American coloniality: the idea that race functions as a sign, as a communicable code, printed on the body, which becomes a legible trace of a continuous history of pillaging, plundering, and defeat (in the case of nonwhite bodies). Segato notes a key distance between the perspectives of coloniality and multiculturalism (→ I/36) (especially in the North American sense): for Segato – and likewise for Quijano – race cannot be captured by identity politics because its historicity makes the equivalence impossible. The sign of non-whiteness functions as the reading of a *position in history* that cannot help but be reinforced by identity stereotypes of multicultural politics. Only by altering the reading code, and only by changing the places and semes historically applied to nonwhite bodies can the sign of race disarticulate its historical significance.

In turn, with respect to analyzing the reconstitution of colonial subjectivity, the line of postcolonial studies that follows Homi Bhabha proposes concepts such as hybridity (→ I/30) and ambivalence for understanding the actions of racialized subjects (and colonizing subjects), considering the field of postcolonial literature as corpus. Hybridity is not understood in this case as a resolute dialectic of the resultant third but rather as a close relation between non-mixed components that maintain difference (and for this very reason, they can question authority). Making use of Bakhtin's idea of dialogic and Derrida's supplementary idea, Bhabha declares that it is not in the negation of the dominant discourse nor in the appeal to a binary counter-discourse that the provocative power of anticolonial resistance is established, but precisely in the "supplementary" use of dominant referents (such as the ideas of state, law, and rights), twisting the initial objectives, the authority to which these referents were subjected is suspended (Bhabha 1994, 145–174). This is particularly useful for Latin American postcolonial studies on how hierarchization and racialization were established through the imposition of a politics of language (→ I/13) (Spanish) in the formation of the nation; a language that is, in turn, appropriated by the subjects (De la Peza 2016).

The problem of subjectivity unites exponents of postcolonial criticism and the decolonial turn behind spokespersons for the anticolonial struggle and the "Caribbean record" expressed in the works of Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire. On the one hand, Homi Bhabha considers Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952) to demonstrate the impossibility of closure in subjectivity (the "in-between") and inefficacy of any idea of return in identity formulation that does not give way to essences or nativism. However, from Latin America, Fanon was read with a key complement – that of his close relationship with Sartre (who prefaces *The Wretched of the Earth*), French existentialism, and the political practice of decolonization. Thus, Latin American exponents of postcolonial readings, such as Alejandro de Oto, viewed Fanon's book, *The Wretched of the Earth*, as a text on the violent conditions of colonialism and a manifesto on the paradoxes of racialized subjectivity in tension with humanism (de Oto 2003). Fanon's vision as an intellectual on the left during the 1960s, demanding an end to colonialism, is reread today with a view to putting emphasis on an indivisible subjectivity of the process of racial branding and whose reading in terms of liberation is linked to a renovation of the philosophy of History which needs to regain the colonized conscience.

Finally, in addition to the tension between race and identity, gender difference fulfills a foundational role in postcolonial theory and coloniality (→ Gender Identities, I/28). We have considered certain studies that analyze coloniality and gender, and how bodies that bear the chains of subalternity (women or feminized bodies, nonwhites, Latin Americans) are first racialized in response to the hierarchic order of modern-colonial subalternization and then

recodified in the patriarchic order to be ultimately exposed to plunder and violence. Studies on issues such as the complicity of the national State in the reproduction of discriminatory laws on race/gender (Segato 2011), the persistence of coloniality and gender blindness in the legal system and in considerations of the constructions of indigenous authority (Bidaseca 2011), and the persistence of the racializing order in the multicultural matrix (Curiel 2007) have been abundant, especially in critiques on coloniality especially by nonwhite Latin American feminists.

In general terms, it is increasingly complicated to draw a line delineating the distance between “postcolonial criticism” and the “decolonial turn” without falling victim to unproductive dichotomies. In any case, considering its inter-American dimension, it is probably best to consider both terms as composing a record rather than a canon: they are all possible readings of how to epistemically and politically engage with the imperial/colonial legacies of American societies today, and the futures they imagine.

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39

RACE

Peter Wade

Race is a variable concept, the meanings of which have changed greatly over time. At one level, it can be seen as one way, among others, that humans classify each other. In this sense, it is a way to think about human diversity in terms of particular aspects of three components – human body features, genealogy, and behavior. These three are seen as linked, such that each component is thought to give clues to the other two. At another level, racial thinking is tied to a colonial history in which Europeans violently colonized other continents and classified their inhabitants using a combination of these components (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7). In this sense, race is integrally linked to racism, which helped to legitimate a history of violent colonial domination and social hierarchy (→ Colonial Rule, I/5) (Smedley 1993). The idea of race is generally theorized in terms of its function in legitimating the exclusions and inclusions of social hierarchy and systems of domination (Goldberg 1993; Miles and Brown 2003).

Racial thinking has been conventionally periodized roughly as follows (Banton 1987; Hannaford 1996; Wade 2015). From the 14th to the 18th centuries, racial thinking was based on ideas of genealogy, lineage, and environment. Humans could be differentiated in terms of their parentage, descent, and the physical and social milieus in which they and their forebears existed. People of European origin generally considered themselves superior, but others – for example, the Chinese – took the same stance about themselves (Dikötter 1992). From the 18th to the mid-20th centuries – during the heyday of European imperialism – racial thinking was increasingly based on scientific ideas about the different biology of so-called *rac*es; in *scientific racism*, humanity was divided into a handful of *rac*es, considered inherently and durably distinct, understood to be in a strict quasi-evolutionary hierarchy of moral and intellectual qualities – with “civilized” whites at the top and “primitive” blacks at the bottom (→ Whiteness, I/46) – linked to underlying physical features, which were measured by the new sciences of anatomy and biology with a focus on the skull (Stocking 1982; Eze 1997). From about the 1880s, eugenics emerged as a science-based movement that sought to improve nations’ racial qualities by controlling breeding and creating a “hygienic” social and familial environment (→ Biopolitics, I/22) (Kevles 1995; Turda and Gillette 2016). From about the 1920s, scientific racism was dismantled, as biologists showed that all humans were basically the same and that the biological differences once called racial were only skin-deep; in social science terms, “race” is a “social construction” (Barkan 1992). This all coincided

with a global turn toward political anti-racism after World War II and the horrors of Nazi racism, which made the concept of “race” politically toxic. It did not, however, disappear altogether from scientific discourse, although it was gradually replaced by concepts of biological “population” (Reardon 2005). Bolstered by decolonization and postcolonial reactions to Western domination (→ Postcolonialism, I/38), this anti-racism fed eventually into currents of multiculturalism (→ I/36) and the recognition of diverse identities, often based on categories that previously had been the object of violent oppression.

Racial stratification in the Americas: colonial background

Ideas about human diversity, race, and hierarchy were not very different across the Americas in the early colonial period. In these colonies, Europeans conquered, displaced, and murdered Indigenous peoples (→ I/11) and also exploited millions of enslaved Africans (→ Slavery, I/18). In the process, they developed ways of classifying these groups into a social hierarchy. Differences between the categories were initially conceived as a complex combination of body features (seen as shaped mainly by the environment, but in which skin color was not always of primary importance), genealogical origins, and behavior (especially religious practice) (→ Religion and Missionizing, I/17). For example, the difference between an “Indian” and a “European” was conceived in terms of bodies formed over generations in different environments and by different diets and lifestyles, and also in terms of being a pagan as opposed to a Christian. These differences were located in an overarching hierarchical distinction between barbarism and civilization, in which Europeans occupied a dominant position.

Within this common framework, different colonial contexts, which can be broadly labeled Anglo and Iberian, gave rise to divergent racial categories and structures, which are important for understanding race today. Over time, the Iberian colonies were characterized by sexual mixture – often coerced – between Europeans (mainly men), Africans, and indigenous people (mainly women) (→ Hybridity, I/30). This gave rise to mixed people (*mestizos*) who occupied recognized intermediate categories in the social hierarchy, alongside free blacks, who had escaped slavery through manumission (individual freedom) or flight. By the late 18th century, these intermediate categories were often a majority in a stratified society in which Europeans and American-born white descendants occupied the dominant positions; indigenous people and enslaved black people occupied the lowest strata; and a diverse array of free black people, acculturated indigenous people, and mixed people occupied the middle rungs, themselves stratified by racialized perceptions of physical appearance, parentage, and behavior.

In the mainland Anglo colonies, sexual mixture – although it certainly occurred, often through coercion – was less frequent. Just as important, the offspring of mixed unions were, over time, classified with the subordinate black and indigenous categories, giving rise to a more racially segregated social order. In addition, manumission of and flight by enslaved people was very limited and most black people were enslaved. This all meant that racial categories were fewer and more clearly bounded; it also meant the lower classes were more clearly divided by race (→ Social Inequality, II/20). In the European Caribbean (Anglo, French, and Dutch), a mixed-race category was usually socially recognized, but remained small. These regional differences within the Americas have led to varied meanings of “race”: in the United States, the term refers to specific categories, such as “black” or “white”; in Latin America, *raza* can refer to these core categories, but can also mean a national population, putatively united by mixed ancestry, history, and culture (Hartigan 2013). A further

difference is that in the United States, there is a good deal of consensus over who is black and white (or Native American or Asian), while in Latin America, there is much less consensus over who is to be assigned to one of a more varied set of racial categories (black, white, and indigenous, plus several variants on intermediate “brown” categories, such as *moreno*, *pardo*, and *mulato*, among others).

Changing racial stratification in the Americas after independence

With independence from the European rule (from 1776 for the United States to 1898 for Cuba) came the abolition of slavery (→ Independence Movements, I/10), which occurred in most places around the mid-19th century (exceptions include Brazil where slavery was abolished in 1888, and Cuba, 1886). Abolition in the United States was only achieved after a major civil war (1861–1865), which reflected and exacerbated deep-rooted differences of opinion about slavery and race. In Latin America, abolition occurred mostly without violent conflict – with the important exception of Haiti where slavery was removed only after a major slave rebellion (1791) followed by a war against the French colonial power (→ Revolution, II/44). Abolitionism was supported by an international transatlantic social movement (→ Social Movements, I/41) and was linked to European ideologies of liberalism that were circulating throughout the Americas and were adopted by most American societies. These ideologies were based theoretically on principles of freedom (→ I/27) and equal citizenship (→ II/27), but worked in practice with powerful exclusions based on race, class, and gender (→ I/9). Into the 20th century, science – another transnationally circulating form of knowledge dominated by Europeans – helped to legitimate racial and gender (and class) exclusions in terms of supposed biology.

Biology supposedly defined behavior (culture), but in Latin America, where national populations were often dominated by mestizos, there was some resistance to a North American Anglo-style eugenics of strict biological determinism, which would see these mestizos as inherently inferior due to their black and indigenous ancestries. Despite the circulation of such Anglo theories, in Latin America, there was more emphasis on the possibility of improving *la raza* (the breed, the stock) by social hygiene programs (Stepan 1991; Turda and Gillette 2016). Nonetheless, many countries encouraged European immigration in an attempt to biologically and culturally “whiten” their populations (→ Migration, I/15) (FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 2014). Argentina, which anyway had small black and indigenous populations, managed to attract massive European immigration, allowing it to represent itself as rather European (Alberto and Elena 2016). On the other hand, by the early 20th century, some Latin American nations – most obviously Mexico and Brazil, but also Colombia and Venezuela among others (Wright 1990; Wade 1993) – defined their national identities in terms of being mestizo, with race defined in terms of shared history and culture, as much as shared biology (reckoned by physical appearance and descent). Southern Brazil had successfully attracted substantial European immigration, but the country as a whole also had a very large black and mixed-race population, which braked an Argentinian-style self-representation and meant that national identity was defined in terms of mixedness and lack of racial segregation (Skidmore 1974).

In addition, some Brazilian intellectuals appropriated the idea of Africa and African culture as an authentic and valuable aspect of Brazil’s heritage, highlighting the role of the northeast region (especially Bahia state) in this respect (Burke and Pallares-Burke 2008). The Afro-Brazilian religion of Candomblé, based on possession by Yoruba deities, was increasingly portrayed as a part of northeast regional and even national public culture (→ Religious

Beliefs, I/40), and transatlantic exchanges between Bahia and West Africa were promoted to enhance the perceived authenticity of Brazilian Candomblé practices. During the 1940s and 1950s, links between Candomblé houses in Brazil and Africa were maintained by occasional visits of Afro-Brazilian priests and some white intellectuals to Africa, animating west-to-east transatlantic links that had been forged by Afro-Brazilian intellectuals in the late 19th century (Matory 1999, 2005).

Different from the self-professed mestizo nations of Latin America, in the United States, strict segregation prevailed in a society defined as basically white, with racial categories defined quite rigidly in terms of descent. In the aftermath of the civil war and the failure of the northern states to impose racially inclusive policies on the southern states, a tacit compromise was reached by which the nation could be formed around a cohesive sense of whiteness (→ I/46), which would dominate blackness. Racial segregation was the price paid (mainly by black people) for national unity (Marx 1998). Segregation varied by region: in the Southern ex-slave states, from the 1870s to the 1950s, the so-called Jim Crow laws prevailed, which legally segregated blacks and whites in public facilities such as jails, schools, restaurants, and public transport; in practice, housing, jobs, and religion were also highly segregated. Black-white marriage was illegal and after 1910, the so-called “one-drop rule” became law in many states in the South and beyond, institutionalizing a definition of a black person as anyone with a single “drop of black blood” in their traceable ancestry. Segregation supposedly created categories that were “separate but equal,” but in fact black people were systematically discriminated against. For example, in Mississippi in 1930, the state invested five times more in the education (→ I/24) of white pupils compared to their black counterparts (Work 1931). Southern society also involved a rigid racial etiquette that defined appropriate behavior and privileged white people with symbolic dominance in every situation, even though some working-class whites were also economically subordinate in the class system (→ Social Inequality, II/20). A very violent expression of this racial etiquette and of the repression of black people was lynching, a practice that was technically illegal, but to which the authorities often turned a blind eye or even facilitated: Mississippi saw about 500 lynchings of black men between 1882 and 1930 (Tolnay and Beck 1995).

Outside the South, legal segregation did not operate, but racial prejudice created powerful *de facto* segregation in housing and jobs. Before 1917, urban segregation was fomented by racial zoning statutes, among other mechanisms; after that date, segregation continued to be generated by a combination of informal neighborhood racism, class mechanisms (most black people were on low incomes), and state policies (e.g. the Federal Housing Administration’s recommended use of “restrictive covenants” to block private house sales to black buyers, and the FHA’s use of a “redlining” policy to assess the creditworthiness of mortgage applicants in terms of the racial profile of the area where they planned to buy, meaning less than 2 percent of FHA loans were made to nonwhite buyers between 1930 and 1950) (→ Urbanization, I/45). For the millions of black people who migrated from the South, especially after 1940, this led to urban black ghettos characterized by cumulative cycles of disadvantage and lack of investment. Ghetto formation was fueled by “white flight” from neighborhoods perceived as becoming even slightly black, which led to a declining tax base and consequent disinvestment. Meanwhile, in the South and Southwest, Mexicans and other “Hispanics,” although at various periods defined as legally white, were often in practice considered as black in regions with Jim Crow segregation, and were subject to informal segregation in other areas (→ Latinidad, I/33).

The blatant racism of U.S. segregation allowed Latin American countries – especially those that elected to define their national identities in terms of being mestizo – the opportunity to portray themselves as racially tolerant, comparing themselves favorably to the United States.

Race was an idea in terms of which countries defined themselves and each other on a global stage and in a global hierarchy: U.S.–Brazil racial comparisons in particular were common throughout the 20th century and still today, as each country ponders racism, past, and future. The idea that the United States structured in terms of relative racial purities – black versus white – was the polar opposite of Brazil organized around racial mixture and the tolerance that mixture supposedly entailed was deployed by commentators in both countries. U.S. black activists pointed to Brazil as an object lesson in a critique of U.S. racial segregation; Brazilian intellectuals used U.S. racism as a counterpoint to highlight their nation's supposed racial tolerance. Toward the end of the 20th century, the U.S. civil rights and Black Power movements provided a reference point by which Brazilian racial mobilization was judged as weak by observers north and south (Seigel 2009).

Racial inequality and protest since World War II

Since the World War II, legal segregation in the United States has been dismantled, under intense pressure from the black civil rights movement (→ Social Movements, I/41), which, building on earlier black protest and self-help organizational networks, mobilized to oppose segregation through direct action and legal challenges. Federal affirmative action programs helped to expand the small black middle class. Indices of urban segregation (100 = total segregation; 0 = total desegregation) have slowly dropped in major cities to a high of 78 in 2010, down from 88 in 1990. Still, at a smaller scale of resolution, areas which are nearly 100 percent black persist in cities such as Chicago (Pattillo 2007); some observers identify a change toward the “hyperghetto,” with high levels of precarity, crime, social dislocation, and corresponding state intervention (Wacquant 2008). Also, in 1975, median household income for blacks was 60 percent of that for non-Hispanic whites; in 2010, it was 58 percent. Other indices of racial inequality include the criminal justice system, especially in the context of the “war on drugs,” which targets young black men, despite the fact that they do not use drugs more than whites. In Washington, three out of four young black men will serve time in prison. Nationally, black men are incarcerated ten times more than white men (Wade 2015). In addition, black people are eight times more likely to be a victim of homicide than white people and more than twice as likely to be killed by the police (Guardian 2015; Silver 2015).

Despite this, some claim that race has declined in significance as a cause of inequality, compared to class (see Omi and Winant 1994). At the same time, many adopt a color-blind discourse, denying that race plays a significant role, and claiming that the position of all people in society is determined according to the normal rules of a liberal meritocracy (Bonilla-Silva 2003). This has led to challenges to affirmative action programs, which have been rolled back in the face of accusations that they exclude white people from opportunities and thus constitute the so-called “reverse racism,” a view that disingenuously claims that white and black exclusions are equivalent, when they clearly have different valences in a system that manifestly privileges white people overall. The rationale for affirmative action – as a reparation for past injustice and present racism – is no longer legitimate; instead, the rationale is that diversity is a valuable economic resource (e.g. for the workplace). Of course, race can never work independently of class – all inequalities are driven by the same mechanisms of exclusion in housing, jobs, and education – but the examples of the criminal justice system and the incidence of violent death clearly show that race continues to be a major cause of inequality (→ Intersectionality, I/32). Many conclude that racism needs to be addressed on its own terms, not just by implementing class-based policies, and much less by leaving everything to a market-driven “meritocracy.”

In Latin America, inequality clearly has a racial bias, with the top strata being much lighter-skinned on average than the lower strata (Hernández 2013). In Brazil, 33 percent of whites hold high-status occupations, compared to 23 percent of *pardos* (browns) and 20 percent of *pretos* (blacks) (Telles and Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America 2014). Yet, color-blind stances and claims that class outweighs race are even stronger than in the United States, given that residential racial segregation indices are much lower than U.S. rates, and that in many countries, most people are mixed, while in some others (e.g. Argentina), most people are considered “white.” Claims persist that Latin American countries are racially tolerant compared to the United States (Da Costa 2014). However, where race is enumerated – as it increasingly is in censuses across the region (Loveman 2014) – statistics show that racial inequality exists even when class difference is controlled for. In Brazil, for example, studies have shown that nonwhite people receive less long-term economic benefits from a college education than white people (Silva 1985). Between 1960 and 2000, the nonwhite wage in São Paulo remained stable at about 60 percent of the white wage, with the amount of this disparity being attributable to discrimination remaining the same for men (at roughly 40 percent) and increasing for women (from 53 to 63 percent) (Lovell 2006). The existence of racism is confirmed by qualitative evidence from interviews and ethnography (Twine 1998; Sheriff 2001; Wade 2015). Such data also show that, within the multiracial families which apparently betoken the insignificance of racial difference (→ Family, I/26), racial hierarchies and colorism exist, often centered on ideas about beauty and personal value (→ Whiteness, I/46) (Moreno Figueroa 2013; Hordge-Freeman 2015). In addition, increasing attention is being paid to the incidence of violence that disproportionately affects nonwhite people, whether this are high levels of homicide and police harassment and killing in the Brazilian favelas (Amnesty International 2015; Vargas 2018), or of massacres and forced displacement from land in Colombia (Oslender 2016).

Since the 1960s, Latin American black and indigenous social movements have pushed for recognition and rights. These movements were linked into transnational activist networks; black movements especially were often inspired by the U.S. and South African struggles for racial equality (Fontaine 1981). There was some divergence between indigenous movements, which tended to focus on land (→ II/15; Indigeneity, I/31), and black movements, which were smaller, more urban, tended to focus on racial disadvantage and consciousness-raising, and were often more directly modeled on U.S. black protest (Hanchard 1994). Despite the different agendas, after 1990, these movements helped drive a widespread move toward multiculturalist reform in the region (→ Multiculturalism, I/36), recognizing and giving varied rights to indigenous and, to a lesser extent, black minorities. Where black minority rights were recognized, it was often – e.g. in Colombia, Ecuador, and Honduras – as a result of black organizations adopting an indigenous-like stance, presenting themselves as culturally distinct ancestral communities rooted in the land in specific regions (→ Memory Politics, I/34); less space was given to issues of racism and black people as a national category, although Brazil was an exception in this regard, after 1995 (Hooker 2009).

However, the 2001 United Nations World Conference against Racism, held in Durban, South Africa, proved to be a touchstone in this regard, building on ongoing support for Latin American black mobilizations and legal reforms provided by U.S. bodies, such as the Ford Foundation, the Kellogg Foundation, and the Congressional Black Caucus. As before, race had been a continental arena for the circulation of ideas and practices, and these influences favored the emergence of a more binary division between black and white in Latin America, evidenced in the increasing presence, in statistics, policy, and politics, of inclusive categories such as Afro-Colombian, or, in Brazil, *negro* (which includes the census categories of brown

and black). These are by no means only foreign imports, however, as arguably some basic conceptual divisions between white, black, and indigenous have always structured mestizo societies such as Colombia and Brazil.

In Colombia, the state has developed programs giving special land rights to black and indigenous communities and supporting black and indigenous university applicants. Similar, if less comprehensive, developments are occurring in some other countries, such as Ecuador and Honduras. While these initiatives represent important advances for black and indigenous minorities, questions persist about to what extent they also form part of a state-driven agenda of neoliberal governance (→ Neoliberalism, II/16; State Transformation, II/21), as these programs extend the state's reach into areas where state presence has been historically weak. They can also act as a co-optative mechanism, including black and indigenous communities in some respects, while extractive development continues apace alongside communities with newly gained land titles (→ Extractivism, II/9), resulting in displacement of people and degradation of land and resources (→ Environmental Justice, II/8) (Wade 2002; Speed 2005). In Colombia, dissatisfaction with the limited nature of legal reform for black communities – when the vast majority of Afro-Colombians live in cities – has been one element in an increasing focus on anti-racism, although this is rarely shared by indigenous movements which continue to focus on land, livelihoods, and cultural rights. The new focus is varied, including organizations that highlight black uplift and the need to foment an entrepreneurial black middle class, and ones that promote grassroots organizing, autonomy, and human rights (→ II/35).

In Brazil, there was an official U-turn in the mid-1990s, recognizing that racism was indeed a problem, and instituting controversial race-based affirmative action in higher education (→ I/24) and health (→ I/29) (when such programs were being rolled back in the United States). Continuing the long tradition of Brazil–U.S. comparisons, opponents to racial quotas in Brazilian universities, which divided “black” from “white” at admission, said such measures were based on a U.S. model of race and were inappropriate for Brazil, where many people were neither black nor white. They argued that the policies risked exacerbating racial divisions, which some opponents saw as not a major feature of Brazilian society, and contended that racial inequality was better addressed by class-based policies targeting the poor, which would perhaps deracialize society. Supporters of the quotas responded that class-based policies, while useful, could not address the disadvantage caused by racism, past, and present. The 2012 Social Quotas Law combined socioeconomic and racial criteria in defining those eligible for quota places, specifying first that a proportion of places should go to people who met certain economic criteria and then that a subsegment of these should be distributed among black and indigenous people, proportional to their demographic weight in the local state territory. Quotas have proved effective in radically changing the racial composition of some university programs previously monopolized by white and light-skinned students (Hernández 2013); the economic and symbolic impacts of these changes have yet to become evident.

Conclusion

Some contend that the United States and Latin America are coming closer together in racial terms (Bonilla-Silva 2004): segregation has decreased in the former, while the massive immigration of Latin Americans and Asians in the last few decades has blurred the classic black–white divide that has always been the cornerstone of the U.S. racial order (→ Transnational Migration, I/44). This process of “browning” is fostered by the fact that almost 40 percent of Hispanics

(to use the U.S. Census term) refuse to classify themselves in the main racial census categories and instead say they are of “some other race” (→ *Latinidad*, I/33) (Rodríguez 2000). In contrast, in Latin America, there is now greater formal recognition of ethnic and racial diversities (→ *Ethnicity*, I/25). In Brazil, the word and concept of race have an institutional life in politics and policy, while a classificatory divide between white and black exists alongside more varied classifications recognizing degrees of mixture and color. The idea that the United States is being “Latin Americanized” depends, however, on the idea that the two regions were polar opposites in the first place, which neglects the broader view that all American (and Caribbean) societies are variations on the same theme of a colonial encounter between Africans, Indigenous people, and Europeans; and which overlooks the fact that countries such as Mexico or Brazil liked to define themselves as being paradises of racial tolerance compared to the U.S. racial hell. To be sure, change is occurring north and south of the border, but it is not helpful to think in terms of polar oppositions and their overcoming. It is necessary to understand both how race operates in each context and also how racial meanings traverse national boundaries in a transnational dialogue. Latin American countries have been said by many nationalist ideologues to be examples of societies where mixture has transcended racial difference and racism – a “post-racial” society *avant la lettre* (→ *Hybridity*, I/30). In fact, these countries suggest that racial mixture is just another mode through which racial difference can be lived and racism expressed.

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RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

Heinrich Wilhelm Schäfer

Religious belief is a contested term. First, what is a belief and what is religion? Second, why do such beliefs matter in society? Are they merely ways of cheating and tranquilizing the public or do they at least guarantee a stable social life? The first question is theoretical and must be discussed briefly from the outset of this entry. The decisions taken upon the theory determine how the questions proposed in the second category can be approached: the role of religious beliefs in different societies and Inter-American relations; the contradiction between the tendency of agnosticism (Uruguay: 38 percent agnostic, Latinobarómetro 2014, 16) and the tendency to strongly practice a religious faith (El Salvador: 71 percent, Latinobarómetro 2014, 30); and finally, the mutual influence, change, adaptation, and conflict between Latin American and North American religious praxis. The special case of the Inter-American is focused on within a bigger picture of transnational religious flows and blockades (Dussel 1967; Prien 1978; publications by CEHILA; Gründer 1992; Koschorke 2002; Hiery 2015), within a specific concept of religious praxis.

From the theoretical point of view, this entry follows a Bourdieusian line of thought, approaching *religion* as praxis. Therefore, religious beliefs are taken as a specific brand of embodied dispositions and objectified operators of human communication and action. As embodied dispositions, religious beliefs regulate – through interplay with a myriad of non-religious dispositions – perception, judgment, and actions of individual and collective actors. As operators of human communication, religious beliefs are objectified as sermons, Bible lessons, billboards, chats, blogs, websites, and are represented through the semiotic meaning of institutions like Sunday school, Eucharist, or the Pope. The aim of this approach is to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between the “social physics” of functionalism and the “idealist semiology” of mere text analysis (Bourdieu), thus relating the worldview of actors and their “imaginaries” with objective social structures. That is, relating the dispositions with positions and bridging the gap between signs and things, actors and structures, and the symbolic and the material (Schäfer et al. 2015). In other words, religious beliefs can be taken as operators of human praxis. They acquire meaning only under the concrete conditions of existence that function at the same time as context of reception and production.

Similar to any actor, religious actors ascribe meaning to the world that surrounds them. The difference resides in semantic contents. Religious actors interpret their experience by means of a promise of “salvation” (Riesebrodt 2010), referring to a transcendent entity. Such

entities are bestowed with capabilities and powers beyond human reach. In consequence, these entities or forces are conceived as helpful to cope with different conditions of existence and they are addressees for prayers of petition and thanksgiving.

The most important feature from the praxeological point of view is the generated identification of believers or their institutions with the transcendent entities by different religious practices. Thus, religious individuals and institutions (the Church) are thought to partake of a *supramundane* power that bestows not only a particular power for resilience against and compensation for suffering and adverse conditions, but also higher legitimacy for religious or other social institutions and an impressive rationale for the integration of groups or whole societies.

Finally, it is an old truism that due to their practical flexibility, religious beliefs can adapt to changing social conditions in order to stay meaningful to the actors (→ Religion and Missionizing, I/17), or they can be transposed to different social conditions and change their meaning accordingly, and, in turn, they are able to exert influence on social conditions. Religious beliefs, fixed as mere “imaginaries” without social context, are “vanity of vanities” (Kohelet 1: 2), but religious beliefs as social praxis can “move mountains” (Mt. 21: 21) or can contribute to changing entire societies, as it has happened in Latin America by means of the U.S. Protestant Mission beginning in the 19th century.

Inter-American discussion of the topic

To talk about religious beliefs in Inter-American relations today means to refer to a wide variety of actors as different as isolated indigenous groups in the Amazon, traditional Catholicism, powerful upper-middle-class Neopentecostals, and urban tribe churches. It also involves Latin American Pentecostal mission endeavors in the USA and transnational elites of faith business, and finally the reception and transformation of U.S. religious discourses and practices. Pondering the different “streams” of Inter-American religious flows according to their quantity and social effects in the 20th century, there is a stark preponderance of Evangelical, especially Pentecostal, influence from north to south over any other kind of interchange, such as Catholic migrants to the USA; Santería believers and priests from Cuba, Brazil, Miami, and other places; and the networking of American Indigenous practitioners between south and north (→ Indigeneity, I/31). In this sense, history has established a bias. Moreover, the focus on Inter-American relations proscribes two further limitations. With regard to historical time, an active entanglement between the two subcontinents began to develop only with the eclipse of the colonial period and the beginning of the North American mission. Regarding space, the transatlantic relations with Europe (Catholics and North American Protestants) and with Africa (Afro-American religions, recently Brazilian Neopentecostals, and small Muslim communities) must be excluded from this overview. With regard to the actors under scrutiny, the focus is on those who act within Inter-American transnational relations or are affected by Inter-American relations of other actors. While the transatlantic flows and the spreading of Afro-American religion in Latin America, such as Brazilian Candomblé into Southern Cone Candombe, are interesting processes to look at, for the sake of feasibility in this entry, the concentration is on the predominant flows in terms of their social effect.

In the historical perspective, three periods of religious transformations will be focused on, which coincide with basic phases of the sociopolitical development in the postcolonial nation-states as established by José Bengoa (2011) (→ Nation and State Building, I/16; Nation State, II/38).

Different worlds and liaison – colonies and 19th century

The colonial period is of interest for Inter-American studies on religion inasmuch as during this time of almost complete separation of Anglo-Saxon and Spanish colonies, quite distinct religious *habitus* were formed. Yet, the Anglo and Latin American worlds remained completely separate.

It was not until the formation of the independent nation-states in Latin America during the 19th century (→ Independence Movements, I/10) and the U.S.-American pretention of hemispheric domination that U.S.-American Protestantism started its mission endeavor to the south (→ Interventionism, II/36), as there was no comparable flow from south to north. First, Protestant missionaries performed as religious counterparts of anti-colonist liberal politics among the local upper middle classes. At the end of that century, however, newly founded mission societies with conservative Evangelical backgrounds began to address the marginalized in Latin America, aiming for religious conversion. In the framework of U.S.-dominated Pan-Americanism (→ II/40) (e.g. the 1916 Panama Mission Conference), 20th-century Latin America was to be transformed by new religious actors from the USA: first, conservative Evangelicals, and later primarily Pentecostals and Neopentecostals.

Association – 1900–1950

While the evangelical mission societies – American Bible Society (1864), Christian and Missionary Alliance (1887), and Latin American Mission (1921) – prompted the first wave of mass evangelism in Latin America, the enduring change of the Latin American landscape came with the Pentecostal and, later, the Neopentecostal movements. After a precursory trend toward enthusiastic and even trance phenomena among Evangelicals, in 1901 the Pentecostal movement was “born” in terms of a collective self-definition distinct to Evangelicals. Groups of mainly poor and partially black Christians saw themselves illuminated by the “Spirit of Pentecost” that had returned to accompany “His people” through the last tribulations toward the end of the world. The constitutive reference to the presence of the Holy Spirit was decisive. It enabled illiterate marginalized people to receive divine revelation by trance or similar experiences. In the beginning of the movement, this factor was important, but later stifled under the predominance of white literate experts leading the bigger churches, and finally today, it is frequently misused as an instrument of religious authoritarianism.

The movement spread rapidly across continents, but quickly split in its first decade into white and black branches (→ Ethnicity, I/25). While the latter stayed in poor neighborhoods in the USA, the former organized transnational missionary endeavors with a stronger fervor than the Evangelicals. Albeit the white churches were less enthusiastic, prone to trance, and emphasized evangelical Bible teaching, the Pentecostal mission in Latin America was the only nonindigenous and non-Afro-American – that is: non-discriminated – religious option with elements of trance and incorporation of the sacred by enthusiastic religious practices.

Examining the most important religious dispositions and practices of Pentecostalism, it is obvious that together they constitute a strongly subjectivist brand of religiosity – the staunchest contradiction possible to traditional Catholic objectivism. In contrast to a local saint and the sacraments administered by a priest, the Holy Spirit inhabits the heart of a person and is “portable.” The belief in the presence of the Holy Spirit empowers people, making them feel accepted by God and bestowed a special capacity to overcome the hardships and challenges of a life in poverty. The Spirit accompanies His people when rural urban migration is unavoidable. Around the mid-20th century in the industrialized Cono Sur, it

was already visible that the suburban belts of poverty were populated by Pentecostals and Evangelicals (Willems 1967; Lalive d'Epinay 1969; Bastide 2007) (→ Urbanization, I/45).

Today, it has become a hard fact all across Latin America that the outskirts of metropolises have a high percentage of non-Catholics, and traditional centers are populated predominantly by Catholics (Jacob et al. 2003; Torre and Gutiérrez Zúñiga 2007). However, around the 1950s, the percentage of the general Protestant population in Latin America still was well below 10 percent. The Catholic Church, the monopolist in the emerging religious field, had made some headway in addressing the popular classes in the first half of the century. In continuity with the social encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and the Catholic Social Doctrine, a process of “Romanization” (Roux 2014) of the Latin American Catholic Church took shape. The Inter-American transnationalization was thus countered by strengthening the transatlantic relations (→ Atlantic, I/3), mainly by founding transnational Catholic social corpora, such as of Catholic universities (1944), educators (1945), families (1951), and the Acción Católica (1946). The latter has maintained a strong influence until today, especially in rural areas.

Until the 1950s, both Protestantism and Catholicism had acquired modern strategies of striving for social presence. Protestantism was identified by the Catholic hierarchy as a potential competitor, denouncing the missionaries as agents of a North American cultural attack on Latin America. This religious transnationalism contradicted public politics during a time when, according to Bengoa (2011), national identities were increasingly forged by cultural and political programs, such as Indigenismo in Mexico, Peronismo in Argentina, Frey, and later, Allende in Chile (→ Indigeneity, I/31; Populism, II/43). The U.S.-American actors have again changed the tides of motivation. The Pan-American activism (e.g. the 1916 Missionary Conference in Panama) (→ Pan-Americanism, II/40) was followed by the Great Depression (→ Crisis, II/4) and gathered speed again in the 1960s with Kennedy's Alliance for Progress (→ Development, II/6) with corresponding socioreligious activities (D'Antonio and Pike 1964) and an increasingly professional mission.

Enmeshment: 1950–1970

Around the 1950s and 1960s, the zeal for converts grew more professional among U.S.-American missions. In Depth Evangelism organized public campaigns in stadiums and similar places and evangelistic radio stations were built. Additionally, Wycliffe Bible Translators/Summer Institute of Linguistics and other missionary enterprises “discovered” indigenous peoples (→ I/11) all over Latin America as addressees of their cultural gospel, alienating them from their religious roots, with a clear bias toward integration of indigenous actors into national projects of modernization (→ I/35). This “encounter” has partly led to irritation among indigenous communities, fostering the reorientation in indigenous traditions as a counter effect, and laying the foundation of what later would become an indigenous revitalization; another part has led toward the intended integration, most visibly where economic and social change has scattered the reproductive basis of the communities.

Notably, it is not simply the religious supply that made Protestantism grow, but also a new religious demand forged by rapid social change: urban industrialization in Latin America's South and in Mexico (→ Urbanization, I/45), as well as later agro-industrial restructuring in other countries, especially in Central America (→ Land, II/15). While these developments favored either corporatist organizing or religious conversion in the lower classes, urban educated middle classes benefited from the professionalization (lawyers, physicians, professors, and technicians) and the growth of public administration. Some of these people were

second-generation Evangelicals and even Pentecostals who became increasingly unwilling to accept the command of U.S. missionaries over their churches. The subsequent conflicts can be seen as a concrete and conflictive entanglement by means of which religious actors kept up with political nationalism and pronounced themselves against transnational domination. On the one hand, these conflicts led to national churches splitting off, mainly Pentecostal (e.g. Unión Evangélica Pentecostal de Venezuela, Principe de Paz and Elim, Guatemala), and consigning more power to national leaders in the big U.S. mission churches (e.g. the Church of God, Cleveland and the Assemblies of God). The new national churches usually readopted impulses from the early days of Pentecostalism in terms of direct religious revelations, charismatic leadership, identification with local lower classes, and an interest in social involvement. In spite of the inner-denominational anti-colonialism, at the same time they benefited from the North–South activities of U.S.–American evangelistic freelancers such as In Depth Evangelism or, Luis Palau beginning in 1966 (the Argentinian–U.S. citizen’s biography is emblematic of an “entangled Inter–American existence”), since the Evangelists made the converts enter local churches and contributed to strengthening the Protestant position in the religious field.

Entrapment: 1970–1990

Growth, public perception, along with active and passive political involvement of Protestantism in Latin America increased forcefully during the 1970s and 1980s, the dark age of national security regimes and counter insurgency warfare (→ Authoritarianism, II/25; Military, II/37). Inasmuch as U.S. foreign policy, mainly the CIA, was the driving force behind military coups (the Operation Condor), the repression of democratic movements and extreme violence against civil population, along with the creation of paramilitary groups (the “Contras”) against Nicaragua (International Court of Justice, June 27, 1986), led to Protestantism being entrapped in politics. During pronounced social, political, and military polarization, the demand for religious meaning changes and religious beliefs easily acquire political significance given strongly religious populations – which is usually the case across Latin America. Thus, religious specialists and lay people *volens volens* are dragged into political dynamics, even if they maintain a strictly religious discourse. At the same time, both the collective identities of religious actors and the political relevance of religious beliefs and strategies increase.

One of the first notable religious positions is of movements interested in social justice and political participation of the marginalized (→ Social Movements, I/41), namely Theology of Liberation and the ecumenical branch of the liberal Historical Protestantism with connections to the World Council of Churches, Geneva. Already by the early 1960s, the ecumenical activities had flourished in Brazil (Waldo Cesar, Julio de Santa Ana, Richard Shaull, and the organization “Iglesia y Sociedad en América Latina”) under the reformist government of João Goulart and were quickly stifled by the military coup in 1964. However, the pivotal moment for the rise of the religious justice movement was the Latin American Bishops Conference in Medellín 1968 – a Catholic, transnational, but not an Inter–American event. Having acquired official legitimacy, Catholic Liberation Theology started off as a Latin American religious project for social justice and took almost immediate effect on a few important Protestant churches and theological schools, such as Instituto Superior Evangélico de Estudios Teológicos (Argentina), Seminario Bíblico Latinoamericano, and Departamento Ecueménico de Investigaciones (both Costa Rica, the latter a foundation of Chilean exiles after the CIA–lead coup). With regard to religious beliefs, the old Catholic imagery of the

crucified Christ and the celestial virgin had been completely substituted. Theologians such as Gustavo Gutiérrez, Leonardo Boff, and Raúl Vidales introduced the image of Jesus as a *compañero* and the Virgin as a poor yet committed woman. The theological motive of the Exodus was central for the discourse of liberation, and the social situation of “the poor” became the ethical starting point for theology. While this religious position paralleled many pro-justice and democracy movements all over the continent (→ Social Movements, I/41), its effect on social revolution was the most intense in Central America, namely Nicaragua (→ Revolution, II/44). It motivated many Christians – not only Catholic, but also Baptists and Pentecostals – to fight in the ranks or at least to support the Sandinista guerrilla and, after 1979, to engage in the social reforms of the revolutionary government. Similar effects were seen in the rebellions of El Salvador (Bishop Romero and the Lutheran Church) and Guatemala (Catholic catechists and Historical Protestants).

The rebellions in Central America had at least one strong Inter-American repercussion. They ignited fears of a domino effect in the U.S. government, especially the Reagan administration, and religious movements began to exert considerable effects on U.S. foreign policy (→ Interventionism, II/36). Besides the broad repertoire of measures implemented (diplomacy, economic aid or embargo, military supplies, training in torture, psychological warfare, and surveillance), religion was an important object of interest and means of intervention for the Reagan administration, found, for example, in the leaked documents of the Committee of Santa Fe meetings (1980 and 1988) and the foundation of the Institute on Religion and Democracy (IRD 1981) (Ezcurra 1982; Diamond 1989). The containment of Liberation Theology was of highest priority.

For many reasons, the policy on Central America was highly contested in the USA, as the legitimacy of religious actors down south became a domestic issue and involved politicians, churches, and social scientists. Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, Pentecostal churches in Central America had been multiplying and simultaneously gaining public visibility. The social difference between Catholic base communities and Pentecostal congregations in Central America was transformed into an ideological antagonism in the U.S.–American debate surrounding the Reagan-era policy. Since Theology of Liberation was already well represented, the assessment of the Pentecostals in Central America was at stake. First, the liberal North American Congress on Latin America, a small NGO news publisher on Latin America, did an investigative piece from a political science point of view on the “The Salvation Brokers” (Domínguez and Huntington 1984) in Central America, placing the Pentecostals close to U.S. foreign interests, but not giving much insight into the religious logics of the actors.

The answer from an IRD perspective came with “Tongues of Fire” (Martin 1990), an ill-researched book (Martin does not even understand Spanish) repeating aspiring Weberian preconceptions, highly promoted in the USA and Europe (and looked at with disdain by Latin American Pentecostals). The domestic conflict in the USA had, in turn, direct consequences for religious actors in Central America. The “left,” not only liberal Mainline churches, engaged in supporting pro-revolutionary projects in Nicaragua – such as the ecumenical Center Antonio Valdivieso (Uriel Molina, José Argüello) – or rescuing persecuted Christian activists and victims of counter insurgency warfare from the iron grip of CIA-backed military repression in El Salvador and Guatemala.

The primary actor from the right was the Reagan administration that cooperated in various (partly covert) forms, with religious representatives in Nicaragua (Bishop Obando y Bravo or the head of the Evangelical Pastors’ Convention) or with the religious right in the USA and elsewhere. The U.S. religious right engaged into “Santa Fe” strategies in different ways. In consultation with U.S. and Guatemalan government officials, leaders of the

religious right agreed upon supporting the genocidal regime of the Neopentecostal dictator Rios Montt (Schäfer 1992, 225). The religious right (reportedly, Gospel Crusade, Youth with a Mission, Campus Crusade for Christ) was also actively involved in the “Iran-Contra-Gate” conspiracy in support of terrorism in Nicaragua (216).

One effect of the politico-religious strategies and “joint ventures” of U.S. foreign policy was that the social, political, and military polarizations in Central America were transposed even more forcefully into the religious sector, and religious actors were increasingly entrapped within opposite political positions. In Guatemala, for example, in 1982, the Neopentecostal organization of Gospel Outreach – the social service branch of the El Verbo Church, which Rios Montt belonged to – was involved as a social agent in the military pacification program “Guns and Beans” in the countryside. In the city, the church preached the “restoration” of Guatemala under the “King David Efraín Rios Montt.” This was not to the liking of the leading Pentecostal bodies, who supported the idea of the living in the final stage of history and Christ’s imminent return.

With regard to religious beliefs, these two decades have created strong profiles of different religious *habitus* in an astonishingly clear connection to social positions and religious traditions (religious supply and demand) of the actors, and not to political manipulation. In short, the central theme of historical time is flow and destiny. From the vantage point of Catholic and Protestant liberationists, the goal of faith is to contribute to creating a fair society. Besides some differences between Protestant and Catholic approaches, many believers shared the idea of “turning the kingdom of God more and more [into] a reality on earth” by creating just conditions for everybody – in a way, a progressive transformation of 19th-century social evolutionism of the Social Gospel. At first glance, the theocratic restorationism of many Neopentecostals may be similar, but in reality, it is entirely different. Finally, the conservative Pentecostal expectation of Christ’s coming from heaven in the last days indicates yet another entirely different religious *habitus*.

In order to understand the latter, it is important to remember the early U.S. Pentecostals of 1901 and their double emphasis on both enthusiastic incorporation of the Holy Spirit and the expectation of the coming of Christ. Under highly violent and life-threatening situations in Central America (and also in Colombia, and to a lesser extent in Brazil), the apocalyptic belief in an imminent end of the world was a strong means for marginal and hopeless people to make sense of their condition. They developed inner-congregational strategies of survival like not involving themselves in politics and social issues, since the time for such things had run out anyway. For people with sufficient capital and influence in society, this passive Apocalypticism did not work.

To understand the active Apocalypticism of the Neopentecostals, it is helpful to recall the generation of the movement in California during the 1950s. It was created as an upper-middle- and upper-class split away from the Assemblies of God, the first Neopentecostal organization of the Full Gospel Businessmen’s Fellowship International. During the 1960s and 1970s, a considerable number of successful upper-middle-class organizations developed from this root, many of which, especially the “Restorationists,” headed for an authoritarian and theocratic transformation of society in terms of a millennial kingdom on earth. Neopentecostal missions began to work in Latin America in the early 1970s and quickly spread among the middle class, promoting health and wealth as the main benefits of religious belief. During the 1980s in Central America, the key strategy to reach that aim was “spiritual warfare” against transcendent and social demons in order to install God’s kingdom on earth, obviously with a Christian, like Rios Montt, in government. According to the different social positions of the believers, the Neopentecostal religious operators transformed

and continued to transform into varying religious habitus. Under the Central American conditions, the disposition to aggressively enter into “spiritual” and military warfare prevailed. In Brazil and other countries during the 1980s, other symbolic operators, namely those of magically gained prosperity and health, functioned primarily through religious rituals of purification and goal centeredness. This focus on religious praxis has become increasingly important during the socioeconomic transformations between the 1990s and today (Cleary and Steigenga 2004, 2007) (→ Neoliberalism, II/16).

Complexity: 1990 until today

Bengoa (2011) dates a third phase from the 1990s until today, coinciding with regime changes and a decrease of political polarization (→ State Transformation, II/21). This is a period in which the nation-state (→ II/38) in Latin America has lost power in relation to international financial organizations and their structural adjustment programs, and its cultural appeal has diminished for the new middle classes, and later to poor youth, in comparison to the rising role of new media and transnational cultural communication (→ Media Flows, III/35). For Latin American religious actors, this period has been one of rapid diversification, revitalization among indigenous and Afro-American religions, as well as the outset of transnational religious cooperation and missionary activities created on their own behalf, with their own financial resources and control.

With regard to U.S.-American actors, the political strain upon religious activities toward Latin America has lessened considerably after the end of the Central American wars and increasing engagement of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The personal missionary activities to Latin America also seem to have diminished and have given way to the use of new media and mutual interchange (→ Digital Culture, III/28).

Nevertheless, religious activity in Latin America has increased. On the one hand, (Neo)Pentecostal churches and Protestantism, in general, keep growing almost everywhere (except Uruguay and Chile), and in some countries (especially Central America), they consist of almost half the population (Vásquez and Marquardt 2003; Williams, Steigenga, and Vásquez 2009). On the other hand, the Catholic charismatic movement has grown strongly during the last decades and has built a religious counter force to the (Neo)Pentecostals, who nevertheless practice a very similar religious style (Cleary 2011). Recent field studies of the author and his team in Central America suggest that one of the reasons for the surprising increase in religious interest consists of social disintegration, overall precarious working relations (even on the managerial level) (→ Informality, II/13), and individualization that call for religious “techniques of the self” (Foucault). Different transformations of Neopentecostalism offer class-specific brands. For the upper middle class, the religious promise of success comes with John Maxwell- or Rick Warren-style coaching for an efficient life preached in glamorous megachurches. In the lower classes, the hindrances to economic stability are often diagnosed as demonic oppression and treated by exorcism rituals. Social disintegration is also perceived as all-encompassing corruption, discrediting of political parties, and endemic criminal violence. The recourse of many believers, even Catholics, to the Bible as a binding law and principle of social order makes sense with this background and explains some of the relative success of religious politicians (→ Political Communication, II/42).

In general, the influence of Protestant, especially Neopentecostal, actors in politics has risen (Cleary and Stewart-Gambino 1997; Freston 2001, 2008). Actors like the Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus and its leader Edir Macedo have declared a goal to obtain a dominant voice in the Senate and the House of Representatives in Brazil. The recent *golpe blando*

against President Dilma Rousseff, which pushed the corrupt and reactionary oligarchy back into power again, would probably have not been possible without the activities of the *bancada evangélica* in the Brazilian House of Representatives. In Guatemala, the *Fraternidad Cristiana* has organized a *Te Deum* for the elected presidents of the nation for over a decade, and an informal group of church leaders agrees upon which candidate is worthy of the support of their church members. Additionally, the Catholic *Te Deum*, which was inaugurated in the 1950s to bless the dictatorship of Castillo Armas, functions similarly by claiming the Catholic Church's power of legitimation (and delegitimation) over political rulers.

However, there is an important difference between Neopentecostal leaders and the official Catholic Church. The former is held responsible only by their constituency, that is, their success as a public figure to mobilize clientele whatever the political tides might be (→ Clientelism, II/29), and the dominant tides in most countries are of the dominant social classes. To be explicit, most of these church leaders favor neoliberal concepts of economy and society (→ Neoliberalism, II/16) and “harvest” among the victims of these politics. In contrast, the Catholic Church in most countries has its own weight as a highly formalized and officially recognized entity, and – more important – is accountable to the Vatican. This institutional weight on its own does not mean that the Catholic Church is “progressive,” but it does guarantee a relatively robust independence of its positions. However, as the Theology of Liberation has been able to act under this umbrella, other Catholic movements are protected too. Today, this is true for religiously and politically conservative movements, such as Legion of Christ and Opus Dei. These organizations do not only strongly influence Latin American dominant classes and politics. Today, under the conditions of rising insecurity in the middle classes, they have also made headway into the lower social strata (→ Social Inequality, II/20).

With regard to the intricate relations between politics and religion, Nicaragua is somewhat peculiar. The Sandinista President Daniel Ortega is able to co-opt influential religious leaders of Neopentecostal and Charismatic churches and organizations into his patrimonial politics, ask for advice, donate real estate for church building, and sponsor social projects of the churches – with the clear intention to garner support for his regime and gently stifle political opposition to his government's lack of constitutionality. In the midst of strong religious and conservative political dynamics, an increasingly strong current of Pentecostal churches with a politically left-wing orientation is developing in the lower classes of Latin America. Many of these groups are engaged not only in neighborhood activities, for example, by reintegrating criminal youth, but also political mobilization.

While not technically Inter-American in terms of their political significance, the Afro-American and Indigenous movements ought to be mentioned here (→ Social Movements, I/41; Indigeneity, I/31). After the end of the National Security regimes and the Central American wars, these formerly repressed movements have gained increasing influence in Latin American politics. After centuries of persecution and in spite of ongoing discrimination, the 1992 commemoration of 500 years of colonialism served the indigenous peoples as a visible starting point for public action in the Indigenous movement (although organizational activities date further back). As movements with social and political agendas, Afro-American actors in Brazil are especially anchored in the educated lower middle class and foster emancipatory politics. In the Andean countries and Guatemala, the indigenous movement has revitalized indigenous religious traditions and become increasingly influential in official politics, such as political parties and candidates in Guatemala. The Indigenous and Afro-American movements have become increasingly active in regard to Inter-American relations. For instance, talking to “spiritual guides” in Guatemala or Mexico, one learns about transnational networks of cooperation among colleagues – North American, Eurasian,

etc. – offering their spiritual and shamanistic alternatives to church Christianity to North American and European consumers.

The same is true for Afro-American religions, be it Haitian, Cuban, or Brazilian (→ African-descendant Literatures, III/2). During the last decades, Candomblé, Umbanda, Santería, Voodoo, María Lionza, etc., have become transnational enterprises that promote a constant back and forth between Latin America, the USA, Africa, and the rest of the world. It is not only black migrants from Latin America living in the USA that have exported their religious identification to the United States. In conformity with the religious style of offering *trabajos* instead of recruiting followers – the dispersion of Afro-American religion to the USA has also affected white, religious uprooted people in the North, including those of intellectual middle-class origin (→ Whiteness, I/46). Thus, quite a few dwellers of Biscayne Bay beaches might have acquired the title and status of a Bablao by attending courses with a Cuban grandmaster of this discipline.

Currently, Latin American migrants to *El Norte* are potentially able to considerably change the political landscape in the USA. They represent some 18–20 percent of the general population in the USA, in some counties of the Southwest measuring up to 50 percent (→ Latinidad, I/33). Most of these people are Catholics who either import the veneration of their local Saints and Virgins to U.S. streets (such as the Tepeyac Association in New York) or engage in enthusiastic style of worship coined by the Catholic Charismatic movement. Other Latinos are Pentecostals and either attend U.S.-American churches or, more often, establish their own Pentecostal communities in the USA as places where even undocumented immigrants can find a spiritual and social home, despite a hostile social environment.

The Latin American Protestant actors mainly participate in two transnational Inter-American activities. Like the Catholics, the lower classes physically migrate in search of labor and create “transnational spaces” (Pries 1999) over time by communication, exchange of goods, and travel between the USA and Latin America. Some of the migrants are pastors or, at least, have some experience in leading. These people can establish migrant churches in the USA. In contrast, the managers of the Neopentecostal megachurches (such as Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus, Brazil, or Casa de Dios, Guatemala) fly to attend missionary events that their organizations stage in the USA, Europe, and elsewhere.

The intention is to win over U.S. Americans, Europeans, Asians, etc. However, at least with regard to Europe and the USA, most of these events are attended by Latin migrants (→ Transnational Migration, I/44). The Latin American megachurches have supported powerful religious players who are financed and directed from Latin America, in communication with their North American colleagues, and build transnational networks of religious managerial elites. Today, the days of North American Christian mission endeavors to Latin America have ended. Inter-American religious entanglement in terms of physical relations is headed by Latin American actors, mainly migrants and managers.

Finally, beyond the physical change of location, communication is an important operator for religious identity. Therefore, Inter-American religious flows are mediated in an ever increasing quantity by the media, be it conventional or social media (→ III/41). In short, the transnational space of religious communication is as heterogeneous as the space of physical relations. While social media and the Internet contribute to maintaining local inter-religiosity and favor small suppliers, large U.S.-American suppliers are favored by broadcast (→ Television, III/43). In any case, the communicational flows constitute a twenty-four-hour global religious conversation, a truly virtual eternity of sacred noise (→ Media Flows, III/35).

Final discussion

A topic is relevant in Inter-American studies, first, if it is useful to scientifically refer to a relevant field of practice and objective social relations for South and North American people. It should also be considered relevant, as helpful to scientifically examine external relations of the American hemisphere. For the topic *religion*, both conditions are true, as in both South and North America, religious beliefs, practices, and institutions are far more important for cultural, social, and political processes than in Europe. Moreover, the topic is prone to be disregarded due to the common secularist habitus of social scientists that tends to produce a scholastic fallacy regarding religious practices.

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41

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

León Enrique Ávila Romero

When looking for the definition of a social movement, it is fundamental to note that different meanings have been created and morphed over time. The rational choice theory, that comes from the field of economics and has Mancur Olson as its leading exponent, is one of the most influential approaches on the subject. From its perspective, collective action can be explained as a product of pressure groups' rational behavior and the existence of incentives for their involvement (Green and Shapiro 1996). In contrast, the resource mobilization theory highlighted the action strategies, problematizing the rational choice theory's assumption of a rational actor. The former focused on analyzing all human, material, cognitive, and technical resources available to operate collectively. The "new social movements" theory retrieved the Marxist notion of social conflict as well as Weber's definition of agency, emphasizing the study of the new types of conflicts that emerged in postindustrial societies. Alain Touraine (2006), one of the most influential theorists on this subject, considered identity to be the main vector for action. The political-opportunity-structure approach emphasizes analyzing context – from the political system to political culture – to understand the possibility of collective action. Other approaches concentrate on the emergence of collective identities and how this permits the expression of common objectives for understanding social movements (Melucci 1994). During the 1990s, the Latin American discussion focused on the articulation of movements in the context of the everyday life of the popular classes, discussing the question of political culture (Alvarez, Escobar, and Dagnino 2018). Many empirical studies tend to combine these different approaches to social movements in their analyses.

The concept of social movement refers to an organization with a longer continuity in time, while the concept of collective action refers to practices of social protest, such as strikes, work stoppage, rallies, public statements, threats, blockades, and hunger strikes, among others. Social movements form part of the so-called civil society (→ II/28) and are sometimes connected to other forms of collective action like labor unions, churches, or NGOs.

Even though the actors of a social movement may undertake collective actions, a single collective action alone cannot be regarded as a social movement. According to Charles Tilly and Wood (2009, 5), a social movement should have four main features, whose acronym is WUNC: Worthiness, which implies a sober demeanor, neat clothing, presence of clergy or dignitaries, and mothers with children; Unity, including matching badges, headbands, banners, or costumes, as well as marching in ranks, singing, and chanting; Numbers as applied

to headcounts, signatures on petitions, messages from constituents, filling streets; and Commitment, which means braving bad weather, visible participation by both the old and handicapped, resistance to repression, ostentatious sacrifice, subscription, and/or benefaction.

Landsberger (1974), in turn, defines movements in regard to low status groups, stating that a movement is “any collective reaction to such low status” and setting out four dimensions: (1) the degree to which there is a common consciousness of sharing the same fate; (2) the degree to which action is collective both in (a) extent of persons involved, and in (b) degree of coordination and organization of action; (3) the extent to which the action is “instrumental” and designed to achieve a goal outside itself as well as the degree to which it is “expressive” and is undertaken because of the gratification inherent in the action itself; (4) the degree to which the reaction is based exclusively on low socioeconomic and political status, as against being one in which other issues – religious, national – play a “genuine, independent part” (Landsberger 1974, 236).

The sociological and historiographical reflection basically distinguishes between two historical phases of social movements. The traditional social movements of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century are mainly linked to the workers’ and peasants’ movement (→ Class Struggle, II/3), and the abolitionist and anti-imperialist movements, and also – to a lesser extent – to the women’s rights movement (→ Gender, I/9) and the abolitionist and anti-imperialist movement (→ Slavery, I/18). In the context of mass consumption in global Fordism and on the eve of the emergence of the postindustrial society, the so-called new social movements emerged that place less emphasis on questions of material redistribution of goods and more emphasis on a change of values in diverse themes.

In this context, across the Americas, the struggles for recognition of indigenous rights as well as various ethnic and gender movements are of paramount importance (→ Indigeneity, I/31; Ethnicity, I/25; Gender Identities, I/28). Furthermore, movements for environmental justice (→ II/8) and the betterment of urban living conditions achieved considerable relevance (Castells 1979) (→ Urbanization, I/45). Especially in the context of military dictatorships (→ Authoritarianism, II/25), human rights (→ II/35) movements emerged, for which the solidarity movements with Latin America in the United States and Canada were crucial. At the end of the 1990s, the alter-globalization movement (→ I/22) was formed against the neoliberal globalization (→ Neoliberalism, II/16), which for its broad range of topics also was called the “movement of the movements” (Klein 2001).

Peasant revolts, anti-imperialism, and agrarian reform

With the turn of the 20th century, peasant revolts arose in Mexico which culminated in the Mexican Revolution of 1917. Its main demand was the distribution of land (→ II/15) and the “Land and Freedom” slogan of Mexican Revolution’s leader Emiliano Zapata and his Liberation Army of the South (Huizer, Gerrit, and Stavenhagen 1974) shook the continent (→ Revolution, II/44), enabling the emergence of multiple social movements and rural uprisings – as defined by Eric Wolf (1969). As a consequence of the Mexican Revolution, more than 50 percent of the country’s land remains in the hands of peasants and indigenous peoples to this date.

In Colombia, the arrival of the United Fruit Company caused dozens of deaths in Urabá and other wide regions where commercial plantations were settled, creating a trail of destruction and death among the field workers who claimed their rights and a piece of land to work. The history of the environmental and social depredation caused by the United Fruit Company in Latin America is appalling. Horror stories remain in the collective memory

of many regions, as in the case of Colombia. In the Colombian case, the massacre of peasants by the army as retaliation for the strike waged by the former was portrayed in Gabriel García Márquez's novel *One Hundred Years of Solitude*. The farm workers in the area of the Magdalena River's basin demanded a salary increase, as well as social insurance and the labor benefits they lacked. According to Brungardt (1987, 115), between sixty-eight and eighty people officially died in the massacre, but public memory talks of more than a thousand deaths. The actions by the United Fruit Company were related to the perceived threat by the national government of the development of a separated nation in the banana region and were used as the rationale for the repression perpetrated against hundreds of rural workers.

In various cases, the peasants' demands were entangled with the anti-imperialist discourse of the 1930s. In the year of 1932, Cesar Augusto Sandino led the uprising against the U.S.-American invasion in Nicaragua, defending the sovereignty of the national territory with his army of civilians (Selser 1981). Previously, in 1928, Farabundo Martí traveled to the U.S. and became linked to the Anti-Imperialist League of the Americas. After a stay in Nicaragua with Sandino, he led an important rebellion in El Salvador. Thousands of men revolted against the government for a piece of land, and 15,000–30,000 peasants were killed by dictator Maximiliano Díaz's troops (Gomez 1996).

After World War II and in the midst of the Cold War, the U.S. initiated the "Alliance for Progress" between 1961 and 1967, which led to incipient agrarian reforms in Latin America as a way to control and "corporatize" the peasants (→ Development, II/6; Modernization, I/35). Thus, the distribution of land (→ II/15) continued in Brazil, Guatemala, Peru, Ecuador, and Mexico, among others.

In 1952, the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement and the mining workers in Bolivia arranged a revolution that gave way to social changes and to an incipient agrarian reform. It was only until the rise to power of President Evo Morales in 2006 that the colonization process in the "Half Moon" area (in the areas of Santa Cruz, Trinidad, Tarija, among others) has intensified without significant changes to the agrarian structure, respecting the agricultural capitalist industry and their large estates. In 1954, President Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala was overthrown by a coup d'état. Arbenz had distributed lands owned by the United Fruit Company among the peasants (Sabino 2008). On January 1st of 1959, the Liberation Army led by Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara entered Havana, signaling the victory of the Cuban Revolution. The agrarian reform they undertook involved the distribution of land among the peasants, as well as collectivization processes that were monitored by the new Cuban government. In 1962, the peasant revolt led by Hugo Blanco in the region of Cuzco in the Andean highlands enabled the hacienda workers to regain their rights; Blanco was nonetheless apprehended by the police. This uprising laid the foundations for the agrarian reform that Peruvian President Juan Velasco Alvarado undertook during the 1970s. In contrast, the distribution of land that socialist President Salvador Allende had started in Chile came to an untimely end when General Augusto Pinochet overthrew him through a coup d'état in 1973. In 1979, the triumph of the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua gave way to an important agrarian reform that distributed thousands of hectares among the peasants and created agricultural cooperatives (Banmeister 1998).

However, as the neoliberal economic model has been enforced in Latin America since the late 1980s, the agrarian reform processes have come to a halt and the respective distribution of land slowed down substantially, triggering serious conflicts in the field. In 1994, the international movement La Vía Campesina arose with two central components: (a) North America, which groups farmers from United States and Canada, and (b) Latin America, which groups the main agricultural organizations of the region under the Coordinadora

Latinoamericana de Organizaciones del Campo – CLOC (Martínez-Torres and Rosset 2010). The movement is currently in a stage of resistance and opposition against free trade (→ Regional Integration, II/18). One of the most relevant events where the movement took part was the massive protest against the World Trade Organization's Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico in 2003. In this event, the suicide of South Korean farmer Lee Kyung Hae took place as his ultimate protest against the terrible impact of WTO trade policies on South Korea farmers. That year, the protests curbed the aims of the Doha Development Round to liberalize the agricultural sector.

Workers and popular movements

In the context of class struggle (→II/3), it is fundamental to describe two main trends: (a) the anarcho-sindicalism and (b) the Marxist or proletarian tradition (→ Socialism, I/42). In this sense, the anarcho-sindicalist trend was highly influential to the organization process of the working class in the early 20th century. In Mexico, for example, the efforts of the Liberal Party led by brothers Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magón gave way to the undertaking of unionist actions such as the Rio Blanco and Cananea strikes in 1906, both of which were repressed by fire and sword by Porfirio Díaz's bloody regime (Trejo 2005). According to Godio (1980), in the period between 1900 and 1918, most of the Latin American working-class movement was dominated by anarcho-sindicalists. They contributed to the creation of Argentine Workers' Federation in 1901, which turned into the Argentine Regional Workers' Federation (FORA, in its Spanish acronym) in 1904. One year later, the Uruguayan Regional Workers' Federation (FORU) was founded.

In the northern part of the continent, anarchism had a strong influence on the workers' movement in the United States. In the early 20th century, anarchists led an intense union activity among the East Coast's factories and hegemonized the organization processes in the early stages of the workers' movement. The American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the International Workers of the World (IWW), founded in 1905 (Grevin 2006), stand out among the main workers' organizations in the country.

During the 20th century, the workers' struggle reached its peak with the involvement of various sectors in the planning of a common agenda that pursued better salaries, labor benefits, the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the observance of the right to strike (→ Labor Representation, II/14). In the midst of the Mexican Revolution (1910–1919), the *Batallones Rojos* (Red Battalions) consisted of workers who were hired by the government to repress the peasant's uprising led by Francisco Villa and Emiliano Zapata. It is during this period that the first workers' organization emerged in Mexico: the *Casa del Obrero Mundial* (House of the World Worker), and later the *Confederación Regional de Obreros de México* (Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers). Finally, Mexican corporativism was consolidated under the mandate of President Lázaro Cárdenas del Río (1934–1940), who ordered the creation of the Mexican Workers' Confederation in order to control the workers' movement. Nonetheless, in sectors such as education, this institutional control has been confronted by thousands of school teachers in 1959, 1989, and 2016 (Ávila Carrillo and Brizuela 1990) (→ Education, I/24). Meanwhile, the health care sector has gone to swell the ranks of independent unionism (→ Health, I/29): in the years 1966, 2005, and 2016, workers of the Mexican Institute of Social Security and also of the Ministry of Health took to the streets to demand improved life conditions and work benefits. Some other trade unions in Mexico such as the mining, the automotive (Volkswagen, Nissan, Ford), and the railway unions gave way to workers' movements, some of which have been successful and others

harshly repressed. However, in a country where only 10 percent of workers are unionized, and where 1 percent of them belong to independent unions, the dominance of the neoliberal ideology is apparent.

In Argentina, the workers' movement has been highly relevant due to their struggle for labor rights and fair working conditions, the same that were considerably lessened when the neoliberal economic model was introduced in the country during the 1990s (→ Neoliberalism, II/16). Between 1983 and 2017, there have been more than forty calls for general strikes; the vast majority of them happened during Raúl Alfonsín's regime (Santella 2009).

Workers' movements in Brazil have been complex and manifold. At first, the nationalist struggle overshadowed class interests; however, in the midst of the dictatorship, a working class emerged and organized, leading to the formation of the Brazilian Workers' Party, which ruled the South American country from January 2003 to August 2016.

Environmental movements and movement for animal rights

The Environmental Justice Movement emerged during the Civil Rights movement, as African Americans began to question the dumping of hazardous waste in their neighborhoods as well as the air and water pollution across areas inhabited mainly by ethnic minorities (→ Environmental Justice, II/8). Hannigan recounts, "In the 1970s this was confined largely to the local context, but within the decade it spread to a wider theatre as the struggle for environmental equity was presented as a fight against 'environmental racism'" (2014, 16). In 1979, Texas Southern University Professor Robert Bullard launched a research project whose findings proved that most landfill sites were mainly located in those areas where African-American and Hispanic communities lived. Some years later, a 1991 reunion of African-American leaders gave rise to a national and international movement to stop the environmental destruction of lands and communities (Martínez-Alier et al. 2016).

Parallel to the Environmental Justice Movement, the movement called "Environmentalism of the Poor" emerged. Martínez-Alier et al. explain its name as

a term referring to a politicized environmentalism cognizant of the dialectic between expanded capitalist accumulation at a global scale and environmental dispossession, and often motivated not only by local material concerns but also at broader scales by opposition to dispossession of sovereignty and self-governing authority.

(2016, 22)

This movement has been characterized by the protection of nature (→ II/39). It is usually structured around the conservation of a common natural good or place, such as a river, a forest, a jungle, or any natural place that is threatened by the neo-extractivist model (→ Commons, II/31).

The website *Atlas of Environmental Justice* presents more than 2,540 cases of "ecological conflicts and spaces of resistance" all over the world, categorized in more than hundred thematic fields and classified by the area of conflict (EJATLAS 2018). Among these conflicts, the ones that stand out the most are related to the mining activity, waste management, the use of fossil fuel and nuclear energies (→ Energy, II/7), water management and water conservation, infrastructure development, the industry, and the negative effects of tourism (Martínez-Alier et al. 2016).

The Americas are within the world's regions where the extraction volumes of natural resources by the capitalist system have been higher than during the whole colonial period

(→ Capitalism, II/2), an extractive activity that leaves a trail of destruction and environmental collapse in its wake (Rodríguez-Wallenius 2015). However, there are multiple processes of resistance against these capitalist extractive activities, especially against mining and its aftermath of depredation and landscape modification. Thus, social mobilizations against the dispossession and pollution of lands have proliferated across the region (Bebbington et al. 2018).

Infrastructure projects such as the construction of highways, hydroelectric dams, industrial enclaves, special economic zones, and megaprojects are like a specter that haunts the regions, leaving a path of destruction and deforestation in their wake. Likewise, conventional tourism has turned into another predatory economic activity in which mangroves are destroyed and coastal erosion is caused on the grounds of job creation. In wide areas such as the Mayan Riviera, beaches have been privatized and the wildlife's livelihood conditions have been narrowed.

On the other hand, the enforcement of a conventional agricultural model involving a heavy fossil fuel consumption generates greenhouse gases (→ Climate Change, II/30). Additionally, the massive use of agrotoxins, as pointed out by Rachel Carson in her book *Silent Spring*, has caused serious concern among environmentalist movements, who expose the substantial decrease of honeybee populations and other pollinators, as well as the loss of biodiversity, desertification processes, and the pollution of soil and water (Altieri 2002). Moreover, the environmentalist movement in North America has encouraged actions against transgenic crops, and more specifically against the Monsanto Corporation (Cook 2015).

A special brunch within the different environmental movements is the movement for animal rights. From an ethical perspective, the advocacy for animal rights arose with Aldo Leopold's ideas about "land ethic" in his work *A Sand County Almanac* (1949). Subsequently, in the 1974 book *Man's Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions*, John Passmore raises the question about the importance to conserve and preserve all species in the world (Ávila Romero 2014). Accordingly, Passmore argues that a change of attitude toward the environment and the move away from the biosphere's exploitation were urgent and necessary (→ Nature, II/39). He is considered the founder of the Deep Ecology, which considers humankind as a part of its surrounding environment and advocates for radical political, cultural, and economic changes in order to restructure modern societies into a harmonic cohabitation among humans, animals, and nature. In 1975, Peter Singer published his book *Animal Liberation*, in which he states that all animal species have the right to life, to the protection of their freedom, and to be free from torture. Several world-renowned media figures have openly voiced their support for animal rights; actors and actresses such as Brigitte Bardot, Leonardo Di Caprio, Charlize Theron, Pamela Anderson, Paul McCartney, Pink, among others, are against the use of furs from wild animals.

During the 1980s, the organization People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) won their first case against the scientific use of gorillas in experiments in a site called Silver Spring in the U.S.A. Since then, PETA has been successful in their demands for improved life conditions of farm animals and their opposition against fast-food chains like McDonalds, Burger King, and Wendy's. Likewise, there has been a wide rejection toward Canada's annual slaughter of seals. Over thirty countries have banned the purchase of the skin obtained by this slaughter carried out for economic purposes (Sommer 2009)

The animal liberation movement has focused its efforts on opposing and rejecting bullfighting, which the movement considers demeaning and cruel to animals. In countries like Cuba, Argentina, and Costa Rica, bullfighting shows have been forbidden. Some Mexican states like Guerrero and Sonora have followed suit; yet in Mexico City, where the bullfighting venue with the world's largest visitors' capacity is located, some protests against the abolition took place in the year 2009.

In countries like Colombia, the anti-bullfighting movement had already started in 1997 and improved its structure further through the creation of the platform ALTO in 2018 (Parra 2018), while in cases like Peru, the movement is still in its early stages where a demonstration against bullfights was just recently organized in Lima in November 2017. In Venezuela, the bullfighting venue in Caracas has been turned into a cultural center, and in Nicaragua, bullfights have been altogether abolished in 2010 within the framework of the law for animal welfare. The prohibition of bullfights in Panama was enacted in 2011. In the U.S. and Canada, the movement against the meat industry and the vegan movement gained strength especially on the East Coast, creating a new discourse regarding animal rights which transcends the utilitarian perspective.

Civil Rights movement

According to Piven and Cloward, the Civil Rights movement by the African-American population in the United States had two main objectives: one was to secure formal political rights in the South, especially the right to the franchise; the other was to secure economic advances. In retrospect, it is clear that the main victory was the extension of political rights to Southern blacks (1979, 59). The Vietnam War, initiated by the U.S.-American army, caused a strong anti-imperialist sentiment across several countries, and gave way to the emergence of a peace movement among different sectors of the U.S.-American nation. In this context, African Americans were excluded from any political participation and denied access to good jobs as well as to higher education – the doctrine “separate but equal” prevailed at the time (→ Race, I/39).

Leaders such as Martin Luther King and Islam Nation’s Malcolm X marked a whole generation of young white and black Americans and showed them the importance of fighting for their civil rights and against discrimination (→ Civil Society, II/27; Citizenship, II/28). In August 1963, the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom was held in Washington, D.C., congregating over 250,000 people. It was to that point the largest public protest in the history of the nation and became a landmark event for the early Civil Rights movement. Rosa Parks was one of the most outstanding figures of the movement, which opposed racial segregation and raised an important social awareness within the U.S.-American society. Despite the fact that segregation was declared unconstitutional in 1954, it was only after 1965 that civil rights were voted in, thanks to the efforts made by African-American groups to launch the Civil Rights movement.

Parallel to these achievements and as reaction against them, the Ku Klux Klan intensified in the U.S. South its open racism and its advocacy of white supremacy (→ Whiteness, II/14). This led to the radicalization of several members of the Civil Rights movement, who opted for self-defense mechanisms. In this sense, the Black Panthers Party (BPP) was founded by Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale in Oakland, California in 1966 (Seale 1991). According to Pulido (2002), the group was rooted in the Marxist–Leninist doctrine, and in Black nationalism, Maoism, and the ideologies developed by Malcolm X, Frantz Fanon, and Paulo Freire. While the African-American movement has its roots in the system of slavery and therefore the colonial heritage of the Americas, the Latino movements, and especially the Chicano movement, were motivated by the imperial politics of the U.S. and the subsequent migration processes. Between 1846 and 1848, the United States of America carried out a war of conquest in which Mexico lost almost half of its territory (Ávila Carrillo 2018). The outcome was especially problematic for the Hispanic population who resided in the conquered areas, and who were discriminated and excluded

by the new rulers (→ *Latinidad*, I/33). Nonetheless, the Mexican Farm Labor Program (known as the “Bracero” program) was implemented during World War II, encouraging the hiring of Mexican workers through temporary contracts as a labor force for factories and fields. The consequent increase of Hispanic population in the United States gave way to a struggle for the recognition of their collective rights. The term *Chicano* refers to all U.S. Americans of Mexican descent. In the decade of the sixties, César Chávez created the most important Latino organization at the time, The National Farm Workers Association (NFWA), who pursued social and labor rights for the workers of the fields. The NFWA supported the strike of the vine fields’ workers as well as a consumer boycott on grapes (Griswold del Castillo and Garcia 1995).

The Chicano movement in the United States has gone through several stages: at first, its main goal was to organize a joint struggle by service workers as well as food and farm workers, in order to achieve better living conditions; subsequently, with the growth of the Latino immigration (→ *Transnational Migration*, I/44), the struggle focused on the civil rights of the Hispanic communities and on fighting deportation. At present, in Trump’s era, their main demand is to keep immigrant families together and abolish forced separation.

Other social movements, which could be discussed in the context of the struggle for civil rights, are movements which challenged patriarchal hierarchies and the discrimination of sexual minorities (→ *Gender Identities*, I/28). This includes the feminist movements of the 19th century as well as the movements for the rights of homo-, trans-, and intersexual people of the 20th and 21st centuries, the so-called LGBTQ+.

First nations and indigenous autonomy

The social movements for the recognition of indigenous people’s rights in the Americas have followed a difficult and lengthy path (→ *Indigeneity*, I/31). Many countries of the region have gone through persecution and extermination processes, with Brazil, Argentina, United States, Canada, Chile, Cuba, and Colombia as the most outstanding cases. Even though the native communities experienced a significant decrease of population after the arrival of the Spanish in the Americas, the processes of land dispossession carried out by the independence authorities have caused an even bigger extermination among indigenous peoples (Galeano 2005) (→ *Indigenous Peoples*, I/11).

On the one hand, indigenous lands (→ II/15) have become relevant as spaces where native knowledge, practices, and resources are preserved; on the other, the actions for land dispossession among indigenous peoples have intensified. In this sense, indigenous autonomy processes are of paramount importance at the present time. For example, the struggle of Canada’s First Nations has been quite relevant, as they have consolidated a special regime that allows them relative autonomy as well as the management and enjoyment of their territories. The U.S.-American case is much more complex due to the extermination policy carried out during the colonial expansion to the west, which involved both the decimation of indigenous communities and their compulsory land dispossession.

In the year 1969, indigenous activists occupied the Alcatraz Island in the San Francisco bay for nineteen months. This was one of the most visible actions of the American Indian Movement (AIM), which concentrated on granting legal advice to indigenous communities and individuals in the U.S. as well as in the sphere of education, creating the first indigenous school in 1978 (Wittstock and Salinas 2006).

The 500th anniversary of the indigenous, black, and popular resistance in 1992 led to a renewed interest in indigenous issues all along the continent, which, in turn, became the perfect breeding ground for new movements. For its relevance and impact, the most outstanding movements developed basically in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and the United States. In Bolivia, the Movement toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo – MAS – in Spanish) consolidated its hegemony after the “war on water” that took place in the Cochabamba valley in 2000, as well as their demonstrations against aerial fumigation of coca plantations. The MAS outlined a complex agenda that included indigenous issues; the party has achieved significant advances such as constitutional changes, the acknowledgment of *mother earth’s* rights, participation in the Indigenous People’s Global Summit on Climate Change, and the declaration of peasant and indigenous land ownership (→ Climate Change, II/30). The “Kataristas of the *Altiplano*” are another form of indigenous movement in Bolivia. They have declared the agrarian revolution and the Tahuantinsuyo Republic, and they see President Evo Morales as a reformist leader.

In Mexico, the uprising of the Zapatista Army for National Liberation in 1994 exposed the serious situation suffered by the indigenous communities, making global headline news and causing an impact. This allowed the peasants involved to achieve indigenous autonomy, with developments such as the creation of Good Government Boards in August 2003 (Ávila Rojas 2018) that serve as the highest decision-making entity for the Maya and Zoque Peoples in Chiapas. They also exercise their autonomy within the fields of education, health care, human rights, and communication across several regions.

Other examples of indigenous movements can be found in countries like Colombia and Ecuador. That is the case of the *minga indígena* rally in Colombia, organized by the Nasa people, who demanded the recognition of their rights to territory and were supported by many other indigenous communities who joined the protest. The rally covered the distance between the Cauca Valley and the city of Cali, drawing national and international attention toward the military conflict and the importance of the indigenous peoples in the country. Likewise, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador was founded mainly to demand the recognition of the indigenous territories and their rights to them. The relation between this organization and the national government has fluctuated between rapprochement and confrontation along its different stages.

It seems that after two decades (1990s and 2000s) of success for indigenous rights, the last years were dominated by the struggle to defend indigenous territories against neo-extractivist policies. More recently, the Standing Rock protest in North Dakota in 2016 demonstrated against the planned construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline, which would partially run through the territory of the Standing Rock Indian Reservation. Several public figures such as artists, environmentalists, and prominent figures joined the natives’ protest and the construction of the pipeline was temporarily halted (Dellapenna 2018). One of the most apparent threats to indigenous territories is open cast-mining activities in Mexico, Colombia, and Peru (Saade 2013), as well as in Bolivia, Brazil, and Venezuela. Mining concessions for thousands of hectares are granted to transnational corporations (→ II/23), while the exploitation of the minerals contaminates water resources of the region provoking the resistance of the adjacent indigenous communities.

Student movements

The most important student movement in recent history took place in the year 1968 and involved the active participation of thousands of college students and young adults all over the

world. The student's movement of 1968 evolved in various continents, with the outstanding mobilization in Paris, Prague, and a number of Latin American countries, and shaped a generation of young people, opening opportunities for social transformation.

In the Americas, relevant events in regard to the movement developed in several cities. One of the most important developments took place in Mexico City a few days before the start of the Olympics there. It all began when a street fight between students from two different colleges was harshly repressed by the police, who also infringed on the university autonomy by raiding the campuses of the National Autonomous University of Mexico and the National Polytechnic Institute (Ávila Carrillo 2018). These events led to a deep uneasiness among the student communities, who organized protest rallies and the seizure of college campuses. On October 2, 1968, the federal army repressed a peaceful demonstration by the popular student movement at the Plaza of the Three Cultures in Tlatelolco. All the leaders of the National Strike Council were arrested and dozens of students were brought to a military camp where they were killed. The exact number of victims is still unknown.

The University of California, in Berkeley, became the cradle of the Free Speech movement during the fall of 1964, as its students carried out protests for over two months against university regulations that prohibited information desks and other political activities as well as political debate within the University campus. Led by Mario Savio and Jack Weinberg, thousands of young people participated in the demonstrations, which ended with the arrest of 773 people for occupying the administration building, the removal of the campus administration, and a vast enlargement of student rights to use the University campus for political activity and debate (Freeman 2004). In April 1968, Columbia University's campus was seized for a whole week as a way to protest the alliance between the Pentagon and the aforementioned university, and also in solidarity with the Harlem neighborhood in New York. Likewise, in August 1968 and in the framework of the Democratic Convention in Chicago, several demonstrations against the Vietnam War took place.

Meanwhile, the student movements that emerged in Latin America in 1968 caused ideological revolutions that challenged the political structure, consolidating a social counterpart in the economic, cultural, and educational levels, where the *status quo* discourse underwent a transformation (Wallerstein 1989). The precedent of the student movement in Brazil was the creation of the National Union of Students in 1937, an organization that led the struggle against Goulart's dictatorship. The organization played a key role in the developments in 1968 in Brazil, when thousands of young students from state universities mobilized and organized riots in Rio de Janeiro between May and July that same year. In Colombia, the student movement has gone through different organizational stages. In 1964, the students carried out a 500-km rally; in 1971, after a military repression, they organized assemblies to prevent such repressions from happening again.

For the student revolts of the 1960s, the so-called counterculture was of paramount importance (→ Subcultures, I/43), in which songwriters such as Joan Baez, Bob Dylan, among others, created protest songs as well as a unique movement in which thousands of young people sang and danced, protesting against war and for peace (→ Protest Music, III/17).

After 1968, the student movement in Latin America had to face dictatorships and authoritarian governments, especially in the Cono Sur (→ Authoritarianism, II/25). However, in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia, many students who participated in the students' struggle later became fighters of the revolutionary guerrilla movements.

As the neoliberal economic model arrived in the region, a process to privatize college education started (→ Education, I/24). Thus, many protests against the increase in the required student fees took place, as well as the demands for a quality public education that was free

of charge. In the year 1986, rector Jorge Carpizo of the National Autonomous University of Mexico decided to increase the costs of the student fees and to restrict the automatic entry from high school to college. In response, the University Student Council was founded and a university strike was arranged, which was successful in reversing Carpizo's changes (Acuña 1987). Between 1999 and 2000, after another privatization attempt, the students created the General Strike Council, which took actions for over nine months to halt the increase in student fees' while endured the intervention of the police.

Also in Mexico, two major events took place in 2014 in regard to the student movement. On the one hand, the National Polytechnic Institute's community declared a work stoppage, demanding involvement in decision-making, a congress, and proper equipping of their laboratories. On the other hand, the disappearance of forty-three students from Ayoztinapa's Normal Rural School in Iguala, Mexico caused one of the greatest demonstrations for the defense of human rights and the human dignity in the country's history. President Enrique Peña Nieto and his administration were forced to allow the entry of international experts and observers.

In Chile, following the end of Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship, several student movements emerged. Two of them are worth noting: (1) the "penguins" movement and (2) the student movement of 2011. The first movement consisted in the revolt by high school students in 2006, who seized their school campuses and demanded an improvement in the education quality and of the school units. The uprising unveiled the processes for the privatization of education that the right-wing authorities had developed, something that the Chilean society appreciated. In the case of the 2011 movement, the leader of the Students Federation at the University of Chile Camila Vallejo came under the spotlight for her strong demand for a college education free of costs and the termination of credits and payment of dues imposed on students Cono Sur. In turn, the student mobilizations in Argentina focused on the defense of the democracy during the military dictatorship; later, they protested against the neoliberal rule of Carlos Menem (1994–1999), and had an important participation in the opposition against the "corralito," an informal name for the economic measure undertaken by the Minister of Economy at the time, and which ultimately led to President Fernando de la Rúa's defenestration.

Movements for democracy and "respect the vote"

Several social movements in the Americas have had the right to vote as their primary interest; the suffragist movement that conquered the right to vote for women is one of these cases (→ Gender, I/9). Women's vote in the United States was first introduced in the state of Wyoming in 1876 (McCammon et al. 2001). The Canadian suffragist struggle took a long time but it achieved its first victory as women were granted the right to vote in the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta in the year 1916 (Kealey and Sangster 1989).

In Latin America, Ecuador became the first country to introduce the right to vote for women; it was declared in 1929 (Prieto and Goetschel 2008). Subsequently, the Uruguayan Congress approved the decree in 1932. Argentina followed suit in September 1947, during the administration of Juan Domingo Perón (Palermo 1998). Only in 1955, were women in Mexico legally allowed to vote. Nonetheless, effective suffrage has not always been enforced in the region. For example, one of the main reasons for the Mexican Revolution in 1910 was the civilian outrage for election processes whose final results were highly questionable.

In the United States, several election processes have had very tight margins of voting between the two main candidates, as in the case of the elections between Richard Nixon

and John F. Kennedy in 1960, between Al Gore and George W. Bush in the year 2000, and between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump in 2016. In the last two cases mentioned, the candidates of the Democratic Party obtained the majority of the votes cast, but the U.S.-American system and its Electoral College allowed the victory of the candidate for the Republican Party (→ Democracy, II/32).

In México, the rebellion of 1952 after the election results was caused by the defeat of candidate Miguel Henríquez Guzmán by a wide margin of votes, which was understood by many as an evident vote rigging. Henríquez and his followers launched riots that were violently suppressed by the administration of Miguel Alemán Valdez. In 1988, the National Democratic Front led by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solorzano claimed vote rigging (Barberán et al. 1988) and launched protest actions that led to the foundation of the Democratic Revolution Party (Graf 1989). In 2006, after a very tight election between candidates Andrés Manuel López Obrador and Felipe Calderon, the former declared that the election was fraudulent and called for a sit-in demonstration over the main touristic and commercial avenue in Mexico City (Schedler 2009).

The case of assassination in Colombia on April 9, 1948, when liberal leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was murdered, became the main event to cause the “Bogotazo” (a series of massive street riots in the Colombian capital) and to start the period called “The Violence” in Colombian history. In Brazil, President Dilma Rousseff was dismissed by the Congress in 2015 in what was called a “soft putsch” (Gentili et al. 2016). Three years later, Ignacio Lula da Silva was restricted from participating in the presidential election, despite being the most popular candidate according to surveys. Against this background, thousands of civilians, and social and political organizations rallied in protest and for the defense of democracy.

Entangled movements

The summary outlined earlier shows that social movements have traversed different stages. In the initial phase, they pursued a social transformation, a revolutionary reform that projected class interests (→ Class Struggle, II/3), and both workers and farmers’ organizations played a central role, due to their deep anti-capitalist sentiment and their struggle for social change, for an equal and fair society (→ Labor Representation, II/14). The workers’ movement indeed acquired labor rights and better life conditions for the working class.

Theories of social change permeated in hundreds of thousands of workers in the U.S. and Canada, who saw the creation of a new society, in which principles of equality and solidarity were fundamental. In the agrarian societies of Latin America, hundreds of thousands of mestizo and indigenous peasants chose the path of rebellion, and some of their demands were achieved paving the way for agrarian reform and the redistribution of the land (→ II/15).

Subsequently, the Civil Rights movement and its opposition against authoritarianism (→ II/25) and repression gave way to movements for the women’s right to vote (→ Gender, I/9) as well as movements against discrimination and racism (→ Ethnicity, I/25; Race, I/39), movements in defense of democracy (→ II/32) and respect to the vote, territorial rights and the autonomy of indigenous peoples (→ I/11), movements for climate justice (→ Climate Change, II/30; Environmental Justice, II/8), etc. These causes swayed societies and communities all over the Americas, and achieved their aims under the leadership of the young and the black, radically changing core aspects of modern society in the region.

At present, new social movements have emerged and traversed a process of socio-ecological transition and social power, in which “agendas” and “social networks” dominate the action paths (→ Social Media, III/41). Processes of empowerment and social awareness in regard

to specific issues are essential as they enable transformations that reach beyond the political field, covering cultural, social, and environmental aspects. Thus, newfound attitudes such as the equal respect for animals, life, and the planet are part of a new civilization horizon. The defense of nature, life, dreams, or aims of millions of inhabitants in the Americas creates possibilities and maintains the hope of building a new societal landscape.

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42

SOCIALISM

Marc Becker

Socialism advocates the social ownership of the means of production and the placing of human needs above the interests of capital (→ Capitalism, II/2). Although originally conceptualized in Europe in the 19th century as a way of organizing advanced industrial societies under worker control, in the Americas, socialism has received the most interest in peripheral and dependent export-oriented economies (→ Extractivism, II/9) that have long struggled with persistent problems of high rates of poverty and extremely unequal socioeconomic systems (→ Social Inequality, II/20). Although with the fall of the Soviet Union some observers thought interest in socialism had largely come to an end, socialist governments returned to the Americas with a vengeance at the beginning of the 21st century. In addition, socialist movements that operate below a national or governmental level have emerged (→ Social Movements, I/41) to challenge the modern state (→ Nation State, II/38) and the neoliberal capitalist agenda (→ Neoliberalism, II/16).

Nineteenth- and early 20th-century socialist thought

Nineteenth-century socialism was divided into three general currents. Marxism was based on the writings of Karl Marx, and placed the working class as a key agent of social change. In contrast, utopian socialism pointed to intellectual arguments and enlightened ruling class interests, rather than the working class, as the agent of change. Edward Bellamy's 1887 novel *Looking Backward* is an example of this trend. Finally, anarchism strongly influenced the labor movement. The International Workers of the World (IWW) was the best organizational expression within the North American labor movement (→ Labor Representation, II/14), while anarchist groups influenced the emergence and evolution of labor groups throughout Latin America. Anarchists dominated the left in Latin America for several decades before Marxist socialist and communist parties began emerging there in the 1910s and 1920s (Aguilar 1978). All three trends sought to destroy capitalism, but were divided over the roles of the working class and government structures in achieving that goal (→ Class Struggle, II/3).

Many of the most significant radical influences during this period came from Italian and other European immigrants who brought with them their anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist influences to the Americas (→ Migration, I/15). Much of this initial anarchist influence flowed into the continent through Argentina. Most Russian and Yiddish, as well

as large numbers of Italian anarchists in the United States, only became anarchists after they migrated, and many leading anarchists in Latin America from the 1890s to the 1920s were born in the hemisphere (Laforcade and Shaffer 2015).

In the Caribbean, Cuba provided a hub for the circulation of anarchist news and cultural productions (→ Political Communication, II/42). A rally on Haymarket Square in Chicago on May 1, 1886, and the subsequent hanging of four anarchists for their alleged role in a bomb-throwing incident led to the celebration of May Day as the International Workers' Day. The highly controversial murder trial and execution of Ferdinando Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti in Massachusetts in 1927 similarly resulted in an international support for the anarchist cause.

In the United States, Eugene Debs came out of the American Railway Union to become one of the country's most important socialist leaders. In 1894, Debs led a strike against the Pullman Company that shut down much of the country's railroad traffic. He ran as the socialist party candidate for president a number of times, including one run in 1912 where he earned more than a million votes. He was imprisoned during World War I for leading the opposition to the war. Anarchists and socialists divided about how to respond to the "Prussian aggression." While Debs' socialist party opposed the war, the newly formed Puerto Rican Socialist Party supported it. Most anarchists opposed the war, but some key activists followed Peter Kropotkin in urging support.

The Mexican Revolution (1910–1920), which led to the removal of dictator Porfirio Díaz, was the first successful 20th-century revolution (→ Revolution, II/44). Scholars have subsequently debated whether the revolution represented the culmination of a 19th-century liberal bourgeois reform movement, an anti-imperialist nationalist movement, a disorganized rebellion, a peasant revolt, or a failed socialist revolution. Ricardo Flores Magón and his brothers Enrique and Jesús were noted anarchists and social reformers who strongly influenced the ideology of the revolution.

Communist international

Despite anarchism's early significance, its political importance was eclipsed with the 1917 October or Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. John Reed, a journalist from the United States, recorded these events in *Ten Days That Shook the World*. The success of using government structures to change society inspired many anarchists to join with Marxists in the 1920s to create communist parties throughout the Americas. The Third or Communist International (Comintern) formed in 1919 with its base in Moscow and its goal to organize a single, centralized party to lead a world revolution. The Comintern initially focused its efforts on Europe and Asia, and it was not until its Sixth Congress in 1928 that it "discovered" Latin America as a potential area of revolution (Caballero 1986).

Initially, European immigrants and their descendants dominated the communist parties and excluded Indigenous peoples (→ I/11) and African descendants. In the late 1920s, the Comintern instructed local parties to work for Black and Indigenous liberation even to the point of separation. In the United States, this policy led the communist party to come to the defense of the Scottsboro Boys, nine Black teenage boys accused of rape in Alabama in 1931. Although attempts to create Indigenous and Black republics in the Andes, Brazil, Cuba, and the southern United States failed, it did lead to a close association of communists with their liberation struggles.

In Peru, José Carlos Mariátegui wrote passionately on Indigenous issues (→ Indigeneity, I/31). His most famous book *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality* (1928) is a foundational

work on Latin American Marxism and commonly cited as the one book to read to understand Latin American realities (Vanden 2011). Mariátegui argued that once Indigenous peoples had seized onto socialism, they would cling to it fervently, since it coincided with their traditional communal forms of social organization. He made the materialist claim that the problem of the Indian lies in the land tenure arrangement (→ Land, II/15), and their situation can only be improved by changing the feudal landholding system (Liss 1984).

Divisions

After the various socialist tendencies had briefly unified in the 1920s to create communist parties, the Marxist left soon diverged once again into several different trends. A reformist wing identified with social democracy opposed vanguardist politics and preferred to work within electoral systems (→ Democracy, II/32). A socialist wing remained strongly Marxist and revolutionary in its orientation, often taking more radical stances than the Communists, but opposed subjugating their work to an international movement, instead favoring to root their efforts in local realities. The various leftist parties occasionally attempted to form popular front governments, but were only successful in Chile in 1938 with the election of Pedro Aguirre Cerda as president (Löwy and Pearlman 1992).

In the 1940s, one of the most serious divisions within international communism revolved around debates regarding Earl Browder's class-collaborationist policy. Browder's position as the general secretary of the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) had repercussions throughout the Americas. Comintern instructions flowed from Moscow through him to the rest of the parties in the hemisphere. With Germany threatening the very existence of the Soviet Union during World War II, Browder argued that the historic antagonisms and contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the working class had disappeared. Communists should unite behind their governments and support the Allies in the war effort to defeat fascism in Europe. In 1943, the Comintern disbanded as part of an attempt to build unity with the United States in a battle against fascism in Nazi Germany.

Supporters of the Russian Revolution split into Stalinist, Trotskyist, and Maoist camps. The first remained as the orthodox communist parties contending that due to a lack of capitalist development (→ II/6), the objective conditions were not right for a socialist revolution, and sometimes as a result engaged in United Front alliances with bourgeois parties. Followers of Leon Trotsky opposed the repressive and dictatorial aspects of Stalinism, and instead pursued an ideology of permanent revolution. Although a Soviet agent killed Trotsky in Mexico in 1940 where he had sought refuge, except for some presence among labor leaders in Bolivia and the United States, his ideology did not gain much traction in the Americas. Followers of the Chinese revolutionary Mao Tse-tung preferred a peasant strategy of taking power by circling the cities with rural forces.

Cuban Revolution

The victory of Fidel Castro's guerrilla troops over the Fulgencio Batista dictatorship in Cuba in 1959 was the single most important event for socialist movements in the Americas in the 20th century. Chief ideologue Ernesto Che Guevara contended that its triumph proved that a vanguard based in the countryside could overcome superior military forces and create the objective conditions necessary for a revolution, although scholars subsequently debated these interpretations. International solidarity campaigns such as the Venceremos Brigades and Hands off Cuba defended the revolution.

The success of the Cuban Revolution challenged the assumptions of orthodox Marxism in which a successful revolution must be rooted in an urban proletariat. The triumph of an armed struggle in Cuba gave hope and inspiration to a new generation of revolutionaries, and led to the flourishing of guerrilla movements throughout the hemisphere. Attempts to lead insurrections against Batista-style dictatorships in Panama, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti quickly met with defeat (Sader 2011).

One of the oldest, largest, and longest running guerrilla movements was the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). It formed in 1965 as the military wing of the Colombian communist party to defend rural peasant movements from right-wing attacks. An attempt at a negotiated solution in the 1980s failed when right-wing death squads killed thousands of militants who had demobilized to form a political party called the Union Patriótica (UP, Patriotic Union). In 2012, the FARC once again entered into peace talks with the Colombian government and in 2016 a peace treaty was signed initiating the demobilization of the FARC.

Most attempts to create new guerrilla armies to repeat Cuba's success met with failure. Peasant organizer Hugo Blanco launched an armed insurrection in Peru in 1961 but failed because of his shortcomings as a guerrilla fighter. Subsequent attempts by Luis de la Puente and Héctor Béjar failed because of a lack of organic connections with rural communities. These failures foreshadowed Guevara's own defeat and execution. Guevara had left Cuba to continue revolutionary struggles, first in the Congo in 1965 where he faced defeat, and then in Bolivia where he was executed in 1967 while attempting to lead an insurrection that was to form the start of a continental Latin American revolution.

Guevara's death led to a shift from rural-based to urban guerrilla movements. Abraham Guillén, an exiled veteran of the Spanish Civil War who lived in Uruguay and Argentina, published *Strategy of Urban Warfare* in 1966 that advocated for an urban focus. These urban movements were largely rooted in student and intellectual populations. One of the most significant was the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional–Tupamaros (MLN–T, National Liberation Movement–Tupamaros) in Uruguay. They gained a Robin Hood image through engaging in spectacular robberies and kidnappings and the distribution of food in poor neighborhoods. Leftists in several different countries established a guerrilla movement called the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR, Revolutionary Left Movement) dedicated to radical solutions to problems of poverty and exploitation.

In 1970, the socialist Salvador Allende won the presidency of Chile with a plurality of the vote. Allende, a close ally of Cuba, was the first democratically elected Marxist president in the Americas. He declared that he would build a Chilean road to socialism, drawing on domestic structures and traditions. A United States-backed military coup removed Allende from power in 1973, raising doubts as to the viable permanency of peaceful roads to socialism (→ Authoritarianism, II/25) (Carr and Ellner 1993).

In 1971, the Peruvian theologian Gustavo Gutiérrez published *A Theology of Liberation* that symbolized a historic turning point in the attitude of the Catholic Church toward popular movements for social justice. (→ Religious Beliefs, I/40) Traditional Catholic theology, which emerged from the articulations of the upper class, endeavored to dictate orders to lower-class workers and peasants. Liberation theologians sought to reverse that relationship, to give hope to the aspirations of the oppressed, and to lead people to realize that they must take a conscious responsibility for their own destiny. Liberation theology employed Marxist analytical tools of class struggle (→ II/3) to reflect critically on societal problems. An important element of liberation theology was the concept of praxis, the combination of theory and practice in a revolutionary situation. Liberation theology became

a particularly important influence on Central American revolutionary movements in the 1970s and 1980s.

In 1979, Sandinista guerrillas defeated the pro-United States Somoza family dynasty in Nicaragua, seemingly repeating the triumph of the Cuban Revolution twenty years earlier. Numerous international solidarity groups came to the defense of the Nicaraguan people. Some people arrived as aid workers who brought educational or technical skills (→ Education, I/24), and others traveled to assist with coffee harvests. Many solidarity groups were religiously based. As it had done with previous socialist revolutionary attempts, the United States armed members of the previous regime into a counterrevolutionary force. Witness for Peace was built on a concept that the presence of unarmed United States citizens would deter these “contra” attacks. The influential Pledge of Resistance vowed that if the United States invaded Nicaragua, they would engage in massive public resistance. These grassroots campaigns were successful in preventing a United States military intervention in the country. Nevertheless, attacks on “soft” nonmilitary targets destroyed the Nicaraguan economy, finally leading to the electoral defeat of Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega in the 1990 presidential election. Together with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Sandinista defeat seemed to indicate a shift away from interest in socialism.

Maoism gained the most support in Peru where a branch of the Peruvian Communist Party known as the “Shining Path” led a bloody guerrilla struggle against the government. The Shining Path initially gained popular support for their emphasis on popular justice and moral behavior, including holding “people’s trials” that often ended in the execution of abusive property owners, police officers, and other unpopular figures. Much of their support came from rural students and schoolteachers who found their social mobility blocked due to racial prejudice and economic stagnation. The party provided women with a protected space in which they knew that they would not face humiliation or discrimination for being poor, Indigenous, and female (→ Indigeneity, I/31; Gender Identities, I/28). On September 12, 1992, the government captured leader Abimael Guzmán, leading to the movement’s collapse. Latin America’s most deadly guerrilla war killed an estimated 70,000, but the underlying conditions of poverty and alienation that had originally led to the insurgency remained unresolved.

On January 1, 1994, as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (→ Regional Integration, II/18) that was to eliminate trade barriers between Canada, the United States, and Mexico came into force, the launch of a guerrilla war in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas caught the world by surprise. The Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN, Zapatista Army of National Liberation) announced their opposition to neoliberal economic policies that favored the wealthy at a cost to marginalized Mayan farmers.

The Zapatistas were part of a hemispheric challenge to neoliberal economic policies (→ Neoliberalism, II/16) (Castañeda 1993). The 1992 Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; the First International Encounter for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism that the Zapatistas organized in Mexico in 1996; and a protest that shut down the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle were all part of this movement (→ Alter-Globalization, I/21). Rural workers in Brazil formed the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST, Landless Workers Movement) as a mass social movement to fight for land reform and against injustice and social inequality (→ II/20). In the midst of an economic collapse, a Horizontalist movement emerged in Argentina in the early 2000s with workplace takeovers and direct democracy experiments at the grassroots level. The privatization of the municipal water system in Cochabamba, Bolivia, led to a “water war” with grassroots mobilization turning back neoliberal policies (→ Privatization, II/17).

These divergent social movements (→ I/41) converged in the World Social Forum (WSF) that first met in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 2001. The WSF quickly grew from an assembly of 10,000 people who gathered to talk about creating a “globalization from below,” to more than 100,000 in subsequent years. With the slogan “Another World Is Possible,” the WSF presented a direct challenge to the conservative British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s claim “There Is No Alternative.” The forum provided an open platform for activists to discuss strategies of resistance to neoliberal globalization and to present constructive alternatives.

Pink Tide

During the 1990s, oligarchical forces throughout much of the Americas implemented neoliberal policies of privatizing social functions that seemed to halt socialist advances. In 1998, however, Hugo Chávez won the election in Venezuela, reinvigorating interest in socialist paths to change (Wilpert 2007). In quick succession, much of South America and parts of Central America also elected leftist governments, several of them referring to their programs as socialism for the 21st century. These governments appeared to swing in many different directions, ranging through the left-populist Peronism in Argentina with first Néstor Kirchner and then his wife Cristina Fernández, Chile’s neoliberal socialism with Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet, Uruguay’s middle-class social democracy with Tabaré Vázquez and José Mujica, Fernando Lugo’s liberation theology in Paraguay, Rafael Correa’s progressive Catholicism in Ecuador, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s trade unionism in Brazil, guerrilla socialists including (once again) Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua and Mauricio Funes in El Salvador, Bolivia’s Indigenous socialism with Evo Morales, and Venezuela’s state-centered socialism of Hugo Chávez, as well as that of Raúl and Fidel Castro in Cuba (Barrett and Chavez 2008; Webber and Carr 2013). In the United States, Bernie Sanders led a concerted democratic socialist campaign for the presidency in 2016. Despite the plurality of voices and perspectives, socialism was firmly back on the agenda. However, with conservative governments back in power in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil in 2018, and the fierce political and economic crises of the *chavista* government in Venezuela, the ebbing of the pink tide is becoming evident.

Conclusion

Throughout the long 20th century, socialists have debated a series of issues that continue to be present throughout the Americas. These include whether goals of social justice are best achieved through gradual reforms or rapid revolutionary changes; whether a vanguard party should lead a movement or if it should be based in a mass popular movement; whether an armed, electoral, or mass movement will best lead to permanent and lasting change; whether charismatic leaders will rule in the interests of the people or only reinforce their personal concerns; whether to engage in broad class alliances or emphasize the working class; whether to base a struggle in rural or urban areas; and what the proper role of government structures is in making desired changes (Burbach, Fox, and Fuentes 2013). Despite occasional reverses, socialism remains a very real presence throughout the Americas.

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43

SUBCULTURES

María del Carmen de la Peza and Michael Stewart Foley

Subcultures became an important subject of scholarly inquiry in the second half of the 20th century. Much of that scholarship has been devoted to refining the very definition of subcultures because the term has been deployed so widely that it seems, at times, undefinable. That is because the term Subculture is a polysemic one, composed of the word culture and the prefix sub. As Hannerz points out, the term can mean either a segment of a great culture, a subordinate culture to a dominant one, an underground and rebellious culture, or a culture that is deficient, qualitatively inferior (1992, 70). Nevertheless, in the Americas, the subculture concept was adopted by scholars mainly to designate emerging minority cultures on the margins of large cities, as an effect of the processes of modernization (→ I/35) first and then of globalization. Other concepts such as “mass culture” (Adorno and Horkheimer) were used to refer to the degraded culture promoted by cultural industries (→ III/27); “counterculture” to refer to emerging youth cultures as a form of explicit rejection of the postwar “mainstream” U.S. American culture. In his book *The Time of the Tribes*, Michel Maffesoli (2004) proposes the tribal metaphor to conceptualize the postmodern societies characterized by tradition/modernity and mass/segmentation paradoxes (→ Modernism and Postmodernisms, III/36). In U.S. and Latin American megalopolises such as Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Caracas, or Buenos Aires, members of specific communities (youth, sexual, religious, sporting, or musical) are regrouped to fight against the adversity that surrounds them (→ Gender Identities, I/28; Religious Beliefs, I/40; Protest Music, III/17). It is no longer the big institutions but the small groups who organize the sociality of the 21st century. Meanwhile, the concept of “popular culture” (Mattelart and Piccini 1974; García Canclini 1982, 1990; Martín-Barbero 2002) configured from Gramsci’s criticism of Marxism was used in Latin America to refer to the urban cultures of the popular sectors, in opposition to the hegemonic National culture (→ Popular, I/37).

U.S. American approaches to subcultures

Sociologist Russ Haenfler has offered the working definition of a subculture as being a “relatively diffuse social network having a shared identity, distinctive meanings around certain ideas, practices, and objects, and a sense of marginalization from or resistance to a perceived ‘conventional’ society” (2013, 16). That is, the groups studied as subcultures “are

often positioned by themselves and/or others as deviant or debased” (Gelder and Thornton 1997, 4). Sometimes, this positioning is determined by origins in a lower economic class (→ Social Inequality, II/20), one’s race (→ I/39) or ethnicity (→ I/25), or sexuality; other times, it is determined by cultural or political interests. Scholars have often tried to distinguish subcultures from countercultures on the basis of spatial geography (subcultures being associated with local “scenes”) or impact on the mainstream society (the liberalization of certain cultural mores because of the Sixties counterculture, for example), but these distinctions break down quickly. Consequently, the definitions remain very much subject to debate.

Over the span of five decades, the scholarship on subcultures has evolved, from the mid-century examination of youth subcultures as deviant to the study of “postsubcultures,” often regarded as frivolous, by the end of the century. Those trends track easily with demographic shifts from the early postwar years to the twenty-year period during which baby boomers entered adulthood through the post-baby boom generations; that is, in the 1960s and 1970s, the periods in which baby boomers participated in subcultures in the greatest number, there is a general tendency to ascribe greater importance to subcultures. It is in writing about those years that scholars are more likely to ascribe to subcultures a greater influence on the wider society.

Subcultures are often portrayed in the mainstream press and in mainstream U.S. American society, more broadly, as dangerous, as clear evidence of society’s decline. However, as sociologist Russ Haenfler notes, “many subculturists are not so different” from their mainstream counterparts, in “leading well-adjusted, productive, and meaningful lives” (Haenfler 2013, 2). That is not in contrast how the first scholars of subcultures regarded their subject. Rather, scholars by mid-century saw subcultures arising from urban dislocation (→ Urbanization, I/45). Cities, as crucibles of poverty, crime, and unrest, became laboratories for “deviant” behavior – in the form of gangs of youth, for example. Yet, although scholars such as Frederic Milton Thrasher and William Foote Whyte identified marginal, deviant behavior, they saw the social conditions of the city – of economic inequality, racial and ethnic prejudice, of inadequate social services – as the primary culprits, even as many community leaders believed that crime and social deviance were primarily the products of immoral individuals (Thrasher 1927; Whyte 1943). By the 1950s, scholars such as Albert Cohen argued convincingly that deviance and the subcultures in which deviance seemed to thrive arose in response to the denial of equal opportunity (Cohen 1955). As poor, urban youth struggled in an era of middle-class expansion, they became more likely to turn inward, to reject the values of the mainstream society, and to build a community based on their own interests and values.

“Middle-Americans” (as mainstream, middle-class U.S. Americans were often called by political scientists and journalists) living through an era of Cold War hysteria, with fears of communists lurking in U.S. American city schools, libraries, newspapers, etc., saw subcultures not only as deviant but as subversive, as threatening the health of the republic. Moral panics punctuated the mid- to late 20th century, as the public grew agitated over the latest music, fashion, and drug crazes captivating segments of American youth. From covert marijuana use at mid-century to the alleged Satanism of some heavy metal music in the 1980s, one generation after another fretted over the seemingly destructive path of many young subculturalists.

As the scholarship coming out of the University of Birmingham’s Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies showed in the 1970s, subcultures were seen as a challenge to mainstream cultural hegemony – an idea that dated to Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci’s notions of capitalism (→ II/2) producing structures of culture that reinforced capitalism’s

dominance, that there could be no better alternative to capitalism. By the 1970s, when Dick Hebdige wrote his enormously influential book, *Subculture: The Meaning of Style*, most scholars agreed that subculturalists' identity, as expressed in a bricolage of style in which they upended accoutrements of mainstream style, marked the "oblique challenge to hegemony" that made subcultures potentially politically potent (Hebdige 1979, 137). The fact that moral panics responded to the styles of punks, rappers, goths, and metalheads only seemed to confirm the theory.

In the United States, moral panics occurred even in response to subcultures that were neither urban nor expressly political, such as bikers and surfers. In both cases, however, the youth who participated were seen as self-styled outsiders who rejected U.S. American values and norms at a time when the vast majority of U.S. citizens believed that they were living in a perfectible social and political experiment. In this time of the so-called "liberal consensus," in the years after the United States emerged from World War II as a global superpower, with a booming economy that produced a massive redistribution of wealth, most "middle Americans" could not imagine why any of their fellow citizens, and particularly their children, would challenge or turn away from this obvious success story (→ Family, I/26).

However, as the baby boom generation reached adulthood, significant segments of American youth found themselves attracted to various outsider "tribes" where they felt more comfortable and could spend all of their time in solidarity with others like themselves. In the 1960s, a broad rejection of the liberal consensus – marked by enormous, depersonalizing institutions of government, corporations, and universities – became known, rather imprecisely, as the "counterculture." Purely in terms of scale, the counterculture – marked by individual "hippie" style and fashion, choice of music and drugs, and unconventional vocations and avocations – far outstripped any single subculture, and was often associated by the mainstream with the more overtly political social movements of the same period (→ Social Movements, I/41). Although some participants and pundits alike tried to disentangle the countercultural and the political in sixties youth culture (in, for example, the New Left or the anti-war movement), the subversive power of both was enhanced by that entanglement. A group like Trans-Love Energies in Detroit, a countercultural commune that eventually spawned the White Panther Party, which advocated a "Total assault on the culture by any means necessary, including rock and roll, dope, and fucking in the streets" and included the proto-punk garage band the MC5, was not easily categorized, but that hardly mattered to the participants. To middle America, groups like Trans-Love Energies could have been a subculture, a counterculture, a New Left vanguard, or a druggie commune – or all of the above – but to participants, it was an experimental version of a society they would have liked to have seen built on a national scale.

This notion of what the sociologist Wini Breines (1989) calls "prefigurative politics" is central to distinguishing political subcultures. While many self-identified hippies may have thought of themselves and their choices in music, drugs, and fashion as diverging from mainstream society, proportionally few of them committed themselves to building a fundamentally utopian, prefigurative community – one that was meant to be a micro-model of the larger society that participants dreamed of building (→ Utopias, III/23). Others did, of course, including many who moved to rural communes in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Miller 2011). Yet, fuller versions of prefigurative subcultural politics did not emerge until the 1970s and 1980s, when punk and hip-hop swept through American cities (→ Protest Music, III/17).

Although the politics of British punk often seems to overshadow its United States counterpart, scholars are increasingly devoting more analysis to the politics of U.S. American

punk (Mattson 2001; Foley 2015; Ensminger 2016). At times, as in San Francisco, punks formed a subculture that fashioned itself as a community of resistance to early stages of neo-liberalism (→ II/16), particularly as manifested in urban policy (→ Urbanization, I/45). At other times, as in Washington, D.C., punks formed a community of resistance that targeted the national government, particularly the policies of the Reagan administration. In both such cases, punks carried on, in their prefigurative approach to politics, strains of Sixties New Left strategies and tactics.

For example, San Francisco became home to arguably the most political punk scene in large part because of a city government that, under the leadership of Mayor Dianne Feinstein, worked closely with real estate developers and landlords to “clean up” certain parts of the city that they regarded as less salubrious, but which were typically home to immigrant and working-class communities. As landlords converted rental properties to condominiums and developers bought up old residential hotels, more and more long-term residents of the city began to be displaced. Punks were among those who not only staked claims to certain parts of the city (where they both lived and put on concerts), but they joined other activists in protesting the steady dispossession of the city by moneyed interests. When police came in August 1977 to evict the last elderly holdouts from the International Hotel, a longtime home to single Filipino and Chinese retirees, punks showed up with hundreds of others to block the police from entering the hotel. They were beaten back and overcome by police, but the event established punks as willing to make common cause with housing activists and members of various minority and ethnic communities (Foley 2015, 66–67).

In Washington, D.C., punks participated in an even wider range of political resistance. Some, associated with the hardcore punk scene exemplified by the band Minor Threat and the independent label Dischord records, formed a straightedge community that committed to abstaining from drug use, smoking, and alcohol consumption; it was also expressly anti-patriarchy, with some members pledging chastity as a stand against sexual conquest. Perhaps that sounds like a puritanical lifestyle, but members of this subculture found a measure of solidarity and mutual respect in this culture of resistance that formed the basis for participation in a variety of campaigns on both local and national political issues. In this way, as in San Francisco, punk subculturists functioned as a “collective action reservoir” (Haenfler 2013, 53) or a “waker cell” (Clark 2004, 453), perpetually on standby, ready to be mobilized in service of a political cause as needed. In some cases, the collective action reservoir effectively becomes a subcultural institution, living on in perpetuity. To this day, for example, Positive Force, a resistance community that originated in the D.C. hardcore punk scene, defines itself as “an activist collective, seeking radical social change.” In the 1980s, it not only participated in various “Rock Against Reagan” activities but, like San Francisco punks, joined with activist communities on questions facing the city, particularly on the issue of homelessness – at a time when homelessness was reaching crisis levels in many U.S. American cities, including the nation’s capital. By the middle of the 1980s, punk had become, as a subculture, one of the most potent vehicles for youth protest in the United States. As the nation prepared for the 1984 presidential election, punks stalked the major party candidates in “War Chest” tours, highlighting the disproportionate funding of the Defense Department at the expense of social spending (Mattson 2001, 15–16).

Despite the best efforts of straightedge punks, misogyny persisted in hardcore punk scenes around the country. As early as the 1980s, women punks in bands such as Frightwig confronted hardcore’s hypermasculinity by infusing their music with feminist political messages, laying the groundwork, ultimately, for the rise of Riot Grrrl. Originating in both Washington, D.C. and Olympia, Washington, Riot Grrrl came to prominence on the strength of bands such as Bikini Kill, Bratmobile, and Heavens to Betsy, as well as through

pioneering feminist punk zines such as *Riot Grrrl*. By distributing zines via punk collectives nationwide and at punk shows and benefits, riot grrrls built arguably the most enduring subculture to come out of punk (Marcus 2010).

Meanwhile, at roughly the same time that punk rose to prominence as a politically potent subculture in the United States, so, too, did rap and hip-hop. Appearing first in the deindustrialized and nearly abandoned Bronx, New York in the 1970s (→ De-Industrialization, II/5), I/37), DJs such as Kool Herc, Afrika Bambaataa, and Grandmaster Flash brought young people from the black community together, at first, to have a safe place to gather away from gang violence – and as a challenge to downtown, white disco culture – but also as an expression that no matter how much city officials might neglect or try to marginalize the black community, it not only survived but thrived as a political force. The persistence of Black Power politics – most associated with Malcolm X and the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense – fueled the politics of hip-hop. Pride in one's African heritage, independence from the white power structure (→ Whiteness, I/46), and a commitment to self-defense in the face of racist violence (often perpetrated by white police officers) have led scholars such as Patricia Hill Collins and Jeffrey Ogbar to make the link between Black Power and hip-hop central to our understanding of this art form and the subculture that arose around it (Collins 2006; Ogbar 2007). In the case of groups like Public Enemy, whose records, such as *It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back* (1988) and *Fear of a Black Planet* (1990), carried anthems of political resistance, the Black Power connection is obvious. Similarly, NWA's "Fuck Tha Police" was only the most famous of many songs critical of policing in the black community, years before hip-hop provided the soundtrack to the Black Lives Matter movement. Indeed, in retrospect, it is clear that hip-hop has been one of the most important threads connecting the Black Power politics of the 1960s to the Black Power politics of Black Lives Matter.

The migratory movements that happened over 300 years ago have progressively increased the presence of Latin American and Afro-descendant workers and their music in the heart of the main U.S. cities as Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago (→ Popular Music Flows, III/16). For example, as Carolyn Cooper (2004) analyzes in her book *Sound Clash: Jamaican Dancehall Culture at Large*, the New Yorker rap/hip-hop anchors its roots in Jamaican reggae, and it is the product of a mixture of traditional rhythms of Jamaica, particularly *ska*, and recorded music, mainly coming from the United States (→ Hybridity, I/30).

The rise of hip-hop and punk was accompanied by a vibrant street art subculture (→ Muralism, III/37). Graffiti artists such as Coco 144, Mico, and Lee 163 came out of the Bronx, tagging subway cars with their distinctive signatures from the early 1970s until now – again, as an existential statement that no matter how marginalized the community might be, black and Latino Americans were not going away and would not tolerate being ignored. A crackdown from city government ensued, but in time, graffiti writers extended their range to claim places – to mark territory – all over New York and other American cities that were not legally their own. The daring involved in creating street art in public spaces, on privately owned buildings and shop fronts, by stealthily painting subway cars in train yards, reaching seemingly unreachable (but highly visible) spaces, inspired others while simultaneously causing distress among community leaders (Chang 2005). By the time street artists such as Keith Haring and Shepard Fairey spread their "subway drawings" (Haring) and "Obey" (Fairey) messages across New York and other urban skylines all over the United States, and were arrested repeatedly for breaking the law, their legends – and the perceived potency of street art – only grew. As the forces of urban neoliberal policy have consolidated their hold on U.S. American cities (→ Neoliberalism, II/16), the subversive messaging of street art – particularly the street art that challenges the dispossession of cities at the expense

of long-term residents – has steadily gained adherents. By the turn of the century, resistance as expressed in street art had become as common in urban centers as had the shiny new luxury towers the artists critiqued.

Latin American approaches to subcultures

In Latin American countries, the genealogy of the concept of culture – and hence, the subordinate notion of subcultures – has followed a different trend than in Europe and the United States of America. While in the latter two the division between high culture and mass culture prevailed, in Latin America the opposition was established between the modern culture (occidental) and the native cultures (which are considered premodern) (→ Indigeneity, I/31). Anthropology's object of study in both Europe and the United States has always been the culture of the Other, the different culture (inferior and backward) of the indigenous peoples (→ I/11), who were first conquered and later colonized (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7), and whose cultures have prevailed despite the modernization efforts (→ Modernization, I/35). Injustice, inequality, and an increasing discontent among such peoples resulted in two different (western) proposed measures to overcome poverty and underdevelopment: the U.S. American developmental model (→ Development, II/6) and the Marxist-inspired socialist revolution (→ Socialism, I/42).

In that context, in the 1960s and 1970s after the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, a set of investigations arose on the role played by cultures (dominant and subaltern) in the Latin American political processes. The developmental theories of American sociology founded on the concepts of highbrow culture (modern) versus popular culture (traditional) were questioned from the Frankfurt school's theories of ideological domination and cultural imperialism, and from the Latin American theories of dependence, both of Marxist inspiration. This debate took place in the context of the Cold War, characterized by the confrontation between the capitalist and communist blocks in the search for expanding their influence on the continent (→ Geopolitics, II/34).

The notion of "subculture" in U.S. America acquired centrality in studies on culture and attested to the existence of a resistance community, fundamentally, against capitalism and the patriarchal matrix. This resistance community was anchored to music as a symbolic mediation, but also as a place of political cohesion. In Latin America, on the other hand, the discussion on culture intersected with other categories: colonization, modernity, coloniality, subalternity, and capitalism (→ Postcolonialism, I/38). It was the category "popular culture" and its use that introduced a shift in theory and criticism from Latin America (→ Popular, I/37), especially from the proposals developed in popular education.

The action research and the participative investigation models, both developed in the field of popular education in Latin America (→ Education, I/24), allowed for debating the idea of the dominated and defenseless individual. Concepts such as alienation and manipulation attempted to explain the ways in which popular cultures were dominated either by the archaic powers of traditional cultures (premodern) or by the mass culture and the dominant ideology promoted by cultural industries (→ III/27). The Latin American experiences of action research and direct contact with the research subjects as well as its criticism to cultural imperialism allowed for challenging the vision of the passive and defenseless subject facing the established powers.

The works in popular education developed by Paulo Freire in Brazil in the 1960s and by the Center for National Reality Studies (CEREN, for its Spanish initials) during the Popular Unity government in Chile in 1970 are outstanding in this field. In the books *Education*,

The Practice of Freedom (1969) and *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970), Freire outlines his proposal for Popular Education as part of his decolonization project for Brazil. The proposal was discussed and developed in the Brazilian Studies Institute (ISEB, for its Portuguese initials) and the University of Brasilia, starting from the need to think about Brazil as an own reality and as a project with the aim to form intellectuals that would be at the service of the national culture against the dominant civilizatory approaches – European and U.S. American – to pull the Third World out of underdevelopment. Freire oversaw the education for adults at the Ministry of Education and Culture of Brazil, and of the Episcopalian Basic Education from 1961, where his popular education method was implemented: critical, dialogic, and participative (→ Education, I/24). Both projects were considered to be subversive and were repressed and suppressed by the 1964 military coup.

In Chile, at CEREN directed by Armand Mattelart, Michel Mattelart and Mabel Piccini developed research work on “Television and Popular Sectors” (1974) (→ Television, III/43). Starting from the criticism of the American diffusionist theories as well as of the Marxist-mechanicist dominated ideologies, the authors opposed the concept of mass culture to that of popular culture, from which majorities stop being submissive spectators to become the active subjects of a cultural experience not dissociated from their liberation project (7). As a result of the empirical work carried out, Mattelart and Piccini (75) concluded that “meaning develops in the dialectic relationship established between message and receiver.” The receiver is defined as a producer of meaning who vindicates his protagonist role in the construction of an alternative project of culture, at the precise time that he reads and demystifies the bourgeois universal message based on his concrete class interests (→ Media Participation, III/36). In both experiences, the direct work with popular sectors allowed for debating the concepts of manipulation and alienation and recognizing different agency forms of individuals within the contradictory and complex processes of domination and/or liberation. Other noteworthy experiences of action research with popular sectors were those regarding the mining radio stations in Bolivia and the Indigenous radio stations in Mexico (→ Radio, III/40).

Investigations about the role of cultures (dominant and subaltern) in revolutionary struggles were brutally interrupted by the military coups that occurred in Brazil (1964), Chile (1973), Uruguay (1973), and Argentina (1976) (→ Authoritarianism, II/25). As Corona pointed out, the Latin American theoretical discussion (and its communicative feature) in the seventies took place in magazines such as *Sociedad y Desarrollo* (CESO in Chile); *Sociedad y Política* (Aníbal Quijano in Peru); *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional* (CEREN in Chile); *Comunicación y Cultura* (Mattelart and Schmucler in Chile, Argentina, and Mexico); *Arte, Sociedad e Ideología* (in Mexico), and *Chasqui* (UNESCO-CIESPAL in Ecuador), the latter, a journalism magazine that disseminated Latin American experiences (2017, 91). Those scholars and social fighters that survived repression, murder, and forced disappearance migrated to different countries in Europe and North America (USA and Mexico), where many of them kept on conducting research.

The failure of revolutionary struggles and development programs showed that the Marxist theory of class struggle (→ II/3) and the developmental theories of progress and modernization were inadequate to explain the diversity and complexity of popular cultures, as well as to understand their role in Latin American economic and political processes or to solve problems derived from poverty and social inequality (→ Popular, I/37). Based on hegemony theories and the ideologies understood as social processes of significance, as well as on Psychoanalysis, Communication Studies, Youth Studies, Cultural, Postcolonial and Decolonial Studies (→ Postcolonialism, I/38) and the feminist criticism from the global South (→ Gender Identities, I/28), new alternatives were discerned to think critically about Latin

American popular cultures, crossed by complex and uneven power relationships among races, classes, genders, and generations (→ Intersectionality, I/32).

The seminal works of Jesus Martín-Barbero and Nestor García Canclini are mandatory references in this field. These authors problematized the concepts of highbrow culture, mass culture, and popular culture in the context of studies on urban popular cultures in Latin America. In the 2002 book *Oficio de Cartógrafo. Travesías latinoamericanas de la comunicación en la Cultura* (*The Cartographer's Work. Latin American Journeys of Communication within Culture*), Martín-Barbero proposes in a paper presented at the UAM-X in 1978 to oppose the dominant perspectives on ideology at that time and calls for the need to enquire “not only the ploys of the dominator but also every other thing of the dominated that works in favor of the dominator” (2002, 19). This hypothesis, as Martín-Barbero himself points out, would be one of the axes of investigation throughout his life. In his long research career, Martín-Barbero accounts for the active participation of popular sectors in the social construction of meaning, establishing complex and contradictory relationships of connivance, negotiation, resistance, and conflict with established powers.

In turn, in the texts *Las culturas populares en el capitalismo* (1982) and *Culturas híbridas. Estrategias para entrar y salir de la modernidad* (1990), García Canclini problematizes the crossovers between tradition and modernity and attempts through the concept of hybridity to “understand the ‘circularity’ among the educated, the popular, the massive, the global and the local” (Rufer 2016, 67–68), respectively (→ Hybridity, I/30). These texts dispute the concepts of culture as closed realities and account for the intrinsic relationship between culture and power as well as the forms that popular cultures adopt in modernity within Latin American countries.

Both sides of the continent have been influenced by the theoretical appropriation of School of Birmingham’s “subculture” category, but it has implied different processes. In the case of Latin America, the notions of hegemony, popular culture, mass culture, dominator-dominated, tradition, modernity, ideology, identity, and identification processes have prevailed in the research, though some of them have been absent from the research on U.S. America. Latin American studies on culture have been mainly undertaken with special emphasis from the disciplinary field of communication. The studies on youth in Latin America are especially remarkable in this wide field of research, in which concepts such as counterculture, subculture, tribes, or directly “youth cultures” (in plural) have prevailed.

In his book *La contracultura en México. La historia y el significado de los rebeldes sin causa, los jipitecas, los punks y las bandas* (*The Counterculture in Mexico. The History and Meaning of the Rebels without a Cause, the Hippies, the Punks and the Gangs*), Jose Agustin performs a study on youth cultures in Mexico, following the method of short-term analysis and essayistic style. The work is a detailed chronicle of the countercultural events – and of their protagonists – that occurred between 1950 and 1990. Based on the concept of counterculture, which the author defines as a series of cultural movements and expressions, usually juvenile and collective, which overflow, reject, remain marginal, confront, or transcend the institutional culture (Agustin 1996, 137), Agustin makes a genealogy of cultural transformation waged by the Mexican youth in the second half of the 20th century. From the author’s point of view, this cultural revolution took place in the fields of Philosophy, Psychology, Literature, Music, Theater, and Plastic Arts, and was expressed in the existentialist, beatnik, and hippie movements, with an impact on the youth culture of Europe, the United States, and Mexico (→ Popular Music Flows, III/16). According to Agustin, the countercultural movement that developed in Mexico in those years was the reaction of new generations to social exclusion and to the sexual, political, and cultural repression that was exercised by both state and family authoritarianism (→ II/25; Family, I/26).

In the book *Rebeldes con causa. La contracultura mexicana y la crisis del Estado patriarcal* (*Rebels with a Cause. The Mexican Counterculture and the Crisis of the Patriarchal State*), Erik Zolov (2002) starts from the hegemony crisis of the postrevolutionary Mexican state. The book focuses its attention on the generational conflict, with regard to the impact of the antiauthoritarian, transnational, and sexual liberation youth culture among the Mexican middle-class youth. Based on interviews with different actors and on the analysis of songs and movies, Zolov offers a landscape of contradictions in the Mexican social formation, both modern and conservative. Such contradictions are expressed in the struggles of the young middle-class rockers against the authoritarian and patriarchal PRI regime and the Catholic and conservative Mexican society. All this became a favorable hotbed for the youth revolt and the emergence of the Wave culture. According to the author, the youth revolt in Mexico resulted from the state and family authoritarianism, the country's accelerated modernization process, and the cultural imperialism – represented by rock music – fostered by the development of cultural industries (→ III/27) such as movies, radio broadcasts, television, and the record industry, as well as their impact on the country's large cities. The crisis (→ II/4) of the Mexican State found expression in the revolt of middle-class youth, whose more evident explosion was the Student Movement of 1968 (→ Social Movements, I/41).

A paradigmatic study about youth cultures in Mexico is the book *Por los territorios del rock. Identidades juveniles y rock mexicano* (*Over Rock Territories. Youth Identities and Mexican Rock*) by Maritza Urteaga, published in 1998. The author criticizes and discusses the Bourdieu field theory, the cultural consumption of García Canclini, and makes use of Gramsci's hegemony concept, the method of analysis of the Feixa's youth subculture and Maffesoli's tribes, to construct her own theoretical perspective and proper methodological tools to reflect on underground rock and the constitution of youth identities in Mexico. By means of a thorough ethnographic and documentary work, Urteaga shows how the youth of Mexico and Nezahualcóyotl Cities find in rock music a space of identification and counter-identification to form their own identity and to differentiate themselves from the youth of other generations – rock'n'roller in the 1950s; *ondera* in the 1960s, and punk in the 1980s – and other social groups, through their music consumption practices (→ Protest Music, III/17).

In the book *Emergencia de culturas juveniles. Estrategias del desencanto* (*Emergence of Youth Cultures. Strategies of Disenchantment*) published in 2000, Rossana Reguillo makes a tour around the rise of youth as a privileged object of research in Latin America. In the 1980s, with the ascent of neoliberalism (→ II/16), the Latin American youth began to be considered as “responsible” for the violence in the cities ... the gang boys – the *cholos* and *punks* in Mexico, the *maras* in Guatemala and El Salvador, the groups of hitmen, bands and *parches* in Colombia, the boroughs' *landros* in Venezuela, the *favelados* in Brazil – began to show up in the yellow journalism and in the police notes in the media and aroused the interest of social sciences (2000, 4). Throughout her research career, Reguillo has studied the youth from a sociocultural perspective following many and very diverse youth collectives, prioritizing the spaces and times in which they move into an active and visible status within the public space. Her primary investigation tools were the observation, the in-depth interview, both individual and collective and, in a privileged manner the discussion group, as methodological devices that have allowed, at the same time, to locate the actor and to enter the universe of his representations. According to the author, the youth expresses “hope and fear” through “diverse symbols and languages” and “in their strategies, in their communicative interaction forms, in their world perceptions” they display “a policy in lower case” to make the world “a better place to live” (4).

The studies of youth cultures with ethnographic orientation in Latin America have stressed the processes of group identification and differentiation regarding other groups based on symbolic and cultural consumption practices, giving them identity (→ Consumerism, 1/23). Furthermore, the various youth cultures are understood as places of resistance against the dominant culture and where race, class, gender, and generation identities are constructed.

Despite finding a repertoire of terms that link the studies on youth with certain analytical perspectives from U.S. America, the category “subculture” has been subsumed in research that points to the problem of colonization (and all its historical variants), coloniality and colonial relations, subalternity, racism and the issue of race, Eurocentrism, and Western-centric logics of domination. This point does indeed reveal a radical difference between studies on subculture in U.S. America and the use of subordinate notion of subcultures in Latin America. This difference denotes implications, in political and theoretical terms for both sides of the hemisphere.

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TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION

Gilberto Rescher

Migrants are in the Americas, as in other parts of the world, frequently seen as victims pushed around by external forces while looking for a better place to resettle and stay for the rest of their lives, being attracted by supposedly higher standards of living (→ Social Inequality, II/20). This corresponds, on the one hand, to oversimplified prejudiced discourses on migration, but, on the other hand, to theoretical assumptions put to the fore by classical migration theories. In contrast, transnational perspectives on migration try to account for the complexity of migration processes. While classical migration theories assumed that migrants moved only once or rarely twice and therefore left all of their social ties behind, research in the 1990s began to show that this concept of migration frequently did not fit to reality. At the same time, classical assumptions concerning the reasons for migration and their implications for the so-called home and host societies proved not to be the sole elements in the migratory process. Due to empirical findings on the migration between Haiti and New York and seeking to move beyond static and mono-causal explanations of migration, Nina Glick-Schiller and her colleagues developed the concept of transnationalism (Glick-Schiller, Basch, and Szanton-Blanc 1992). It shows that certain groups of migrants form communities or social groups that maintain their links to the country of departure, frequently travel back and forth, and seem to be embedded in both countries, thus creating transnational border-crossing social formations of long duration. Thus, the concept of transmigration means explicitly transnational migration and is not to be confused with transit migration, which is also relevant in the Americas and often can be part of processes of transmigration.

Thus while classical migration theories focused mainly on economic reasons and consequences of migration or were concerned with questions of (non) integration in the so-called host societies (Park 1928; Siu 1952), migration studies from a transnational perspective have an alternative focus. A central paradigm of former approaches was the existence of push and pull factors that were central for the emergence of migration (→ I/15). Typically, migration processes were typologized in dichotomies like legal vs. illegal, voluntarily vs. enforced, or economically induced vs. flight migration, and migrants were often conceptualized as passive objects driven by external forces. These ideas also made their way into public and political discourses and are still present in the interpretation of migration and the positioning of migrants as much in countries of arrival as of departure. This can well be seen in the context of Inter-American processes of migration and related public debates. Transnational studies

in contrast intend to put more attention to the complexity of processes of migration aiming at a more comprehensive picture. They therefore emphasize a variety of possible motivations for migration that are combined, stress the migrants' agency, and show how former patterns of migration transform into or interrelate with processes of transnational migration (Faist 2000; Pries 2001a, 2001b).

The concept was taken up by several scholars who refined it in several respects and created a broad set of transnational approaches to migration and other social phenomena. The areas of research include the formation of transnational communities, transnational politics, the complex of transnational migration and development (→ II/6), etc. (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Khagram and Levitt 2008; Faist, Fauser, and Reisenauer 2013). Hence, there exists a wide array of diverse approaches to transnationality, most of them concerning not just transnational migration but also other kinds of transnational (social) formations like issue-centered networks, nongovernmental organizations, and enterprises (Faist and Özveren 2004; Pries 2008). However, most of the literature relates, by far, to transnational migration and it is seen as the main process of transnationalization. In comparison to globalization and cosmopolitanism studies (→ Cosmopolitanism, III/5), transnational approaches are regularly more grounded and concrete, focusing on specific social practices, phenomena, formations, cases, etc. Therefore, day-to-day practices like those of migrants building up transnational networks and social spaces have come into focus and migration has become a typical area of interest. Though the case of transmigration between Mexico and the USA is very prominent in transnationalization literature, processes of transnational migration from central and South America and the Caribbean are also important despite longer distances and more arduous routes, as well as Asian transmigration e.g. from the Philippines or Korea. To this should be added Canada as a country of destination, as the huge extent of south–south migrations and also transit migrations crossing parts of the continent are highly relevant.

Development of the concept

The initial concept of transnationalism by Glick-Schiller, Nina, Linda Basch, and Christina Szanton-Blanc (1992, 1999) saw transnational migration as a central element of the capitalist expansion of the world-system that served the economic purpose to reallocate cheap labor force (→ Capitalism, II/2). Against this background, the practices of migrants were studied showing their agency and highlighting the political implications of this kind of migration. Thus, the term transnationalism was originally coined to denote the responses of political actors in the sending countries employing a nationalist discourse to avoid the detachment of migrants from their “homeland.” So, political and economic considerations were seen as leading to the transnationalization of nationalist discourses in an attempt to strengthen the phenomenon of long-distance nationalism (Anderson 1992; Fouron and Glick-Schiller 2001) (→ Nation State, II/38). Elements of this transnationalism are political discourses, the enhancement of services offered to migrants, visits of politicians to migrant communities, the transformation of citizenship rules and those for extraterritorial voting, etc. (Bauböck 2003) (→ Citizenship, II/27).

Parting from this initial conceptualization of transnationalism, other scholars began to study transnational links, especially those created through transmigration. In consequence, the scope was broadened and several phenomena were observed and studied. Several studies tried to develop the idea of a transnationalism from below in contrast to transnational processes fostered from above by political discourses or the habits of wealthy cosmopolitans, managers, and the like (Smith and Guarnizo 1998). Later on, this idea was dropped as the

conceptual distinction between “below” and “above” was not clear enough, as, on the one hand, local and global processes always interrelate, and, on the other hand, the concept’s central idea is the same on diverse levels (Smith 2002). Therefore, this conceptual division was mostly dropped. However, most studies still focus on underprivileged migrants, as here the patterns of migration defer most clearly from stereotyped public assumptions that often conceptualize them as victims of circumstances driven by external forces and above all lacking human agency. In contrast to such prejudiced visions, even migrants in a position that could be defined as subaltern are often very mobile and independent actors, pursuing individual aims and acting strategically. These are characteristics often assumed to be typical exclusively of elite and qualified migrants. So, a transmigration perspective can be very useful to overcome such bias and to acknowledge the complex processes by which transnational migrants construct border-crossing networks that entangle diverse social and geographic spaces; adapt to different contexts; and transfer material (→ Remittances, II/19) and immaterial resources, knowledge, visions, and much more.

The “core” concept

The concept of transnationality is sometimes used in an unspecific manner, as it is applied to any kind of relatively sustained border-crossing link and process. In this sense, migration that crosses a national border per se could be seen as transnational, a *de facto* replacement of the term international migration by transnational migration. However, this is a gross oversimplification, as transnational processes are more specific. Transnational always refers to social formations, processes, networks, and/or spaces that are highly dense, especially through intense interactions or exchange across borders. So, transnational migration is only genuinely transnational if the related links and processes are condensed and sustained. Social practices of engagement inside family, communitarian networks, or other social formations have to be lasting (Faist and Özveren 2004; Pries 2008). This ongoing interwovenness of social interactions creates transnational social spaces or fields that cross borders and are plurilocally grounded. This means that social spaces, which are basically constructed through social interactions, are extended beyond borders, thus linking actors in diverse places in different countries. Such practices include traveling back and forth; regular communication throughout the transnational social space; and the transference of ideas, symbols, and goods, but they also embrace more emotional aspects like feelings of belonging (Pfaff-Czarnecka 2010) to a certain community or identity constructs. This means that the idea of national states as a container, containers in which national territory, society, and culture coincide (Pries 2001a), rooted in methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002) is conceptually broken. All of the transnational practices and flows penetrate national borders and point at the transnational interwovenness of social relations.

Indeed, the flow of people, ideas, goods, symbols, money, knowledge, and all kinds of resources across national borders are central to transnationality and are included with transnational migration (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). This means that migrants have several places they call home in at least two countries and that their perspectives and life worlds go beyond a national territory. However, transmigration is not supposed to defy and overcome nation-states (→ II/38). It proves simplistic methodological nationalist conceptions to be inappropriate, but nonetheless shows that national states and national borders still matter. If this transmigration occurs irregularly, it especially affects the lives and practices of the migrants, though the irregularity is not perceived as unmanageable or as interrupting social ties. As such, irregular transmigrants account for the fact that

contrary to some political discourses, border security has not yet been able to stop migration. Moreover, several studies have analyzed the diverting character of such discourses and implicit strategies of illegalization from a transnational standpoint (Cornelius 2001; Feldmann and Durand 2008; Spener 2008).

As stated before, this basic feature of transnationality has led to the study of a broad range of transnational processes and phenomena, most of which are connected to transmigration. Those include areas like the study of transnational communities (Portes 1998), of identity, citizenship (Kivisto and Faist 2007), family (→ I/26) relations like transnational motherhood (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1997), or are concerned with reconfigurations of social and geographic spaces as the abovementioned concept of transnational social spaces (Pries 1999; Faist and Özveren 2004), and the concept of transnational topographies (Besserer 2004) show. Political transnationalism is another branch of transnational studies dedicated *inter alia* to the analysis of political processes related to transmigration. This discussion focuses often on migrant organizations enhancing the political participation (→ II/41) of migrants as much in countries of arrival as in those of departure (Orozco 2003; Portes, Escobar, and Walton Radford 2006; Fox and Bada 2008), but also examines in a more ample manner the political engagement of migrants and their possible contribution to democratization (Bakker and Smith 2003; Smith 2006; Rescher 2015, 2017) (→ Democracy, II/32).

Since the beginning, transnational studies have more often been receptive of diversity issues in migration processes starting with gender relations (→ Gender Identities, I/28) (Fouron and Glick-Schiller 2001; Goldring 2001, 2003), but also taking into account the relevance of other dimensions of heterogeneity like ethnicity (→ I/25), age, or education (→ I/24), often from an intersectional perspective (→ Intersectionality, I/32). Many studies that were more sensitive by employing open, explorative, and often ethnographic methodologies became aware of the presence of diversity and its significance in migration, thus breaking with precedent biases and blind spots. This is especially relevant in an Inter-American context due to the importance of diverse intersecting elements in social positioning that has been altered and even aggravated when crossing national borders. Relatively new foci in this direction are the transnational migration of members of homosexual and transgender groups seeking a more liberal and tolerant environment (Howe, Zarasky, and Lorentzen 2008) and of indigenous migrants that occupy specific positions inside migrant communities as their ethnic categorization preserves its relevance e.g. toward other migrants from the same country (→ Indigeneity, I/31) (Anderson 2004; Fox 2004; Fox and Rivera-Salgado 2004; Rivera-Salgado 2004; Schmidt and Crummett 2004; Stephen 2007). At the same time, indigenous communities maintain their kind of self-organization adapting it to the new circumstances, thus transnationalizing it (Kearney and Besserer 2002; Rescher 2008; Rivera Garay 2009) and like in the case of the Otavalo organize their transnational economic activities making intense use of their cultural background (Kyle 1999).

As well as accounting for the diversity of migratory processes, regional focuses have also begun to broaden. In the beginning, theoretical debates focused mainly on specific empirical studies and their regional focus. As these cases were taken as paradigmatic for some time, it was assumed that they presented a typical and paradigmatic transnational migration pattern and other processes were just subsumed or overlooked. In the case of the Americas, many (initial) studies were done on the emblematic case of transnational entanglements between Oaxaca in Mexico and California, minting the concept of Oaxacalifornia (Kearney 1995). However, as more research was done in the field of transnational migration, it became clear that though the main phenomenon and processes are similar, there can be significant differences from case to case concerning, for example, the abovementioned questions of ethnicity

or specificities related to local contexts. Therefore, over the last years, a multiplicity of case studies focused on “unnoticed” migration processes and created a more comprehensive overall picture.

Other current approaches include the discussion of media usage in transmigration and the related rise of virtual communities (Greschke 2009) (→ Digital Culture, III/28; Social Media, III/41) as well as of the relation between transnationality and development. Here, a vision can be distinguished in which the essential contribution of transnational social and cultural flows to development (→ II/6), often referred to as social remittances (→ II/19), is highlighted (Levitt 1998; Rivera Garay 2009; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). In this regard, the position of diasporas in transnational networks can be especially important. More recent studies also focus on emotional elements of transnational migration like the nostalgic economy of migration (Hirai 2009).

Lately, the question of relative immobility concerning transmigration has also been addressed. Faist (2006) states that certain preconditions need to be fulfilled for the rise of transnational migration and that transnationality may also include a majority of persons that are not frequently migrating. In this sense, Levitt and Glick-Schiller (2004) make a distinction between strong and weak transnational ties to show that even those who do not engage in strong transnational practices can be part of transnational fields or transnational social formations. Therefore, transnational social spaces are not just formed at an individual level by migrants that constantly move back and forth, but also must account for the diverse types of migrants and nonmigrants constituting the transnational social spaces transmigrants belong to. So crucial to the concept of transnational migration are transnational social ties that parting from their character of interwovenness enhance plurilocal entanglements and transfers.

Current debates and advancement of the concept

It is mostly assumed that transnationalization arose or at least gained a new quality due to improvements in communication and travel technologies that fostered a time-space compression. However, the question of whether transmigration is a new phenomenon or if just a new perspective has been applied to already existing phenomena has been largely debated. Indeed, certain border-crossing relations in the past could fit to the transnationalization paradigm (→ Borderlands, II/26) (Foner 1997). Such examples are the famous case of social networks of Polish peasants that migrated to the USA, studied by Thomas and Znaniecki (1918) through analyzing their written correspondence. This phenomenon has equivalences in several parts of the American continent that included a high degree of back-and-forth mobility and sustained cross-border linkages. An exemplary case is the so-called *golondrinas* farm workers and peasants from Southern Italy traveling seasonally to Argentina to work in agriculture or the beef industry (Adelman 1995). Furthermore, special cases of social formations that existed before a national border began to cross them have to be taken into account, like the case of several indigenous peoples (→ I/11) “divided” by national borders and finally social practices of groups living in regions that were annexed by another nation-state as in the case of Arica and Paricanota in Northern Chile or the formerly Mexican states of the U.S.–Southwest.

Furthermore, as in the case of other forms of migration, most of the processes of transnational migration take part between countries in the global south. Thus, ideas about the so-called developed countries as the main or sole target destination of migrants, as often proliferated in public and political discourses in the USA/Canada and Europe, prove to be incorrect. Nonetheless, the corresponding impression persists due to visions that are based on

a perspective parting from the north. This also applies to scientific studies on transnational migration that put a strong focus on transnational fields that span northern and southern countries, often by academics based in the respective countries, but lesser attention to accor-dant phenomena in south–south processes of transmigration and transnational socialization and community formation in these regions. In this sense, cases in the Americas can be seen as paradigmatic. American examples of such processes are the transmigration of Bolivians to Argentina and Brazil (Spiegel 2005), Nicaraguans diverse interrelated migratory processes (Prunier 2011) or of refugees from several African countries in Brazil have become ethni-cized due to their Muslim background and are therefore very much appreciated as workers in factories that produce halal products for exportation. Moreover, most of the southern countries of the Americas are also transit countries for migrants traveling to a state beyond. This can be an internal process, like Ecuadorians or Central Americans traveling through Mexico to reach the USA, or Bolivians passing Chile in transit to Argentina or Brazil, but also an external one like in the case of migrants from China or the Middle East traveling migration routes through diverse countries on the American Continent to reach the USA. Current insights show that those migrants who do not reach their original goal eventually forge transnational networks that include the countries they (had planned to) pass in transit.

A currently debated question is whether future generations descending from the original migrants will maintain these strong transnational links and corresponding practices or if trans-nationality is going to vanish gradually. To date, there is empirical evidence that in some cases, transnational orientations can become lost, but in general, such perspectives are preserved by second- and third-generation “migrants” (Levitt and Waters 2002; Menjivar 2002). Perhaps a special case includes those persons whose parents migrated as members of indigenous commu-nities. Belonging to these specific communities means that social cohesion is often enforced through *usos y costumbres* (ways and customs) as a specific set of rules that also applies to migrants and their descendants. This points to the possibility of ongoing transnational entanglements, including practices of cross-border mobility perceived as normal by the community’s mem-bers, or in contrast, a more severe rupture if a person refuses to fulfill the expectations.

In addition, several of the processes analyzed by transnational studies could be understood as translocal instead of transnational. This means that social processes are often based in spe-cific localities and thus influenced by local settings and contexts. Also, the actors’ structures of relevance are locally framed. Translocality tries to integrate social links that refer not just to other geographic localities but also to socio-spatial sites on diverse levels of social orga-nization (Appadurai 1995; Lachenmann and Dannecker 2008). This could be used to put a more defined focus on certain phenomena or to enhance and refine transnational perspec-tives in relation to certain topics. For example, in the case of transmigration, there are often processes of internal migration that precede or even go hand in hand with transnational migration; therefore, the whole background and context of a transnational process has to be taken into account and not just the transnational dimension of the field (Lachenmann 2007; Rescher 2010). Therefore, it could be useful to more specifically distinguish between when to discuss transnationality and/or translocality. However, these ideas should not be seen as contrasting but rather as a distinction that could sharpen analyses in a variety of cases, as several studies on transnationality already include a broader perspective.

Conclusion and prospects

The last years’ economic crisis (→ II/4) in the USA and the ongoing aggravation of the “protective” measures at the Mexican/U.S.-American border and beyond have had

specific impacts on the situation of transmigrants and have therefore led to a change of patterns in transnational migration. Transmigrants without legal documents have delayed their visits to their places of origin, thus restricting the “traveling forth and back” aspect of transnational migration. There is a growing risk of not being able to return to the USA and they often need more time to find work and repay the debts they incurred for their travel expenses. This adds to the above-stated general questions of if future generations will maintain transnational links or if they will disappear gradually. However, these current problems do not mean that transnationality will cease to exist. Though the strategies of concerned actors may change, the phenomenon per se will maintain its relevance, and transnationalization in the Americas will go on in all of its dimensions, be it cultural, political, or social.

Another interesting phenomenon is a process often referred to as forced transnationalism. This is the growing number of deportations of persons who have been living for a long time in the receiving country or have even grown up there, as in the U.S.-American case of the “dreamers,” and are therefore more accustomed to living in the host country than in their ascribed homeland. These deportees tend to engage in transnational networks to maintain contact to their (former) host country regularly with a sense of nostalgia. Several examples show that the deportees often work in extraterritorial call centers making use of their language skills, their social and practical knowledge on the society they were deported from, and allowing them, in their words, to feel the illusion of being home (Golash-Boza 2015; Gutierrez 2017). However, apart from deportations, there are other kinds of processes of return migration that are often embedded in transnational migration networks and corresponding social formations.

Hence, transnationality and especially transnational migration with all of its social, cultural, and political implications will remain as important social phenomena all over the world with some of the most prominent and striking examples being in the Americas. This analytical approach will continue to be an important perspective to investigate a broad range of contemporary phenomena like that of transmigration. This can be seen by the fact that studies on transnational migration have started to consider diverse areas related to migration, thus showing how the social processes along with transnationality intercede with other processes of social change and socialization.

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45

URBANIZATION

Lawrence A. Herzog

Early 21st-century urbanization in the Americas can be viewed as a collision between the forces of tradition and those of globally driven change. On the one hand, there are powerful cultural norms that have shaped urban space differently over the centuries in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres of the Americas (Park and Burgess 1967; Yeates and Garner 1976; Reys 1992). On the other hand, those differences are mediated by global forces that are increasingly bringing the orbits of disparate cultures closer (Sassen 1991; King 1994; Abrahamson 2004; Clark 2016). In this entry, several emerging discourses are explored for the case of urbanization in the Americas. The entry seeks to clarify how urbanization has unfolded over time, noting differences north and south of the border. By tracing the evolution of urban space in the first part, some of the sharp contrasts between north and south are highlighted. Secondly, and perhaps more critically, urbanization in the hemisphere is increasingly influenced by the forces of globalization, whether through transnational migration (→ I/44), trade, investment, global media (→ Cultural Industries, III/27), or internationally funded megaprojects. Two specific discourses of global change are addressed: first, the evolution of “global suburbs” on urban peripheries, and the ways in which those new formations involve north–south connections; second, the example of the emerging “transfrontier metropolis” on the Mexico–United States border (→ Borderlands, II/26) as a kind of laboratory of bicultural/ north–south urbanism, in the context of globalization of shared geographic space (→ Geopolitics, II/34).

It is important at the outset to point to the scale of urban growth in Latin America. Latin America is already the world’s most urbanized continent with some 80 percent of the total population living in urban areas. According to UN Habitat, by 2050 in Latin America, 90 percent of the population will live in cities (UN Habitat 2012). Today, 260 million people live in 198 of Latin America’s largest cities (defined by 200,000 or more inhabitants). These cities generate about 60 percent of the GDP of Latin America. Brazil and Mexico are the two urban giants of the Americas; 35 percent of Latin America’s urban population live in these two nations, and nearly half of the largest cities, some 86 (out of 198), are in Brazil and Mexico.

In this entry, a distinction is made between “North American” (mainly the United States) and “Latin American” (Mexico, Central and South America) urbanization, because of the important cultural and socioeconomic contrasts between the highly developed “north” and

the less developed “south” (→ Development, II/6). Clearly, culture is one important determinant of the human use of urban space and the built environment, though, of course, it is not the only determinant. Many scholars, for example, have studied how culture shapes the perception and use of public space and the buildings around spaces (Rapoport 1984; Herzog 2006).

The evolution of urban space in the Americas: contrasting developments North and South of the border

The colonial period: 1500–1800

A driving force in how urban space is valued and used in Latin America is the region’s historic emphasis on the traditional center, or downtown. The origins of the power of “centrality” can be traced to the era of colonial town planning, when the Spanish royal family coordinated plans for the design of its colonial city via an Imperial system of governance and control (→ Colonial Rule, I/5). The rules were clearly stated and rigorously enforced through the *Laws of the Indies* in the early 1500s. The policy prescriptions were documented in a subset of those laws called the “Royal Ordinances for the Laying out of New Towns” (Stanislawski 1947). Using ideas borrowed from the Greeks and Romans, the Royal family ordered Spanish colonists and town engineers to build cities in a “grid-iron” configuration, anchored by a central square (*plaza mayor*) set within a rectangular street grid. The ordinances stated that the key institutions – the church, government palace, and market – would be sited on or near the main square. Larger cities would have a number of secondary plazas geometrically spread out around the main square.

The main plazas both literally and symbolically embraced the powerful role of church and state (→ Religion and Missionizing, I/17). Centrality was enhanced by building palaces and homes for elite families adjacent to the main plaza. Also nearby, colonists were instructed to build other key facilities – the customs house, Royal granary, Royal tobacco warehouse, and Royal treasury. The colonial city plan had a very distinct social geography: indigenous and lower caste members of society were to be kept far from the center, if not literally outside the city (→ Indigenous Peoples, I/11; Interethnic Relations, I/12). This is revealed in these instructions to colonists from the original language of the ordinances: “All settlers, with greatest possible haste, are to erect jointly some kind of palisade, or dig a ditch around the main plaza so that the Indians cannot do harm” (Nuttall 1922, 252).

During the colonial period, cities in Latin America were compact and residential status was defined by proximity to the main plaza. The compactness may have partially disguised the separation of Spanish settlers from indigenous or mixed (mestizo) city dwellers (→ Indigeneity, I/31; Hybridity, I/30), but in subsequent periods, this segregation process became more distinct. Still, there were often indigenous enclaves even within the compact colonial urban spaces – they were called “cabildos” in some regions. Furthermore, there were entire indigenous towns outside colonial cities, for example, on the outskirts of Cuzco and Trujillo, Peru, and on the periphery of Mexico City and Oaxaca, Mexico (Murillo, Lentz, and Ochoa 2012). Indeed, scholars have argued that in colonial Spain, the “lettered city” (*ciudad letrada*) was, in the end, both symbolically and functionally the mechanism by which the colonial Spanish elite reproduced power, while keeping indigenous people unequal and distant from those same urban spaces and opportunities (Rama 1996).

Meanwhile, north of the border U.S.-American cities were historically influenced by the colonial traditions of British town planning, and also by the anti-urban Jeffersonian

philosophy that favored agrarian life. Indeed, the British tradition of the country estate and the preference for the countryside may have partly driven the early periods of urban growth in the U.S., when the expansion of cities depended on agriculture and wilderness resources (→Nature, II/39). It is thus not entirely surprising that one of the founding fathers of the United States, Thomas Jefferson, was said to have written: “I view large cities as pestilential to the morals, the health, and the liberties of man” (Jackson 1985, 68).

North American cities during the colonial period were also influenced by the gridiron design plan, notably in Philadelphia, New York City, Chicago, and the nation’s capital, Washington, D.C., though the latter also combined the gridiron approach with radial diagonals and traffic circles, using French architect L’Enfant’s plan. Some scholars believe that the use of the gridiron for U.S. cities was mainly for reasons of economic efficiency, rather than connecting urban life with nature (→ II/39) (Sennett 1990). Still, the grid dominated much of the original historic core of American cities.

Immigration and segregation: 1800–early 1900s

During the 19th century, European immigration increased, and in Latin America, linear corridors extending from the downtown core defined the new zones of high-status and upper-income residence. Meanwhile, the poor remained in emerging slum quarters close to the city center or nearby industrial districts (→ Social Inequality, II/20). In larger cities, by the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in Buenos Aires or Mexico City, for example, electric rail and streetcars facilitated the movement of wealthier families along these new corridors.

North American cities grew during the industrial age of the 19th century, and quickly evolved under the influence of, first, land speculators, and then a sophisticated, private sector, laissez-faire-oriented growth industry (→ Capitalism, II/2). Industrialization, overcrowding, noise, and pollution in central cities led to innovation in transport technology, and soon the wealthier classes were migrating out to the “streetcar suburbs” of the mid and late 19th century. But another development in the U.S. was that the private home became the symbol of family life (→ Family, I/26), as neighborhoods grew away from the traditional downtown. This would eventually lead to the evolution of independent peripheral communities, and a citizen-based “home rule” movement that produced autonomous new “suburban” towns. A national housing program with federally backed mortgages would later fortify the mass suburbanization of the middle classes after World War II.

It is, of course, important to emphasize that the urbanization process in the Americas, fueled by the industrial revolution and immigration (→ Migration, I/15), led to profound patterns of socio-spatial segregation, many of which continue up to the present day. North of the border, scholars have focused on European immigrants, African Americans, Latinos, and Asians. Studies show that most ethnic groups arriving in cities in the U.S.-America experienced segregation, due to discrimination, inequality and limited income, as well as due to the spatial patterns of labor markets (which diminished access) (→ Ethnicity, I/25). In the case of North America, European migrants – including Italian, Irish and eastern European Jews – were initially segmented into ethnic enclaves in major cities (Knox and Pinch 2010). However, those cultural enclaves broke down over time, as European immigrants assimilated into mainstream urban culture.

The late 19th century and early 20th century flows of African Americans from the rural south to northern and Midwestern cities were characterized by not only segregation and cultural enclave formation, but much more violent “ghetto-ization,” which, continues throughout the 20th century, and up to the present. Indeed, African Americans remain

the most segregated ethnic population in the United States (Massey and Denton 1993). This pattern was exacerbated in the mid and late 20th century, when the phenomenon of “white flight” accelerated (→ Whiteness, I/46). Middle-class white populations in cities, like Detroit, Cleveland, Philadelphia, or Oakland, began to migrate – en masse – to the new freeway suburbs distant from the urban core. Meanwhile, black families were left behind, partly because of their limited wages and the high cost of housing, but also due to institutional practices that enhanced “ghetto-ization” through processes such as “red-lining” (banks not lending to minorities), “steering” (realtors not showing black families houses in certain neighborhoods), and restrictive covenants (racial restrictions embedded in deeds to property). By the late 20th century, this process was exacerbated by “exclusionary zoning,” yet another practice that perpetuated white suburbs by not allowing zoning for higher density, less-expensive housing for lower-income minority populations (Babcock and Bosselman 1973) (→ Security, II/45).

Latino immigrants also experienced the “barrio-ization” or “ghetto-ization” phenomenon, once they began arriving, first from Mexico in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and later from other parts of the Caribbean and Latin America after 1950, and up to the present (→ Latinidad, I/33). Latinos in U.S. cities vary by region, with California and U.S. southwestern cities like Phoenix, Dallas, Houston, Los Angeles, San Diego, and El Paso dominated by Mexican immigrants; south Florida cities like Miami and Tampa are mostly populated by Cubans, and New York City by Puerto Rican, Dominican, and more recently, other Latin American populations. Latinos have experienced the same discrimination and institutional barriers to assimilation as blacks (Davis 2000) (→ Race, I/39), but upward mobility has allowed many U.S. Latinos to move away from the barrio (Diaz 2003; Arreola 2004). For Asian Americans, who migrated to the U.S. in larger numbers in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, there has also been a pattern of early cultural enclave formation, followed by significant assimilation into mainstream urban society north of the border (Johnson, Poulson, and Forrest 2003).

South of the border, the 19th century was also a period of increasing segregation in Latin American cities, between the Spanish colonial elite and the indigenous/mestizo poor and working class. Spatially, as cities industrialized and grew in the 19th century, the Latin American cities began to evolve from a concentric shape to the one where elite neighborhoods began forming along radial “spines” defined by either rail lines, or trolley lines (and later bus lines) that allowed elite families to move away from the increasingly congested older downtown (Griffin and Ford 1980). This left behind emerging pockets of indigenous poor in central city slums, while the wealthy moved away from the center.

By the late 19th century in the larger Latin American cities, as industrialization unfolded, and as these cities grew, their expansion was strongly influenced by European architecture and urban design ideas of the period. Thus, the larger cities – Buenos Aires, Caracas, Mexico City, Santiago, Lima, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo – were subjected to what has been termed “Hausmannization,” borrowing from the French designer who oversaw the expansion of Paris as a system of boulevards and new radial streets (Almandoz 2002). These ideas contributed to major shifts in the designs of major cities across Latin America.

The modern period: early 1900s–2000

Latin America’s cities were dramatically reshaped by the ideas of “modernism” (→ III/14) in architecture and city planning. Borrowing from European thinkers like Le Corbusier, and later from U.S.-American urbanists like Louis Sullivan or Frank Lloyd Wright, one of the

most striking changes in Latin America in the 20th century is the importance of architectural innovation in the form of modernist, high-rise urbanism, both around downtown, and eventually moving toward the periphery. The first “garden suburbs” in Sao Paulo, for example, were heavily influenced by European town planners. The building of large-scale, high-rise, rectangular public housing complexes – in megacities like Mexico City, Caracas, Sao Paulo, and elsewhere – clearly could be linked back to the leading European and U.S.-American modernist thinkers of the era. Indeed, great urban designers emerged in Latin America – Mario Pani and Luis Barragan in Mexico, Lucio Costa and Oscar Niemeyer in Brazil, and many others. These developments would be mirrored north of the border, to some extent, where Le Corbusier’s reach was extended by architects who fled the Nazi regime in Europe in the 1930s, ending up in Chicago or New York City, becoming part of the modernist changes impacting U.S.-American cities after 1940. Modernism in the U.S. not only included glass and steel skyscrapers, but also the invention of modern town planning, and the idea of master-planned suburbs fed by the newly created system of highways.

In Latin America, during the 20th century, especially from the 1940s onward, giant waves of rural to urban migration brought millions of landless indigenous farmers to the cities. This eventually produced a large-scale socio-spatial polarization of rich and poor, with the poor funneled into squatter settlements and shantytowns, mainly isolated in districts on the urban periphery, while the rich lived in a cone-shaped area roughly defined by downtown and an elite corridor that connected the city center to a second high-status zone on the periphery (→ Social Inequality, II/20). These two zones for the wealthy were served by streetcars, and later by automobiles (Griffin and Ford 1980).

Thus, moving beyond centrality, the profound socio-spatial polarization of rich and poor marks a critical characteristic of Latin American urbanization for most of the 20th century. For much of the second half of the last century, growth on the urban periphery of Latin America was dominated by *asentamiento irregulares* (irregular settlements), squatter neighborhoods, and shantytowns that evolved as poor rural migrants began arriving in cities in large waves beginning in the 1950s. Indeed, to speak of urbanization in Latin America is to recognize that most of the urban expansion was due to spontaneous colonization and informal settlement construction by the most disadvantaged citizens of Latin American nations (Gilbert 1994).

A dominant narrative here is one of “uncertainty.” Migrants to the city were caught in a vortex of perilous circumstances. Unable to survive from subsistence agriculture in their rural homelands, they arrived in large cities, immediately facing high unemployment, lack of capital, and discrimination. Their only choice was to create their own “spontaneous” settlements, often on either precarious, undesirable land, near toxic pollution sources, urban nuisances like airports or prisons, on unstable, flood-prone hillsides or at the bottom of steep canyons and flood plains (Davis 2006) (→ Environmental Justice, II/8). Furthermore, these migrants were forced to engage in quasi-legal land invasions or were victims of fraudulent property deals with reportedly unsavory elites. As Latin American governments struggled with international debt and other challenges, they were unable to provide public housing or other assistance to rural-urban migrants. This further doomed migrants to a precarious status, living with neither title to their homes, nor even permission from municipalities to reside in their *colonias* (neighborhoods) (→ Informality, II/13). Meanwhile, stigma and social class continue to exact their impact on the socio-spatial segregation of modern cities in Latin America today. For example, in many large cities, indigenous and working-class poor city dwellers are not welcome in the chic places like shopping malls (Zarazúa Villaseñor 2011) (→ Consumerism, I/23).

North of the border, the modern period is highlighted by two shifts in U.S.-American urban form, both driven by transit technology. The first shift, which dominated the first half of the 20th century, was the development of sophisticated rail transit in the form of, first, electric streetcars, then underground subways, and, later bus lines, all of which began to allow the city to shift from a compact form, to one which embraced the so-named “streetcar suburbs.” These rather quickly became overshadowed by a second more consequential transit technology: the automobile. By the 1930s and 1940s, the first wave of “elite auto suburbs” formed along roads that allowed wealthy residents to move out of the aging streetcar communities. These merely foreshadowed a much larger outward movement that would occur after 1950, when cheaper automobiles and the construction of freeways allowed mass movement of U.S.-Americans to the new “freeway suburbs” (Yeates and Garner 1976) (→ Fordism, II/10).

By the 1980s, this sweeping decentralization of the middle and upper classes, and the wholesale spatial reorganization of the U.S.-American metropolis stand distinct from the more compact, center-based Latin American pattern. The emerging American suburbs generated a perverse ecological problem that soon spawned a new term: “urban sprawl.” The American suburb is increasingly viewed as unsustainable in the long term. For one, the dispersed geography of suburbia is highly automobile-dependent, which becomes problematic considering that petroleum is a finite energy source for the future (→ Energy, II/7). Critics of sprawl have also been unified in their concerns with its hidden public health costs (→ Health, I/29): traffic congestion, air pollution, highway fatalities, obesity, and diseases that result from lack of physical activity like walking or cycling (Herzog 2015).

The postmodern period: 2000–present

Only in the late 20th and early 21st centuries does the decentralization of Latin American cities begin to take place along with the formation of middle- and upper-middle-class “suburbs” on the periphery. Yet, even when that decentralization of the wealthy occurs, the legacy of socioeconomic polarization continues; the new elite suburbs are often gated, sometimes take the form of luxury high-rise towers, and protected with high-tech security systems and privately hired security forces (Caldeira 2000) (→ Security, II/45). These emerging landscapes of “social policing” suggest a connection to similar trends in U.S. cities, in what some scholars have called a fortified or “carceral city” (Davis 1990).

By the first decade of the 21st century, global forces – foreign corporate investment (→ Transnational Corporations, II/23), franchising, media, and branding of socioeconomic values – began to reshape the spatial form of cities. The forces of globalization and the neoliberal model of economic development (→ Neoliberalism, II/16) brought North American values of “fast urbanism” – heightened consumerism (→ I/23), the expansion of shopping spaces, advertising, high technology, business parks, and other sectors – to Latin America, and contributed to reshaping urban territory, mainly on the periphery. These forces combined to create metropolitan regions characterized by fragmentation and by the formation of what has been termed an “archipelago” of gated enclaves and fortified centers all served by the automobile and all disconnected from each other (Sabatini, Caceres, and Cerda 2001). These closed off “islands” of activity included gated suburbs, malls, private schools, and social and recreation clubs. The emerging archipelagos of increasingly spread-out developments, as in the U.S., became overwhelmingly dependent on automobiles, and, even, in some cases, on private toll roads that allowed the wealthy to get to work more quickly. These patterns have been observed across the Americas, especially in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Brazil (Coy and Pohler 2002; Salcedo and Torres 2004).

In the U.S., the term “post-suburbia” began to emerge in the 1990s, at first in southern California, and later in other parts of the country, and elsewhere. Many of the theoretical arguments of “post-suburbia” became part of what was later termed the “Los Angeles School” (L.A. School), a group of scholars and writers based at various major southern California universities. The thrust of the L.A. school’s argument is that a new urbanism was emerging in the rapidly growing peripheries of North America. This postmodern urban model diverged from traditional urban spatial theory, which viewed the city as a set of land uses (→ Land, II/15) revolving around a single center – the old downtown. The new pattern consisted of sprawling constellations of land uses, industrial sectors, service industries, diverse forms of commerce, and mega-office complexes, not oriented around a traditional city center but spread across a more multicentered spatial landscape. This postmodern space enclosed new activities: information capitalism, computer technologies, consumerism, neighborhoods tied to shopping malls, in short, a cosmopolis, with globalized links to other parts of the planet (Soja 1996).

Also, in this postmodern period, some ethnic groups have made their way to the suburbs as well, forming new peripheral enclaves, or “ethnoburbs” (Li 2008). In the U.S.-American case, cities in the 21st century have also evolved toward a process termed “metropolitanization” where their form and functions are increasingly defined, by their connections to the larger global economy. Metropolitanization involves a shift toward a greater reliance on “information capitalism” (→ Capitalism, II/2) which often involves spreading the location of employment centers in a dispersed fashion across an expanding urban region (Kling, Olin, and Poster 1995).

While considerable changes have gripped the periphery of both U.S.-American and Latin American cities, significant change has occurred in the central cities as well. In both Latin America and the U.S., there has been a “return to the center,” a revitalization of downtowns, often oriented around changes and improvements of great public spaces (Herzog 2006), or upgrading and preservation of historic buildings and spaces (→ Memorial Culture, I/14; Memory Politics, I/34) (Scarpaci 2005). This movement on both sides of the border has often been complicated by gentrification, which raises land value, driving out working-class families who have lived in central city neighborhoods for many generations.

Geographies of entanglement I: global suburbs in the Americas

Despite the striking differences between North and South American urbanism, the age of globalization has ratcheted up cultural, ecological, and economic integration within the hemisphere (→ Regional Integration, II/18). This had led to what can be called new geographies of entanglement in the urbanization experience. One of the more visible examples lies in the changing geographies of the periphery of Latin American cities. Since the 1990s, one can speak of the globalization of urban sprawl, that is, the export of the North American model of “suburbs” to Mexico, Central and South America. Elite and middle-class communities are being built on the periphery of Latin American cities. Everything from marketing strategies to infrastructure form shows the influence of the North American suburban model of the 1950s and 1960s, even though the higher density, often high-rise suburban forms in the Southern Hemisphere do not necessarily look exactly like the single-family U.S. suburbs of the earlier era. What both regions share is peripheral growth built around auto-centric places, typically defined by “single use” zoning, where residential space is separated from commercial and office space, thus expanding the average movements made by city dwellers each day, and leading to wasteful energy practices and higher levels of air pollution (→ Climate Change, II/30; Disaster, II/33).

The new gated suburbs in Latin America are called “*barrios privados*” (private communities) in Argentina, *condominios* in Chile, *conjuntos* or *urbanizaciones cerradas* in Ecuador, *condominios fechados* (closed condominiums) in Brazil, and *fraccionamiento cerrados* in Mexico. In Brazil, elite high-rise closed condominiums are the norm in global suburbs. In Mexico, there are both mid-rise and high-rise suburban apartment towers for the wealthy, but also spread-out, low-density subdivisions for the working and middle classes. Whatever form the built landscapes take, what is consistent across Latin America is the “socio-cultural design narrative” that has come to define global suburbs. This “suburb narrative” is borrowed from the North American model, and is embodied by social exclusivity, an increasing desire for private over public space, the fear of crime, a preference for predictable, homogenous built environments, and a greater emphasis on consumerism and shopping within artificially constructed spaces (Herzog 2015) (→ Consumerism, I/23). The U.S. suburb narrative is reproduced in the cultural branding of United States prototypes, for example, through place names for public spaces and important nodes in the new Latin American suburbs. Many suburban shopping malls in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, for example, have names in English like “New York City,” “Downtown,” “Open Mall Shopping,” or “Barra World Shopping.” More recently, it has been shown that malls in Latin American cities have diverse uses, and are even taking on a variety of architectural forms (Davila 2016).

The evolution of global suburbs in Latin America illustrates an early 21st-century fundamental reorganization of space in the urbanized regions of the Americas. Wealthy and poor are evermore separated geographically, whether via technology, walls, fences, or politics. The term “global suburb” thus captures both the socio-spatial reorganization that has spread across the globe and the growing cultural/psychological importance to urban dwellers of re-treating or escaping into protected enclaves within the metropolis of the 21st century. These new social and cultural hybrids are part of an evolving social model of cities that may well be reinforcing the conditions of inequality, allowing wealthy classes to further distance themselves from the realities of urban life (→ Social Inequality, II/20). As U.S.-inspired global suburbs fan out onto the periphery of cities in developing nations, they end up competing for space with the *favelas*, *colonias*, and other spontaneous communities that house the growing population of urban poor across the planet.

In the last two decades, two trends are especially notable as Latin America’s periphery has become “entangled” with values and ideas from North America. First, gated communities and fenced suburbs are now spreading into zones that were previously only occupied by squatter communities. In Buenos Aires, middle- and upper-class suburban enclaves have been built; they are now interspersed around or near illegal settlements and garbage dumps, where the poor reside. In general, on the Latin American periphery, luxury residential quarters served by freeways exist juxtaposed against squatter communities, literally enclaves of wealth in vast swaths of poverty. This trend also speaks to a dramatic shift in the scale of segregation. In the 20th century, large-scale segregation was the hallmark of urban form, with rich and poor profoundly separated in space. Today, increasing examples of micro-segregation can be seen with pockets of wealthy and upper-middle-class enclaves now spreading across the metropolitan region. The new enclaves are fortified with fences and walls, but localized on plots that become available depending on topography, land markets, and other factors. And, for the first time, these enclaves are sometimes adjacent to squatter neighborhoods.

The second recent trend in the Latin American periphery lies in the tendency to build “mega-projects,” that are not merely gated communities, but, rather, “gated cities,” giant developments of 30,000 and more inhabitants – in Chile, Brazil, Mexico, and elsewhere.

Of course, the greatest example of a “mega-project” in Latin America was the building of an entire city, the first planned national capital in the world, Brasilia. It was built from 1957 to 1960, under the direction of urban planner Lucio Costa. The original mega-suburb, Alphaville, was also located in Brazil on the edge of Sao Paulo, Brazil, and began construction in 1974. Alphaville and other projects in Sao Paulo were influenced by North American ideas about suburbs and marketing. From Mexico to Brazil, evidence can be found either of direct foreign investment in megaprojects, or the influence of foreign design and marketing strategies in building those projects. One salient case is the elite suburb of Santa Fe, on the western outskirts of Mexico City. Santa Fe’s development involved U.S. and other international investors, as well as the building of foreign-owned commercial, industrial, and office developments.

Both of these early 21st-century trends in the Latin American periphery underscore the clear role of exclusion as the emerging force in the social and geographical construction of urban space in Latin America. This exclusion is not only observed in the formation of gated elite and upper-middle-class residential zones, but also in the rise of highly protected, often fortified privatized business centers, schools, leisure and recreation spaces, and the ever ubiquitous shopping malls.

Geographies of entanglement II: U.S.–Mexico border urbanization

A second by-product of globalization and greater entanglement between North and South America lies in the evolution of an emerging prototype of global urban space – what might be termed a “transfrontier metropolis” (Herzog 1990). The gradual acceleration of transnational banking, offshore manufacturing (→ Global Commodity Chains, II/12), multinational trade blocs (→ Regional Integration, II/18), global communications (→ Telecommunications, III/42), digital technology, and the international division of labor have all shaped a profound “internationalization” of urban space. No longer are cities merely artifacts shaped by local stakeholders; urban centers have become containers increasingly developed and transformed by international actors, from corporate investors and transnational financial interests to transborder marketing entities and cross-national governmental organizations. To accommodate the forces of globalization, cities are constantly reinventing themselves. The “transfrontier metropolis” is a unique form of globalized urbanism in the Americas, lying both literally and metaphorically on the Mexico–United States border – the meeting place of the two cultures, north and south (→ Borders, III/3).

Transfrontier metropolitan regions typically consist of two or more settlement core areas located around an international boundary. Over time, these settlement centers have fused together to form a single ecological and functional city/region, whose socioeconomic, cultural, and ecological integration is a hallmark of the ways in which 21st-century global processes transcend national boundaries. Between ten and fifteen million people today live in transfrontier metropolitan regions that blanket the 2,000-mile boundary from Matamoros–Brownsville to Tijuana–San Diego (→ Borderlands, II/26). Citizens on either side of the boundary are increasingly drawn together into a web of north–south relations, where antiquated dichotomies of “developing” vs. “developed” are shifting, as urban neighbors become part of a common transnational living and working space. Of course, there are also social and political movements that resist these changes (→ Social Movements, I/41), as illustrated in the 2016 electoral primaries for president of the U.S., when one candidate called for the building of a wall between the U.S. and Mexico.

Since the rise of the nation-state in the 19th century, cities usually evolved in locations entirely inside (and often distant from) the boundaries of sovereign nations (→ Nation and State Building, I/16; Nation State, II/38). Yet, during the late 20th century, this pattern began to loosen in some regions across the planet – as population, economic resources, and infrastructure migrated toward the edges of nations, leading to the formation of city regions that sprawl across international boundaries, notably in North America, but also in Europe and Asia. By the second decade of the 21st century, this pattern has become well entrenched.

The “transfrontier metropolis” is an urban configuration that can potentially benefit from the interplay between what might be termed the “space of globalization flows” (trade, labor, and shopping) and the “space of places,” or formation of geographic places near territorial borders. Borders can evolve into interfaces or bridges that generate economic and social development within transborder regions and cities (Sohn 2013). Open borders offer opportunities for cross-border metropolitan spaces to reinforce their position at the heart of global economic networks and to affirm their autonomy as cross-border regional entities. Scholars sometimes refer to this as “debordering,” or softening the barrier effects of the boundary to facilitate global trade, and other forms of cross-border economic development (→ Development, II/6) (Herzog and Sohn 2014).

But globalization has also produced a trend that runs counter to de-territorialization and debordering; this trend is termed “rebordering.” Rebordering is about the securitization of nation-state boundaries (→ Security, II/45). Although the potential security threats of open borders were already a policy concern before September 11, 2001, there was a dramatic paradigm shift about borders and security for many governments after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Within less than a decade, this new mind-set radically expanded the strategy of re-closing territorial borders along the U.S.–Mexico frontier (Andreas and Biersteker 2003). In the name of the “global war on terror,” a sharp acceleration of controls (at the borders and potentially everywhere) unfolded, along with the implementation of networked systems of surveillance as well as, in some cases, the construction of walls and security fences. This trend continues today, given the many well-publicized terrorism incidents across the planet. About 700 miles of wall/fence have been completed along the 1,960-mile U.S.–Mexico frontier. National borders are now viewed as a line of defense against various global threats – narcotics smuggling, gang violence, and terrorism (→ Borderlands, II/26). Beyond the issue of terrorism, the securitization discourse also seeks to control immigration and potentially reduce the number of migrants moving from the South toward the North, mainly for economic reasons, but for some interest groups, perhaps also for political ones (→ Transnational Migration, I/44).

Another interesting feature of the U.S.–Mexico transfrontier metropolis is the spillover of Mexican/Latino culture north of the border. Spain’s built environment legacy in the southwest border region of the United States takes the form of original Spanish colonial architecture in places like Santa Fe, New Mexico, and in “old towns” from Los Angeles and San Diego to Albuquerque. Equally, architectural movements like Spanish Colonial Revival and Mission Revival hugely influenced the building of major public works in large cities on the U.S. side of the border (→ Memory Politics, I/34) – train stations, municipal government complexes, libraries, museums, and entire residential neighborhoods (Herzog 1999). Meanwhile, the border itself has spawned innovation and unusual architectural expressions on both sides – from Latino *barrios* north of the border to new forms of hybrid art and architectural expression on the Mexican side (García Canclini 1990; Dear and LeClerc 2003).

Conclusion

One of the primary features of urbanization in the Americas is the sharp dichotomy between Latin/Mediterranean cities and North American or Anglo-American cities. In the former, the town is the main settlement space, and the dwelling of a secondary private subarea, part of the larger realm. But in the latter, in North America, the dwelling typically constitutes the single (and often only) life space, while the town, or the larger city, constitutes connective tissue – spaces that must be traversed to arrive somewhere, whether that is the workplace, a shopping center, or an entertainment venue. Scholars have argued that Los Angeles, the quintessential postmodern U.S. city of the new millennium, is a prime example of this phenomenon where the private residence is the supreme center of city dwellers' lives, while the sprawling freeways they must move around on are merely "pass through" zones with little daily meaning to them. Meanwhile, postmodern cities like Los Angeles have grown evermore privatized and fragmented, generating a polarized and sprawling geography (→ Privatization, II/17).

Even though cities in the north and south subregions of the Americas have had culturally and spatially distinct projectories, globalization has unleashed new forms of "entanglement," and cross-pollination in the shaping of urban space. The massive spatial decentralization that has so profoundly defined suburbia and post-suburbia in North America is now being reproduced in the form of archipelagos of "global suburbs" in the Southern Hemisphere, from Mexico to South America.

Meanwhile, another form of globalizing urban space is also emerging – the transfrontier metropolitan spaces at the point where the two Americas meet – the U.S.–Mexico border. These cross-border urbanizing regions represent critical laboratories for understanding the future of transnational urbanization in shared geographic, economic, cultural, and functional spaces as the world grows ever closer, via digital technology, shared labor flows, cross-border trade, and other globalizing forces.

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46

WHITENESS

María Teresa Garzón Martínez

Understanding and defining whiteness has its own unique challenges that, for a long time but particularly since the late 20th century, have been assumed by diverse researchers and thinkers in different latitudes of the Americas. They have focused their attention on the white racial subject, imagined and interpreted whiteness, the social construction of “whiteness” as an ideology tied to superiority, and the historical conditions of possibility that have allowed the creation of a classification of the population by race (→ I/40) in which the white is at the top, an ideal, a norm. Thus, the emergence of whiteness as an incomplete phenomenon susceptible to explication has forced us to “see ourselves,” to abandon the place of enunciation of the universal, to revisit our local and global histories, and to decide how to investigate from ethical positions a color that has no color that is only visible to some and, therefore, not shown as it is.

It is important to clarify that when we speak of whiteness, we are not referring to a biological or natural fact or an immutable phenotypic “trait” found in all places and times, but to a cultural, social, material, and economic construction that is a product of concrete historical conditions, which varies from one social formation to another and which is part of another construction: that of race. Indeed, race thought of as a biological “entity,” which uses the color of the skin as “evidence” to establish a social classification system, is also an invention only possible in the context of the European colonial expansion (→ Conquest and Colonization, I/7) that, in the 19th century, appealed to scientific discourses like Eugenics and Social Darwinism to argue its legitimacy. And although UNESCO has declared the nonexistence of race since 1950, this notion of race as a biological entity is perpetuated in the collective imaginary and common sense of many people and institutions in the Americas, transforming itself into concrete practices of differentiation, subordination, exclusion, normalization, and control. Then, both whiteness and race are social problems, not natural facts, but phenomena that are normalized in a system of privileges that must also be historicized and investigated.

The field of studies of whiteness has been mostly developed by white academics from the United States and the United Kingdom since the 1980s, who question the centrality of a “white” thought in the construction of the literary canon and the national historiography; however, in Japan, South Africa, Australia, and other places in the world, they have also gained a great momentum (Roediger 2001). This implies that the experience and

analysis of whiteness depend on the geopolitical context in which it is inscribed and its own history. For example, it is one thing to talk about the Irish migration and another to speak of the Hispanic migration to the Americas (→ Migration, I/15). Similarly, it is not the same to speak of whiteness when it is constructed in relation to miscegenation and indigenism (→ Indigeneity, I/31), as in Mexico, or in relation to “racial democracy,” as in Brazil, or in relation to the lettered national project, as in Colombia. Also, whiteness depends on the language that is used to account for it, as in the Americas where there is no consensus on a definitive name for the concept due to the multiple languages that inhabit this territory and blend together, as well as the hybridization of theories and translation processes that are not always effective in accounting for the different edges of whiteness; for example, whiteness, as it is made in the United States, does not have the same meaning as *acriollamiento* or *mestizaje* or *purity of blood* as in Latin America.

Finally, although the interest in thinking about whiteness has spread to disciplines such as literary criticism, history, cultural studies, sociology, anthropology, popular culture (→ Popular, I/37), philosophy, linguistics, and folklore since the 1990s (Fisher Fishkin 1995), it is important to analyze the place from where knowledge and knowledge/power relationships are produced. This has also impacted the way whiteness is understood since, in addition to prolific dialogues, there are important differences and interests in the disciplinary fields. For example, the whiteness of which history speaks is not the same as that spoken by feminism or the decolonial theories, so political anti-racist commitments also change (→ Postcolonialism, I/38). Faced with the complexity of thinking about whiteness, “Many scholars have found it more fruitful to study what whiteness *does* rather than trying to identify what whiteness *is*” (Dolan 2006, 137).

Race traitor’s dream

In his classic paper *Whiteness Studies: The New History of Race in America*, Peter Kolchin (2002) asserts that in the United States, whiteness as an object of study for social and cultural knowledge production seems to have come out of the “nothing.” With this statement, Kolchin expressed his surprise at the proliferation of what is known as *whiteness studies*. In fact, early criticisms of whiteness were made long ago by writers writing from racialized positions (Du Bois 1920; Fanon 1952, 1982; Coetzee 1988; Paul Gilroy 1993). Indeed, the first studies on whiteness are found in African American texts that reflect on slavery (→ I/18), such as the work of Frederick Douglass *The Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave* (1845). Similarly, Native American thinkers have posed the questions of white values and of the expansion of white nationalism in the United States before the “label” of whiteness studies appeared. Thus, both black and indigenous thinkers, in the United States, have already pointed out that whiteness lies at the center of racism. However, in the 1990s, in the midst of intense despondency at the persistence of racism, the reification of nationalism, the collapse of progressive movements, and the onslaught of the right, the word *whiteness* appears everywhere. In this period, studies were published that today are considered classics: Theodore W. Allen’s *The Invention of the White Race: Racial Oppression and Social Control* (1994); David Roediger’s *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of American Working Class* (1991); Toni Morrison’s *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination* (1992); and Ruth Frankenberg’s *White Women Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness* (1993).

In the United States, classical studies on whiteness have dealt with issues such as the invention of the white race by the plantation bourgeoisie to give solid foundations to the slave system (Allen 1976/1995); how white workers came to identify themselves as white in

opposition to black and slave at the end of slavery when black men were integrated into the free labor market (Roediger 1991; Ignatiev 1995) (→ Slavery, I/18; Interethnic Relations, I/12); the representations that the European migration raised from 1790 constructed from a scheme between race and nationality that ends up configuring the idea of “Caucasian race” (Frye Jacobson 1999); the construction of U.S.-American identity based on the perception of whiteness as opposed to negritude (Morrison 1992); the way in which whiteness shapes the life of white women as a system of differentiation that conditions the life of those to whom it grants privileges, as well as those it oppresses (Frankenberg 1993); the mechanisms by which whiteness shapes a hegemonic white feminism whose political praxis is based on racial prejudice (Newton 1999) and building a white nationality-*Americanness* (Babb 1998).

The study of whiteness proposes a change of perspective which implies that white or whitened persons investigate the processes, the cultural, historical, sociological, and economic aspects, as well as the conditions by which they are constructed as white, including their identity, the “privileges” (white skin privilege, white race privilege, white privilege), the advantage of being able to see without being observed, and whiteness as a fundamental social construction in racial ideology and racism in the Americas. In sum, the *whiteness studies* propose an interested reading of the history of Western hegemony from a center-periphery logic, in which racial identities such as white, native, black, and geopolitical identities such as “South” and “North” (→ Geopolitics, II/34) emerge in articulation with institutions such as colony (→ Colonial Rule, I/5), slavery, miscegenation, citizenship (→ II/27), industrial modernity, the Nation-State (→ II/38), and its effects on our present. Indeed, “Historical questions concerning who was considered white, or not, and how these distinctions fluctuated throughout different eras prove useful in determining how whiteness traverses racial, cultural, ethnic (→ Ethnicity, I/25), religious (→ Religious Beliefs, I/40), gendered (→ Gender Identities, I/28), regional, locational, and sexual lines within the United States and globally” (Thompson 2006, 20). So when we talk about whiteness, we are not talking about a history of colonization and coloniality, in which whiteness is fundamental for the creation and maintenance of a classification of the population according to a racial hierarchy, a form of marking the alterity and the exploitation of “the others” (Quijano 2000) (→ Biopolitics). Therefore, it is not possible to understand whiteness by its appearance, but by its history. A history in which whiteness is transformed into relations of power, domination, and hegemony that are not “marked,” but are invisible, and appear “natural and pure,” are “omnipresent” and normative, and formulate an interpretation of the world as the only one possible.

Likewise, whiteness can also be understood as a “white mythology,” a rhetorical strategy through which the West accounts for itself as the beginning and end of the human (Young 1990). Political challenges have been proposed which argue that the “color of the skin” no longer holds meanings of oppression and discrimination. Instead, by the construction of a new whiteness, these challenges claim to be more positive and suitable for multicultural dialogue. Certainly, an important part of the intellectual policy of the whiteness studies works for the overthrow of the white privilege under the motto: “Treason to whiteness is loyalty to humanity” (*The Race Traitor, Journal of the New Abolitionism*, 1993–2005).

In the Latin American context, whiteness is not a frequent problem of study, since the social sciences, humanities, and cultural studies have often favored the study of miscegenation or the so-called “myth of racial harmony” in colonial or national contexts (Guimaraes 1996; Wade 2007). In Brazil, it is common to find studies on the convergence of three roots – African, Indigenous, and Portuguese – in the conformation of the nation and the effects of this in a supposed racial “harmony,” which has built the idea of a “racial democracy” that today sustains state-affirmative policies to fight against racism; in Argentina,

knowledge has arisen under the idea that the “character” of the people has an overseas basis as they are the descendants of those who “arrived on the ships” – the Spaniards; and in Mexico, the idea of the “cosmic race” – a union of the best of the Indigenous world, the Mestizo world, and the Hispanic world – is used to construct a nation narrative: *la mexicanidad*, established through education, which tries to westernize the indigenous and leaves out the Afro-population from the national story. Whiteness in this context is related to caste systems and the processes of *mestizaje* and what this represents in terms of moving away from the indigenous, the black, the barbarian, toward a unidirectional path of civilization through the migration of whites to the Americas. So, the question of a “past” to overcome and the theme of miscegenation, multiculturalism, and “strategic essentialism” are current debates in the region (Briones 2002).

In this context, the proposal of the philosopher Bolívar Echeverría stands out because it is one of the few that is built in a process of transference, that rewrites and hybridizes theories, as well as flows of meaning and knowledge, and can be contrasted with the production of American knowledge more than with Latin American. Certainly, Echeverría’s work on whiteness is the most important link between the production of knowledge in the United States and Latin America on the subject. In concordance with the most contemporary studies that analyze the intersectionality ($\rightarrow$ I/32) of white supremacy, male supremacy, and the economic order, as well as Christian and heterosexual domination (Ferber 1998), in the unfinished essay *Imágenes de la blanquitud* (2007/2010), Echeverría understands whiteness as the condition of modern humanity, which possesses certain characteristics such as, for example, making life centered on the production of economic wealth an ethical practice. Yet, that special kind of humanity is not given in abstract terms; therefore, it is necessary to have an appearance and an image that distinguishes it: to be clean and orderly, to have good ways of expressing oneself, discretion in their attitude and gaze, and moderation of gestures and behaviors. Whiteness also requires a more specific social context within the nations and the identities that they belong. Whiteness is constructed at a global level as a condition and quality of the modern capitalist civilizational order, from which one can enter (whitening) or depart (darkening) depending on the possession of symbolic, economic, and sometimes corporal capital.

From another geopolitical perspective of knowledge, this time driven by the fields of postcolonial studies and subaltern studies and in accordance with the recent academic proposals from Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and Asia (Lewis and Mills 2003), Latin American decolonial research on whiteness is articulated with broader criticisms of globalization read in the key of the world capitalist empire, as it originated in Europe. Here, the focus is located on the study of the “purity of blood” discourse. The “purity of blood” is a myth that was engendered in the Middle Ages to explain the division that Herodotus makes in the world. For this Greek historian and geographer, the world is organized in three regions – Europe, Asia, and Africa – where Europe occupies a place of hegemony since its inhabitants, preferred sons of Noah, are considered more civilized (Castro-Gómez 2005). Later, this idea was transferred to Spain to support the so-called “blood cleaning statutes,” established by the Council of Toledo in 1449, with the purpose of drawing a border between the “old Christians” and the converted Jews and Moors. Here, the intention is to build a genealogy of the Hispanic that comes from the inhabitants of Europe who, by definition, are “pure” Christians without “Jewish stain” or a “Muslim” background (Böttcher, Hausberger, and Torres 2011) ($\rightarrow$ Interethnic Relations, I/12).

Once the “purity of blood” arrived in American lands in the 16th century, it underwent a transformation by the rapid processes of mixing and miscegenation ($\rightarrow$ Hybridity,

I/30). Thus, it was no longer a question of a catholic European lineage (→ Religion and Missionizing, I/17), but of the physiognomy correlate that this myth needed to continue to operate in other contexts where qualities such as eye color, skin, or hair type began to matter in the sense of making distinctions and notions of superiority. In this way, the “purity of blood” has been used as a strategy by creole settlers, landowners, and *encomenderos* to differentiate and draw boundaries with certain population groups considered inferior by belonging to some “caste,” by not having noble lineage, by being poor, by not being educated, and by not possessing moral and intellectual qualities similar to that imposed by a scale of white values (→ Interethnic Relations, I/12). Thus, at the same time, the identity of the descendants of the Spaniards is fixed, which creates the aspiration of other ethnic groups to be “whitened” by means of marriage agreements with whiter people, and builds a caste system that organizes the population according to its degree of whiteness (Castro-Gómez 2005) (→ Gender, I/9).

The literary imagination

Whiteness inhabits language (→ I/13), common sense, codes, signs, and symbols that we use to communicate and produce knowledge. Then, through our tools to endow the world with meaning, whiteness normalizes and its privileges become invisible. So, an anti-racist commitment to social transformation must therefore include changes in mental habits, language, and representations, along with changes in economic and political structures (Roger and Mosley 2006).

This is where the literary imagination becomes relevant. Certainly, in the Americas, literature is a field in which the study of whiteness is dominant, since novels, poems, essays, letters, and other types of written works often account for racial constructions that operate both in the narrative universe and in the real world. For this reason, literature has become a powerful means to criticize the reproduction and maintenance of the systems of inequality (→ Social Inequality, II/20) based on whiteness as a norm and what it means to represent and be represented as white (Engles 2006). So, the question that is privileged is how literature – in English and in other languages and always in dialogue with other disciplines – forges and fixes the meaning of white in territories where white hegemony has been imposed and institutes whiteness as a synonym for humanity. Thus, it has been proposed that literary creation and literary criticism has been a space of struggle for the meanings of whiteness to the point that, at present, many of the analyses produced from literature are considered precursors of the “boom” of *whiteness studies*.

Especially relevant is the contribution of afro, black, and colored writers in the United States, the Caribbean, and Africa, and, in particular, the contribution of women writers from the Americas, whose works show the racism experienced by women; the complexity of the racial order; the desire for the white; the intersections between racism, classism, sexism, and heterosexuality (→ Social Inequality, II/20; Gender Identities, I/28); as well as the possible ways of resisting.

Toni Morrison’s text *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination* (1992) is perhaps the most important analytical proposal to review. After examining the canon of American literature of the 19th and 20th centuries, Morrison argues that whiteness and U.S.-American identity are a possible construction only in opposition to the African presence. Morrison exposes how readers of virtually all U.S.-American literature have been positioned as white, that is, as white men, and the identity that follows is based on ideals that can only be applied to whites. Because of this, a U.S.-American black man, for example, cannot identify with the ideal of freedom since his ancestors experienced slavery (→ I/18).

In this sense, whiteness is more than just an invisible regime, but it is also “not seen” by the white perspective. Morrison concludes that this derives from the location of people in zones of “existence” and “nonexistence,” which imply that negation is what has built the identity of Afro-American people, the relationships that have been established between whites and blacks (→ Silencing, III/19), African American history, and the concepts of beauty that have been imposed on women, in particular.

The nonexistence zone

In her novel *The Bluest Eye* (1970), Morrison tells the story of Pecola Breedlove, a girl who is considered ugly, because of her dark features that do not resemble Shirley Temple, the famous children’s actress with blond hair and a white complexion. When Pecola feels bad about the constant fighting between her parents, or because her mother prefers the white children she cares for, or for the sexual violence she suffers from her father, she dreams that she has blue eyes because she relates that fact to success and the possibility of changing lives. However, the dream never comes true and Pecola is trapped in that denial until she goes crazy. In addition to exploring the influence of whiteness representations in the audiovisual media and their effect on perceptions of beauty on a black girl (Dyer 1997), Morrison presents an overview of the impossibility of the existence of black lives, especially black women who cannot be located in the universe of whiteness.

The same impossibility of existence is exposed, in another context, by Gertrudis Gómez de Avellaneda, a Cuban writer of the 19th century. In her novel *Sab* (1841), she narrates the life of Sab, a slave who falls in love with his mistress, Carlota, in a context where the end of slavery and the response of creole intellectuals to it are imminent (→ Slave Narratives, III/20). In fact, intellectuals think that the best thing for their nation is to make Cuba the largest European colony in the region, sponsoring white immigration. In this sense, the discourses on the “purity of blood” and the ideas of an “origin” with an overseas base and Hispanic lineage are reactivated. Although he considers his skin as a sign of misfortune because of the biblical curse that the West attributes to the black man, Sab believes that if he can afford his freedom, he will be worthy of his mistress’s love and so buys a lottery ticket (Gomariz 2009, 109). Nevertheless, Carlota is engaged to marry an English gentleman. Once the economic bankruptcy comes to the family of Carlota, Sab decides to give her the winning ticket of the lottery so that, in this way, she retains the love of the English gentleman. This act of generosity cost Sab’s life. Thus, between slavery, the desire for whiteness, and the representations of the subject of African origin as docile, the existence of the white and the black demonstrates that its presence or absence does not change the terms of history.

In between

The racial passing – posing as a race other than one’s “own” – is another leitmotif of the literature written by racialized women in the Americas, with its earliest antecedent being the tale of Kate Chopin’s *The Father of Désirée’s Baby* (1893). Different arguments and outcomes are narrated from the viewpoint of black women who bear witness to the position assigned to them by the racist order, the conflicts associated with miscegenation, and their attempts to be whitened. Here, the role of official history often speaks of “the curse of the slave trade” and the stereotypes of the black constructed by school, religion, mothers, and grandmothers, which, in turn, resigns women to its reality, their lack of capacity for agency, and the relentless desire to go white as the only way of survival. In addition, in these novels, it is also

possible to see the intertwined functioning of race, class, gender, and heteronormative systems, where women aspire to establish kinship relationships with white men, since it is they who guarantee a better life and not the men of their own race who instead often blame them for their own failures or choose white women (Rulon 2006).

An early proposal on racial passing is the novel *Plum Bun* (1928) by Jessie Fauset, writer of the “Harlem renaissance.” Fauset explores the “step” of its protagonist, Angela Murray, with European ancestry, for the purpose of gaining advantages and the subsequent recovery of their African American identity. Also, *Passing* (1929) by Nella Larsen tells the story of two friends, Irene and Clare, who after a long time find themselves again. Irene is a mulatta who is apparently satisfied with her racial status and is married to a black man. Clare, also a mulatta, is married to a white man and passes as white, thereby gaining social and economic status. When these friends are reunited, Clare tries to return to the circle to which Irene belongs, regardless of the dire consequences that it may have if her “false” condition be discovered. Finally, Mayotte Capécia, in her novel *La Negresse Blanche* (1950), shows the difficulties that the protagonist has in accepting her racial identity and the weakness that a black/white binarism supposes in the world of the novel, because it is precisely these borders’ blurriness that allows for passing. In exile, as a result of the French occupation of Martinique, she is confronted with a search for her identity and tries to whiten herself by establishing relations with people who are more pale (Rulon 2006).

In Latin America, there is a proposal that can well be read as racial passing, but in reverse of what the previous novels show, that is, from white to black. In Irma Pedrosó’s novel *Sombras de Pueblo Negro* (1940), it tells the story of a mulatta who is elected as a councilor in a small town and her transformation from a white middle-class woman, to a black hardworking social activist in the 1930s in Cuba. Certainly, the novel exposes the life of Iris Manuela, an adopted young woman who does not know her Afro-Cuban origins because her natural parents had clear skin and passed as white. Upon reaching adolescence, Iris Manuela discovers her story and that of her real parents and begins to identify as Afro-Cuban and feminist. Thus, the novel exposes the “racial problem” in that country and the contrast between a white and black life incarnated in the same body that ends up politicizing and defending its negritude as a way to negotiate parameters of gender, race, and class in the context of the social debate of the future of Cuba (Méndez 2003, 169).

The existence zone

Whiteness cannot be defined exclusively by its opposition to negritude, since this would imply limiting it to its facet of privilege and social power when in reality it implies a wide range of subtle factors and power relations which account for the way of life of white people, the construction of their identity, their relationship to dominant images and narratives, the way they interpret their location in the “zone of existence,” and, ultimately, their perception of what it means and implies to be white and how their lives and their practices are structured by the privilege of that white hegemony. The literature on whiteness includes autobiographies, memoirs, letters, personal reflections, case studies, and interviews in which white women narrate their lives to identify their privileges, complicities, challenges, resistance, and tools used to deconstruct whiteness, analyzing and criticizing the narratives and theories in which the whiteness is framed.

Ruth Frankenberg (1993) examines through life histories of white women the places they have in the racial structure of the United States, at the end of the 20th century, and sees the life of white women as a place of reproduction of racism, but also of resistance and change. In

her book, Frankenberg raises three axioms. First, that in societies structured in domination, feminists must remember that they act from the social relations that they try to transform. Second, experience builds identity. Third, there is a direct relationship between the point of view and the experience. In this sense, Frankenberg analyzes how the lives of white women become sites of resistance against the reproduction of racism considering that the experience of the white is located temporally and spatially; is bounded by the forms that the racism acquires in a given context; and the way it intersects with other racial and cultural categories, class, and gender, involving subordination.

Another experience very similar to those mentioned earlier is the biographical essay of Minnie Bruce Pratt (1984). Here, the author reflects on how racial determinations affect the identity of a white woman and what it means to renounce that identity of the rich white wife living in an exclusive and peripheral area of the city (→ Urbanization, I/45) and to recognize herself as a lesbian living in the impoverished center and black in that same city. After a divorce and the loss of custody of her children, Pratt represents the “home” as the place where she rejects the life she has chosen, and the values she personifies and promotes in her writings, and the “community” as the unstable place of the fight. In this sense, this essay moves from the sense of identity that expresses the title to a complex development of the relationship between home, identity, and community through the writing of a “personal history” that draws a path painful from “unconsciousness” to “consciousness” (De Lauretis 1999).

In Mexico, there is a proposal that dialogues with the previous ones, although it is less elaborated. Marisa Belausteguigoitia (2009) brings together the voices of a group of women of different skin colors, social class, political positions, and regional origins that consider the processes of racialization with reference to three questions: How is it spoken from the skin? What shades does it produce? How do skin tones and voice circulate? In a context where there is a commitment to miscegenation as a trope of the nation, and daily racism that speaks of the indigenous as a problem (→ Indigeneity, I/31) and of the black as nonexistent, there is an awareness that being *güera* – blonde – or being *prieta* – brown – is not a minor fact, but crosses the very existence of women and has consequences in their lives. “*Prieta* is a wounded word. *Güera* also. As hurt words as the identities they name. Since miscegenation there is no *güerez* without *prieteidad*, or *prietez* without *güereidad*” (Priego 2010) [translation by the author]. Through a cross between literature, autobiography, and history, an effort is made to understand themselves as women while at the same time accounting for the alterity that separates them and the struggles that unite them, explaining to the country where they live without achieving, however, any deeper analyses or political proposals more encompassing than the self-reflection on the place that inhabits our “skin.”

Whiteness

Richard Dyer (1997) invites us to study whiteness as a way to “make visible what is rendered invisible when viewed as the normative state of existence” (3) with the objective of displacing the whiteness of its dominant position. This invitation is more valid today than ever, since we cannot understand racism, the social classification of people by race and coloniality, in its different expressions in the Americas, if we do not appeal to the criticism of whiteness, which provides new answers to old questions. Now, the study of whiteness, at present, in our territories, shares several starting points.

Whiteness does not refer to a biological fact, but rather constructs definitions of whiteness as a social construction beyond the whiteness / negritude binarism and to pay greater

attention to the historical and geopolitical contexts and to the multiple meanings that whiteness acquires in the concrete practices of people.

This premise has as a consequence that whiteness is an essential part of the geopolitical and discursive construction of the Americas within the framework of the modern and colonial world system. In other words, in our territories, the histories of whiteness can only be explained by imperialist projects of capitalist expansion, which, in order to attain their objectives, classify the population for reasons of race.

However, the “experience” of whiteness is different in terms of local histories in the Americas. Therefore, the approaches and tools that are used to account for it are also different, although there are transfers and hybrids. Whiteness studies in the United States have been configured with emphasis on what whiteness “is” and “does” and its repercussions on the present. In Latin America, the “purity of blood” and whiteness have always been considered in relation to miscegenation, the “indigenous problem,” and the place of afro in national accounts and identity.

Whiteness does not appear naked; it is always articulated to other devices of domination, such as class, gender, heterosexuality as a political system, among others. As a “white mythology,” whiteness also inhabits the symbolic world, language, and culture, which accounts for the literary imagination that has represented white and its patterns of domination and power. In this sense, aspects such as the organization of the world in centers and peripheries, which produces dichotomies such as soul-soulless, civilized-barbarian, human-nonhuman, and areas of existence and zones of nonexistence not only stand out, but also strategies of interrogation, resistance, and survival. To read whiteness from the displacement of the racial object to the racialized subject, from description and imagination to who describes and imagines, from the service to whom it is served (Morrison 1992), forces us to “see” whiteness in conjunction with the story of how we become who we are and what we really want to be beyond “whiteness as property” or “whiteness as terror” (Roediger 1998).

For the aforementioned, in its prescriptive mode, the studies on whiteness must assume the commitment to produce useful tools for the construction of anti-racist commitments, where the abolition of whiteness, its reconfiguration under “other terms,” or the abolition of race and coloniality are real political horizons.

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INDEX

- Adams, John 23
 Adams, John Quincy 25, 168
 Africa 34, 40–44, 46, 48–49, 51–52, 67–70, 72, 77–78, 87, 89, 115, 140, 155, 157–158, 160, 162, 185, 188, 192–194, 200, 212, 262, 281, 283, 309, 315, 380, 382, 385, 395–396, 404, 412, 469, 472–473
 African 19, 23, 28, 30, 41–45, 48–49, 51, 53, 64, 69, 71–72, 76, 78, 80, 82, 94, 96–97, 118–119, 128, 138, 140, 142, 147, 152–153, 155–160, 162, 176, 181, 184–188, 190–194, 198–199, 219, 242, 263–267, 282, 284, 291–293, 295, 308–310, 312–316, 331, 335–336, 341, 343, 350–351, 353, 356, 371, 394–395, 398, 400, 419, 421, 430, 440, 452, 459, 470–471, 473–475
 African-descendant Literatures 41, 284, 412
 Afro-American 1, 2, 3, 5, 193, 299, 309, 323, 362, 371, 404–405, 410–412, 474
 Afro-Caribbean 136, 282, 309
 Agassiz, Louis 310–313
 Aguirre Cerda, Pedro 431
 Alaska 114, 138, 178, 217, 246, 266
 Alemán Valdés, Miguel 426
 Alexander VI 64, 117, 136
 Alfonsín, Raúl 419
 Allende, Salvador 215–217, 248, 283–284, 302, 359, 406, 417, 432
 Alter-Globalization 208, 218, 222, 225–226, 253, 280, 288, 326, 416, 433
 Alves, Rubem 286
 Amazon 70–72, 93, 131, 137, 160, 231, 267, 320, 323, 328, 342, 404
 America 344, 385
 Andes/Andean 4, 24, 45, 54, 68–72, 93–95, 99, 102, 112, 115–116, 118, 137, 142, 146, 154, 169, 178–179, 181, 199, 202, 209–210, 216, 225, 247, 260, 319, 322, 326–328, 342, 347, 349, 361, 386, 411, 417, 430
 Andrada, José Bonifácio de 88
 Antarctic *see* Polar/Arctic/Antarctic
 Anthony, Susan B. 98
 Anzaldúa, Gloria 292, 293, 331–332
 Apache 71, 113, 172
 Aquino, Thomas 137
 Araucanos *see* Mapuche
 Árbenz, Jacobo 213, 417
 Arctic *see* Polar/Arctic/Antarctic
 Argentina 4, 27–28, 31, 71, 115, 130, 137, 142, 146, 148, 150–151, 161–162, 166, 167, 172, 156, 209, 214, 216, 218–220, 224, 226, 247–248, 250, 253, 256, 260, 264–265, 275, 283, 289, 295, 298–299, 305, 327, 331, 345, 348–349, 356–358, 362, 371, 373, 375, 383, 385–386, 390, 395, 398, 406–407, 418–420, 422, 425, 429, 432–434, 442, 451–452, 462, 464, 471
 Aristide, Jean-Bertrand 217
 Artigas, José Gervasio 106, 149
 Aruba 52
 Asia 6, 28, 34–35, 68, 70–72, 78–79, 153–154, 160, 162, 200, 212, 248, 259, 265, 281, 283–284, 380, 382, 385, 430, 466, 472
 Asian 46, 50–51, 71–72, 78–79, 82, 129, 142, 154, 160, 200, 266–267, 293, 312, 314, 317, 342–343, 395, 399, 412, 448, 459–460
 Atahualpa 80, 82
 Atlantic 18, 20, 23, 48, 67, 75, 87, 94, 104, 111, 155, 162, 184, 198, 282, 309, 406
 Aupamut, Hendrick 132
 Authoritarianism 152, 169, 217, 228, 240, 248, 274, 281, 283, 286, 300, 324, 349, 360–61, 373, 407, 416, 424, 426, 432, 442–43
 Aylwin, Patricio 217, 349

- Aymara 255, 289, 323, 235, 343
 Aztec 15, 57, 68, 80–82, 88, 91, 113, 116,
 137, 146–147, 150, 153–154, 189, 247,
 264–266, 294
- Bachelet, Michelle 289, 434
 Baez, Joan 424
 Baran, Paul B. 214
 Bardot, Brigitte 420
 Barragán, Luis 461
 Baruch, Bernhard 212
 Basilio da Gama, José 88
 Bastidas, Micaela 95
 Batista, Fulgencio 283, 431
 Bautista Alberdi, Juan 28, 356
 Bayard Swope, Herbert 212
 Beauvoir Bertrand, Simone de 292
 Belize 128, 146
 Bellamy, Edward 429
 Bello, Andrés 30, 142
 Biopolitics 28, 123, 129, 209, 213, 294, 321, 366,
 389, 393, 471
 Black Panther 284, 421, 440
 Blaine, James G. 31
 Blanco, Hugo 417, 432
 Boas, Franz 259, 311
 Boff, Leonardo 286, 408
 Bolívar, Simón 2, 24–25, 31, 38, 87, 89, 102,
 106–107, 141, 148–149, 168, 208, 219, 226,
 253, 254, 281–282
 Bolivia 4, 105, 115, 137, 142, 146, 148, 154,
 166–167, 186, 202, 213, 216, 218, 225–226,
 247, 249–250, 253, 255, 266–267, 275, 283,
 289, 294, 301, 305, 321–323, 325–328, 334,
 348, 350, 358, 360, 386, 388, 417, 423,
 431–434, 442, 452
 Bonaire 52
 Bonaparte, Louis 32
 Bonaparte, Napoleon 21, 23–24, 88, 103–105,
 107, 148, 167
 Borderlands 27, 42, 131, 201, 305, 451, 457,
 465–66
 Borders 293, 331, 387, 465
 Brazil 4, 15–16, 20, 23–25, 28, 35, 39, 44–45,
 49, 53–55, 61, 64, 69–71, 75, 80, 87–88,
 101, 107–108, 115, 118–119, 127, 135,
 137–138, 141–143, 147–149, 151, 155–156,
 158–162, 166, 169–170, 185–188, 190,
 192–195, 198, 209–210, 214, 216–220, 222,
 225–226, 248, 250, 253, 260, 264–265, 267,
 276, 283, 286, 289, 291–292, 300,
 305–313, 317, 321, 327–328, 331–332, 334,
 336, 339–340, 344, 348–349, 356–362,
 372–374, 376, 384–385, 395–400, 404,
 407, 409–412, 417, 419, 422–424, 426, 430,
 433–434, 441–442, 444, 452, 457, 461–462,
 464–465, 470–471
- British/English 3, 15–16, 20–22, 25, 36, 31,
 35–38, 42–46, 49, 51, 53, 57–59, 61–64,
 69–70, 75–77, 80–81, 88, 96–98, 102–103,
 107–108, 113, 116, 120, 122, 125, 128,
 132, 136, 139–140–143, 146–147–148, 151,
 155–160, 162, 166, 170, 185–187, 192–193,
 198, 200, 207–208, 210, 224, 231–332, 236,
 238, 260, 262–263, 265, 312, 334, 336, 371,
 373, 375, 383, 386, 434, 438, 443, 458–459,
 464, 474
- Brock, Sir Isaac 151
 Browder, Earl 431
 Brown, John 281
 Bush, George H. W. 217
- Caldas, Francisco José de 43
 Calderon, Felipe 426
 Calvo, Carlos 31
 Camadessus, Michael 224
 Canada 5, 16, 31, 39, 61, 63, 71, 80, 82, 97–98,
 102, 113, 119–121, 128, 146, 149, 151, 157,
 160–161, 166, 173, 179, 181, 217, 226, 246,
 254, 256, 260, 264–266, 278, 298–299, 301,
 303, 305, 319–321, 324, 327, 339, 343–344,
 365, 416–417, 420–422, 426, 433, 448, 451
 Canadian 120, 128, 151, 176, 222, 224, 260,
 264–266, 304–305, 321, 328, 343, 425
 Cape Verde 45, 51, 175
 Capitalism 29, 41, 50, 57, 78, 136–37, 143, 167,
 172, 185, 190, 198, 202, 223, 236, 283, 287,
 294, 328, 355, 379, 420, 429, 437, 448, 459,
 463
 Cardenal, Ernesto 286
 Cardenal, Fernando 286
 Cárdenas del Río, Lázaro 283, 322, 418
 Cárdenas, Cuauhtémoc 426
 Caribbean 2, 15–16, 19–21, 23, 28–30, 35,
 39–40, 42, 44–46, 49, 52–53, 55, 69–70, 72,
 75, 91, 97, 102, 115, 117–119, 122, 125,
 127–128, 137, 147, 156–160, 166, 181,
 184–190, 192–193, 195, 198, 200, 202, 214,
 262, 282, 286, 291, 307–309, 311, 314–317,
 334, 339, 342–343, 356, 358, 382, 390, 394,
 400, 430, 448, 460, 473
 Carlos III of Spain 85, 138
 Carlos V 60
 Carranza, Venustino 210
 Carrera, José Miguel 23
 Carson, Rachel 426
 Castañeda, Adolfo 272
 Castro, Fidel 213, 283, 417, 431, 434
 Castro, Raúl 434
 Central America 16, 21, 26, 28–29, 35, 52, 55,
 69–71, 107, 128, 131, 146, 160, 166, 168, 186,
 203, 211, 291, 319, 327, 348, 406, 408–411,
 433–434, 452
 Césaire, Aimé 314, 316, 390

- Chaco 131, 210
 Chamorro, Violeta 217
 Charles III. of Spain 85, 132, 138
 Chávez, César 422
 Chávez, Hugo 150, 208–209, 218, 226, 253, 289, 434
 Chicana/o 4, 214, 266, 292–293, 323, 331–332, 336, 340–342, 344–345, 384, 421–422
 Chile 16, 22–23, 25, 27–28, 71, 106, 109, 114–115, 129–131, 137, 142, 148, 150, 154, 161, 166–167, 169, 172, 186, 207, 214–217, 226, 241, 248–249, 260, 264–265, 283, 289, 294–295, 299–300, 302, 304–305, 320, 324–325, 327, 336, 348–349, 359–360, 406–407, 410, 417, 422, 425, 431–432, 434, 441–442, 451–452, 462, 464
 China 18, 70, 209, 452
 Christophe, Henry 104
 Churchill, Ward 324
 Cinema 350
 Citizenship 30, 42, 92, 98, 109, 120, 141, 146, 169, 186, 209, 241, 249, 279, 291, 306, 320, 322, 331, 341–42, 345, 366, 375, 380, 395, 421, 448, 471
 Civil Society 110, 170, 240–41, 279, 300, 326, 348, 361, 375, 415, 421
 Clark, William 21
 Class Struggle 170, 212, 280, 322, 324, 335, 374, 416, 418, 426, 429, 432, 442
 Clavijero, Francisco Javier 22, 88
 Clientelism 167, 411
 Climate Change 72, 115, 289, 420, 423, 426, 463
 Clinton, Bill 223
 Clinton, Hillary 426
 Collar de Mello, Fernando 217
 Collier, John 312, 321
 Colombia 25, 45, 71, 89, 102, 118, 127, 137, 142, 149–150, 166–168, 213, 218, 223–224, 231, 247, 255–256, 265, 276, 283, 289, 302–303, 305, 325, 327, 332, 334, 345, 348–350, 359, 360, 365, 372, 388, 395, 398–399, 409, 416–417, 421–424, 426, 432, 444, 470
 Colón, Cristóbal 15, 17–19, 34–35, 40, 67–68, 71–72, 91, 113, 116–117, 150, 218, 247, 262, 294, 324, 327
 Colonial Economies 18, 21, 41, 63, 70, 76–77, 101, 107, 118, 126, 133, 139, 154, 158, 166, 171, 198, 203, 308, 342, 356
 Colonial Rule 18, 20, 36, 44, 48, 89, 93, 112, 125, 137, 147, 156, 169, 176, 186, 201, 230, 247, 263, 279, 308, 320, 331, 339, 342, 356, 368, 379, 393, 458, 471
 Columbian Exchange 15, 18, 51, 64, 79, 83, 118
 Columbus, Christopher *see* Colón, Cristóbal
 Comanche 71, 117, 118
 Commons 59, 123, 155, 328, 389, 419
 Comte, Auguste 356
 Cono Sur 210, 216, 405, 424–425
 Conquest and Colonization 15, 18, 34, 49, 57, 68, 90, 92, 112, 125, 136, 150, 153–154, 168, 176, 198–199, 218, 225, 228, 247, 259, 262, 272, 282, 295, 319, 324, 331, 339, 368, 374, 379, 383, 393, 441, 469
 Consumerism 142, 208, 216, 353, 357, 362, 373, 445, 461–464
 Cornwallis, Charles 69
 Correa, Rafael 209, 219, 226, 255, 287, 289, 434
 Córtes, Hernán 68, 70–71, 82, 91, 149–150
 Cosmopolitanism 214, 242, 285, 289, 310, 317, 448
 Costa Rica 142, 166, 172, 211, 214, 247, 256, 295, 299–300, 303, 305, 327, 407, 420
 Costa, Lúcio 461, 465
 Cree 113, 114, 128, 141, 321
 Crenshaw, Kimberlé 331, 344, 239
 Creoles 2, 20, 22–25, 36, 38–39, 43–45, 85, 87–88, 97, 101, 105, 128, 130–131, 140, 150, 159, 162, 165–166, 170, 181, 188, 191–192, 194, 307–309, 311, 313–317, 342–343, 374, 385, 388, 473–474
 Crisis 103, 129, 161, 171, 198, 252, 284, 286, 301, 340, 375–76, 406, 444, 452
 Cuba 2–4, 6–7, 16–17, 21, 26, 31, 45–46, 55, 82, 118, 122, 132, 142, 149, 158, 160–161, 168, 170, 185–186, 190–192, 198, 200, 202, 207–208, 211, 213–217, 226, 249, 251, 253, 264, 271, 283–284, 291, 294, 298–301, 303–306, 331, 334–336, 340, 356, 359, 371, 395, 404, 412, 417, 420, 422, 430–434, 441, 460, 474–475
 Cuervo, Rufino José 142
 Cultural Industries 212, 216, 241, 340, 370, 436, 441, 444, 457
 Curacao 52
 Custer, George Armstrong 152
 D'Escoto, Miguel 286
 Da Silva, Inacio “Lula” 209, 218, 289
 Dance 179, 239, 377
 Davis, Angela 293
 Davis, Jefferson 28
 De la Rúa, Fernando 425
 Deindustrialization 440
 Deloria Jr., Vine 120
 Democracy 20, 37, 109, 141, 170, 195, 240, 246, 260, 285, 288, 341, 349, 355, 370, 372, 380, 426, 431, 450
 Dessalines, Jean-Jacques 103–104
 Development 27, 30, 56–57, 70, 81, 90, 106, 119, 123, 128, 137, 142, 165, 171, 190, 198, 202, 214, 218, 226, 246, 248, 265, 271, 286, 309, 322, 325, 355–56, 383, 387, 406, 417, 431, 441, 448, 451, 458, 466

- Díaz, Porfirio 210, 418, 430
 DiCaprio, Leonardo 420
 Diderot, Denis 43, 88, 279
 Digital Culture 244, 249, 288, 326, 377, 410, 451
 Disaster 155, 184, 230, 463
 Disney, Walt 240
 Dom João 62, 107–108
 Dom João I 62, 87
 Dom Pedro I 149, 166
 Dominican Republic 16, 31, 52, 68, 104, 117–118, 122, 142, 168, 211, 299, 301, 305, 349, 359–360, 432
 Dominicans 17, 50, 122, 177–178, 199
 Douglass, Frederic 190, 470
 Du Bois, W.E.B. 41, 219, 291, 331
 Dutch 16, 42, 46, 51–53, 75–76, 78, 80, 117, 121, 139, 158, 160, 185, 187, 262, 308, 394
 Dylan, Bob 424
- Ecuador 4, 22, 95, 97, 115, 121, 127, 142, 146, 148–149, 166, 186, 202, 217–219, 224–226, 250, 255–256, 266–267, 271, 276–277, 289, 305, 322–325, 327–328, 386, 388, 398–399, 417, 423, 425, 434, 442, 452, 464
 Education 27, 84, 120, 122–123, 136, 142–143, 169, 181, 211, 265, 271, 298, 321–322, 334, 336, 348–349, 359, 396, 399, 418, 424, 433, 441–442
 Eisenhower, Dwight 213
 El Salvador 137, 142, 166, 217, 224, 248, 274, 276–277, 283, 286, 301, 305, 360, 403, 408, 417, 424, 434, 444
 Ellacuría, Ignacio 286
 Energy 419, 462
 Enlightenment 20, 22, 30, 36, 41, 60, 104, 138, 141, 148, 186, 190, 247, 264, 279, 282, 383
 Environmental Justice 299, 326, 328, 361, 368, 399, 416, 419, 426, 461
 Equiano, Olaudah 87
 Eriksson, Leif 18
 Escobar, Pablo 243
 Ethnicity 23, 30, 44, 82, 125, 137, 258, 166, 193, 218, 247, 249, 272, 309, 317, 319, 322, 331, 340, 365, 380, 400, 405, 416, 426, 437, 450, 459, 471
 Europe 2–6, 8, 17–19, 21–24, 28–30, 32, 34, 36–43, 46, 48, 51–55, 58, 64–65, 68–72, 78–79, 84, 87, 99, 103, 112, 117–118, 123, 130, 140, 145, 148, 153, 155, 160–162, 172, 178, 190, 192, 194, 198–199, 208, 211, 224, 228, 232, 234, 240, 243–244, 259, 260, 262, 265, 281–283, 293–294, 303, 311, 314, 330, 335, 356–358, 369, 380, 383, 385–386, 404, 408, 412–413, 429–431, 441–443, 451, 461, 466, 472
 European 1–3, 15–24, 26–32, 34–38, 41–44, 46, 48–52, 54, 56, 58, 64, 68–72, 75–83, 85–86, 88, 91, 95–98, 103, 105, 109, 112–114, 117–122, 125–128, 130, 133, 135–136, 138–143, 146–147, 150–151, 153, 155–159, 161–162, 165–172, 175–180, 182, 184–185, 189–194, 198–200, 208, 211, 224–225, 228–232, 236, 241, 259, 261–262, 271, 277, 280–282, 287, 293–294, 308, 310–314, 324, 332–334, 340–343, 355–356, 365–366, 371, 379–382, 384, 387, 389, 393–395, 400, 412, 429–430, 442, 459–461, 469, 471, 473–475
 Extractivism 48, 64, 78, 112, 118–19, 171, 226, 230, 237, 277, 286, 328, 356, 362, 383, 387, 399, 429
 EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional) 218, 223, 288, 324, 433
- Fairey, Shepard 440
 Falkland Islands *see* Malvinas
 Family 94, 97, 116, 119, 132, 216, 238, 349, 398, 438, 443, 450, 459
 Fanon, Frantz 314, 381, 387, 390, 421
 Ferdinand VII 105, 108
 Fernández de Kirchner, Cristina 289, 434
 Fernandez de Navarrete, Pedro 65
 Flores de Oliva, Isabel 178
 Flores Magón, Enrique 418, 430
 Flores Magón, Ernesto 210
 Flores Magón, Jesús 430
 Flores Magón, Ricardo 210, 418, 430
 Fordism 242, 462
 Foucault, Michel 228–229, 231–234, 242, 288, 292, 366, 381, 384, 410
 Foundational Discourses 37, 43, 76, 85, 93, 112, 117, 119, 128, 140, 149, 160, 170, 175, 240, 308
 France 3, 16, 20–21, 23–24, 26, 29–30, 32, 37–38, 41–42, 49–53, 58, 61, 65, 69, 75, 80, 84–86, 102–103, 119–121, 151, 157–158, 166–168, 177, 179, 186, 200, 228, 234, 237, 240, 284, 291, 316, 330, 344, 365
 Francia, Gaspar Rodríguez de 106
 Frank, Andre Gunder 214
 Franklin, Benjamin 22, 43
 Freedom 20, 24, 36, 59, 84–85, 88, 92, 139, 148, 155, 162, 189, 211, 240, 291, 330, 395
 Freedom of Expression and Censorship 85, 110
 Frei Montalva, Eduardo 360
 Freire, Paulo 253, 287
 French 3, 6, 15–16, 20–24, 38, 42, 44–45, 49, 51–52, 61, 63, 69, 75–76, 78, 80–82, 87–89, 95, 102–105, 107, 109–110, 113, 116–117, 119–122, 125, 132, 136, 142, 146, 148, 150–151, 155, 157–160, 162, 169–170, 176, 185–187, 189, 194, 198–200, 207, 225, 228, 236, 239, 242, 247, 260, 262, 266, 279, 282,

- 291, 308, 311, 313–314, 316–317, 330, 356,
381, 383, 390, 394–395, 459–460, 475
- French Guiana 157
- Frenk, Julio 302
- Freyre, Gilberto 265, 276, 311–313
- Fujimori, Alberto 325
- Furtado, Celso 214, 286, 358
- Gaitán, Jorge Elicier 213, 426
- Gallegos, Rómulo 213
- Gama, Vasco da 18
- Gamio, Manuel 214, 259, 311, 313, 321
- García Márquez, Gabriel 417
- García, Héctor 215
- Garifuna 128, 276, 343
- Gates, Thomas 96
- Gender 18, 27, 34, 75, 81, 85, 119, 125, 156, 170,
323, 247, 262, 272, 293–294, 380, 395, 416,
425, 473
- Gender and Work 94, 116, 130, 188, 199, 273,
277, 291, 333, 381
- Gender Identities 122, 188, 211, 216, 219,
241, 244, 249, 261, 271, 278, 286, 289, 330,
390, 416, 422, 433, 436, 442, 450, 471, 473,
122, 188, 211, 216, 219, 241, 244, 249, 261,
271–272, 278, 286, 289, 330, 390, 416, 422,
433, 436, 442, 450
- Geopolitics 18, 29, 40, 77, 109, 138, 143, 165,
173, 244, 281, 286, 334, 359, 381, 441,
457, 471
- George III of England 102
- German 4, 6, 86, 142, 157, 200, 208, 210, 214,
262, 287, 383
- Germany 4, 16, 85, 161, 332, 336, 431
- Gibbons, John M. 260
- Gibson, Charles 202
- Giuliani, Carlo 225
- Glissant, Édouard 315–317
- Global Commodity Chains 27, 42, 55, 70, 76,
94, 286, 381, 465
- Gobineau, Arthur de 311
- Goldman, Emma 212
- González Abreu, Ermilo 282
- González de Cellorigo, Martin 65
- Gorbachev, Mikael 217
- Gore, Al 426
- Gouges, Olympe de 219, 330
- Goulart, João 407
- Grace, William R. 172
- Great Britain/England 4, 16, 20–21, 24–25,
29, 30, 40–42, 49–51, 53, 58–59, 62–65, 70,
75–76, 80, 85–86, 96, 102, 104, 120, 147–148,
151, 156, 158, 161, 165–168, 171–172, 186,
200, 215, 225, 237–238, 291, 330, 345,
356–357
- Guadeloupe 52, 61, 316
- Guanches 64, 78
- Guarani 131, 137, 138, 142
- Guatemala 122, 128, 137, 142, 146, 154, 166,
202, 211, 213, 253, 295, 322, 324, 327,
336, 348, 358, 387, 407–409, 411–412, 417,
424, 444
- Guevara, Ernesto Che 208, 215–216, 359,
417, 431
- Gutiérrez, Gustavo 286, 408, 432
- Guyana 61, 192, 200
- Guzmán, Abimael 433
- Haiti/St. Dominique 16, 20, 23–24, 45, 61,
69, 84, 88, 93, 101–104, 109–110, 129–130,
148, 170, 188, 194, 211, 217, 265, 282, 291,
298–299, 330, 333, 343, 395, 412, 432, 447
- Hakluyt, Richard 59
- Hamilton, Alexander 22, 36, 37
- Haring, Keith 440
- Hawaii 31
- Health 211, 231, 246, 284, 322, 359, 399,
418, 462
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 2, 280,
281, 287
- Henríquez Guzmán, Miguel 426
- Henry VIII 59, 65
- Herskovits, Melville J. 191, 309
- Hidalgo, Miguel 106–107
- Hill, Jasper 321
- Hispaniola *see* Dominican Republic
- Hobbes, Thomas 65, 84
- Holland *see* Netherlands/Holland
- Honduras 21, 128, 137, 146, 166, 211, 219, 256,
327, 349, 398–399
- Houston, General Sam 26
- Huguenots 42, 61
- Human Rights 36–37, 44, 87, 92, 104, 117, 136,
143, 169, 178, 186, 195, 199, 214, 226, 228,
241, 249, 261, 265, 272, 275, 281, 291, 295,
299, 306, 323, 326, 330, 345, 350, 355, 380,
399, 416
- Hybridity, Mestizaje, Créolité 18, 30, 43, 54, 62,
71, 82, 86, 119–120, 127, 136, 142, 149, 159,
181, 188, 191–192, 209, 260, 263, 282, 334,
341, 365, 374–375, 381, 390, 394, 400, 440,
443, 458, 472
- Iberian 6, 19–20, 22, 24, 35–36, 44, 49–53, 55,
57, 63, 77–78, 93–94, 117, 129, 138, 156, 166,
168–170, 185–188, 262–263, 342, 383, 394
- Independence Movements 20, 36, 39, 45, 55, 58,
81, 84, 88, 92, 118, 123, 141, 147, 153, 166,
186, 200, 247, 262, 281, 320, 339, 355, 385,
395, 405
- Indigeneity 19, 30, 83, 86, 110, 113, 117, 121,
126, 136, 141, 143, 146, 170, 199, 209, 218,
222, 228, 240, 246, 254, 259, 262, 273,
280, 287, 289, 309, 311, 331, 341–342, 348,

- 361–362, 367, 371, 385, 388, 398, 404,
406, 411, 416, 422, 430, 433, 441, 450, 458,
470, 476
- Indigenous Literatures 43, 83, 112, 116, 141, 327
- Indigenous Media Production 143, 325, 327
- Indigenous Peoples 15, 19, 25, 30, 36, 41, 48, 57,
63, 68, 75, 77, 86, 91, 101, 153, 167, 175, 188,
198, 223, 254, 319, 350, 367, 371, 384, 394,
406, 422, 426, 430, 441, 451, 458
- Informality 299, 410, 461
- Inka/Inca 15, 19, 57, 80–82, 69, 71, 92, 94–95,
112, 115, 146, 154, 199, 232, 247, 264–265,
342, 382, 397
- Inter-American 1–9, 16–17, 20, 29, 31–32,
42–46, 58, 165, 193, 195, 207–210, 213–216,
220, 244, 280, 287–288, 295, 301, 307, 309,
312, 316–317, 321, 323, 327, 358, 379, 382,
386, 391, 403–408, 411–413, 447, 450
- Intereethnic Relations 19, 28, 57, 76, 80, 97, 120,
159, 162, 169–170, 180, 203, 262, 273, 294,
310, 458, 471–473
- Intersectionality 90, 95, 98, 216, 241, 250, 261,
285, 291, 293, 397, 443, 450, 472
- Interventionism 16, 20, 26, 29, 30, 38, 168, 208,
356, 359, 405, 408
- Iroquois 97, 112, 116, 155, 179, 189
- Isabela of Spain 60, 62
- Italian 49, 88, 161, 222, 429–430, 459
- Italy 16, 88, 150, 161, 451
- Ivory Coast 43
- Jackson, Andrew 25
- Jamaica 16, 42, 52, 91, 192, 331, 440
- Japan 70, 203, 332, 343, 350–353, 469
- Jara, Víctor 216
- Jefferson, Thomas 22–24, 36–37, 87, 128, 132,
167, 170, 186, 458–459
- Jews 18, 51, 58, 61, 77, 129, 156, 161, 178, 188,
260, 266, 308, 312, 343–344, 459, 472
- João VI *see* Dom João
- John III 64
- Johnson, Lyndon B. 358, 360
- Joseph I of Portugal *see* Dom João I
- Joseph I of Spain 105
- Journalism 141
- Juárez, Benito 218, 325
- Kallen, Horace 260
- Kant, Immanuel 279
- Kateri Tekakwitha 179
- Keith, Minor 172
- Kennedy, John F. 237, 358, 426
- King Jr., Martin Luther 216, 284, 287, 352, 421
- Kirchner, Cristina *see* Fernández de Kirchner,
Cristina
- Kirchner, Néstor 209, 218, 289, 349, 434
- Klein, Naomi 224
- Knox Polk, James 26
- Kondiaronk 120
- Kropotkin, Peter 430
- Kubitschek, Juscelino 358
- Kuna 223, 326
- Labor Representation 246, 266, 283–84, 302,
322, 376, 386, 418, 421, 426, 429
- Lagarde y de los Ríos, María Marcela 294
- Lagos, Ricardo 434
- Lakota 71, 320, 323
- Land 25, 38, 59, 71, 81, 94, 112, 117, 121,
141, 161, 171, 203, 211, 226, 264, 283, 321,
322, 324, 359, 398, 406, 416–17, 422, 426,
431, 463
- Language 15, 18–19, 34, 63, 75, 87, 91, 102, 113,
179, 316, 319, 339, 343, 381, 386, 390, 473
- Lardizabel y Uribe, Don Manuel 87
- Las Casas, Bartolomé de 17, 68, 117, 122, 178,
199, 286
- Latinidad 25, 31, 168, 215, 266, 293, 335–336,
396, 400, 412, 422, 460
- Latino Media 240, 340
- Le Corbusier 460–461
- Lenin, Wladimir Iljitsch 283
- Lenni Lenape 321
- Life Writing 324, 387
- Lincoln, Abraham 281
- Lloyd Wright, Frank 460
- Locke, John 22, 65, 88
- Lom d'Arce, Louis-Armand de 86
- Londoño, Juan Luis 302
- López Obrador, Andrés Manuel 426
- Louverture, Toussaint 69, 104, 282
- Luce, Henry R. 17, 208, 211
- Lugo, Fernando 434
- Lula *see* Silva, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da
- Luxemburg, Rosa 291, 331
- Macas, Luis 226
- Macri, Mauricio 219
- Madison, James 24
- Magic Realism and the Fantastic 216
- Malcom X 284
- Malinche 82, 91
- Malvinas 31, 168
- Mao Tse-tung/Maoism 283, 421, 431, 433
- Mapuche 71, 113, 130–131, 264, 320
- Mariana, Juan de 65
- Mariátegui, José Carlos 127, 322, 371–372, 388,
430–431
- Maroon 91, 128, 187–188, 291
- Marquis de Pombal 62, 85, 87
- Martí, Farabundo 417
- Martí, José 3, 31–32, 149, 208, 283, 287, 356
- Martin-Barbero, Jesús 241, 372, 443
- Martinique 52, 61, 157, 314–316, 475

- Marx, Karl/Marxism/Marxist 187, 192, 193,
197, 214, 240, 280, 388, 389, 415, 418, 421,
429–432, 436, 437, 441, 442
- Massasoit 151
- Maximilian of Habsburg 29
- Maya 15, 71, 92, 113, 116, 131, 137, 146, 154,
189, 282, 324, 351, 387, 420, 423, 433
- McNickle, D'Arcy 321
- McCarthy, Joseph 212
- McCartney, Paul 420
- Mead, Margaret 292
- Means, Russell 323
- Media Consumption 241, 370, 373, 375
- Media Flows 139, 241, 370, 372, 410, 412
- Media Participation 373, 436, 442
- Meiggs, Henry 172
- Memorial Culture 18–19, 91, 272, 347, 463
- Memory Politics 30, 149, 218, 260, 264, 324,
398, 463, 466
- Menchú, Rigoberta 324, 387
- Menem, Carlos 425
- Mercado, Tomás de 50
- Mercator, Gerhard 35
- Meriwether, Lewis 21
- Mesoamerica 68, 112, 116, 118–119, 122, 138,
154, 178
- Mestizo 30, 44, 54, 125, 127, 129–130, 132, 146,
149–150, 170, 263–266, 282, 312–314, 317,
324, 326, 334, 341–343, 385, 394–396, 399,
426, 458, 460, 472
- Mexican 16, 26, 29, 34, 55, 79, 87–88, 115, 130,
138, 141, 146, 151, 167–168, 201–203, 207,
209–210, 214–215, 218–219, 223, 225, 248,
252–253, 265–266, 272, 274, 277, 283, 288,
294–295, 302–303, 305, 311–312, 320–321,
325, 334–335, 340–342, 381, 384, 396, 416,
418, 420, 422, 425–426, 430, 434, 443–444,
451–452, 460, 466
- Mexico 16, 22, 25–26, 30–31, 50, 54–55, 68, 69,
71–72, 82, 87, 91–92, 97, 109–110, 114–116,
119, 121, 127–131, 137–139, 142, 146–151,
154, 156, 159–160, 166–168, 171, 178–179,
181, 186, 200–202, 209–210, 215, 217–218,
220, 223, 225, 241, 247, 253, 256, 259–260,
263–265, 282–283, 285, 288–289, 295,
299, 301–302, 305, 312, 320–322, 324–328,
331, 335–336, 342, 345, 348, 357, 361–362,
372, 383, 385, 395, 400, 406, 411, 416–418,
423–426, 431, 433, 436, 442, 444, 448, 450,
452, 457–467, 470, 472, 476
- Migration 18, 26, 28, 37, 50, 59, 69, 76, 114,
125, 136, 140, 150, 198, 259, 310, 317, 355,
371, 395, 447, 459, 470
- Miguel d'Escoto, Miguel 286
- Milanés, Pablo 216
- Military 44, 167, 169, 208, 214, 234, 283, 351,
360, 407
- Miranda, Francisco de 23
- Modernism and Postmodernisms 30, 242, 279,
386, 460
- Modernization 27, 30, 38, 214, 228, 240, 265,
309, 328, 386, 388, 406, 417, 436, 441
- Molina Enriquez, Andrés 312
- Molina, Juan Ignacio 22
- Monroe, James 26, 168, 340, 356
- Montaigne, Michel de 86
- Montcalm, General Louis-Joseph de 151
- Monteagudo, Bernardo de 106
- Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de 22, 89
- Montezuma 82
- Moore, Thomas 86
- Moraga, Cherrie 292–293, 331–332
- Morales, Evo 209, 218, 226, 255, 267, 289,
325–326, 417, 423, 434
- Morelos, José María 106–107, 282
- Mormons 178
- Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo 348
- Mott, Lucretia 98
- Mujica, José 209, 289, 434
- Mulattos 44, 104, 125, 129, 131–132, 263, 282
- Multiculturalism 136, 209, 219, 254, 260, 266,
267, 310, 324–325, 327, 350, 352, 387, 390,
394, 398
- Muralism 312, 349, 440
- Muslims 77–78, 117, 129, 176, 188, 193, 198,
343–344, 380, 404, 452, 472
- Náhuatl 82, 92, 112, 137
- Nanny of the Windward Maroons 91
- Nariño, Antonio 89
- Nation and State Building 20, 23, 30, 37, 39–40,
65, 84, 92, 103, 123, 126, 135–136, 140–141,
146, 248, 259, 281, 312, 320–321, 341, 368,
404, 466
- Nation State 41, 86, 109, 146, 165, 223, 228,
234, 237, 246, 280, 320, 327, 331, 347, 355,
362, 365, 374, 379, 383, 404, 410, 429,
448–49, 466, 471
- Nature 22, 64, 67, 83, 84, 86, 97, 114, 175,
231–32, 237, 244, 272, 327, 368, 388, 419,
420, 459
- Neoliberalism 215, 233, 237, 241, 248, 280,
286–87, 300, 305, 310, 324, 340, 366, 374, 399,
410–11, 416, 419, 429, 433, 439–40, 444, 462
- Netherlands/Holland 45, 49–53, 95, 103, 158
- Newton, Huey P. 421
- Newton, Isaac 84, 88
- Nicaragua 26, 128, 137, 142, 166, 211, 217, 253,
283, 286, 327, 407–409, 411, 417, 421, 424,
432–434, 452
- Niemeyer, Oscar 461
- Nixon, Richard 358, 360, 425
- Noriega, Manuel 217
- Novak, Michel 260

- O'Higgins, Bernado 106, 149
 O'Sullivan, John 26
 Obama, Barack 219, 300
 Orozco, José Clemente 312
 Ortega, Daniel 411, 433–434
- Páez, José Antonio 167
 Paine, Thomas 37
 Palmer, A. Mitchell 212
 Pampa 71, 131
 Panama 50, 55, 118, 142, 168, 186, 211–212, 217, 223, 256, 326, 405–406, 421, 432
 Pan-Americanism 16, 20, 31, 38, 150, 168, 208, 321–22, 340, 356, 405–406
 Pani, Mario 461
 Paraguay 87, 106, 137, 142, 166, 170, 179, 186, 216–217, 226, 246, 256, 265, 283, 305, 327, 348–349, 434
 Parks, Rosa 421
 Parsons, Talcott 237, 357
 Participation 62, 64, 165, 169, 253, 267, 281, 320, 322, 341, 357, 376, 450
 Patagonia 131, 246, 356
 Pedro I 108, 166
 Peña Nieto, Enrique 425
 Pérez de Herrera, Cristobal 65
 Perón, Juan Domingo 214, 425
 Pershing, John J. 210
 Peru 35, 43, 55, 101, 105–107, 114–115, 118, 127, 131, 137, 142, 146, 148–151, 158–162, 167, 169, 172, 178, 185, 200, 202, 209, 218, 225, 247, 264, 275, 283, 286, 294–295, 301, 305, 321–323, 325, 327–328, 342, 345, 348–349, 383–386, 388, 417, 421, 423, 430–433, 442, 458
 Phillip II 60
 Pickering, Thomas 121
 Pilgrim Fathers 125
 Pink 420
 Pinochet, Augusto 215, 217, 248, 284, 300, 302, 417, 425
 Pizarro, Francisco 150
 Plantation Literature 159, 184, 314
 Pocahontas 82, 151
 Polar/Arctic/Antarctic 176–177, 217
 Political Communication 316, 356, 371, 410, 430
 Popay 152
 Pope Paul III 199
 Popular 122, 209, 238–240, 436, 441–442, 470
 Popular Music Flows 239, 377, 440, 443
 Populism 239, 371, 377, 406
 Portugal 23, 42, 44–45, 58, 61, 64–65, 75, 77–78, 85–87, 108, 117, 119, 136, 143, 147, 149, 155, 161–162, 166, 171, 344
 Portuguese 15–16, 23, 32, 42, 49–53, 55, 61–62, 64, 75–77, 80, 87–88, 107–109, 113, 117–118, 133, 136–138, 141–142, 146, 149, 156, 158, 166, 185, 187, 194, 199, 236, 247, 263, 307–308, 312, 344, 412, 442, 471
 Postcolonialism and Decoloniality 142–143, 208, 218, 229, 240, 255, 280, 287, 294, 296, 308, 313, 323–324, 332, 341, 361, 366, 368, 376, 394, 441–442, 470
 Pratt, Richard Henry 120
 Prebisch, Raúl 214, 358–359
 Princess of Dos Pilas 92
 Privatization 248, 288, 303, 305, 433, 467
 Protest Music 424, 436, 438 444
 Public Intellectuals 239, 324, 347, 372
 Puerto Rico 16–17, 55, 158, 170–171, 186, 190, 341
 Puritan 57, 76, 93, 96, 147, 244, 439
- Quakers 86, 139, 186, 262
 Quechua 115, 137, 226, 255, 272, 343, 388
- Race 28, 38, 41, 82, 91–92, 106, 126, 182, 190, 203, 216, 218, 232, 235–236, 249, 261, 276, 286, 292–293, 310, 317, 319, 322, 330, 350, 356, 365, 368, 379–380, 383, 389, 421, 426, 437, 460, 469
 Radio 371, 442
 Raynal, Abbé 22, 88
 Reagan, Ronald 215, 243, 350–351, 382, 408, 439
 Regional Integration 142, 171, 219, 226, 324, 418, 433, 463, 465
 Religion and Missionizing 18, 22, 49, 63, 92, 113, 119, 126, 136, 147, 199, 247, 394, 404, 458, 473
 Religious Beliefs 27, 57, 84, 93, 103, 109, 139, 145, 150, 157, 168, 187, 219, 262, 275, 286, 309, 319, 339, 343, 432, 436, 471
 Remittances 449, 451
 Revolution 20, 36, 39, 44, 69, 81, 84, 88, 101, 109, 130, 148, 166, 170, 186, 194, 201, 209, 211, 240, 247, 252, 279, 281–282, 287, 320, 322, 359, 371, 383, 395, 408, 416, 430
 Ringmann, Matthias 34
 Ríos Montt, Efraín 409
 Rivera, Diego 312
 Roca, Julio Argentino 130
 Rocky Mountains 21
 Rodó, José Enrique 3, 356
 Rodríguez, Silvio 216
 Romero, George 237
 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 212
 Roosevelt, Theodore 29, 31
 Rosas, Juan Manuel de 167
 Rosenstein-Rodan, Paul 357
 Rostow, Walt Whitman 357–360
 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 22, 84, 88–89
 Rousseff, Dilma 219, 289, 411, 426
 Rowlandson, Mary 87
 Russell, Diana 295

- Sacagawea/ Sacajewea 82, 151
 Sacco, Nicola 212, 430
 Sáenz, Moisés 321
 Salish 321
 San Martín, José de 24, 102, 106–107, 148–149
 Sanders, Bernie 434
 Sandino, Augusto César 417
 Santa Anna, General Antonio López de 26
 Santamaría, Juan de 65
 Santander, General Francisco de 89
 Santángel, Luis de 17
 Sarmiento, Domingo Faustino 31, 142, 356
 Schwarzenegger, Arnold 242
 Seale, Bobby 421
 Security 219, 246, 284, 349, 357, 460, 462, 466
 Senghor, Léopold 314
 Sepúlveda, Juan Ginés de 178
 Shoshone 71, 115
 Silencing 83, 90, 316, 320, 31, 344, 347, 387, 474
 Silva, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da 209, 218, 289, 426, 434
 Siquieros, David Alfaro 312
 Slave Narratives 87, 184, 474
 Slavery 16, 19–20, 23, 28, 40, 42, 48, 61, 64, 69, 78, 84, 86, 91, 94, 101, 103, 108–109, 117, 122, 127, 140, 147, 153, 157, 167, 170, 176, 190, 197, 230, 259, 279, 281, 291, 308, 317, 330, 339, 350, 356, 384, 394, 416, 470–471, 473
 Smith, Adam 22, 186
 Social Inequality 29, 57, 83, 90, 98, 125, 131, 142, 172, 203, 211, 236, 240, 244, 246, 248–49, 256, 285, 293, 298, 317, 322, 330, 336, 343, 361, 374, 379, 389, 394, 396, 411, 429, 433, 437, 447, 459, 461, 464, 473–74
 Social Media 219, 244, 277, 412, 426, 451
 Social Movements 90, 140, 143, 216, 218, 222, 237, 242, 246, 252, 261, 276, 278, 284, 293–294, 300, 323, 335, 341, 344, 352, 367, 384, 395, 397, 407, 408, 411, 429, 434, 438, 444, 465
 Socialism 209, 211, 218, 248, 253, 266, 280, 283, 291, 322, 339, 371, 418, 441
 South America 2, 8, 16, 20, 22, 24–25, 35–36, 40, 43, 46, 64, 71–72, 81, 85, 113, 115, 118, 138, 146–149, 151–152, 172, 177, 180, 184–186, 192–193, 203, 211, 217, 219, 265, 282, 287, 320, 342, 348, 350, 353, 419, 434, 448, 457, 463, 465, 467
 Spain 15–18, 20–24, 26, 29–30, 35, 41–43, 45, 58, 60, 62–65, 71, 75, 80, 85–86, 88, 102–108, 117–118, 121–122, 129, 131, 136, 138–139, 147–148, 151, 155–156, 159, 161–162, 165–169, 171, 175, 178, 185, 225, 264, 277, 281–282, 336, 339–340, 342, 344, 384, 458, 466, 472
 Spaniard 21, 24, 60, 63, 68, 71, 91, 102, 105, 111, 105, 127, 137, 139, 146, 154–157, 159, 161, 171, 247, 312, 344, 472–473
 St. Dominique *see* Haiti/St. Dominique
 Stanton, Elizabeth Cady 98
 State Transformation 217, 255, 271, 288, 325, 366, 372, 399, 410
 Stone, Lucy 98
 Stroessner, Alfredo 217, 348
 Sub-comandante Marcos 218
 Subcultures 140, 237, 277, 424
 Sucre, Antonio José de 106, 149
 Sullivan, Louis 460
 Suriname 69, 190, 200, 299
 Sweden/ Swedish 121, 225
 Sweezy, Paul 214
 Tamayo, Franz 321
 Taxation 61, 300, 359
 Telecommunications 465
 Television 240, 248, 352, 371, 377, 412, 442
 Thatcher, Margaret 215, 382, 343
 Tobago 200
 Transnational Corporations 231, 301, 423, 462
 Transnational Migration 209, 230, 256, 274, 328, 333, 336, 366, 369, 399, 412, 422, 457
 Travel Writing 86, 356
 Trinidad 16, 200
 Trotsky, Leon/Trotskyist 213, 431
 Trudeau, Justin 266
 Trudeau, Pierre Elliott 260
 Truman, Harry S. 4, 212–214, 357–358
 Trump, Donald 219, 300, 422, 426
 Truth, Sojourner 291, 331
 Tupac Amaru II 95, 169, 130, 323, 388
 Tupac Katari 323
 Twain, Mark 29
 U.S.–American 2, 4–7, 21, 24–25, 30, 32, 38, 93, 139, 207–208, 210–212, 214, 216, 242, 260, 277, 293, 332–333, 340–341, 353, 355–361, 373, 376–377, 405, 407–408, 410, 412, 417, 421–423, 426, 436–443, 445, 452–453, 458–463, 471, 473
 Unane, José Hipólito 43
 Unfree Labor 18, 49, 61, 69, 78, 94, 118, 140, 153, 177, 185, 230, 317
 United States/United States of America/USA 5, 16–17, 20–32, 36–39, 40, 58, 71, 88, 98, 103–106, 109, 113, 115, 118–120, 127–130, 138–141, 143, 146, 148–152, 158–159, 160, 161, 166–173, 186, 188, 190–192, 194–195, 198, 200–203, 207–220, 223, 225, 226, 229, 231, 241, 243, 247, 254, 259, 260, 264–267, 281, 284–285, 288, 291–293, 295, 298–301, 303–305, 311–312, 319, 321, 323, 327, 330, 331, 333, 339–344, 348, 350–351,

- 353, 356–358, 360, 365–366, 368–369, 373, 379–382, 384–386, 394–400, 404–405, 408, 412, 416, 418, 421–423, 425, 430–434, 438–442, 443, 448, 451–453, 457, 460, 464–466, 469–473, 475, 477
- Urbanization 26, 28, 115, 142, 156, 214, 236, 243, 250, 277, 299, 304, 328, 349, 351, 356, 396, 406, 416, 437, 349, 476
- Uruguay 3–4, 28, 71, 106–107, 216, 218, 247–249, 253, 256–257, 283, 289, 298, 348–349, 356, 359, 371, 403, 410, 418, 425, 432, 442
- USA *see* United States/United States of America/USA
- Utopias 38, 133, 140, 245, 438
- Vallejo, Camila 425
- Vandera, Carrió de la 87
- Vanzetti, Bartolomeo 212, 430
- Vargas Llosa, Mario 283
- Vasconcelos, José 132, 252, 265
- Vaz de Caminha, Pedro 118
- Vázquez, Tabaré 218, 434
- Vega, Garcilasco de la 82
- Velasco, Juan de 22
- Venezuela 4, 23, 30, 52, 55, 105–107, 118, 122, 142, 147–150, 166, 167, 185–186, 213, 218, 226, 247, 249, 253–254, 256, 277, 286, 301, 305, 327, 345, 356–357, 360–361, 375–376, 395, 407, 421, 423, 434, 444
- Vespucci, Amerigo 2, 17–18, 35, 118, 150
- Victoria, Francisco de 199
- Vidales, Raúl 408
- Villa, Francisco “Pancho” 210, 418
- Viscardo y Guzmán, Juan 43, 88
- Visual Cultures 243, 325, 349
- Voltaire 22, 88, 89
- Waldseemüller, Martin 2, 34
- Walker, William 26
- Warren, General Joseph 148
- Washington, George 23–24, 103, 121, 129, 148–149, 168, 186
- Wasmosy, Juan Carlos 217
- Wayna Qhapaq 69
- Weber, Max 57, 125
- West Indies 21, 42, 49, 52, 55, 61, 87, 95, 105, 192, 198, 313
- Whiteness 28, 53, 94, 97, 128, 162, 169, 194, 200, 209, 219, 230, 261, 265, 273, 276, 291, 293, 310, 321, 336, 341–343, 356, 371, 385, 393, 396, 398, 412, 421, 440, 460
- Wickham, Henry 70
- Wilson, Woodrow 210, 211
- Wirikuta 328
- Wolfe, James 151
- Wollstonecraft, Mary 291, 330
- Zapata, Emiliano 210, 416, 418
- Zapatista 222–223, 225, 253, 266, 288, 324, 326, 331, 335, 423, 433
- Zapotecs 189, 325
- Zelaya, Manuel 219
- Zetkin, Clara 291, 331
- Zimmermann, Friedrich Walter 210
- Zumeta, César 356